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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is divided in two main parts. The first part 
compares and contrasts early experiments with non-slave 
labour in Cuba and Sao Paulo. The second part considers 
projects for the gradual abolition of slavery and the 
transition to free labour. The objective is to examine 
how Cuban and Brazilian planters solved the problem of 
labour supply triggered by a rapid growth of plantation 
exports during the nineteenth century. At this time sugar 
and coffee plantations came to characterize economic 
development in the two areas. Continued expansion was 
threatened by international pressures to end the trans-
Atlantic slave trade. Challenged by international demands 
to terminate the "African trade" Cuba and Brazil sought 
to solve the labour problem by means of immigration. From 
the mid-century until the end of slavery in the 1880s, 
planters would experiment with several labour systems, 
involving a variety of labour relations. Besides slaves, 
Europeans, Chinese, Mexican Indians, Canary Islanders, 
and free domestic workers (white and coloured) would be 
employed on the plantations. Substituting "free" labour 
for slave labour was not ,a' simply\Cmatter of labour 
supply. For Cuba there was the question of the 
relationship with Spain and its consequences for the 
defense of slavery and the impact on immigration. For 
Brazil there was the question of forging a national 
identity. What would be the place of slaves, freedmen and 
immigrants in the new nation. In both regions these 
considerations had a racial dimension. Also planters were 
anxious to secure a cheap disciplined workforce. What 
labour system would best meet these requirements? 
As this thesis demonstrates this was a time of 
experimentation. From the first, in Brazil alternative 
supplies of labour were regarded as a means of transition 
to free labour. In Cuba new supplies of workers were 
viewed as complementing slavery. But the first 
experiments with non-slave labour affected the processes 
of the abolition of slavery and the transition to free 
labour while the meaning of "free labour" and 
"transition" also changed over time. 
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In the nineteenth century Cuba and Sdo Paulo were transformed 
from relatively diversified agricultural economies into plantation 
economies. Sugar and coffee plantations came to characterize 
economic development in the two areas. Continued expansion based on 
this model was, however, threatened by international pressures to 
end the trans-Atlantic slave trade. With a relatively scarce 
population and vast stretches of vacant land, both regions depended 
on external supplies of labour and were now confronted by the 
problem of finding a way of replacing slave labour or at least 
supplementing it so as to sustain labour-intensive plantation 
production. As Cuba and Brazil became the last supporters of slavery 
in the New World, Cuban and Brazilian planters had to face two 
interrelated issues. How to find a new source of labour to replace 
slaves and how to end slavery and reorganize labour relations 
efficiently without disrupting production. 
As soon as pressures to cut the supply of African slaves began, 
Cuba and Brazil sought to solve their labour problems through a 
series of strategies. From the mid-century until the end of slavery 
in the 1880s, planters would experiment with several labour systems, 
involving a variety of labour relations. Besides slaves, Europeans, 
Chinese, Mexican Indians, Cayihary Islanders and free white and 
coloured domestic workers would be employed in sugar and coffee 
plantations. Political-ideological questions, such as the 
maintenance of colonial ties (for Cuba), the constitution of the 
nation and racism affected choices and attitudes regarding the 
options available. Costs, discipline and efficiency were also 
related concerns. 
At the beginning of the 1870s, Cuba and Brazil started a 
relatively successful process of gradual abolition of slavery, with 
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the approval of Free Birth laws in Spain in 1870 and in 
Brazil in 1871. Despite fears that the abolition of slavery would 
destroy the plantation system, in the event abolition did not 
seriously interrupt the near continuous growth in plantation 
production. Slavery was finally abolished in Cuba in 1886, and in 
Brazil in 1888. A few years later Cuban sugar production peaked at 
around one million tons of sugar a year. Sao Paulo, with a growing 
production was able to meet more than 60% of total world coffee 
demand. In both areas, production would finally be sustained by the 
arrival of European immigrants engaged in special labour relations 
and new patterns of land use. 
The first part of this study compares and contrasts early 
experiments with non-slave labour in the Spanish colony, Cuba, and 
in the Brazilian province, Sao Paulo. The second part compares and 
contrasts plans and policies for the gradual abolition of slavery 
and the transition to free labour. The objective is to examine how 
Cuban and Brazilian planters solved labour problems posed by a rapid 
growth of plantation export production in response to increasing 
world demand during the nineteenth century. As the study will show, 
early experiments with non-slave labour greatly affected the 
processes of abolition of slavery and transition to free labour. The 
use of labour contracts, or workers under contract, reinforced by 
draconian regulations, provided plantations with a cheap labour 
force at a time when the price of slaves was rising, particularly 
after the 1850s with the ending of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. 
These experiments with non-slave labour influenced concepts of "free 
labour" which crystallized in the debate about the "social 
question". They influenced the formation of alternative patterns of 
labour relations which were devised both as a substitute for slavery 
and to complement it. They also had an impact on post-abolition 
society. 
******** *** 
There is a vast literature about experiments with non-slave 
labour and about the abolition of slavery and the transition to free 
2 
labour in Brazil and Cuba. Approaches to the problem of explaining 
the abolition of slavery in these countries have emphasized the role 
of demographic, (international and national) economic and social 
changes. They have also stressed the political-ideological effects 
of legislative debates, the role of slave protests and the pressure 
of the antislavery movement.' This thesis will take the view that 
early experiments with non-slave labour influenced formal attempts 
that aimed to devise a framework for the gradual abolition of 
slavery. The evolution of free labour relations was inextricably 
linked to the issue of the future of slavery. Attempts of gradually 
transforming slaves into free labourers, without political and 
1 On the abolition of slavery in Brazil, E.V. da Costa (Da 
Senzala a Colonia 2nd ed., Sao Paulo: Livraria de Ciencias Humanas, 
1982) argues that the contradiction between capitalism development 
and slavery (as described by E. Williams in Capitalism and Slavery 
(London: Deutsch, 1964)) undermined the "peculiar institution". 
Viotti emphasizes the key role of a structural "crisis" provoked by 
the decreasing profitability of slavery with the development of 
capitalism in the process of determining the course of abolition. 
Viotti latter added a variety of other factors (capital 
accumulation, technology, transport improvements, creation of a 
internal market, growth of national population, antislavery movement 
and parliamentary initiative) which contributed to undermine slavery 
and to create the conditions within which transition could take 
place (see preface to 2nd. ed. op.cit.,). R.E. Conrad, The  
Destruction of Brazilian Slavery (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1972) stresses demographic changes and parliamentary debates, 
and R.B. Toplin, The Abolition of Slavery in Brazil ((New York: 
Atheneum, 1972) emphasizes slave initiatives. Others such as P. 
Beiguelman, Formacao Politica do Brasil.Teoria e acao no pensamento 
abolicionista (Sao Paulo: Pioneira, 1967) underline immigration 
policies. On the abolition of slavery in Cuba, M. Moreno Fraginals, 
similar to Viotti, emphasize "structural crisis" and contradictions 
between slavery and the development of capitalism, in his El 
Ingenio. Comple-jo econamico social cubano del aztcar 3 vols.(Havana: 
Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1978); see also Fraginals articles 
"AboliciOn a desintegracift" and "Plantaciones en el Caribe: el caso 
de Cuba, Puerto Rico y Santo Domingo"(1860-1940) in La historia como 
arma, y otros estudios sobre esclavos, inclenios y plantaciones  
(Barcelona: Critica, 1983). A.F. Corwin, in Spain and the Abolition 
of Slavery in Cuba, 1817-1886 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1967) places greater stress on the political and legislative process 
carried out in Spain. R.J. Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba. The  
Transition to Free Labor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1985) examines links among various kinds of pressures and on the 
interactions between masters, slaves, rebels and administrators to 
understand the dynamics of the process of emancipation and 
transition to free labour. 
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economic disruption, and the search for alternative labourers and 
systems of labour lay at the crux of the problem of organizing a 
transition to free labour in Brazil and Cuba. 
In writing on Cuba or Brazil, some authors have made reference to 
the experience of one or more other countries in order to 
demonstrate the peculiarities or common characteristics of their 
case study. But to date there has been no systematic attempt to 
compare and contrast processes of transition in Brazil and Cuba. 
From the literature on early experiments with non-slave labour in 
individual countries, several common themes may be identified. 
Amongst these, controversial schemes applied in Cuba and Sao Paulo 
stand out, notably the condition of early sharecroppers who were 
contracted to work on Paulista coffee estates and the importation of 
coolie labour in Cuba at the middle of the nineteenth century. Were 
sharecroppers and coolies manifestations of free labour or did these 
systems represent a new form of slavery? 
The growing diversity of the workforce on nineteenth century 
Brazilian and Cuban plantations _ estate slaves, leased slaves, 
emancipados, Asian, Mexican or Europeans employed under various 
arrangements _ and the effects of these distinct forms of labour 
on the gradual abolition of slavery and the transition to free 
labour has also been considered by various authors. Most agreed that 
this heterogeneous labour force which gradually emerged during the 
period of the decline of slavery eased the final abolition and 
helped the transition to free labour. The most frequent explanation 
is that the importation of thousands of immigrants lowered the cost 
of labour, allowing planters more flexibility in adjusting to new 
conditions. For instance, focusing on Cuba, Sidney Mintz pointed out 
that the importation of many thousands of Yucatecan and Chinese 
contract workers "eased the transition from slavery to freedom for 
the plantation owners by lowering the market price of free labor; 
thereby they took the burden of the transition upon their own 
4 
backs". 2  With respect to sao Paulo, according to Stolcke and Hall, 
experiments with various labour arrangements in the coffee 
plantations sharecropping, hired labour, and colonato _ made 
possible a relatively non-violent transition to free labour. The 
arrival of great number of Italian immigrants from the 1880s lowered 
wages and helped to create a free labour market) 
In the literature on Cuba, the diversity of the workforce is often 
cited as evidence of the dissolution of the slave system. The main 
argument is that the adoption of more advanced technology in the 
1870s, to meet international beet sugar competition, required a 
changeacomposition of the workforce. Slavery was incompatible with 
technology. 4 At the centre of this debate stands the role and nature 
of the various experiments with non-slave labour, and specially the 
"coolie system". The literature that examines the importation of 
Chinese contract workers to Cuba has focused on the trade and the 
living and working conditions of coolies on the sugar plantations. 
The resemblance with plantation slavery is immediately suggested by 
the nature of trade and conditions stipulated in the contracts and 
labour legislation. The question is further complicated by the fact 
that in Cuba  as distinct from other areas at that time _ 
coolies were traded and employed while the international slave trade 
to the island was still flourishing and slavery remained the 
2 S. Mintz, "Foreword" in R. Guerra y Sanchez Sugar and Society 
in the Caribbean. An Economic History of Cuban Agriculture. Transl. 
by Marjory M. Urquidi (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) 
p.XXV. 
3 V. Stolcke and M.M. Hall "The Introduction of Free Labour on 
Sao Paulo Coffee Plantations" Journal of Peasant Studies 10:2 (1983) 
p.170, p.182. 
4 See M. Moreno Fraginals, El Ingenio, op.cit., I,pp.220-221; 
see also his articles "Plantaciones en el Caribe: el caso Cuba-
Puerto Rico-Santo Domingo (1860-1940)" in La historia como arma, 
op.cit., pp.55-117 esp. p.75, and "Migraciones Asiaticas a Cuba, 
1849-1859" also in La Historia como arma, pp.118-144, esp. p.136. 
The "essential conflict" between slavery and technological 
advancement" (amongst other political and social influences) in the 
process of "internal desintegration" of the institution of slavery 
is also expressed in J. Le Riverend, Historia EconOmica de Cuba 
(Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1985) p.333. 
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dominant form of plantation labour. The Cuban historian Juan Perez 
de la Riva, who has written extensively on aspects of the coolie 
trade and coolie life, refers to the system as "esclavitud china". 
Examining the legal status of coolies in Cuba, he detects a 
"espiritu esclavista" in the formulation of the legislation, 
contrasted to official declarations that colonos were free. 5 He also 
points out that Cuban planters, Spanish traders and their allies 
wanted to convert the coolie into a "permanent slave". 6 Jose Jimenez 
Pastrana, another Cuban historian who has also examined the issue 
points out that the terms of the contract and practices on the 
plantations reduced the Chinese to the category of slaves. 7 
The debate over the status of the "coolie system" underlines the 
broader discussion about the ending of slavery and "transition to 
free labour". Was it a new system of slavery, semi-slavery, or a 
real capitalistic form of wage labour. How compatible was it with 
the process of transition to free labour, or proletarization. The 
foremost historian of Cuban sugar production, Moreno Fraginals, 
5 J. Perez de la Riva, "La situaciOn legal del cull en Cuba" in 
El BarracOn. Esclavitud y Capitalismo en Cuba (Barcelona: Editorial 
Critica, 1978): pp.111-140 esp. p.125; this idea also permeate his 
articles, "Demografia de los culies chinos en Cuba (1853-1874) in El 
BarracOn, op.cit., (pp.55-87) and "Aspectos EconOmicos del trdfico 
de culies chinos a Cuba (1853-1874)" in El Barracon, op.cit., pp.89- 
110. Note the term colono (colonist) in Spanish to describe the 
Chinese and other contract labourers in Cuba. Sharecroppers in Sdo 
Paulo were also called "colonos". Warren Dean observes that 
Vergueiro, who first introduced sharecroppers onto coffee 
plantations in Brazil, called the workers colonos" blurring the 
distinction between indentured and freeholding settlers", W. Dean, 
Rio Claro. A Brazilian Plantation System, 1820-1920 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1976) p.90. Note also that the term 
colono in Cuba would be used to refer to a sugar cane grower as well 
(under the colonato system). And in Brazil the term also described 
the worker engaged in the system of colonato, a complex combination 
of daily, annual, and piece-work wage remuneration, combined with 
non-monetary benefits, arrangement that prevailed in Sao Paulo until 
1950s. 
6 J. Perez de la Riva, "La situacion legal" in El BarracOn, 
op.cit., p.126. 
7 J. Jimenez Pastrana, Los chinos en las luchas por la 
liberacion cubana (1847-1930) (Havana: Instituto de Historia, 1963) 
p.30. 
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observed that Chinese made possible the first steps in sugar 
industrialization. 8  The Chinese were miserably paid wage-workers, 
cheaper than slaves, who made the mechanized mill a viable 
proposition. Fraginals considers that the Chinese constituted a 
shift from slave to wage labour. They provided the skilled, free 
labour force essential to mechanization and industrialization. 9  The 
argument rests on the belief that technological progress requires a 
highly skilled and legally free work force. 
Rebe66 Scott in her study of the gradual abolition and the 
transition to free labour in Cuba criticised Fraginal's assertion 
that technological advance necessarily required a free and skilled 
labour force and therefore that "it is misleading to place great 
weight on their [Chinese] formal status as wage labourers in an 
explanation of how they could help plantations mechanize" . 1° Scott 
suggests that in Cuba, far from being incompatible with capitalist 
industrialization, slavery was sustained by modern plantation 
agriculture. Chinese workers performed unskilled, agricultural tasks 
just like slaves and advanced mills used both slave and coolie 
labour interchangeably. She points out that "in theory planters 
could have treated the Chinese as free wage workers operating under 
long-contracts. Instead most treated them as virtual slaves" . 11 In 
her view Chinese contract labour "was an odd form of 'wage labour' 
in which the worker had almost the same effective legal status as a 
slave, and in which twice as much was spent on the purchase of his 
contract and on foregone interest on that investment as was paid in 
wages. Of course, maintenance and foregone interest were part of the 
real wage cost. The point here is that, like slavery, the employment 
of Chinese indentured laborers involved fixed investment and fixed 
8 M. Moreno Fraginals, El Ingenio, op.cit., I, p.221. 
9 M. Moreno Fraginals, El Ingenio, op.cit., I, pp.308-309. 
Fraginals also observed that in the advanced mills Chinese were 
treated as wage workers and that those working for small Jamaica-
train mills did so under the same conditions of slaves. 
R.J. Scott, op.cit, p.35. 
R. Scott, op.cit., p.32. 
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maintenance costs" .12  The economic motivations of planter and 
Chinese contract labourer were not substantially different from 
those of master and slave. But Scott does not regard the Chinese as 
equivalent to slaves. Despite the way Chinese were treated, they 
stood in an intermediate position in the labour hierarchy, a third 
category between free and slave. 13 Chinese were also on occasion 
perceived as especially suited to work with machinery. And "once 
this perception existed _ either owing to racism or to belief that 
they really were "free workers" _ then masters might take steps to 
change the circumstances of the Chinese in ways that made them 
likely to behave differently" .14 
In addition, Scott remarks that careful consideration must be 
given to the argument that the diversity of forms of labour was 
indicative of a desintegration of Cuban slavery. She observes that 
slaves in receipt of bonus or being granted provision grounds was a 
feature far from being exclusive of this period. She calls attention 
to the fact that this mixture of labour forms was brought together 
without the abandonment of slavery. According to Scott, "that the 
men who ran these mixed plantations in many cases continued to be 
opposed to emancipation is further evidence of the difference 
between perceiving 'contradictions' within slavery and identifying 
the forces actually driving abolition forward". 15 Scott suggests 
further that free labour and indentured labour were economically 
complementary to slavery: "indentured Chinese workers often dealt 
with the centrifuges while slaves handled other tasks; white 
woodcutters on contract would relieve the plantation of direct 
responsibility for providing fuel; the employment of free workers 
during the harvest diminished the problem of year-round maintenance 
of all workers" . 16 Flexibility in the process of adaptation and an 
pp.30-31. 12 	R. 	Scott, 	op.cit., 
13 	R. 	Scott, 	op.cit., pp.31-32 and pp.109-110. 
R. 	Scott, 	op.cit., p.32. 
R. 	Scott, 	op.cit., p.108. 
16 	R. 	Scott, 	op.cit., p.109. 
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acceptance of the gradual way of abolition, had unforeseen effects 
on the social structure necessary to sustain forced labour. And in 
the end continued improvisations finally undermined slavery. 17 
Laird Bergad, focusing on the principal Cuban sugar district of 
Matanzas, suggests that planter attemptsto change the labour basis 
of sugar production was a reaction to external threats to the end of 
the trans-Atlantic slave trade "rather than to any lack of economic 
viability of slave labor or to any real possibility of fomenting a 
broadly based labor market in Cuba". 18 Bergad points out that "it 
is impossible to argue that Chinese labor represented the beginning 
of a transition to free labor and that dependence on forced labor 
decreased". 19 Chinese labour may have heralded a shift away from a 
total reliance on slave labour but that does not imply that it was 
a step towards free wage labour. The composition of coerced labour 
altered but the importation of Chinese did little to foster the 
growth of wage labour or to decrease the dependence of Matanzas 
planters on external labour supplies. The utilization of Chinese 
represented a continuation of forced labour in another form. Thus 
Bergad concludes that Chinese contract labour represented little 
more than the maintenance of old forms of labour-force 
organization. 20 
This study will contribute to the debate about Chinese coolie 
labour and the solution of the labour problem in Cuba in many ways. 
Most importantly, it identifies two distinct historical moments 
17 R. Scott, op.cit., p.109; Scott discusses the arguments of 
the "internal contradiction" of slavery, incompatibility between 
slavery and technology and the effects of the diversity of the work 
for abolition of slavery in her article "Explaining Abolition: 
Contradiction, Adaptation, and Challenge in Cuban Slave Society, 
1860-1886" Comparative Studies in Society and History 26:1 (January 
1984) pp.83-111. 
18 L.W. Bergad, Cuban Rural Society in the Nineteenth Century. 
The Social and Economic History of Monoculture in Matanzas 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) p.254. 
19 L.W. Bergad, op.cit., p.253. 
20 L.W. Bergad, op.cit., p.254. 
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within which these issues should be considered. Thus, at mid-century 
the searching for alternative labour schemes was a response to the 
external threats to the end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and to 
the acute labour demand. The analysis of the experimentation with 
several labour arrangements, of the conditions of the coolie trade 
and contract labour conditions demonstrated that Chinese coolies 
came to be viewed as the best of several possible alternatives to 
diminishing slave imports. The scheme guaranteed a cheap, 
disciplined workforce and was unlikely to disrupt the existing 
system of slavery. In addition, importing Chinese workers became a 
profitable enterprise. Although the arrangement was not designed to 
substitute slavery nor to effect a "transition to free labour", the 
Chinese were then perceived as a an "element of transition" _ a 
free man under coercion during the fixed-term contract. When the 
debate about gradual abolition started in the 1860s contract labour 
came to be perceived differently. Chinese and other contract 
labourers were then envisaged as the only means compatible with a 
so-called "period of transition", namely an orderly, safe process of 
gradual abolition of slavery. Contract labour would provide a new 
form of labour organization able also to accommodate former slaves. 
The contrast with Brazil will give a new dimension of the role of 
these other forms of coerced labour within the process of framing a 
"gradual abolition and transition to free labour", and thus 
qualifying and sometimes extending issues raised by the literature 
about Cuba. 
As in Cuba, the debate about the role and nature of early 
arrangements with non-slave labour in Brazil is concerned about its 
relationship with the end of slavery and the transition to free 
labour. However, major studies on experiments with free workers on 
Sao Paulo coffee plantations have focused in the main on the 
character and dynamics of the various arrangements with immigrants 
workers in an attempt to explain the labour regime prevailing in 
twentieth century Brazilian agriculture. The preoccupation is not so 
much with the early sharecropping scheme but with its later 
manifestation, the colonato, which survived on Sao Paulo coffee 
estates until 1950s and with other traditional labour arrangements 
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with poor or landless Brazilians. Given the peculiarities of these 
labour schemes authors have argued about the feudal, non-capitalist 
and/or capitalist nature of Brazilian agriculture. 21 The point of 
reference is wage labour as the typical capitalist form of surplus 
extraction. Some interpretations (mainly those of the capitalist 
thesis) try to highlight the broader economic structure into which 
Brazilian agriculture is inserted and have attempted to identify 
those schemes with wage labour. Their thesis is based on the 
argument that those labour schemes were more productive than wage 
labour. Others of the same school attempted to show the functional 
(and contradictory) interaction between an agriculture based on pre-
modern labour relations and industry. The system favoured capital 
accumulation and a transfer of funds to manufacturing. 22 This debate 
had greatly affected the views about the transition to free labour 
in Brazil which has become identified as a "transition to 
capitalism". The assumption being that the desired or necessary end 
result would be a switch to free wage labour. This is ahistorical 
and ignores the complexity of contemporary discussions in Brazil 
during the 1860s and 1870s. 
Yet other authors, dealing narrowly with early experiments with 
European sharecroppers in Sao Paulo, have identified in the system 
features of indenture labour or "disguised slavery", a mixture of 
pre-capitalist feudal labour and capitalist wage labour. 
Sharecropping was first introduced in the province by the planter 
Nicolau Vergueiro at the end of the 1840s. The initial debt incurred 
by the immigrant _ to cover transport costs and subsistence 
21 On the feudal, and non-capitalist, position see the 
traditional influence of A.P. Guimaraes, Quatro Seculos de 
Latifundio (sao Paulo: Fulgor, 1964); C. Prado Junior, A Revolucao 
Brasileira (sao Paulo: Brasiliense, 1966); see also J. Gorender, 0 
escravismo colonial 5th ed (Sao Paulo: Atica, 1988), and same author 
A escravidao reabilitada (sao Paulo: Atica, 1990). 
22 See, for instance, F. de Oliveira, Economia brasileira: 
critica a razao dualista (Sao Paulo: Cebrap, 1972); S. Silva. 
"Agricultura e capitalismo no Brasil". Contexto 1 (1976) pp.23-32. 
J.S. Martins considered these arrangements as a "capitalist 
production of non-capitalist relations", in 0 cativeiro da terra 
(Sao Paulo: Ciencias Humanas, 1979). 
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advances _ led the contemporaneous and current literature to 
identify similarities between the scheme introduced by Vergueiro and 
debt peonage and indentured labour. 23 As in Cuba, there are those 
who view early experiments with sharecropping as representing a 
"slavery mentality" or a "mentalidade escravista". 
Despite some superficial similarities between the early 
sharecropping schemes in Sao Paulo and the condition of coolie 
labour on Cuban sugar plantations, as this thesis will reveal, the 
processes were quite distinct. In the final analysis, and 
notwithstanding the efforts of some planters to promote contract 
labour recruitment, indentured labourers were not introduced to 
Brazil onlarge-scale. Vergueiro's original experiments with 
sharecroppers did not result in a flow of immigrants under contract 
similar to those applied to the Chinese in Cuba. Rarely does the 
literature about early sharecropping on Sao Paulo coffee 
plantations, deal with the "trade" in European workers and planter 
23 The idea is expressed in S.B. de Holanda, "Prefacio do 
Tradutor" in Thomas Davatz, Mem6rias de um colono no Brasil 2nd. ed. (sao Paulo: Martins, 1951) p.18; E.V. da Costa "Sharecroppers and 
Plantation Owners: An Experiment with Free Labor" in her The 
Brazilian Empire, Myths and Histories. (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1985) pp.94-124; W. Dean, op.cit., chapter 4; V. 
Stolcke and M.M. Hall, argued against the idea that the initial 
debt, burden imposed on colonos to cover the cost of their passage 
to Brazil, was indicative of debt peonage. They observe that if "we 
define debt peonage in its strict sense as being the intentional  
burdening of labourers with a debt to tie them to a property, this 
interpretation is inappropriate for the case of Sao Paulo". The 
primary aim planters pursued in charging immigrants with transport 
costs and food advances was to recover their initial investment. 
Stability of labour on the plantations was a welcome by-product, 
"The Introduction of Free Labour on sao Paulo Coffee Plantations" 
Journal of Peasant Studies 10:2 (1983) pp.170-200 esp. p.193, fn.40. 
But this assertion is controversial. Aspects of the sharecropping 
scheme that could reinforce its similarities with indentured labour 
have not yet been researched. This involves issues such as the role 
and expectations of the companies involved in the trade in colonos. 
These immigration companies dealt in labour contracts which were 
bought and sold in a manner not dissimilar to the trade of the 
Chinese coolie in Cuba. And what of planters? How did they regard 
labour contracts? Did they differentiate between slave, and debt-
burdened colono and free worker? This thesis will provide some 
evidence to answer these issues which have been surprisingly ignored 
in the existing literature. 
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attempts to deal in sharecropper contracts. Most authors have 
centred their attention on the "failure" of the sharecropping 
system, thereby ignoring the implications of planter attempt to 
establish a trade in sharecroppers. Usually the literature makes 
only passing reference to the trade which is superficially described 
as signalling that planters viewed colonos as slaves and that this 
was responsible for the "failure" of early experiments with contract 
colono labour. It has been variously suggested that planters either 
attempted to make free labour as profitable as slave labour or that 
due to their long tradition as slaveholders, resorted to forms of 
coercion which were unacceptable to the European immigrants. 
Planters, it has been argued, showed themselves incapable of 
accepting a contractual relationship and immigrant workers rebelled 
or deserted. 24 Verena Stolcke and Michael Hall criticized this 
approach and emphasise that the conditions in which this system of 
free labour was introduced explain its failure. 25 According to them, 
the failure of the scheme cannot be attributed to its lower 
productivity. Only the most forward-looking planters experimented 
with sharecropping. Planters knew that they had to find an 
alternative form of free labour or abandon coffee cultivation. 
Modernizing planters viewed labour as a cost of production and saw 
sharecropping as a more flexible, cheaper form of labour recruitment 
than slavery. They were also aware that slavery was not a permanent 
institution that could be relied on to provide an adequate supply of 
labour indefinitely. In switching to sharecropping these planters 
were not seeking to replicate slave labour conditions. On the 
contrary, sharecropping was more economical and yielded higher 
returns to the planter than slavery or a straight wage labour 
scheme. The failure of early sharecropping was due fundamentally to 
24 The early difficulties with immigrant workers attributed to 
the unprofitability of the schemes in comparison to slaves is 
discussed in E.V. da Costa, "Sharecroppers and Plantation Owners, An 
Experiment with Free Labor", op.cit.; W. Dean, op.cit., chapter 4; 
S. Buarque de Holanda, op.cit.; J.S. Witter, Ibicaba, uma 
experiencia pioneira 2nd ed.(Sao Paulo: Arquivo do Estado, 1982). 
These authors lists several factors that contributed to the 
abandonment of sharecropping system; differences in arguments are 
appointed in chapter 4 of this thesis. 
25 V. Stolcke and M. M. Hall, op.cit. 
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the absence of one essential prerequisite, a surplus population of 
free labour that would have kept wages low and workers subject to 
exploitation. "Under these circumstances, neither the economic 
incentives contained in the sharecropping contract, nor the resorts 
to frauds and occasional coercion succeeded in assuring a profitable 
and reliable labour force (...) The permanent problem of labour 
productivity and discipline was only resolved in the 1880s when the 
state began to subsidise mass immigration and thus lay the 
foundations for an effective capitalist labour market" . 26 For 
Stolcke and Hall, the absence of a surplus population of free labour 
rather than traditional social attitudes led planters to resort to 
coercive measures, though they accept that it was the use of 
coercion that explains the "failure" of the sharecropping. 
As this thesis will emphasise the supply of European sharecroppers 
was only disrupted after the failure of these experiments. But the 
idea that plantation labour was only possible under coercion 
survived. This is confirmed by the methods employed by planters to 
recruit domestic free labour in place of European colonos. Planters 
attempted to secure various sources of non-slave labour, under a 
regime in which discipline and productivity could be assured through 
tight contracts and coercive legislations. In this sense, from the 
perspective of planters, what seems to have failed was the project 
for European immigration and not the contract system per se. 
Planters would continue their search for contract labour, changing 
contract conditions to reflect new circumstances, devising draconian 
legislation and turning to a more suitable labour force _ 
Brazilians, former slaves and Chinese _ who could be made to 
accept to these conditions. Thus it was the consequences of the 
failure of projects to attract European colonos under contract, not 
those projects themselves, which permit comparison to be made 
between Cuba and Brazil. 
How these experiments helped to facilitate a gradual abolition of 
slavery and transition to free labour can be better understood if a 
26 V.Stolcke and M. M. Hall, op.cit., pp.188-189. 
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direct connection is made between the process of gradual abolition 
and perceptions of free labour implicit in the first experiments 
with these early labour arrangements. In the past century the use of 
contract labour _ in Brazil and in Cuba _ was described as a 
"means of transition" and was explicitly linked to the idea of a 
gradual ending of slavery and thereby facilitating a switch to free 
labour. 27 As was mentioned above, attempts in Brazil did not result 
in a flow of migrants under contract such as the Chinese to Cuba. 
However, the idea of controlling labour through contracts pervaded 
most of the policies devised to solve the labour question. In 
addition to explicit attempts to import contract labour from Africa 
and Asia, the main target would be domestic labour, free Brazilians 
and former slaves. As will be shown contract labour was closely 
connected to a policy of gradual abolition of slavery and a 
controlled transition to free labour. This provides another 
interesting point to compare and contrast the Cuban and Brazilian 
cases. 
Contemporaries applied the term "transition" to refer to a 
labourer, or a system of labour _ distinct from slave and slave 
labour _ to be employed during the period of a gradual abolition 
of slavery. The term covered the process of transforming slaves into 
freedmen, the new position of these freedmen in the labour hierarchy 
and the employment of either domestic or immigrant contract 
labourers. It also embraced modes of reorganizing labour that were 
devised either to support slavery while delaying final abolition, or 
to constitute forms of labour after abolition. 
The idea of transition is ambiguous and has several connotations. 
Only by identifying the first and second phases of the process is 
27 Stanley L. Engerman observes that the basic function of 
contract labour was to provide labour for plantation work. A side 
effect was to keep down the wages of workers already there. 
Nineteenth century movement of contract labour include migrants from 
low-income countries, almost exclusively non-whites, exchanging 
transport costs for labour services, destined for specific type of 
work on plantations in tropical areas, "Contract Labor, Sugar, and 
Technology in the Nineteenth Century" Journal of Economic History 
43:3 (Sep. 1983) pp.635-659. 
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possible to refer to a "transition period"; and it is important to 
know what the second phase _ the end of slavery _ implied. In 
the language of the time or in modern usage the terms usually 
employed in the debate about transition are "slavery" and "free 
labour". Nowadays, the phrase "free labour" has often been displaced 
by "wage labour", the principal characteristic of capitalist 
extraction. And the term "transition" is viewed as representing the 
period in which the bases for a free labour market were set up. But 
in the nineteenth century it might be that "transition" was employed 
in a different sense, a time in between two systems or possibly as 
a near permanent condition, given that the gradual abolition of 
slavery was expected to take a very long time in Brazil and Cuba. 
Scott suggested that "abolition" and "transition to free labour" 
in Cuba were distinct processes. The abolition process was legal and 
institutional. Planters accepted free labour in Cuba but did not 
accepted abolition. Scott also suggested that the concept of gradual 
abolition had special connotations. It was seen not as an 
alternative to the indefinite preservation of the institution but 
rather as a means of avoiding sudden emancipation. "Adherence to 
gradual abolition thus reflected both a strategic acceptance of an 
eventual transition to free labour and a tactic to delay that 
transition". 28 
The literature for Brazil and Cuba identifies the period of 
"transition" as the decades of the 1870s and 1880s, when the legal 
and institutional process of gradual abolition took shape and 
alternative labour arrangements were forcefully created. This study, 
however, focuses on new forms of organizing free labour that were 
attempted largely before this period. Although considered by 
contemporaries as "means" or "elements" of "transition", the 
existing literature has found it difficult to incorporate these 
systems of labour and associated debates within the general 
discussion about the creation of a "free labour market", a process 
which in Brazil and Cuba is usually identified with the 
28 R. Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba, op.cit., p.40. 
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transformation of the system of plantation production by means of 
technology advances and of the colonato and immigration. The point 
this study intends to emphasise is that these early experiments _ 
with coolies in Cuba and European sharecroppers in mid-nineteenth 
century Brazil and with various other forms of contract labour _ 
influenced the process of gradual abolition and set the parameters 
for the "transition to free labour" as perceived by contemporaries. 
And, as the thesis will demonstrate, the period between one phase of 
transition and another included distinct attempts to implement that 
transition. It will also be clear that a "free labour market" might 
not have been the final end envisaged by nineteenth century 
planters. 
Finally, this thesis touches upon another controversial issue 
that is worth remarking: the role and function of laws in the 
organization and transformation of slave societies. During the 
nineteenth century Cuba and Brazil experire. an  enormous absolute 
growth in laws regarding labour and working conditions. 29 Current 
research has identified this phenomenon as a result of the 
development and strengthening of the capitalist plantation 
production. Slave working conditions were shifted towards a more 
rigid and coercive system. 30 This thesis ja-i-/1 focuses on laws and 
29 In nineteenth century Brazil, the great majority of the laws 
regarding slaves were issued after 1850, see D.R. Fenelon, 
"Levantamento e sistematizacao da legislagao relativa aos escravos 
no Brasil". Anais do VI Simposio Nacional dos Professores de 
Historia: Trabalho Livre e Trabalho Escravo.3 vols (Sao Paulo: 
Revista de Hist6ria, 1973) II, pp.199-307. In Cuba, new detailed 
slave regulations were issued in 1842, see the "Reglamento de 
Esclavos" in Bando de Gobernaci6n y Policia de la Isla de Cuba 
espedido por el Escmo. Sr. Dr. Geronimo Valdes. (Havana: Imprenta 
del Gobierno, 1842), and there were several amendments during the 
next decades. 
30 According to F. Knight "Slavery, Race and Social Structure 
during the nineteenth century"ln R.B. Toplin (ed.) Slavery and Race 
Relations in Latin America (Weport: Greenwood Press, 1974), p.208 
the sugar revolution in the nineteenth century Cuba created new 
forces and strains on the conventional structure and institutions of 
the society. The system became more rigid and more coercive. Also, 
according to R.K. Aufhauser "Slavery and Technological Change" The 
Journal of Economic History 34 (March 1974) pp.36-50 esp.47-48, "The 
coming of the sweet plant shifted the real wage, the length of the 
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regulations regarding "free labour"; slave regulations also will be 
examined but only to the extent that they point to a changed status, 
to emancipation and "freedom". The assumption is that law is an 
important historical factor, an active force (re-) shaping roles and 
relationships. 31  Defining a framework for the transition from 
slavery to "freedom" was a difficult task. It required more than 
changing the legal status of slaves. It involved re-shaping 
attitudes to work and mechanisms of social control embracing all 
workers. 32 Repeated attempts to legislate over labour reveals the 
intent to achieve greater control of labour and hence of the whole 
process of reorganizing labour relations. 
According to Genovese, comparative history is a treacherous field. 
Scholars have to learn to recognize its pitfalls and understand its 
working day and the distribution of income to the detriment of all 
workers, free or slave". Frederick Cooper suggested similar patterns 
to other areas and crops as South Carolina, South Brazil and 
Zanzibar, producing rice, coffee and clove respectively. Regarding 
Zanzibar the author observes that development of regulated, close 
supervised labour reveals the extent to which the organization of 
society was responding to the dictates of the market. Plantation 
Slavery on the East Coast of Africa (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1977) and same author, From Slaves to Squatters. Plantation 
Labor and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya, 1890-1925 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). 
31 E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters. The Origin of the Black 
Act (London: Penguin, 1977) chap.10, regards law as not merely an 
expression of class interest, but it mediates class relations and 
for its effectiveness as "ideology" it shall display and 
"independence". Examining the role of laws on U.S. southern slave 
societies, E.D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll. The World the Slaves 
Made. (New York: Vintage Books, 1976) also suggested that "the law 
must be viewed as an active, partially autonomous force, which 
mediated among the several classes and compelled the rulers to bend 
to the demands of the ruled"(p.26). 
32 F.Cooper points out that the experience of Great Britain in 
Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya makes clear that free labour implied the 
submission of workers to a uniform code of laws, to the rigors of 
the market, and to internalized discipline, in contrast to the 
personal control and coercion of the slave master. He also observes 
that the elimination of slave labour would require more than 
changing slave's legal status and paying them wages. It required the 
reshaping of attitudes to work and mechanisms of social control. 
From Slaves to Squatters, op.cit., pp.2-4. 
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limits. 33 By contrasting and comparing experiments with non-slave 
labour, and the institutional and legal processes of abolition and 
transition in Brazil and Cuba, this thesis does not intend to argue 
that the pattern and process was the same for both areas. On the 
contrary, the purpose is to allow comparison and contrast to shed 
light on aspects and questions which might not be evident within the 
framework of a single national study. 
On embarking on this research, it initially appeared that the 
similarities between Cuba and Sao Paulo were obvious. Both were 
transformed in the nineteenth century from relatively diversified to 
plantation economies. The rapid growth of plantation production was 
threatened in both areas by external pressures against the slave 
trade. From the beginning both sought to solve a growing labour 
demand by importing immigrants. As a way of securing immigrant 
workers for the plantations both resorted to contract labour 
regulation and draconian legislation. Several experiments took place 
in order to accommodate planters expectations of costs, discipline 
and profitability of new alternative forms of labour. 
Cuba and Brazil were also the last areas to abolish slavery in 
the New World and sao Paulo was one of the Brazilian provinces where 
slavery persisted until the eve of abolition. In addition, Cuba and 
Brazil embarked on a successful process of gradual abolition at the 
same time. In both cases the antislavery movement was weak and late 
to develop. When abolition finally came, there had already been 
major changes in the organization of production and labour 
relations. 
There were other important similarities in terms of patterns of 
population. Sao Paulo and Cuba had a growing and large free 
population, further increased through immigration. For most of the 
E.D. Genevose,"The comparative Focus in Latin American 
History", In Red and Black: Marxian Explorations in Southern and 
Afro-American History (London: Penguin, 1971) pp.375-391. 
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period, the free population outnumbered slaves. In both areas major 
conflicts _ such as the Ten Years War (1868-1878), the abortive 
struggle for independence in Cuba and, in Brazil, the Paraguay War 
(1864-1870) _ provoked social changes that helped accelerate the 
process of abolition of slavery. 
At the beginning it was also obvious that there were differences. 
Cuba was a colony and Sao Paulo a province of an independent 
country. This could make for major differences. The crops, sugar and 
coffee, were different and required distinct forms of labour control 
and discipline. Sugar, like coffee, was labour intensive and needed 
abundant and reliable labour. However, while coffee needed labour 
throughout the whole season, labour inputs for sugar much more 
critical at some points of the productive cycle than others. Also 
major technological changes, for instance in transport, occurred 
earlier for sugar and change in sugar processing _ industrialized 
milling _ had no equivalent in coffee. It was also clear that 
although implementing similar immigration policies, Chinese contract 
workers had been one of the main suppliers of labour for Cuban sugar 
plantations but not for Sao Paulo coffee plantations where families 
of European sharecroppers or tenants predominated. 
However, as the research developed, so the distance between Cuba 
and Brazil narrowed and the points of contrast became even more 
pronounced. It became clear that Cuban planters were aware of what 
was happening in Brazil and vice versa. Planters kept themselves 
informed about circumstances in the other region for most of the 
period. They paid particular and precise attention to their shared 
problems: first, how to resolve labour scarcity in the face of 
attacks on the trans-Atlantic slave trade; later, how to abolish 
slavery, delaying for as long as possible the final end in order to 
avoid anticipated disruption of production. Each area was aware of 
strategies applied by the other, weighing for its requirements, the 
costs of immigration, the efficiency and productivity of new labour 
regimes and future of slavery itself. 
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But in the final analysis, similarities were out-weighed by 
differences. The contrasts were much more striking. Some of the 
differences turned out to be decisive. For instance, the colonial 
status of Cuba. At the beginning it had appeared that the governor 
of Cuba had extraordinary faculties to deal with all the problems of 
the island and that Cuba could have experienced a kind of 
relationship with Spain _ respecting the issue of labour supply 
that resembled that of the province of Sao Paulo with the 
Imperial government of Brazil. But Cuban ties with Spain were much 
more complex. The status of Cuba and more especially the condition 
of Spain affected decisively labour and immigration policies as well 
as the processes of abolition and transition to free labour. Spanish 
foreign policy considerations and an anxiety to retain economic 
control of Cuba limited planter scope for manoeuvre. In Brazil, the 
solution to the labour problem, notably that of the abolition of 
slavery, was not exclusive to Sao Paulo and the distinct interests 
of the various provinces were clear crystallized in disputes that 
occurred within the centralized system of Imperial government. That 
sao Paulo at the end managed to turn the government to its side and 
successfully resolved bitter disputes with other provinces in its 
favour, was due to the growth of coffee profits and their importance 
for the national exchequer. Further, concerns of the young nation 
about its future population and wealth gave the debate about 
slavery, labour and immigration a distinct character in Brazil. The 
development of the labour question was also sharply conditioned by 
differences in coffee and sugar production and by the distinct 
timing of plantation expansion as well as by the pace of 
technological change in sugar. These points of difference and their 
importance will become clearer in the thesis. 
*** *** ****** 
The thesis is divided in two main parts. Part I compares and 
contrasts policies to promote immigration to Cuba and Sdo Paulo. The 
settlement of white immigrants _ designed first to populate the 
regions and to counteract the growing slave population 
constitutes the starting point of the discussion on both areas. But 
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the rapid growth of plantation production, requiring an increasing 
number of workers and changing patterns of landholding, thereafter 
defined a different course of action in Cuba and sao Paulo. The 
first sections of chapters 3 and 4 explain those differences. 
Subsequent sections in these chapters examine the quest for new 
supplies of labour and associated problems of labour recruitment and 
control. 
Part II compares and contrasts plans and policies for gradual 
abolition of slavery and for the transition to free labour. Chapter 
5 examines early plans on the issue and explores changing concepts 
of slave emancipation and of free labour. Chapter 6 compares and 
contrasts the emancipation policies embodied in the gradualist 
legislation implemented from the 1870s in both areas. 
The material used in the thesis is derived from a variety of 
manuscript and printed sources. The rich documentation produced by 
the Spanish colonial office and the administration in Havana 
provided a great deal of the material used in Chapter 3. The 
extensive material of the seccidn de Ultramar, Fomento de Cuba, in 
the Archivo HistOrico Nacional (Madrid) official 
correspondence, reports and minutes _ was a valuable source. Some 
of this material, which showed views and concerns of the Spanish 
government over policies on immigration, slavery and emancipation 
has not been consulted before. Other documents have been analyzed in 
a new light. The problems emanating from the colony reached the 
colonial office through reports and statements produced by the Cuban 
authorities, various semi-official bodies and private associations. 
This material provideda rich debate about policy and appropriate 
courses of action. The collections of the fondos Real Consulado y 
Junta de Fomento, Reales Ordenes and Misceldnea de Expedientes in 
the Archivo Nacional de Cuba (Havana) proved most useful for the 
the 
study of schemes to promote immigration in the period betweeri(1840s 
and 1860s. Planter reports, labour contracts, legislation% and legal 
case% files provide:\ insights into working conditions on the 
plantations and conflicts between planters and workers. 
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For Brazil, legislative debates and official reports were very 
useful in tracing views on labour supply and immigration. The 
Reports of the Ministry of Agriculture contairOdetails about 
immigrant colonies in the various provinces. Presidential reports 
ed were also valuable and point(to the specific problems of Sao Paulo. 
Attached to these reports are planter reports on regional 
development and police reports about life and conditions on the 
colonies and plantations. Nineteenth century reports and accounts, 
more preoccupied with immigrant workers, often passed over Brazilian 
workers. Information on their life and labour conditions had to be 
gathered from sporadic mention in a variety of sources. The 
collection of documents included in the section "Colonies", Arquivo 
Public() do Estado (sao Paulo), contain previously underworked 
documents about immigrant and (especially underworked) Brazilian 
workers on sao Paulo plantations during the 1850s and 1860s. 
Although scattered, this material provide data on\?PoCation of 
colonies, labour arrangements, origin of workers, wages and 
conflicts with planters. In addition, chapter 4 also draws on these 
sources and on information from travellers l reports, police enquiries 
and collections of laws. 
As it will be seen, laws and regulations constitute enet .f the 
ma source of information for this study. Chapters3 and 4 use laws, 
projects-of-law and related parliamentary debates, as well as labour 
regulations to obtain information on immigration policies,abour 
arrangements and to point to issues of discipline and control within 
plantations and conflicts between planter and worker. Chapter 5 uses 
mainly legislative projects, draft proposals and decrees relating to 
slave emancipation extracted from legislative debate and from a 
variety of books and pamphlets. Equally, for chapter 6, the main 
sources are gradualist legislation, the legislative debate in the 
Brazilian Houses of Parliament and Spanish Cortes and official 
reports. 
Although it is said that laws can provide a false picture of a 
situation, given the discrepancy between theory and practice, they 
can be a valuable indication of changing conditions and attitudes. 
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Most of the criticism about the use of laws and statutes as an 
historical source relates to the problem of effective application 
especially in slave societies and within plantations where the 
weakness of the state apparatus or the strength of planters often 
prevented their enforcement. By consulting various texts and formal 
expression of norms and rules (such as laws, projects-of-laws, 
labour regulations and contracts) this study will not focus 
primarily on their enforcement but rather on the meaning of their 
content and circumstances of formulation. A sanctioning of a law, in 
spite of obstacles to its enforcement, is a significative fact. 
First, it creates the possibility of its enforcement. Second, the 
content of a new law usually refers either to a previous or a 
prospective experience. This provides the possibility of assessing 
change over time and can actually signal change or attempts to 
consolidate earlier processes. As argued by a Brazilian member of 
Parliament, opposing the revocation of the 1879 labour law, which 
had been scarcely executed, "to evaluate the efficiency of a law, it 
is not enough to consider the events it address, but the events it 
prevents, and to best consider the preventive effects of the law at 
issue, it is important to consider what would have happened if it 
had not been promulgated". 34 
APB, session of July 10, 1884, p.98. 
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CHAPTER 2  
CUBA AND SAO PAULO: AN OVERVIEW 
In the first half of the nineteenth century Cuba and Sao Paulo were 
transformed from relatively diversified to plantation economies 
producing as main staples sugar and coffee respectively. The Cuban 
sugar mill (ingenio) and the Brazilian coffee estate (fazenda), 
large, well stocked agricultural units based on servile labour came 
to characterize economic development in both areas. Replacing other 
crops, the production of sugar and coffee to supply increasing world 
demand would change utterly patterns of population distribution, 
land tenure and labour use, affecting the whole life of Cubans and 
Paulistas. 
This "overview" identifies relevant changes in the economic and 
social structure of Cuba and Brazil that have a bearing upon the 
"labour question". At the beginning of the century, the surge in 
slavery was a key feature in the shift to a mono staple producer. 
Mounting external pressures to end the trans-Atlantic slave trade 
made the search for alternative labour sources another distinctive 
feature from the mid-century. The changing composition of 
population, technological developments and regional differences 
shaped a shared concern in Cuba and Brazil to devise a framework for 
the gradual abolition of slavery and transition to free labour. 
2.1. The making of a sugar colony. Cuba slowly evolved into a 
prosperous sugar colony after the middle of the eighteenth century. 1 
1 H. Thomas, "Cuba from the middle of the eighteenth century to 
c.1870" in The Cambridge History of Latin America. From Independence 
to 1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 3 pp.277-296, 
p.281; see also R. Guerra y Sanchez, Sugar and Society in the 
Caribbean. An Economic History of Cuban Agriculture. Transl. by M.M. 
Urquidi (New York: Yale University Press, 1964) p.45; R. Guerra y 
Sanchez, Manual de Historia de Cuba. 6th ed. (Havana: Editorial 
Pueblo y Educacion, 1985) chapter XI; M. Moreno Fraginals, El 
Ingenio. Complelo economico social cubano del azficar (Havana: 
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Before this time, the colony had a distinct society, people, and 
culture. Sidney Mintz observed that, for over two centuries, Cuba 
was able to build its society slowly, without continued disturbances 
from the outside. The economy rested heavily on small-scale 
agriculture. Some products such as tobacco and coffee were processed 
and exported. Others like stockraising provided domestic food as 
well as export items such as hides and tallow. The appearance and 
success of large numbers of substantially self-sufficient 
cultivators and small-scale producers over the centuries was almost 
unique in Caribbean according to Mintz. 2 
Several important events conspired to change this pattern of 
diversified small-scale farming and associated urban activities into 
one based on the mono-product sugar plantation. The capture of 
Havana and its occupation for one year by the English in 1762 
facilitated free trade with British ports and its colonies 
triggering a rapid growth in imports and Cuban exports. There was 
also a surge in slave imports during British occupation. The 
destruction of Haitian sugar and coffee wealth in 1790 increased the 
demand for Cuban sugar: sugar prices rose to fabulous heights. The 
independence of the United States of America, creating a great free 
market near Cuba, and Spanish colonial reforms which lifted many of 
the old bureaucratic restraints on trade, also contributed to draw 
Cuba out of the isolation into which it had been forced by previous 
Spanish merchantilist monopoly practices. The activities of forward 
looking men, of whom the creole Francisco de Arango y Parrefio was a 
prime example, was also fundamental. The report Arango sent to 
Madrid in 1792 on how Cuban agriculture should be developed so as to 
take advantage of events in Saint Domingue resulted in a 
constructive response from the Spanish government. By permitting 
slavers of all nationalities to bring their cargoes to Cuba and by 
Editora de Ciencias Sociales,1978) I, chapter II; J. Gilberti, Cuba:  
From Primitive Accumulation of Capital to Socialism (Toronto: Two 
Thirds Editions, 1981) chapter IV; J. Stubbs, Tobacco on the 
Periphery. A case study in Cuban Labour History, 1860-1958  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) p.15. 
2 S. W. Mintz, "Foreword" in R. Guerra y Sanchez, Sugar and 
Society, op.cit., p.xxii. 
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reducing the duties on imported slaves, the metropolitan government 
eased the flow of labour into the island. Another concession was the 
abolition of import duties on machinery, a step which enabled 
planters to follow advice they were receiving from Saint Domingue 
refugees on how best to modernize their mills and purging houses. 
Abolition of taxes on coffee exports and the removal of all legal 
impediments on trade between Cuba and foreigners in 1818 stand among 
other concessions resulted from Arango's report. 3 
By 1830, sugar plantations _ using the term to apply to the 
combination of land and mill 4 were already replacing coffee 
estates. The abundance of natural resources, forests for fuel and 
building timber, the natural fertility of the soil, an open frontier 
into which the industry could expand, and the resulting relatively 
cheapness of land, all made the start-up cost of a plantation 
comparatively low. These factors contributed to the expansion of 
sugar plantations. The demand for sugar combined with access to 
markets justified the investment of massive amounts of capital to 
bring the Cuban industry up to the highest technical standards of 
the 1820s. 5 
Mechanization of the sugar industry began early in the 
nineteenth-century. According to Humboldt, the greatest changes in 
sugar cane cultivation and processing took place between 1796 and 
1800. 6 A great impulse was provided by the arrival of French 
3 The influence of these events is discussed in R. Guerra y 
Sanchez, Sugar and Society, op.cit., p.45; R. Guerra y Sanchez, 
Manual de Historia, op.cit., chapter XI; M. Moreno Fraginals, El 
Ingenio, op.cit., I, chapter II; J. Gi lberti, op.cit., chapter IV; 
H. Thomas, op.cit., p.277-284. 
4 R.J. Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba. The Transition to 
Free Labor, 1860-1899 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) 
p.20. 
5 	J.H. Galloway, The Sugar Cane Industry. An Historical  
Geography from its origins to 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989) p.164. 
6 A. Humboldt, Island of Cuba. Transl. by. J.S. Thrasher. (New 
York: Derby and Jackson, 1856) p.284. 
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planters refugees from Saint Domingue, who brought with them many 
useful techniques for the cultivation and processing of sugar. But 
fiscal encouragement by the Spanish government was also essential as 
well as the entrepreneurial initiative of a class of landowners 
interested in developing their land and promoting wealth. The 
interests and aspirations of these modernizing planters was manifest 
in several societies that they helped to create, namely the Economic 
Society (Sociedad Economica de Amigos del Pais) (1792) and the Royal 
Advisory Board for Agriculture and Commerce (Real Consulado de 
Agricultura y Comercio) (1795). 7 Steam engines were introduced in 
the refining mills as early as 1820, and railway construction from 
the Port of Havana to the interior sugar cane fields began in the 
early 1830s, only a few years after the opening of first passenger 
railway of the world in England in 1825. By 1845 modern sugar mills 
were all linked by private railway to Havana. 8 The wealthier 
planters began to buy vacuum pans in the 1830s and centrifuges after 
1850s. By 1846, 20% of the mills used steams power. 9 Twenty years 
later 78% were steam powered. 
Work on sugar plantations involved elements of both field and 
factory. Sugar production divides into three stages: the cultivation 
and harvesting of sugar cane, the extraction of the juice from the 
cane and the conversion of the juice to crystalline sugar. Planting 
fields of cane is labour-intensive work, but one plant usually gives 
several crops of cane. Cane takes from twelve to eighteen months to 
7 H. Thomas, op.cit., pp.282-285; R. Guerra y Sanchez, Manual, 
op.cit., p.212. 
8 H. Thomas, op.cit., p.291; on the impact of railways for 
Cuban sugar production see M.Moreno Fraginals, El Ingenio, op.cit., 
I, chap. 4; see also 0. Zanetti Lecuona and A. Garcia Alvarez, 
Caminos Para el azilcar (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 
1987) chap. 3 and 4. 
9 The vacuum pans date from 1813. Pressure is used to lower the 
boiling point of the cane juice and thus economize on fuel. 
Centrifugal force was first used in the 1840s for beet sugar. Until 
its invention, the separation of the molasses from the crystals was 
based on the method of natural drainage. Besides greatly speeding 
the process of separation, the centrifuge yielded a drier sugar. 
J.H. Galloway, op.cit., pp.135-7. 
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mature depending on the variety and the environment. The harvest 
season lasted for several months and was the period of peak labour 
demand. This specific period of time must be coordinated with the 
processing of cane, for the cane had to be cut when the proportion 
of sucrose in the juice was highest and above all the juice had to 
be extracted very fast to prevent spoilage. Cane must be milled 
within twenty-four to forty-eight hours of the harvesting. To 
manufacture sugar, some sort of press or mill is required along with 
a boiling house or factory where the juice can be converted into raw 
sugar. Because cut cane deteriorates rapidly and also because it is 
bulky and hence expensive to transport, the mills and factories are 
placed within easy reach of the cane fields. It is raw sugar that 
enters international trade; the refineries are close to where sugar 
is to be consumed. 10 
Over ninety percent of the sugar produced in Cuba during the 
nineteenth century came from the Western and Central departments. 
The rest of the island had a non-sugar economy. Yet, sugar gave a 
distinctive character to the whole Cuban economy and society. Data 
taken from the 1846 census illustrate the different level and 
composition of the agricultural wealth of the three departments (See 
Table 1, Appendix). Henceforth, the marked differences between the 
areas would become more evident. The Western and Central departments 
had the largest number of sugar and coffee plantations and sitios de 
labor (small farms predominantly devoted to subsistence 
cultivation). In the Central department, potreros (stock-raising 
ranches) predominated, accounting for about 50% of the total number 
on the island. In the Eastern department, tobacco plantations 
predominated (46%), followed by coffee plantations (35%) and stock-
raising ranches (33%). Sugar production was concentrated in the 
western and central areas, where 79% of all sugar estates were 
located. 
At mid-century, virtually all Cuban sugarmills were integrated 
units, combining the growing of cane and the manufacture of raw 
10 J.H. Galloway, op.cit., pp.13-17; R. Scott, op.cit., p.24. 
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sugar. 11 According to Fraginals, of 1,318 sugar mills in 1860, 359 
(27%) were animal-powered, 6 (0.5%) were water-powered, 889 (67.05%) 
were semi-mechanized using steam engines, and 64 (5%) mechanized, 
using steampower and more advanced processing technology. Animal-
powered mills had an average production capacity of 113 tons per 
grinding season, semi-mechanized mills some 411 tons and mechanized 
mills 1,176 tons per grinding season. The semi-mechanized and 
animal-powered mills were responsible for 84.71% of 1860 production 
(the animal-powered alone were responsible for only 8%) and 
mechanized mills, despite their greater capacity, were responsible 
for only about 15%. Fraginals suggested that "there was an enormous 
underutilization of installed capacity as a result of labour 
shortage" .12 
The compilation by Carlos Rebello, Estados relativos a la 
Produccion azucarera de la Isla de Cuba, undertaken in 1860 provides 
according to R. Scott the most reliable set of data on Cuban sugar 
and gives a vivid idea of the conditions of sugar cultivation and 
production on the island. 13 See Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix. The 
salient differences between the departments is evident from 
Rebellos's tables. The production of sugar was much more dynamic in 
the western area than in the eastern. From 1,365 sugar mills listed, 
1,065 were located in the Western department, of which 78% were 
operated by steam power. In the Eastern department there were only 
300 mills, of which only 40% were steam powered (Table 4). Of all 
the sugar mills listed, about 38% (401) were located in the 
jurisdictions of Cardenas, Colon and Matanzas (region latter 
included in the province of Matanzas), of which 92.2% were operated 
by steam power. The area under cane in this part of the island 
corresponded to 45% of total cultivated land in the Western 
R.Scott, op.cit., p.24. 
12 M. Moreno Fraginals, op.cit., I, pp.171-173. 
13 Carlos Rebello, Estados relativos a la production azucarera 
de la Isla de Cuba, formados competentemente y con autorizaciOn de 
la Intendencia de Eiercito y Hacienda (Havana: n.p.,1860); this 
document is carefully examined in M. Moreno Fraginals, op.cit.. 
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department. 14 By the end of 1850s the zone was already producing 56% 
of the island's sugar. 15 Matanzas and Santa Clara, with the largest 
number of sugar mills (61%) also had the largest number of steam 
powered mills (68%). They accounted for 70% of the areas under cane 
on the island, the largest number of mills with vacuum apparatus 
(81.8%), the largest average output and the largest number of slaves 
(67.6%). It was not surprise that these two provinces produced over 
three-quarters of total Cuban raw sugar.(Table 4, Appendix). 
Between 1840 and 1868, Cuban sugar production increased from 
161,248 to 720,250 metric tons or more than 300% (See Table 2, 
Appendix). In 1840 Cuba produced about 20% of the cane sugar 
reaching the world market; in 1868 the island produced more than 
40%. 16 This was the time when planters were most exercised by an 
acute labour crisis. This was also the time that international 
pressure to end the trans-Atlantic slave trade mounted dramatically. 
Solutions to the problem of labour supply would entail broader 
considerations about Cuban society and ties with Spain. 
Labour for Sugar. Just as the expansion of sugar production got 
under away, pressures on Spain to abolish pethe slave trade began. 
Humanitarian and economic motives fuelled European pressure for the 
abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and had an impact on all 
slave societies in the Americas at the beginning of the nineteenth-
century. This pressure encouraged new views about the efficiency and 
profitability of free labour in contrast to slave labour and 
provoked the search for new forms of labour organization and 
discipline. The future of slavery, for centuries an essential 
element of sugar production, looked bleak. 
In the Treaty of Madrid signed in July 5, 1814, the Spanish and 
British monarchs agreed that the slave trade was inhuman and unjust. 
14 Resumen del Departamento Occidental in C. Rebello, op.cit., 
p.83. 
15 M. Moreno Fraginals, op.cit., I, p.141. 
16 M. Moreno Fraginals, op.cit., III, pp.36-37. 
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Accordingly, the King of Spain promised to prohibit Spanish subjects 
from supplying other possessions with slaves and to consider the 
means of abolishing the trade. ° In 1817 the Spanish king prohibited 
Spanish subjects from engaging in the slave trade on the coasts of 
Africa "north of Equator". Captains and masters of the ships engaged 
in the illegal trade could be imprisoned for ten years in the 
Philippine Islands and their slave cargoes declared free (Treaty of 
September 23, 1817). Two years later, another treaty (May 20, 1820) 
forbade Spanish subjects to engage in the slave trade on the coast 
of Africa "South of Equator", under the same penalties. It also 
provided that British government would pay Spain £400,000 as 
compensation. 18 The indemnity was paid in London in 1818. Yet the 
trade continued. In June 20, 1835, another agreement declared the 
Spanish traffic abolished in all parts of the world. Warships were 
granted rights of search and punishment for shipowners, captains and 
crew were made more severe. 19 However, following this treaty, the 
imports of slaves seemed to have increased. According to the British 
consul Tolme, from 1835 until 1840 slave imports averaged 
approximately 14,000 and 15,000 a year. In the early 1830s imports 
had averaged only 11,000. 2° At the beginning of the 1840s, the great 
importation of slaves and the activities of British abolitionists 
raised fears about the composition of the island's population: the 
growth of the black population provoked a general sentiment against 
the continuation of the slave trade. Thus, in 1845 the Spanish 
government fashioned the "Law of Abolition and Repression of the 
Slave Trade". This law actually provoked a temporary decline in the 
imports of African slaves. But the trade would soon recover and 
continue at even higher levels than the peaks of the late 1830s. The 
trade would only end with the passage in 1866 of yet another Law for 
A. F. Corwin, Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba,  
1817-1886 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967) p.25. 
18 A.F. Corwin, op.cit., pp.28-29. 
19 A.F. Corwin, op.cit., p.61. 
20 D.R. Murray, Odious Commerce. Britain, Spain and the 
abolition of the Cuban slave trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980) p.111: British consul Tolme's estimate of slave 
landings in Cuba, 1830-1838. 
32 
the Suppression and Punishment of the Slave Trade. The factors that 
contributed to the continuance of the trade are intricate. The 
prosperity of sugar production and the acute shortage of labour gave 
Cuban proprietors reasons to continue to patronize the trade in 
slaves. Slave merchants and slave buyers enjoyed the protection of 
colonial officials who often greatly profited from the trade. And 
finally, there was the ambiguous attitude of the authorities in 
Madrid, weighing international opposition against colonial 
interests. Spain believed that the way of preserving colonial ties 
with Cuba was to maintain the island as a prosperous slave economy. 
In the absence of a domestic source of slaves such as in the United 
States of America, this implied a steady supply of imports. The real 
intentions of the Spanish government can be noted, for instance, in 
legislation, designed to repress the trade. Both the 1845 and 1866 
laws for the repression of the trade provided only heavy fines and 
imprisonment for those involved in the traffic. In spite of 
international pressures, and the criticism of Spanish abolitionists, 
the trade was not declared to be piracy as in Brazil and elsewhere, 
and thus subject to capital punishment. In addition, both the 1845 
and 1866 laws continued to prevent colonial officials from carrying 
out inspections of slave movements on the island or on the 
plantation. 
Nevertheless, the threat of the abolition of the slave trade 
stimulated much debate in Cuba. Anxiety was expressed about the 
"insolent and abusive" British intervention in Spanish affairs and 
fears that the end of the slave trade might also provoke demands for 
the abolition of slavery itself and even threaten colonial ties with 
Spain. There were several economic and political interests involved 
in the issue of eliminating the African slave trade. The 
justification for the continued imports of African slaves was of 
course the great demand for labourers to support the rapid growth of 
plantation export production. And the prosperity of the colony and 
the revenues from sugar production were important reasons for 
Spain's refusal to co-operate with the international movement 
against the trade. Stripped of most of her Empire in the early 
nineteenth century, Spain was now determined to secure its most 
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promising colony by not hurting planter and slaver interests within 
the island. 
In the end, the issue of abolition of the slave trade, and 
subsequently of slavery, was closely connected with the colonial 
status of the island. It (they) were exploited by sections of Cuban 
society seeking autonomy from Spain and anxious to resist foreign 
pressures from Britain and the United States of America. Until the 
1860s, the survival of slavery in the U.S.A also provided some 
Cubans with arguments for closer integration with their powerful 
neighbours. British pressures to end the trade were viewed variously 
as a strategy to destroy the competitiveness of sugar production, 
given the decadence of its West Indies colonies after the abolition 
of slavery, or simply as an excuse to invade the island and take 
possession of its wealth. The growing importance of United States of 
America as a market for Cuban sugar, its proximity and manifest 
interest of acquiring the island also made Spain very cautious when 
considering means to end the African trade. The weak, ambiguous 
response of Spain in the face of the British campaign against the 
slave trade and slavery had raised some sympathy within the island 
for closer links with the neighbouring slave nation, as the most 
effective means of guaranteeing the continuation of slavery in Cuba 
itself. During the 1840s and 1850s some planters made plain their 
view that annexation by the United States was the only solution. 
This hope would continue until the victory of the north in the 
American Civil War. 
Above all, the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and 
slavery became associated with the general sentiment for 
independence from Spain. Whether in pressing for annexation by 
United States, given the economic and political weakness of the 
Spanish metropolis, or in declaring that African slaves stood in the 
way of political liberty for creoles, Cubans were placing the issue 
of independence firmly on the political agenda. Spain's strategy 
would be to manipulate the issue according to circumstances. She 
would argue that with the great increase in black population and 
dangers of the "Africanisation" of the island made continued 
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colonial rule essential. Alternately, Spain would seek to alarm 
planter opinion and secure their loyalty by warning that slavery 
would surely be abolished if colonial ties were broken. Only Spain 
could "defend" slavery in the island and secure order. 
Pressures to end the trans-Atlantic slave trade confronted Cuban 
planters and Spanish government with the problem of finding 
alternative supplies of labour to sustain the growth of sugar 
production. New sources of labour were needed to replace or 
supplement expensive slaves who continued entering the island in 
spite of a temporary decline of the trade. Table 5 gives an 
estimative of the number of slaves imported into Cuba between 1840-
1867. According to figures published by the Foreign Office, the 
total reached almost a quarter of a million. Annual imports reached 
a peak at the end of the 1850s and beginning of the 1860s, following 
a steady growth of sugar production. Average slave prices, 1845-
1879, is shown on table 6. As can be seen in the early 1860s and 
again in the mid-1870s, nominal prices peaked, standing at 
respectively three and four times their level in the late 1840s. 
Continued imports of slaves, however, stimulated a general debate 
about the best means of responding to the growing demand for labour. 
The increase of slaves although considered the basis of the 
prosperity of sugar production was also viewed as a threaten to 
security. Although meeting plantation needs, the increase of the 
black population produced other problems which shaped views and 
policies on the matter of labour supply. An analysis of the changing 
composition of Cuba's population illustrates concerns about the 
racial balance in the island. Table 17 provides data on Cuba's 
population between 1817 and 1862. According to Corwin, 1817 was the 
first time the black population, free and slave, outnumbered the 
white. 21 At this point, blacks accounted for about 54% of total 
population. The proportion of blacks had increased sharply since the 
last decade of the eighteenth century. The main reasons were, of 
course, Cuba's development as a major sugar producer and the ease 
21 A.F. Corwin, op.cit., p.44. 
35 
with which slaves could be imported. Humboldt observes that the 
slave trade in the fifteen years following 1790 was so great that 
more slaves were bought and sold in that time, than in the previous 
two and a half centuries. These activities were redoubled when Spain 
agreed with England that the trade should be suppressed north of the 
Equator in 1817. 22 
In 1846 the black and coloured population still outnumbered the 
whites, although one can see a slight decline in its portion of 
total population: in 1827 it corresponded to about 56% and in 1846 
to 53%. Although the free population always outnumbered the slave 
population, slaves corresponded to 36% of total population in 1817, 
41% in 1827, 36% in 1846 and 27% in 1862. In spite of continued 
imports it has been argued that the growth in Cuba's slave 
population ceased completely by the middle of the 1850s. 23 And from 
1846 to 1862 the balance of population shifted markedly in favour of 
the whites. Whites accounted for about 54% of the total population 
in 1862. Most of this increase was due to immigration and natural 
growth. But the coloured population (including slaves, Asian, 
liberated Africans and Yucatecans) in 1862 still represented 46% of 
global population. 
Although within the coloured population slaves still 
predominated, the number of free persons of colour grew rapidly from 
the 1850s. These included descendants of slaves liberated 
generations earlier as well as those recently manumitted. The 
majority lived in the Western department, where they usually worked 
as artisans, domestics and day labourers in towns and cities. A 
great number also lived on small farms in the east of the island 
producing food staples, cattle and tobacco. 24 The Cuban elite and 
Spanish government debated the question of employing free coloureds 
in sugar production. But planters and colonial officials were 
22 A. Humboldt, op.cit., pp.217-218. 
23 K.F. Kiple, Blacks in Colonial Cuba: 1774-1899 (Gainesville: 
The University Press of Florida, 1976) p.80. 
24 R.J. Scott, op.cit., p.8. 
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apprehensive about mixing free blacks and slaves on the plantations. 
In the 1840s there were legal restrictions against the presence of 
free blacks in plantation areas and their movement within the island 
was strictly. 25 New demographic patterns had contributed to diminish 
anxieties about the black population in the 1860s. Nevertheless, the 
historian Pezuela, writing in the mid-1860s, observed that although 
statistics showed there were a great number of free coloureds 
employed in urban and rural activities, most were employed in non-
essential tasks and that it would be "dangerous, imprudent and 
impolitic" to use them on sugar plantations. 26 Despite prohibitions, 
a few free blacks were employed in administrative and supervision 
tasks. But it may have been that the harsh conditions of plantation 
labour and its association with slavery as well as the availability 
of land in frontier zones made it difficult  as it would be with 
Spanish free workers _ to bind free blacks to the plantations. 
Until mid-century, field labour was the exclusive domain of 
slaves, who often worked also as blacksmiths, coopers, carpenters 
and masons. The use of freemen as labourers was marginal. Gangs of 
free workers were commonly hired to clear frontier lands of forest 
or brush. Free wage labourers were also employed in administration 
and supervision tasks, or as cattle tenders. 27 
With the dramatic concentration of resources in sugar production, 
the mass of slave imports appeared to have been drawn to sugar 
estates. In 1822 the British Commissioner estimated that there were 
about 155,000 slaves on sugar plantations, 54,000 on coffee farms, 
36,000 on minor estates such as tobacco fincas, small farms and 
cattle ranches, with a further 20,000 employed in household 
25 F.W. Knight, "Slavery, Race and Social Structure in Cuba 
during the Nineteenth Century" in R.B. Toplin (ed.) Slavery and Race 
Relations in Latin America (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1974) pp.204- 
227, p.212. 
26 J. de la Pezuela, Necesidades de Cuba (Madrid: Imprenta del 
Banco Industrial y Mercantil, 1865) pp.114-115. 
27 L.W. Bergad, Cuban Rural Society in the Nineteenth Century.  
The Social and Economic History of Monoculture in Matanzas 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) pp.245-246. 
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services. 28 In 1841, there were 240,263 slaves in the fields 
(campos) and 196,232 in villages and towns (poblaciones); in 1860 
there were 311,245 slaves in campos and 65,539 in poblaciones. 29 
According to R. Scott most Cuban slaves in the 1860s lived in the 
countryside, and the largest group (47%) lived on sugar estates. 3° 
 Table 8 shows the distribution of slave population by place of 
residence in Cuba in 1862, Appendix. Rural slaves who were not 
employed in sugar production worked on coffee plantations and 
tobacco vegas, or other small farms and ranches. 
Table 9, based on a census of 1860, shows the distribution of the 
population within the island. The great majority of slaves (86%) was 
concentrated in the Western department were sugar production 
prevailed. In the Western department, slaves corresponded to about 
29% of total regional population, free coloured were 13% and whites 
59% of total regional population. In the Eastern department slaves 
accounted for only 20%, free coloured about 33% and whites 47%. A 
substantial part of the white population was not directly inserted 
in the sugar economy. In 1862 about 236,000 whites lived on sitios 
de labor and estancias predominantly devoted to the raising of food 
crops and another 75,000 on potreros, stock-raising ranches. Some 
311,000 whites lived in the cities and towns, and fewer than 42,000 
on the sugar plantations. 31 The free population of colour was 
concentrated in the western part of the island, in urban areas. In 
the eastern area it had a rural character. Of 84,500 free persons of 
28 A.F. Corwin, op.cit., p.45. 
29 H.H.S. Aimes. A History of Slavery in Cuba, 1511 to 1868. 1st 
ed. 1907, New York: Octagon Books, 1967. p.179. 
30 R.J. Scott, op.cit., pp.10-11. For a distinct view see H.S. 
Klein, Slavery in the Americas. A Comparative Study of Virginia and 
Cuba (London: Oxford Knaegsity Press, 1967, p.151, where he argued 
that because Cubay\rEversified economy, sugar employed only a 
minority of slaves even in the 1860s. 
n• Distribucion de la poblacion en los pueblos y fincas de la 
Noticias Estadisticas de la Isla de Cuba en 1862 (Havana: 
Imprenta del Gobierno, 1864); R.J. Scott, op.cit., p.8; Informacion 
sobre reformas en Cuba y Puerto Rico (New York: Imprenta de Hallet 
y Breen, 1867) I, pp.177-178. 
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color in the eastern districts, some 23,700 lived on estancias, 
while another 15,500 lived on tobacco farms and 7,400 on ranches and 
stock-raising farms. 32 
Although these figures can throw light on the size, composition 
and location of the labour force available to the Cuban sugar 
plantations, by themselves they do not explain the whole situation. 
The problem of "scarcity of labour" was not merely a demographic 
matter and the task of defining policies attempting to increase or 
replace labour supply involved political and economic matters. A 
variety of reasons and circumstances affected choices and attitudes 
to the problem of finding alternative sources of workers, recruited 
either externally or domestically. The choice of a particular 
labourer involved economic calculations such as costs while 
political circumstances, such as maintenance of colonial ties, 
racial balance and external pressures raised other problems. For 
planters, profits and discipline were the main practical issues. 
Initial attempts to solve the "labour problem" involved the 
promotion of white settlement. The feeling that this was the most 
desirable form of immigration would be expressed repeatedly 
throughout the period. The promotion of European immigration would 
help meet the demand for labour while "whitening" the population and 
so facilitate control of blacks and coloureds within the island. 
"Whiteness" and control of blacks and coloureds were also connected 
with questions of autonomy and the constitution of an independent 
nation and not simply related to fears of slave rebellions and 
racial conflicts. Nevertheless, plantation conditions necessitated 
"cheap labour". After unsuccessful attempts to import Spanish 
workers, Cuban planters started looking at other potential sources 
of supply. Proposals would include Asians, Mexican Indians, Canary 
Islanders, free Africans and former slaves. 
In 1847 the first Chinese were introduced on a contract-labour 
basis for a period of eight years, subject to voluntary renewal if 
32 Noticias Estadisticas, op.cit.; R.J. Scott, op.cit., p.8. 
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desired. In 1849 the first contingent of Yucatecan Indians arrived 
in Havana, brought by the merchant Carlos Tolm6. It is estimated two 
thousand Yucatecans were imported during the next decade. 33 But 
Chinese contract workers proved to be answer to planter demands for 
cheap field hands. Between 1847 to 1874 some 125,000 Chinese were 
brought to Cuba (See Table 10, Appendix). Chinese workers entered 
Cuba at the same time as slaves continued to be imported. Indeed for 
most of this period the slave trade was notoriously buoyant. But the 
scale of Chinese worker imports rose markedly after the end of the 
slave trade in the mid-1860s; about 50% of the total number of 
coolies was imported after the end of trans-Atlantic slave trade. 
The organization of the trade in Chinese was very similar to that of 
slaves: terms of engagement, transportation, sale of contracts, 
discipline on the plantations and the profits yielded to the 
traffickers were similar. Chinese labour contracts were sold for a 
period of eight years at four pesos a month, plus food, shelter and 
two changes of clothing a year, a price far below the standard wage 
of free workers. Increasing slave prices made cheaper Chinese 
contract workers very appealing. The majority were taken to sugar 
plantations in the jurisdictions of Matanzas, Cardenas and Colon, 
then the most dynamic sugar areas. Table 11 shows the distribution 
of the Chinese population in Cuba between 1861 and 1877. 
Preparing conditions for free labour. The 1860s witnessed a series 
of great transformations in the Cuban sugar industry. The crisis of 
he Spanish colonialism, the powerful presence of United States, rapid 
developments in science and technology, the universal increase in 
population and new systems of communications were among the causes 
that set the scene for new forms of production and commerce of 
sugar. 
The new industrial plantation, the central or centralized factory 
as it came to be known, would require distinct types of workers and 
a very large capital investment. The replacement of old manual 
machines by relatively sophisticated plant required new buildings 
D.C. Corbitt, "Immigration in Cuba" Hispanic American 
Historical Review 22 (May 1942) pp.280-308, p.302. 
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and a new system of plantation organization. The new central had a 
greater grinding capacity and a higher rate of sugar extraction and 
depended on a more skilled work force than the old ingenio. In 1860 
1,318 mills produced some 515,000 metric tons of sugar: by 1895 the 
number of mills decreased to 250 while production was up to almost 
one million tons. According to Fraginals, the new factories could 
extract almost twice the amount of sugar from the same amount of 
cane as the old mills. 34 
Hundreds of thousand of agricultural workers were required by the 
modern industry in addition to skilled mills hands. Fraginals 
observes that the technology of the agricultural sector of the sugar 
industry (planting, cultivation, and harvesting) lagged behind 
processing. Methods of cultivation and harvesting remained largely 
traditional. Therefore, the amount of cane required by the central 
demanded more land devoted to sugar and a greater number of workers, 
especially cane-cutters. This intensified problems of seasonal 
unemployment outside the three to four months cane harvest season. 
The gap between the agricultural and industrial sector also created 
problems of amortization and optimal utilization of expensive new 
industrial equipment. 35 
In the 1860s, Cuba supplied about 60% of sugar consumed in the 
United States of America and the importance of Cuba in the U.S 
market was growing rapidly. At this time the island exported over 
250,000 metric tons to U.S.A; in 1880 it exported over 500,000 
metric tons to U.S.A., more than 80% of its sugar exports. 36 
 Correspondingly, competition from beet sugar reduced Cuban exports 
to Europe in the last decades of the nineteenth century. "In 1870 
Cuba exported to Europe (excluding the Spanish home market) some 
34 M.Moreno Fraginals, "Plantation Economies and Societies in 
the Spanish Caribbean, 1860-1930" in The Cambridge History of Latin 
America, 1870-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1986) 4: 
pp.187-231, p.188. 
35 M.Moreno Fraginals, "Plantation Economies", op.cit., pp.189- 
190. 
36 M. Moreno Fraginals, El Ingenio, III, pp.70-71. 
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260,000 tons of sugar amounting to 37 per cent of total exports. In 
1880 the figure had fallen to 50,000 tons, some 8.54 per cent: and 
in 1890 exports to Europe were a mere 4,702 tons or 0.72 per cent of 
total Cuban sugar exports". 37 By the 1880s the island was selling 
virtually all its sugar to U.S.A through a single firm, the American 
Sugar Refining Co. 38  
In 1862, 79% of the population residing on ingenios was 
constituted of emancipados and slaves. Free blacks represented 2%, 
and whites and Orientals the balance of 190 In spite of the low 
numbers, the growing participation of whites attracted particular 
comment. A "growing" number of whites were "... employed in various 
tasks of sugar cultivation, sometimes as mere day labourers, tenants 
and colonos". 40 
Although slaves remained the most important element in sugar 
production, the composition of the workforce varied from estate to 
estate. Large plantations appeared to rely more heavily on slave 
labour than small ones. In 1873 the workforce for cultivating and 
processing sugar at the ingenio "Espafia" of Julian Zulueta, in the 
jurisdiction of Colon, was made up of 19 whites, 530 slaves and 86 
Asian. By this time, diversity of labour force was the main 
characteristic of most plantations. This implied workers engaged 
under a variety of conditions and terms of remuneration. Chinese 
already made up an important portion of the workforce. At the 
ingenio "Las Canas" of Don Juan Poey, in Matanzas, of a total of 707 
37 M. Moreno Fraginals, "Plantation Economies", op.cit., pp.194- 
195. 
38  Ibid., p.207. 
39 F. Iglesias Garcia, "The Development of Capitalism in Cuban 
Sugar Production: 1860-1900" in M. Moreno Fraginals,F.MPons and 
S.L. Engerman (ed.) Between Slavery and Free Labor: The Spanish-
Speaking Caribbean in the Nineteenth Century (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins Press, 1985): pp.54-75, p.60. See Table 8, Appendix. 
40 Informacion sobre reformas en Cuba y Puerto Rico (New York: 
Imprenta de Hallet y Breen, 1867) I, p.171. 
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workers, 27 were whites, 450 slaves and 230 Asian. 41 According to 
Bergad, in 1859, the Diago family estates (Tinguaro, Santa Elena and 
Ponina) utilized a workforce totalling 1,580, of whom 583 were 
Chinese. The Arieta estate of Flor de Cuba had a total workforce of 
643, of which 30% were Chinese. Bergad also observed that on 
smaller, less capitalized mills, the proportions of Chinese were 
sometimes higher. 42 Although a great variety in the labour supply 
and systems of labour _ free whites and blacks, Chinese and 
contract labourers from Yucatan, soldiers, coartados and distinct 
forms of relations with the slaves themselves _ was encountered on 
estates, sugar production continued to depend on coercive labour 
arrangements. And as late as 1877 more than 70% of sugar production 
was based on slave labour. 43 
From 1868 to 1878 Cuba experienced the Ten Years War; the first 
large-scale struggle for independence. This important event would 
produce great changes in patterns of labour control, especially for 
the black population. The Moret Law starting the gradual abolition 
of slavery was approved in the midst of the war. In addition, many 
slaves were freed or fled during the conflict. And in 1874 the last 
shipload of Chinese contract workers would arrive in Cuba. The 
Patronship law of 1880 led to final abolition of slavery six years 
late. Between 1862 and 1877 the slave population declined from 
368,550 to 199,094. The main sugar regions of Matanzas and Santa 
Clara held a large and steady number of slaves for most of the 
period, contrasted to the urban area of Havana, where slave 
population gradually declined. (See Table 12, slave population 
between 1862-1877). 
The western part of the island, where the most sophisticated 
central mills were located and which produced over 80% of Cuban 
41 F. Rosillo y Alquier, Noticia de dos ingenios y datos sobre 
la producci6n azucarera de la Isla de Cuba. (Havana: Imprenta El 
Iris, 1873). 
42 L.W. Bergad, op.cit., p.252. 
43 M. Moreno Fraginals. "Plantation Economies", op.cit., p.205. 
43 
sugar, did not suffer greatly from the war. But changes were visible 
even there. In parallel, and as a response to the system of central 
factory, a new form of organizing cane cultivation developed. This 
was the so-called colonato system. According to Galloway, the first 
colonos appeared in significant numbers during the 1870s and already 
by 1887 a third to two-fifths of Cuban sugar was grown under the 
colonato system. It included two categories of colonos: tenants who 
leased land on condition they cultivated sugar cane to send to the 
landowner's mill or central factory and landowners who contracted to 
supply their cane to a central factory. Cuban colonos did not 
constitute a uniform class. Many were independent landowners, 
ranging from owners of small farms to large estates employing large 
numbers of workers. Renters might include former slaves (who had 
been granted land or leased small plots in order to discourage them 
from leaving the estate) tenants with long leases and entrepreneurs 
contracted a on annual basis to supply a specific mill. Rents were 
paid in cane, cash or a combination of both. The arrangements 
linking different types of colonos to sugar processing also 
varied. 44 By leasing land to colonos, a mill or factory owner could 
increase the area of cane cultivated on his estate without incurring 
additional labour costs himself. The increased production could 
justify the capital expense of technological improvement in milling 
and manufacturing. 
Galloway observed that as a means of organizing cane cultivation, 
the colonato system was a success. It accommodated the needs of 
central factory owners, mills' owners unable to repair war damaged 
estates or unable to finance new equipment, and owners of a few 
acres who wished to participate in the cultivation of a cash crop. 
However, it did not attract many formers' slaves. By the end of the 
period, the system applied almost exclusively to white owners and 
tenants . 45 
44 J.H. Galloway, op.cit., pp.165-166; L.W. Bergad, op.cit., 
pp.208-213. 
45 J.H. Galloway, op.cit., p.166; R.J. Scott, op.cit., p.241. 
44 
2.2. The making of a coffee province.  Like sugar in Cuba, coffee 
would change the economy and society of nineteenth-century Sao 
Paulo. By setting up new patterns of production, landholding and 
labour relations it changed the physical geography and rural and 
urban life of the province. At the beginning of the century, the 
province had a relatively diversified production _ alongside sugar 
and aguardente, appeared cotton, manioc, corn, meat, bacon, cheese 
and animals. Some of these products were exported to other provinces 
but most were consumed locally. 46 During the 1810s and 1820s sugar 
expanded continuously and started to change the character of the 
province  
In 1825 coffee had reached second place on the list of exports 
through the port of Santos. 48 By this time, drawing on coffee 
produced in other provinces, coffee exports from the port of Rio de 
Janeiro were also increasing steadily. They rose from 318,032 
arrobas in 1817 to 1,304,450 arrobas in 1826. 49 The growing demand 
from the United States of America and from European countries 
stimulated the planting of coffee. In 1820, with the rise in coffee 
prices, innumerable cafezais appeared around Rio de Janeiro. 50 Until 
the mid-century, the Paraiba Valley was the principal area of 
cultivation. The suitability of Paraiba land for coffee cultivation 
contributed to its spread from the coast around Rio de Janeiro up 
the Valley to the highlands of the province of sao Paulo. By the 
46 A.E. Taunay, Historia do Café no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: 
Departamento Nacional do Café, 1939), II, p.306. 
47 On the development of sugar production in Sao Paulo see 
S.R.R. de Queiroz, "Algumas notas sobre a lavoura do apicar em Sao 
Paulo no periodo colonial" in Anais do Museu Paulista  (sao Paulo 
1967) 21, pp.109-277; M.T.S. Petrone, A lavoura canavieira em Sao 
Paulo. Expansao e declinio (1765-1851) (sao Paulo:Difusao Europeia 
do Livro, 1968); see also W. Dean, Rio Claro. A Brazilian Plantation 
System, 1820-1920 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976) 
chapters 1 and 2. 
48 A.E. Taunay,op.cit., II, p.329. 
49 A.E. Taunay, op.cit., II, p.331; one arroba equals 14,40 
kilogram or 31,7 pounds. 
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mid-1830s coffee cultivation reached the fertile lands of Campinas, 
in the west of sao Paulo. There had been some experiences with 
coffee planting before. 51 But whether due to fears of frosts or due 
to the great distance from, and cost of transport to, the ports or 
simply due to high profits from sugar, these early experiments with 
coffee generally failed. Nevertheless, by 1838 the president of the 
province commented in his annual report on the lack of good roads to 
transport coffee from the plateau to the littoral, and stressed the 
need to improve existing roads in the areas of Bananal, Angra dos 
Reis and Ubatuba. 52 Another report of 1838 pointed out how proximity 
to the ports and difficulties of transport affected the distribution 
of products in the province. At this time, the north produced much 
more coffee than any other area of the province. There coffee 
outnumbered the sugar plantations: in Bananal there were 82 coffee 
fazendas and 8 sugar mills and coffee was despatched to Rio de 
Janeiro for export. 53 But sugar had expanded to the south and west 
and within the province still predominated. The number of sugar 
mills in Campinas had increased from practically zero in 1770 to 95 
in 1829. 54 
Most commercial transactions were made in Rio de Janeiro. The 
greater development of coffee production in Rio de Janeiro was 
evident. In 1838 Rio was producing 2,948,378 arrobas of coffee and 
51 A.E. Taunay, op.cit., II, p.323. 
52 Discurso que o Excmo. Sr. Presidente da Provincia de Sao 
Paulo diriqio a Assemblea Leqislativa da Provincia em 7 de Janeiro  
de 1838 (sao Paulo: Typ. do Governo, 1838). 
53 D.P. Muller Ensaio d'un Quadro Estatistico da Provincia de  
S. Paulo, ordenado pelas leis provinciais de 11 de abril de 1836 e  
10 de marco de 1837 (Sao Paulo: Typ. de Costa Silveira, 1838), 
reprint. Secgao de Obras d'o "Estado de S. Paulo", 1923, pp.130-132; 
A.E. Taunay, op.cit., III, pp.104-107. 
54 Slave population in Campinas increased in this period from 
less than one hundred to 4,890, surpassing the number of free 
people, Peter L. Eisenberg,"Agficar e mudanga social no Brasil: 
Campinas, Sao Paulo, 1767-1830" in his Homens esquecidos. Escravos  
e Trabalhadores Livres no Brasil . Seculos XVIII e XIX. (Campinas: 
Editora da UNICAMP, 1989) pp.343-368, p.344; for the development of 
sugar in Campinas until 1830, see same work, part IV. 
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in 1855 production reached its peak with 9,369,107 arrobas, nearly 
80% of Brazilian coffee production. But coffee production in Sao 
Paulo was expanding fast. By the end of the 1830s, Sao Paulo 
exported through port of Rio de Janeiro some 842,917 arrobas of 
coffee, and in 1855 this had increased to 1,562,477 arrobas. 55 There 
were already signs of a great transformation in the province. 
Changes in the structure of landholding, the great circulation of 
thousand of mules, muleteers coming from the southern provinces, and 
the improvement of roads, animal sheds, and commerce, all reflected 
the development of sugar and coffee cultivation. 56 Smallholders were 
expelled from traditional subsistence plots. Existing on the edge of 
the frontier, squatters were transformed into nomads, agregados, 
freemen and non-renting-paying tenants. Smallholders lost their 
former independence from the plantation sector. Now they became a 
marginal element of the plantation economy, dependent on the planter 
for access to land granted in exchange for labour and other 
services. In a report of 1831, the president of the province 
observed that "the labouring classes" (meaning slaves) and the free 
population were growing in number. 57 
Table 14 shows the evolution of the Sao Paulo free and slave 
population from 1819 until 1886. As Cuba, Sao Paulo experienced an 
absolute growth in both the free and slave population, but the 
proportion of slaves declined almost continuously. In 1819 the 
population of the province numbered 238,323 inhabitants, of whom 
about 67% were free and 33% enslaved. Thirty five years later, total 
population had increased considerably (57%): free population 
constituted over 70% of total population and the proportion of 
slaves had decreased to about 28%. This was a small proportion if 
compared to the slave population of other provinces such as Rio de 
Janeiro, Bahia or Pernambuco. However in terms of absolute numbers 
slaves had increased considerably from 77,667 in 1819 to 117,238 in.  
1854. The great majority of slaves were imported in the 1830s and 
55 A.E. Taunay, op.cit., III, p.20 and see Table 13 in Appendix. 
56 A.E. Taunay, op.cit., III, p.78. 
57 A.E. Taunay, op.cit., III, p.78. 
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1840s, immediately before and after the trans-Atlantic trade was 
declared illegal. 
At this time, the growing number of slaves entering the province 
was a matter of concern for both government and the free and white 
population. In his Ensaio Daniel Pedro Muller criticized the "habit" 
of buying slaves instead of looking for better methods of production 
and labour saving devices. In his view, efficient, small scale 
agriculture employing free labour was preferable to large 
landholdings cultivated by slaves. 58 The increase in slave numbers 
raised fears about the "blackening" of the population, a concern 
rooted in the experience of slave rebellions in other provinces and 
in the broader discussion about the constitution of the recently 
created nation. Slave revolts in Bahia and other parts of the 
country rekindled fears of the Haitian experiences. These anxieties 
appeared to be well founded in sao Paulo. The province was not well-
populated: in 1837, for instance, there was less than 1 person per 
square kilometre. The lack of good roads and the scarcity of free 
population at the disposal of the government would make it very 
difficult to repress any slave revolt in the hinterland. The 
constant fear of travelling in underpopulated areas and roads 
infested of runways slaves exercised merchants, muleteers and 
travellers. In 1848, in his report to the Assembly, the provincial 
president Domiciano Leite Ribeiro, reported that there had been some 
anxiety among planters of Campinas, Itu and Piracicaba about the 
possibility of a general slave rebellion and that panic was 
spreading among Indaiatuba planters causing them to abandon their 
houses and estates. 59 
Although a highly profitable enterprise, coffee cultivation was 
reported to be difficult, hard work. The backwardness of techniques 
of coffee growing and processing were mentioned repeatedly. It was 
stated that all tasks were performed with most rude tools. Before 
58 D.P. Muller, op.cit.; A.E. Taunay, op.cit., III, p.102. 
59 Fala proferida pelo presidente Domiciano Leite Ribeiro, por 
ocasiao da abertura da Assemblea Legislativa em 25 de junho de 1848. 
(Sao Paulo: Typ. do Governo, 1848). 
48 
coffee cultivation could begin, the virgin forest had to be cleared. 
This was a dangerous task and planters often substituted free 
labour, in the form of landless squatters, for that of valuable 
slaves. After clearing and selecting hardwoods to be used to 
construct the main buildings, the land was fired. But clearing and 
planting was just the beginning of the seasonal cycle that continued 
with successive weedings, harvesting, drying, storing, and milling 
of the mature coffee beans. Carlos Taunay in his Manual do 
Agricultor observed that the harvest was carried out manually, and 
that "women and children were the most suitable for picking coffee, 
even amongst six foot high coffee bushes". 60 
At this time, Brazilian coffee had a very bad reputation in 
European markets. According to Carlos Taunay it was considered "the 
last one among commercial kinds" . 61 Some contemporary observers 
attributed the bad quality of Brazilian coffee to the method of 
drying. The drying terrace (terreiro) at this time was of earth, and 
the beans acquired a bad taste. Carlos Taunay advised in his Manual  
that "the method of drying coffee on terraces, besides the intensive 
nature of the work, was prejudicial to the quality of beans". 
Exposed to the elements, the beans deteriorated rapidly. 62 He also 
observed that there were some planters who used to dehull beans by 
hand. This was a time consuming task. Grinding was also performed by 
hand. Taunay observed that on modern plantations, the hulling, 
cleaning, drying and grinding processes were mechanized as the scale 
of production increased. 63 
At mid-century sugar was still the main staple in the province. 
But coffee was becoming more and more important. Coffee prevailed in 
the north, while in the central districts of Campinas and Itu sugar 
continued to be the main cash crop. Jose Thomaz Nabuco de Araujo, 
60 C.A. Taunay, Manual do AcTricultor Brazileiro 2th ed. (Rio de 
Janeiro: Villeneuve e comp., 1839) p.38. 




president of the province in 1852, reported 466 sugar plantations 
and 395 coffee plantations. He observed that coffee cultivation was 
increasingly prosperous and had started replacing sugar. Coffee 
cultivation now being described as easier and more lucrative than 
sugar, in part because the crop was less affected by the bad 
conditions of roads in the province." 
Table 15 shows the evolution of Sao Paulo coffee and sugar 
exports in the 1850s; Table 16 shows the increasing importance of 
coffee within sao Paulo export products during the 1860s and Table 
17 shows the improvement in coffee prices between 1845-1872. 
According to a 1854 report of Machado de Oliveira, coffee employed 
a greater number of workers, and its production was worth more than 
that of sugar. Only in terms of area under cultivation was coffee 
second to sugar. 65 Consistently better prices encouraged planters 
to shift from sugar to coffee or to move from subsistence 
commodities such as corn, beans, rice and manioc into coffee. Given 
the greater profitability of coffee, planters preferred to buy 
subsistence products, rather than to divert potential coffee land to 
other production. In 1860 the high price and scarcity of food 
products was the object of a study carried out by Sebastian Ferreira 
Soares, a mathematician and government official. Soares observed 
that the crisis in food supplies in coffee producing areas was 
mainly provoked by the greater profitability of the staple, which 
now incorporated land and labour previously devoted to subsistence 
64 Mappa das fabricas agricolas de S. Paulo" in Discurso com 
que o Ill.Excmo.Sr. Dr. Jose Thomaz Nabuco de Aradio, presidente da 
provincia de Sao Paulo abrio a Assemblea Legislativa Provincial no  
dia 1 de maio de 1852 (Sao Paulo: Louzada Antunes, 1852) appendix, 
pp.36-37. 
65 " Quadro estatistico de alguns estabelecimentos ruraes da 
provincia de Sao Paulo", organizado pelo Brigadeiro Jose Joaquim 
Machado de Oliveira in Discurso com que o Sr. Jose Antonio Saraiva,  
presidente da provincia de Sao Paulo, abrio a Assemblea Legislativa  
da Provincia de Sao Paulo, no dia 15 de fevereiro de 1855; A.E. 
Taunay, op.cit., III, pp.134-135. 
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By the middle of the century, the importance of coffee production 
for the Brazilian economy was evident. The main coffee producing 
areas were in the provinces of Rio de Janeiro, no Paulo and Minas 
Gerais. Table 13 demonstrate the volume of coffee export through the 
port of Rio de Janeiro between 1850 and 1872. The province of Rio de 
Janeiro was in the lead but as data in Table 18 (coffee exports 
through port of Santos) indicates, sao Paulo was rapidly overtaking 
decadent coffee regions around Rio de Janeiro. At the end of the 
1860s, the opening of the railway linking Santos to the edge of the 
coffee zone would increase considerably coffee exportation through 
this port, as well as furthering the expansion of Paulista coffee 
cultivation. 
Table 19 shows the value of coffee and sugar exports and their 
share in total Brazilian exports. During the 1830s coffee had 
overtaken sugar as Brazil's leading export and by 1850 coffee 
accounted for nearly half of all Brazilian export earnings. From 
this time on, the importance and profitability of coffee sharpened 
differences between the northeastern sugar provinces and the 
southern coffee provinces. Besides the specific needs of both crops, 
the increasing regional differences, resulting from a relative 
stagnation of sugar production and the greater profitability of 
coffee would greatly affect perceptions of the labour problem in the 
two areas and, of course, the means devised to resolve that problem. 
Labour for coffee. Like sugar in Cuba, the expansion of Brazilian 
coffee plantations coincided with external pressures to end the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade and the spread of antislavery ideas. 
When the Portuguese regent, D. Joao VI, and his Court arrived in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1808, fleeing from Napolean's forces, he had 
already committed himself to abolishing the slave trade. That was a 
66 S.F. Soares, Notas Estatisticas sobre a Produodo Agricola e 
Carestia dos G6neros Alimenticios no Brasil. Reprinted (Rio de 
Janeiro: IPEA/INPES, 1977) p.19. 
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condition imposed by the English for escorting him from Portugal to 
Brazil. There followed a series of treaties between the two 
governments for the abolition of the slave trade to Brazil. In 1810 
the Portuguese government agreed to cooperate with the British 
government in the gradual abolition of the trade and to prohibit 
trade with no-Portuguese territories on coastal Africa. In 1815, 
still under pressure, D. Joao VI accepted the prohibition of the 
trade north of the Equator and in 1817 agreed with partial measures 
to abolish the trade to Brazil. Far from reducing the trans-Atlantic 
traffic, these agreements actually resulted in a swift growth in its 
volume as well as in the appearing of the contraband slave trade. In 
1826 Great Britain obtained promise from the government of the 
recently independent state of Brazil to make the slave trade illegal 
in three years time. After 1830 the traffic would be considered and 
treated as "piracy". Thus, for Brazilians legal trans-Atlantic slave 
traffic should end on March 13th, 1830. A parallel measure declared 
free all slaves entering the country after March 1830. However, 
despite the threat of severe punishment against both importers and 
smugglers, the traffic grew. Only in the early 1850s, under stronger 
British pressure and with the enforcement of the Eusebio de Queiroz 
law (September 4, 1850) would the trans-Atlantic slave trade finally 
end for Brazil. 67 
Table 20 shows the volume of slaves disembarked in Brazil during 
the critical period 1820-1855. The increasing number of slaves 
landed in the southern provinces is striking. In the south most of 
these slaves were directed to the coffee provinces of Minas Gerais, 
Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Many also stayed in the capital Rio de 
67 After the abolition of the trade the Brazilian consul in 
Spain was instructed to observe and report about movement of slaves 
in Cuba; there was also a vice consul in Havana with the obligation 
to report on the issue, see AHI, RepartigOes Consulares Brasileiras, 
Correspondencia Geral Barcelona, 239/1/6 and 239/1/7. On the 
abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade to Brazil see Leslie 
Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade. Britain and the 
Slave Trade Question, 1807-1869 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970); Robert Conrad The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery:  
1850-1888 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972) chapter 
2 and same author, World of Sorrow: The African Slave Trade to 
Brazil (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986). 
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Janeiro. The coffee planters in Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Sao 
Paulo could afford the high prices prevailing during the illegal 
trade and provisioned themselves with the required work force. The 
great number of slaves concentrated in these three provinces can be 
appreciated from Table 21, which shows Brazilian slave population by 
province between 1864 and 1887. In 1864 the centre-south of Brazil 
accounted for over 40% of Brazilian slaves. The three coffee 
provinces alone concentrated about 37% of Brazilian slave 
population. Added to newly imported slaves came others transferred 
from urban to rural areas and moved from one sector of production to 
another. The number of slaves entering northern sugar provinces was 
visibly smaller and declined considerably during the years 
immediately before the end of the trans-Atlantic trade. Northeastern 
sugar planters instead of buying preferred to sell their slaves, 
attracted by high profits in southern slave markets." The practice 
of selling slaves to the southern coffee plantations which started 
by this time continued for about three decades after the abolition 
of the international slave trade. While fulfilling the needs of the 
expanding coffee plantations, the internal trade contributed to 4-he solve financial problems confronting northern sugar and cotton 
cultivators. From the 1870s the greater concentration of slaves in 
the southern coffee area was evident. This would greatly affect the 
balance of power within the country, enhancing the influence of 
coffee planters in the government and defining attitudes towards the 
solution of the labour problem. 
68 The higher prices of slaves in Rio de Janeiro than, for 
instance in Pernambuco, the main northern sugar province, is 
illustrated by tables and graphs covering the period after the 
abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade in S.J. Stein, 
Vassouras. A Brazilian Coffee County, 1850-1900 3rd ed. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985) p.229, and P.L. Eisenberg, The 
Sugar Industry in Pernambuco. Modernization Without Change, 1840-  
1910(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974) p.153. Although 
slave prices in Pernambuco rose 50% in the 1860s, and almost doubled 
during the next decade, in the province of Rio de Janeiro they rose 
even more and by the end of the 1870s reached four times values in 
the 1850s. In the coffee district of Vassouras slave price reached 
its peak in 1877, a value of 1:925$000; in Pernambuco the average 
nominal price of a 20-25 years of age slave at this time was 
644$000. There was a tax for exportation of 200$000 mil reis after 
1859 and this might have increased contraband. 
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Table 22 gives details of the sao Paulo regional free and slave 
population after the end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade; Tables' 
23 shows the registered increase of slaves in Sao Paulo brought 
about by the internal slave trade and the contrast with the other 
coffee provinces. During the period when the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade was illegal, the total slave population of Sao Paulo grew by 
nearly 50%. The Mogiana Paulista area had its slave population 
increased by about four and a half times. In the central area the 
increment was only 24%, but in the mid-1850s the region held the 
largest slave population _ about 40% of the total in the province 
and more than twice the proportion of any other areas. During this 
period, the internal slave trade accounts for about 24% of the 
increase in the slave population of Sao Paulo. Most of these slaves 
seemed to have gone to the Paraiba Valley, the central districts and 
the Mogiana Paulista areas. These regions witnessed the largest 
absolute increases in slave population and still contained the 
largest number of slaves on the eve of the abolition of slavery in 
1888. By 1874, in the main coffee districts of Mogimirim and Rio 
Clam located in the Mogiana Paulista region, there were 5,006 and 
3,935 slaves respectively; in the centre, in Campinas, there were 
13,685 slaves while in the east and Paraiba Valley, in the districts 
of Bananal, Guaratingueta, and Taubate there were 8,281, 4,352, and 
4,122 slaves respectively. 69 
In 1874, from a global population of 855,364 inhabitants in the 
province of Sao Paulo, 680,742 were free and 174,622 slave. Thus, 
20,4% of the population was enslaved. In the 1872 census about 57% 
of the sao Paulo slave population was classified as agricultural 
workers. 70 Although slaves predominated in the coffee plantations, 
there is evidence that coffee estates also employed free immigrant 
and domestic labourers. It is estimated that in the period between 
1875 and 1880, slaves represented five-sixths of the workers in the 
69 R. Conrad, The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, op.cit., 
table 14, p.295.. 
70 R. Conrad, The Destruction, op.cit., table 20, p.300. 
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coffee fields. 71 However, this seemed to represent more the 
situation of certain sections of slaveholding provinces, such as Rio 
de Janeiro and Minas Gerais, or old areas of coffee cultivation in 
Sao Paulo. In the new expanding coffee areas of the centre-west of 
Sao Paulo, there was an increasing incorporation of free workers. In 
1854, according to Machado de Oliveira, there were 2,618 coffee 
fazendas in sao Paulo, employing 4,223 agregados, 2,159 colonos and 
55,834 slaves. 72 In the 1870s, after the approval of Rio Branco Law, 
starting the gradual abolition of slavery, and with increasing 
prices of slaves, individual planters drew large numbers of free 
domestic and immigrant workers to their plantations. 
As soon as pressures for the abolition of the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade mounted in the 1840s, sao Paulo coffee planters, 
predicting a catastrophic labour crisis, started to look for 
alternative sources of labour. Domestic free labourers had always 
participated in coffee production, although only in special tasks 
and by special agreements. In 1847 the first European immigrants 
arrived to work on coffee plantations, engaged in a sharecropping 
scheme. Under the terms of earlier sharecropping contracts, the 
planter financed transportation from the immigrant's country of 
origin to the port of Santos, advanced the cost of transport from 
Santos to the plantation, as well as the foodstuffs and tools the 
immigrant needed. Immigrants were assigned a certain number of 
coffee bushes to be tended and harvested. Immigrants were also 
allotted a subsistence plot where they could grow their own food. 
Their remuneration consisted of half the net profit from coffee 
cultivation and from the food crops. According to Stolcke and Hall, 
there were about 3,500 immigrant labourers working on 30 plantations 
in the province by 1855. 73 
71 R.B. Toplin, The Abolition of Slavery in Brazil (New York: 
Atheneum, 1972) p.35. 
72 " Quadro Estatistico" in Discurso...Sr. Saraiva, 1855, 
op.cit.; A.E. Taunay, op.cit., III, p.134. 
73 V. Stolcke and M.M. Hall, "The Introduction of Free Labour 
on the Sao Paulo Coffee Plantations" Journal of Peasant Studies 
10:2(1983) pp.170-200, p.172. 
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The experiment with immigrant workers on sao Paulo coffee 
plantations would be an example to other provinces in Brazil. These 
experiments would be regarded as "progressive" _ an indication of 
Paulista innovation. But a series of conflicts, rebellions and 
complaints raised by the immigrant workers led to a generalized 
planter sentiment against the sharecropping scheme. The repercussion 
in Europe of the bad conditions on sao Paulo coffee plantations led 
European governments, mainly Prussia and Switzerland, to take severe 
measures against colonizing agencies directing emigrants to Brazil. 
Disenchantment with these first experiments with immigrant 
sharecroppers led planters to look for other ways of solving their 
problem of a "scarcity of labour". Besides increasing their number 
of slaves by means of good treatment and the internal trade, they 
focused on measures to stimulate the employment of Brazilian free 
workers as well. Immigrant sharecropping contracts were then 
gradually replaced by a labour leasing scheme. Instead of a share of 
the production, workers were paid a pre-established piece rate for 
each measure of coffee produced. Chinese contract workers would also 
be an alternative repeatedly under consideration though little 
employed. 
From the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade until the 
sanctioning of the Rio Branco Law, Paulista coffee planters 
experimented with several forms of labour relations. In some 
plantations slaves and free workers laboured side by side. Some 
tasks were executed almost exclusively by free labour, such as those 
considered to be dangerous for expensive slaves. Free workers also 
served in positions of administration and supervision. And one could 
find Brazilian and European free workers working in the fields. 
Preparing conditions for free labour. In 1856 coffee cultivation was 
reported to be "the same as it was a hundred years earlier"; first 
clearing, then firing and planting. 74 But the larger plantations had 
already introduced a few innovations in coffee processing. When the 
74 Cf. A.E. Taunay, op.cit., III, p.140. 
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Swiss representative Von Tschudi visited sao Paulo at the beginning 
of the 1860s, he observed drying terraces (terreiro) laid with dark 
tiles which improved the level of heat, dryness and cleanliness. 75 
 He also observed that hulling machines were beginning to appear in 
the western part of the province. But only large estates were able 
to afford them. 76 In the Vassouras area of the Paraiba Valley, the 
most advanced machine used at the time was the heavy crushing mill 
(engenho de piloes), which removed the hull and pith of the beans. 77 
It is only from the 1870s that these changes became more 
apparent. Coffee processing was improved with the use of driers, 
hullers, and cleaning machines. In 1871, the president of the 
province reported that the plantation owners of sao Paulo were no 
longer as backward as in previous years; they had improved their 
methods of coffee cultivation and processing by adopting and 
adapting new techniques. The employment of the plough was reported 
to be common. According to the provincial president, plantation 
owners knew that mechanization was the best means of saving labour, 
which was scarce and expensive. In his view, the progressive 
utilization of machinery was a result of the impossibility of 
increasing labour supply, and of the need to improve coffee 
processing in order to achieve higher prices in the market. And the 
evidence of that _ the president pointed out _ was the 
introduction and widespread employment of American Lidgerwood 
machines, the high costs of which was compensated by the better 
75 The purpose of the terraces was to provide coffee with air 
and heat. This phase of coffee production was very important and 
requires a great care. The lays of coffee had to be mixed many times 
during the day and immediately removed in case of rain. Tschudi also 
observed that there has been attempts to cover terraces, replacing 
sun for artificial heat. J.J. von Tschudi, Viaqem as Provincias do 
Rio de Janeiro e S. Paulo, transl. E. de L. Castro (Sao Paulo: 
Martins, 1953) pp.42-43. 
76 J.J. von Tschudi, op.cit., p.43. 
77 E.V. da Costa, "Sharecroppers and Plantation Owners. An 
Experiment with Free Labour" in The Brazilian Empire, Myths and 
Histories (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985) pp.94- 
124, p.113. 
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prices of the final product. 78 In 1883, a traveller who visited the 
coffee estates in Sao Paulo, wrote that on many of them, the coffee 
beans were pounded, hulled, sorted, polished and sacked 
mechanically. 79 
Alongside the progressive utilization of machinery, the 
construction of a railway network represented a major change. Prior 
to the construction of railways, planters relied on mules, which 
required a large number of workers. The poor roads and the 
deplorable condition of tracks in the Serra do Mar had occasioned 
repeated protests from planters. In 1867 the Sao Paulo railway, 
linking the port of Santos to the edge of the coffee zone, Jundiai, 
was opened. Continued railway building over the next decades helped 
to cut costs and risks and facilitated a saving in labour engaged in 
the transport of coffee. The rapid expansion of coffee production in 
Sao Paulo evolved as a function of the steady westward movement of 
the agricultural frontier permitted by railway construction. 80 
Following railway construction in the 1870s, coffee exports from 
Santos rose from an annual average of 22,300 tonnes for the 
triennium 1866-68 to 35,900 tonnes in 1872-74 and to 44,300 tonnes 
in 1875-77. 81 But if from the 1870s, improvements in machinery and 
transport of coffee helped in the first instance to ease the labour 
problem, in the long run by helping to incorporate new areas and 
expand coffee cultivation it provoked and exponential growth in the 
78 Relatorio apresentado a Assemblea Legislativa Provincial de 
Sao Paulo pelo presidente Excmo. Sr. Dr. Antonio da Costa Pinto  
Silva, em 5 de fevereiro de 1871 (Sao Paulo: Typ. Americana, 1871); 
also A.E. Taunay, op.cit., III, pp.222-223. 
79 E.V. da Costa, "Sharecroppers and Plantation Owners", 
op.cit., p.116. 
80 C.M. Lewis, Public Policy and Private Initiative. Railway 
Building in Sao Paulo, 1860-1899 (London: Institute of latin 
American Studies, 1991) p.13 and pp.19-20; on the development of 
railways in Sao Paulo see also 0. Nogueira de Matos, Café e 
ferrovias: a evolucao ferroviaria de Sao Paulo e o desenvolvimento  
da cultura cafeeira (Sao Paulo: 1974). 
81 C.M. Lewis, op.cit., p.15. 
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demand for labour. 82 Concerns about labour scarcity grew throughout 
the period preceding the final abolition of abolition of slavery in 
1888. 
The approval in 1871 of the Rio Branco Law provoked fears of an 
imminent labour crisis. This law was approved in the face of strong 
opposition by coffee planters. By this time, regional differences 
between the northeastern sugar and southern coffee provinces were 
apparent. At the middle of the century slaves represented about 
three quarters of the labour force of sugar plantations. With the 
end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the high price of slaves, 
sugar planters started to draw upon the large free population 
available and to sell their slaves for a better price to the coffee 
areas. In 1872, in the sugar areas, free labourers surpassed slaves 
in all categories of activities; the importance of slavery had been 
dramatically reduced. 83 Meanwhile, nationally the slave population 
had been increasingly concentrated in the south and was the most 
important contingent of labour supply for the expanding coffee 
plantations. At the end of the 1870s, fearing that the increasing 
distinct interests of the sugar and coffee areas over the issue of 
slavery would undermine national support for the institution, coffee 
planters started to press for the end of the internal trade. This 
was the time when Sao Paulo coffee planters were most concerned 
about the problem of labour supply. Slavery was expected to be 
abolished gradually, but a growing antislavery movement might result 
in an earlier end. Slave protests were mounting and had been 
expressed in the form of flight and violent crimes. Promotion of 
European immigrant workers had been frustrating and immigrants 
already engaged in coffee cultivation had been restive; strikes and 
rebellions were often reported. Brazilian workers had been 
incorporated but were traditionally 
regarded as lazy and unreliable. Chinese contract workers had been 
considered but remained a very controversial alternative and former 
82 C. M. Lewis, op.cit., p.19. 
83 P.L. Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry in Pernambuco.  
Modernization Without Change, 1840-1910. (Berkeley: University of 
Carolina Press, 1974) p.181. 
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slaves were not expected to continue performing field work in the 
plantations. 
Two factors would contribute considerably to re-direct the 
attention of S'do Paulo coffee planters during the next decade: the 
encouragement of Italian mass immigration by the provincial 
government at the beginning of the 1880s; and the spread of a 
peculiar labour arrangement called the colonato. Both were a 
response to the great labour demand provoked by the dramatic 
expansion of coffee and urgent questions posed by the increasingly 
active abolitionist movement. By the late 1860s, after the first 
unsuccessful experiments with European immigrants, gradually the 
planters introduced further adjustments in the labour contract. From 
these experiments the colonato appeared. It was a new scheme of 
remuneration, a mixed task and piecerate system. This arrangement, 
appearing on coffee plantations from the 1880s, was to prevail in 
sao Paulo until the 1950s. Between 1884 and 1914, some 900, 000 
subsidised immigrants arrived in sao Paulo, mostly as cheap labour 
for the coffee plantations. The figure for newly arrived immigrants 
in 1887 exceeded the estimated 50,000 slaves who were being used on 
coffee plantations in 1885. 84 In 1880 Brazil was producing more than 
a half (57%) of total world coffee production. Eight years later, 
the year of abolition of slavery, the country supplied 62% of world 
coffee production. In 1891, it reached almost 65% of world 
production. See Table 24 for numbers of immigrants arriving in Sdo 
Paulo in the last decades of the nineteenth century. See Table 25 
for World Coffee Production by region, 1880-1891, in Appendix. 
84 V. Stolcke and M.M. Hall, op.cit., p.182. 
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PART I 
EXPERIMENTING WITH FREE LABOUR 
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Introduction 
At first glance, parallels can easily be traced between initial 
experiments with free labour in Brazil and Cuba. Following the 
course of initiatives taken as a result of growing external 
pressures to end the trans-Atlantic slave trade, it is possible to 
find similarities in general policies. Thus, during the first 
decades of the nineteenth century, white immigration was promoted 
both to populate Cuba and Sdo Paulo with a class of small 
landholders and to counterbalance the growing slave population. 
Further external pressures to stop the trans-Atlantic slave trade, 
especially during the 1840s, prompted both areas to intensify their 
search for new sources of field hands to work in the expanding 
plantation economy. By this stage earlier policies to stimulate 
immigration were considered expensive and inefficient for plantation 
requirements. Accordingly Cuba and sao Paulo started experimenting 
with a variety of sources of labour supply and labour systems. 
Suggested sources of labour included Europe, Asia and embraced also 
American Indians, free Africans and free coloureds. By mid-century, 
Europeans, Chinese and Indians from Yucatan were brought to Cuba as 
contract labourers. In Sdo Paulo this was the time when Nicolau de 
Campos Vergueiro, a reformist coffee planter, initiated experiments 
with Europeans contracted as sharecroppers to work on his coffee 
estates. The recruitment of workers from several sources reflected 
different purposes and working relations. 
The dependence on external labour supplies and the easy 
availability of vacant land led to attempts to strengthen ties 
binding workers to the plantations _ essentially by means of 
labour contracts and repressive legislation. Prejudice clearly 
played a part in the coincidence of policies. For instance, Europe 
was considered the most desirable source of labour in both areas. 
Europeans were viewed as settlers, potentially industrious 
independent smallholders who would populate the country. They were 
also viewed as a prospective element of the nation and as a means of 
counteracting a growing black population. Chinese and Africans were 
an option but only subject to the control of repressive legislation 
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and tight contracts, as "labour machines" and as a temporary 
solution _ a means of easing the transition to free labour. 
Despite numerous attempts, however, free white immigrants would not 
constitute a real alternative to slave labour until the 1880s. 
Despite these similarities, there were also profound differences. 
It was the nature of these differences that shaped the contrasting 
experience with free labour and gave a distinct dynamic to these 
early experiments. If forecasts of the imminent end of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade and of the collapse of slavery were influential 
in defining alternative labour supply policies, so too was the role 
of the metropolis, in the case of Cuba, and concerns in Brazil about 
the constitution of the nation. 
The slave labour supply crisis provoked by external pressures on 
the African trade affected Cuba and sao Paulo in different ways. In 
the Cuban case, British opposition to the trade was modulated by 
Spanish and by North American interests in it. Spain had always been 
reluctant to terminate the trade, believing that the end of the 
slave trade meant the end of slavery, the end of the prosperity of 
the island and hence a reduction in fiscal revenues. Fears about the 
loss of planter support and thus of control of Cuba also made Spain 
very cautious when approaching the strategic issues of the abolition 
of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the abolition of slavery. 
Thus, the effective end of the trade occurred earlier in Brazil, at 
the beginning of 1850s. In Cuba it was not over until the mid-1860s. 
As a result, Cuban sugar production, although reinforced by 
alternative labour sources, would rely heavily upon slave labour 
until the end of the system in the 1880s. 
There were also differences in the timing of rapid plantation 
expansion. In Cuba the great expansion of sugar production in the 
1840s and 1850s helped bring on the crisis in labour supply. In sao 
Paulo, coffee production expanded dramatically only after the end of 
the trans-Atlantic slave trade. At mid-century, Paulista coffee 
plantations were well stocked with slaves illegally imported during 
the years immediately before the final end of the trans-Atlantic 
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slave trade. In addition, Paulista planters could draw upon internal 
supplies of slaves. It is no coincidence that the internal trade in 
slaves grew substantially during and after the 1850s. These factors 
eased initial adjustments to the end of the supply from Africa. From 
the 1870s a growing free population would be available for potential 
plantation work. 
Cuba and Sdo Paulo began experiments with alternative forms of 
labour at about the same time in the 1840s. Nevertheless, as the 
labour shortage was more acute in Cuba, and influenced by British 
experience in the Caribbean, a greater range of experiments with 
non-slave labour developed more rapidly in the island. In Cuba, most 
of these experiments were designed primarily to address the general 
problem of labour supply, provoked by the great expansion of sugar 
plantations. In Brazil they were viewed as a substitute for slaves 
and _ for a while _ they engendered hopes of an early end of 
slavery itself. However, the final abolition of slavery was still 
far off. Factors promoting the transition from slavery to free 
labour were different in each case but some unity was given to the 
process by the homogenizing influence of world pressure. In 
addition, increasing awareness after the 1860s that Cuba and Brazil 
were the two remaining areas where slavery survived meant that each 
kept itself informed about attempts by the other to manage the 
transition. 
Part I compares and contrasts policies to promote free labour in 
Cuba and Sdo Paulo. The settlement of white immigrants _ designed 
first to counteract a growing slave population, and later to provide 
alternative labour supplies _ constituted the starting point in 
both areas. The need for labour on expanding plantations, however, 
took precedence. The first sections of chapters 3 and 4 contain an 
account of this shift. The subsequent sections examine further 
problems faced by both areas concerning labour recruitment and 
control. 
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CHAPTER 3  
CUBA 
By the time Vergueiro's sharecroppers were arriving on Sao Paulo 
coffee plantations, Chinese and Yucatecan Indians were landing in 
Cuba as contract labourers. For the next two decades there would be 
a multiplicity of experiments with different workers and labour 
systems. This was a period of experiment in both areas. 
This chapter is an attempt to reconstruct the circumstances 
surrounding the initial introduction of "free" workers in Cuba. It 
seeks to explain changes in contracts and labour systems as well as 
motives determining the choice of various groups of workers and 
attitudes towards them. In Brazil initial experiments with non-slave 
labour were carried out by farsighted planters who envisaged the 
speedy end of slavery with the break in the African trade. European 
sharecroppers were viewed as a feasible alternative to slave labour. 
In Cuba experiments with contract workers were an attempt to address 
the acute labour shortage and supplement slave labour which 
continued to be supplied by the trans-Atlantic slave trade. The late 
end of the African trade, the role of Spain and the trade in workers 
made solutions to labour problems in Cuba very different from the 
Brazilian experience. 
3.1. Initial attempts: establishing an immigration policy 
During the first decades of the nineteenth century there were many 
attempts to attract white immigrants as smallholders to Cuba. 
Increasing imports of slaves were a major concern. Exercised by the 
example of slave revolt in Haiti, the Economic Society (Real 
Sociedad Economica de Amigos del Pais) advised in 1794 that 
"although for the general development of the island the introduction 
of slaves should be favoured, it is necessary to proceed carefully 
(...) in order that the number of Negroes may not only be prevented 
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from exceeding that of whites, but that it may not be permitted to 
equal that number". Two years later, in 1796, the Royal Advisory 
Board for Agriculture and Commerce (Real Consulado de Agricultura y 
Comercio) took up the question of white immigration following a 
slave revolt. 1 By this time the promotion of white immigration was 
the means found by creoles such as Francisco Arango y Parrefio, a 
representative of Cuban interests in Madrid, to convince the 
colonial government to support the continued free and unlimited 
import of slaves. 2 
Spain would have preferred to populate the colony with Spanish, 
or at least Catholic white immigrants. A decree of October 21, 1817, 
was the first permitting non-Spanish Catholic immigration into the 
island. 3 This decree permitted settlers to purchase land in the 
island and was issued at about the time when Spain and England 
signed a treaty to end the slave trade ((December 19, 1817). The 
immigration decree of 1817 was designed to support the work of the 
Board for the Promotion of White Immigration (Junta de PoblaciOn 
Blanca) which had been established in 1815 by Intendant Ramirez and 
Captain General Jose Cienfuegos. 4 A further disposition of February 
7, 1818, laid down a tax on each male slave imported into Cuba over 
the following three years, when the treaty to stop the slave trade 
was due to go into effect. The revenue yielded by the tax was to be 
used by the Board to promote white immigration. 5 For the next two 
decades, the Board, as well as the Economic Society and the Advisory 
Board, commercial corporations Arango Y Parreflo had helped to 
create, would be actively engaged in the promotion of white 
1 Quoted in D.C. Corbitt, "Immigration in Cuba", Hispanic 
American Historical Review 22 (May 1942) pp.280-308, esp. p.284. 
2 A.F. Corwin, Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba,  
1817-1886 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967) p.14. 
3 Real cedula de 21 de Octubre de 1817, sobre la manera de 
aumentar la poblacion blanca de la Isla de Cuba. ANC, GSC, leg. 630, 
n. 19889. 
4 D.C.Corbitt, "Immigration in Cuba", op.cit., p.288; A.F. 
Corwin, op.cit., p.33. 
5 D.C. Corbitt, "Immigration in Cuba", op.cit., p.290. 
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settlement. 6 
By 1823 some 845 settlers from Bordeaux, Philadelphia, Baltimore, 
Saint Domingue, Louisiana and other places had arrived at a 
settlement established in Jagua Bay, one of the most important then 
founded. 7 Strategic settlements known as "colonies" were set up in 
Nuevitas, Cienfuegos, Manzanillo, Isla de Piflos and Guantanamo. 8 
 Besides protecting coastal areas, the colonies were intended to 
prevent the formation of bands of runaway% slaves (palenques) in the 
underpopulated interior of the island. 9 
Despite the often stated need to populate certain areas of the 
island, foreigners would always be viewed with reserve. It was 
argued that great numbers of foreign immigrants could create 
antagonisms among the different alien races, primarily against the 
mainland Spaniards (peninsulares), and that they might conspire 
among themselves and with the creoles against the metropolis. For 
instance, in the 1830s conditions to approve the creation of the 
colony Vives in Baracoa required amongst other things that any 
foreigners should be Catholics and that their total number should 
not exceed that of the Spaniards. The plan had been developed by a 
New York company and the colony was suppose to be founded with 
Irish, English and Scottish families. Colonial authorities were 
warned that despite the project's great advantages to the 
development of the region and its inexpensiveness, "one should not 
6 D.C. Corbitt, "Immigration in Cuba, op.cit., pp.290-291. 
7 D.C. Corbitt, "Immigration in Cuba", op.cit., p.291. 
8 Julio LeRiverend, Historia economica de Cuba. 4th ed. (Havana: 
Universidad de la Habana, 1985) p.177. 
9 Acta de la Junta de PoblaciOn Blanca, Habana, August 6, 1830; 
Oficio, Superintendente to Sr. Conde de Villanueva, Havana, 
September 20, 1831; Ministerio de Hacienda de Indias, Consejo de 
Indias approving project, Madrid, January 18, 1833. AGI, Ultramar, 
Seccion X, leg.174. Expediente formado a consecuencia de oficio de 
la Capitania General en virtud de una instancia de Mr. Andres Garr 
sobre establecer una poblacion de colonos estrangeros en las tierras 
de Moa. AGI, Ultramar, Seccion X, leg.174 (Colonia Fernandina de 
Jagua), exp.2. 
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lose sight of the foreign origins of the project", that the 
foreigners would be proprietors of the land, and moreover "that 
these foreigners belonged to a close, powerful neighbouring 
nation...". The project was formally approved in 1833, with the 
observation that there should be "strict vigilance"." 
Another British attempt by the treaty of June 20, 1835, to 
"totally and finally abolished' in all parts of the world" the 
Spanish slave traffic, led to renewed interest in white immigration. 
In the meantime a large flow of white immigrants had been entering 
the island through other channels. Many were wealthy refugees from 
Saint Domingue, Louisiana and Florida. But most came from Spain and 
the Canary Islands as labourers. Some thirty-five thousand 
immigrants entered Cuba between 1834 and 1839. 11 By this time a 
considerable amount of capital was invested in the island, and with 
it came workers, foremen, engineers and so forth. 12 Irishmen and 
Canary Islanders were imported to build railways. 13 
The dispute over the end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade 
brought about contradictory reactions. On the one hand, the 
continuation of the illegal trade in African slaves had caused 
conflict with Britain while the growing slave and black populations 
stimulated widespread fear of rebellions. In the early 1840s 
conflicts with Britain over slaves illegally imported since the 1817 
10 Acta de la Junta de 
Oficio, Superintendente ao 
20, 1831; Ministerio de 
approving project, Madrid, 
X, leg. 174. 
PoblaciOn Blanca, Havana, August 6, 1830; 
Sr Conde de Villanueva, Habana, September 
Hacienda de Indias, Consejo de Indias 
January 18, 1833. AGI, Ultramar, Seccion 
C.M. Trelles y Govin, Biblioteca Historica Cubana 3 vols 
(Matanzas: Imprenta de Juan F. Oliver, 1922) 2, p.357 between 1835 
and 1839 arrived 35,203 white immigrants; in 1836 arrived 8,000 
passengers in Havana, of whom 3,760 were Spanish, 2,690 Canary 
Islanders, and 1,000 from the U.S.A; in 1840 arrived a total of 
5,750, of whom 2,900 were Spanish and 2,850 foreigners. 
12 D.C.Corbitt, "Immigration in Cuba", op.cit., p.294. 
13 M. Moreno Fraginals. El Ingenio: complejo econOmico social  
cubano del amicar (Havana: Editora de Ciencias Sociales, 1978) v. I, 
pp.299-301. 
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treaty and reported slave rebellions provoked a general, but 
temporary, sentiment against the slave trade in the island. 14 More 
importantly it raised the issue of alternative labour sources for 
the flourishing sugar industry. White immigration was viewed as the 
natural solution to both concerns: the racial balance and the labour 
problem. 
By this time, instead of simply immigrant labourers (braceros), 
there were suggestions for the promotion of white immigrant 
families. Articles and pamphlets about sugar mills served 
exclusively by white labour were printed. However, as these 
proposals also tended to advocate changes in the system of sugar 
production as well as in landholding structure, they merely created 
a polemical atmosphere. The sugar master Jose Maria Dau, for 
instance, in his pamphlet "Ingenios sin esclavos", published in 
1837, anticipated problems in attempting to employ free workers in 
sugarmills. 15 He pointed out that without better salaries and living 
conditions (family life, hospitals, schools, better food etc) it 
would be difficult to find people willing to "build up a fortune for 
others". Freemen wanted land to work and so Dau envisaged that a 
large collective plot of land (gran conuco comun) would have to be 
made available to colonists in the mill lands. Otherwise a free man 
would be better off if he dedicated himself to some other activity 
in this "new country with plenty of resources". In Dau's view, 
Canary Islanders were the most suitable immigrants because of the 
common language, their robustness, willingness to work and not least 
14 See, for instance, Esposicion de los hacendados de Matanzas 
al Gobernador Capiten General, pidiendo la supresion de la trata 
(1843), reprod. in E. Torres Cuevas and E. Reyes, Esclavitud y 
Sociedad. Notas y documentos Para la historia de la esclavitud negra 
en Cuba. (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1986) pp.202-205. 
Conflicts with Britain over slavery, black and slave rebellions in 
1840s see D.R. Murray, Odious Commerce: Britain, Spain and the 
Abolition of the Cuban Slave Trade. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980) chap.6 to 9, and R.L. Paquette, Sugar is Made with 
Blood. The Conspiracy of La Escalera and the Conflicts between 
Empires over Slavery in Cuba (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 
1988). 
15 J. Maria Dau. Ingenios sin esclavos (Havana: Imprenta de D. 
Jose Maria Palmer, 1837). 
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for the "facility of acquiring them at low costs". 16 
Other projects included radical changes in the system of sugar 
production, reconsidering the entire concept of a unitary, self-
contained sugar estate. These were probably influenced by 
experiences in the British and the French Caribbean where after the 
abolition of slavery planters had been attempting to establish 
central factories to process raw cane produced by sharecroppers and 
independent farmers. 17 The separation of sugar processing (refining) 
from cane cultivation (production) implied either dividing or 
selling the cane fields to small proprietors who would have a degree 
of independence to produce and deliver cane to a central mill. 
Theoretically this would relieve planters of anxieties over labour 
control, and would encourage greater care in cultivation. In Cuba, 
the government agent Vazquez Queipo in his 1844 report suggested 
that the separation of sugar cultivation from processing was a means 
of encouraging smallholdings and white immigrant families as a 
possible substitute for slavery. 18 Queipo did not believe that 
attempts to encourage white immigrant workers would succeed while 
slavery existed. European emigrants would not choose to go to Cuba 
for low salaries to work alongside slaves. At the same time, the 
separation of sugar production from refining and the promotion of 
small properties were among the suggestions proposed by the Spanish 
writer Ramon de la Sagra when studying the implications of an 
16 J.M. Dau, op.cit., pp.6-7. 
17 Experiments in the British and French colonies, see W.A. 
Green, British Slave Emancipation. The Sugar Colonies and the Great 
Experiment, 1830-1865 9th ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) pp.212- 
213 
18 V. Vazquez Queipo. Informe fiscal sobre fomento de la 
poblacion blanca en la Isla de Cuba y emancipaciOn progresiva de la 
esclava con una breve resena de las reformas y modificaciones que  
para consequirlo convendria establecer en la legislacion y 
constituciOn coloniales: presentado a la Superintendencia General  
Deleqada de Real Hacienda en diciembre de 1844 por el fiscal de la 
misma. (Madrid: Imprenta de J. Martin Alegria, 1845) pp.42-44. 
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eventual end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. 19 This debate would 
resurface again and again. In 1847 when Domingo de Goicuria, after 
unsuccessful attempts to import Spanish labourers, submitted to the 
authorities a petition to import Germans and Scots based on the 
separation of sugar cultivation from processing he aimed exclusively 
to meet the need for labour. 20 However, Goicuria's proposal was 
rejected on the grounds that the island climate was not suitable for 
Europeans and there would be problems of introducing those 
"different races". Besides, it was stressed that the labour system 
under which immigrants would be engaged "contains in itself the 
seeds of destruction, encouraging mutual suspicion and conflict 
between the master and the immigrant workers" .21  Many similar 
proposals submitted to the authorities would be dismissed on those 
grounds, alleging difficulties over climate, religion or patterns of 
land tenure. 
By the mid-1840s plans for transforming the island into a 
prosperous colony of smallholders had assumed a lower priority. 
Sugar cane needed land to expand. The settlement of prosperous white 
smallholders on the island, although desirable in theory, might 
challenge the planter's control of land and restrict land available 
for sugar production. In any case, colonies of white farmers were 
unlikely to help solve the problem of labour on the plantations. 
The great expansion of sugar production led to a dramatic labour 
crisis during the 1840s and 1850s. The construction of the first 
19 Ram6n de la Sagra. Estudios Coloniales con aplicaciOn a la 
Isla de Cuba (Madrid: Imprenta de D. Dionisio Hidalgo, 1845) pp.80- 
87. 
20 Expediente formado a consecuencia de la Real Orden de 12 de 
Diciembre relativo al nuevo proyecto de colonisaciOn propuesto por 
Domingo de Goicuria. ANC, RCJF, leg.195, n.8729. 
21 Analise del proyecto de colonizaciOn de Domingo de Goicuria, 
April 23, 1847, ANC, RCJF, leg. 195, n. 8729. Ultramar refused, Real 
Orden de May 20, 1848, Ibidem. 
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Cuban railway began as early as 1835. 22 In November 1837 the first 
branch was opened to Bejucal, directly south of Havana and one year 
later the railway reached GUines. 23  The opening of the Havana-Gaines 
railway is considered the turning point in the history of Cuban 
sugar production. 24 New transport developments promoted the 
exploitation of newly colonized areas and greatly expanded the 
planting of cane and the construction of new mills. It also made the 
shipping of sugar and supplies quicker, more reliable and cheaper. 
The growth of markets such as that of United States contributed to 
demand. During this time there was a marked increase in Cuban sugar 
exports to Britain stimulated by the British Sugar Acts of 1846 and 
1848, which provided for the gradual equalization of duties on all 
sugar entering Britain irrespective of origin. Until 1854 slave-
grown and free-grown sugar would compete equally in the British 
market. 25 Cuban sugar production rose from 205,608 metric tons in 
1846 to 462,968 metric tons in 1855 (see table 2, Appendix). Cuba's 
plantation economy expanded in both the number and size of the sugar 
plantations. 
A dramatic temporary decline in the slave trade immediately 
following the 1845 treaty between Spain and Britain sharpened demand 
for labour and stimulated fears about supply. From 1845 to 1848 the 
trade reached its lowest level in the nineteenth century before 
final abolition. British Commissioners in Havana estimated that 
10,000 African slaves arrived in 1844. In 1845 only 1,300 slaves 
were landed; 1,500 in 1846; 1,000 in 1847; 1,500 in 1848. By 1849 
slave landings were again on the increase, rising to 8,700 slaves 
(table 5, Appendix). The increased demand for labour had meant 
22 The railway age had just begin with the opening of the first 
line connecting Manchester and Liverpool, England, five years 
before. L.W. Bergad, Cuban Rural Society in the Nineteenth Century.  
The Social and Economic History of Monoculture in Matanzas  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) p.109. 
23 L.W.Bergad, op.cit., p.110. 
24 M.Moreno Fraginals, El Ingenio, op.cit., I, p.272. 
25 D.R. Murray, Odious Commerce, op.cit., p.210. Also see same 
book, Table 8, British Imports of Cuban sugar, 1845-60, p.243. 
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higher prices for slaves. In 1847 slaves were sold for 500 pesos or 
hired out at 14 pesos a term; in 1852 it was observed that "today 
the selling price is 700, and for hiring 20 pesos during the 
harvest". 26 The demand for labour resulting from the increased sugar 
production was heightened by the reduction of the slave trade. The 
high prices of slaves had only been eased by the availability of 
slaves transferred from the declining coffee plantations. 27 
 Fraginals estimated that some 50,000 slaves were transferred from 
coffee to sugar production after the 1830s. 28 In Brazil, as it will 
be shown, the trend was the other way, from sugar to coffee. 
3.2. In search of workers 
The search for alternative labour supplies began in the early 1840s. 
The international crusade against the trans-Atlantic slave trade and 
the prospect of the abolition of slavery itself had intensified 
competition for the world's alternative labour supplies. While 
British planters in Guyana and Trinidad would try to adapt to the 
transition to free labour by importing indentured Indians, Spain 
could provide no such expedient from its Empire. Asians, Africans 
and poor Europeans were the great hope. By the mid-1840s Cuban 
planters were considering, as were their Caribbean competitors, all 
possible sources to provide cheap labour for the plantations. 
Merchants who "traded" in workers played a significant role in 
defining and promoting available choices. The choice of a particular 
source while affected by racial, political and economical criteria, 
was also affected by competition among those trading in workers. On 
the whole, the great demand for labourers in Cuba made the island an 
attractive target for Cuban and foreign entrepreneurs struggling for 
a share of this lucrative business. 
26 Voto del Fiscal Olivares, Havana, February 29, 1852. AHN, 
Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 1, exp. 6. 
27 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 1, exp.2. 
28 M. Moreno Fraginals, El Inclenio, op.cit., I, p.274. 
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3.2.1 Recruiting Europeans 
For most Cuban planters, after the abolition of the slave trade the 
ruin of the island could be prevented only by importing cheap 
immigrant labour on a large scale. Indeed, even while the slave 
trade continued, white immigrants would be required. To increase the 
number of blacks would threaten the security of the island: 
immigrants were necessary to counter this danger. Whites, Catholics, 
Spanish were favoured but immigrants could be of any race, religion 
or country, providing they were cheap, diligent and submissive. When 
Miguel Aldama's experiment with imported Biscayans failed in the 
1840s, he wrote to his brother-in-law Domingo Delmonte: "Many 
hacendados have made up their minds to bring in colonists and if we 
must go to Siberia for them, we have to get them". 29 
Experiments with European workers had already been taking place. 
In 1839, some 240 Canary Islanders were imported. They were 
contracted labourers destined for Puerto Principe. In the following 
year the planter Miguel Estorch started one of the earliest 
experiments with immigrant contract labour on his plantation, La 
Colonia, also in Puerto Principe. 30 Almost at the same time, Aldama 
y Alfonso was attempting to set up a big mill with Spanish workers 
from the province of Vizcaya. 31 These experiments proved 
unsuccessful. "Estorch's Catalans" had been doing splendidly, it was 
reported. 32 Yet the Catalans soon dispersed. According to Fraginals, 
the plan failed for a number of reasons. The Catalans found much 
better paid work in Puerto Principe or became artisans and farmers 
on their own account. They also objected to being made to work 
eighteen hours a day in the harvest and grinding season like slaves. 
29 Quoted from J. Perez de la Riva, Para la Historia de las 
Gentes sin Historia (Barcelona: Ariel, 1976) pp.46-47. 
30 J. LeRiverend, Historia EconOmica de Cuba, op.cit., p.341. 
31 M. Moreno Fraginals, op.cit., I, p.303. 
32 Letter from Betancourt Cisneros to Jose de la Luz y 
Caballero, January 3,1841, in M. Moreno Fraginals,  op.cit., I, 
p.302. 
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Fraginals observed that on the maintenance side, "the Catalans as a 
group consumed 465 pesos more a month than would have be given to an 
equal number of blacks". Fraginals suggested that "Estorch could not 
make them accept inferior conditions since they had not come, as had 
the Canary Islanders and Irishmen, under military law which 
prevented desertion". Estorch ended up selling the contracts. 33 
Signs of a clearer immigration policy appeared in 1842 when the 
Board for the Promotion of White Immigration was abolished and the 
task of encouraging the immigration of "honorable and industrious 
Europeans" was assigned to the Economic Development Council (Junta 
de Fomento). 34 The Council's Committee on White Population soon 
developed a programme to stimulate immigration for the plantations. 
Prizes were offered to planters who settled white families on their 
lands and to sugar mills employing exclusively white labour. A 
contract to import labourers from Spain was signed with a company 
set up by Domingo Goicuria. The Council agreed to pay thirty-two 
pesos towards the travel expenses of each immigrant and to furnish 
food and lodging for a month, plus eight pesos in cash. The 
immigrants were to repay half of this advance and remain in Cuba for 
three years. 35 Although Goicuria went to Spain himself to recruit 
immigrants he obtained only a thousand in the course of two years. 36 
 Prospects were not encouraging. In June 1846, the Council reported 
33 Ibid., p.303; see also J. LeRiverend, op.cit., p.342. 
34 D.C. Corbitt, "Immigration in Cuba", op.cit., p.298; 
J.LeRiverend, op.cit., p.329. The Junta de Fomento, first organized 
in 1795 under the name Consulado, was a government sponsored 
corporation composed of prominent businessmen and planters. Until 
1832 it performed the functions of a chamber of commerce, a 
department of public works, and a tribunal for hearing commercial 
litigations. When the Junta de Poblacion Blanca was abolished in 
1842, its income was assigned to the Junta de Fomento. According to 
Corbitt, when the Junta de Fomento took up the question of white 
immigration by 1843 there was an abundant supply of money with to 
work. D.C. Corbitt, A Study of the Chinese in Cuba, 1847-1947 
(Wilmore: Asbury College, 1971) p.3. 
35 D.C. Corbitt, "Immigration in Cuba", op.cit., pp.300-1; or 
same author, A Study of the Chinese, op.cit., p.3. 
36 D.C. Corbitt, A Study of the Chinese, op.cit., p. 4. 
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to the Captain General that all the efforts to introduce white 
immigrants had resulted in a total of only 1,673, including six 
hundred "coolies" contracted in China. 37 The Council calculated that 
about twenty to thirty thousand labourers were required to supply 
the needs of agriculture. 38 
Although it is difficult to establish the number of European 
immigrants entering Cuba under those contract conditions, it is 
clear that a flow was set in motion. Indicative of that is the great 
increase of the Cuban white population in the years between the 
censuses of 1846 and 1862, due mostly to immigration. 39 Despite 
plans including Irish, German, Portuguese, and other immigrants, 
most came from Spain and its possessions. 40 Although most of these 
immigrants came on their own initiative, and engaged in non-
plantation activities, many came with families and relatives engaged 
in contracts to work on sugar plantations. 
Several lists identifying hundreds of Canary Islanders entering 
the island, and their respective contracts, can be found in the 
records of the Council. Contracts were usually agreed before leaving 
the country of origin; references of good character were attached to 
the contracts. After arrival workers were to remain in barracoons 
(depositos) for up to a month while awaiting hire. If they did not 
37 Informe, June 18, 1846. AHN, Ultramar, leg.91, no. 1, exp.8. 
38 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 91, n. 1, exp. 8. 
39 See table 7, Appendix. According to Trelles y Govin, op.cit., 
p.359, between 1854 and 1859 arrived a total of 76,346 white 
immigrants. 
40 Between 1830 and 1850, 50,000 Canary Islanders emigrated 
mostly to Cuba and Puerto Rico. In the early 1840s the significance 
for the Canary Islands's economy of the remittances made by Canary 
Islanders that emigrated to Cuba was stressed by the Junta de 
Comercio de Canarias when, fearing the ruin of Cuba, it argued 
against any idea of abolition of slavery. See Agustin Guimera 
Ravina, "La burguesia canaria ante la aboliciein: la consulta de 
1842", in F. de Solano and A. Guimera (ed.) Esclavitud y Derechos 
Humanos. La lucha por la libertad del negro en el siglo XIX (Madrid: 
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1990) pp.99-123, 
p.104. 
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find a job in this time they were to be employed by the Council on 
public works at the rate of four pesos a month. Hire contracts could 
be agreed for three years, with the Council being indemnified for 
travel expenses either by the contractor or the immigrant. The 
Council usually acted as an intermediary between the contracted 
immigrants and the planters. But the active role of the Council, 
trading in workers, was evident from the beginning. It is 
interesting, for instance, to see the Council's careful selection of 
the workers when they arrive. 41 In 1849, following a ruling of the 
Committee on White Population, the Council decided not to pay the 
expenses of males older than 40 years, and females over 25; it would 
pay a maximum of 20 pesos for adults, a half that for minors up to 
twelve years, and one third for nursing mothers. 42 
At the time, several abuses were reported. One can imagine the 
number of conflicts that arose from the bad conditions newly arrived 
immigrants faced in the depositos. Illness, drinking and desertions 
were reported. In 1852, a Canary Islander, Manuel Martins Frias, was 
put in stocks for lack of respect to the deposito administrator. 43 
 There were cases of minors being shipped without their knowledge.44
 The colonist Petronila Santana, a Canary Islander, minor, was 
embarked by her mother without her knowledge and without a 
passport. 45 In March 1846, the Committee on White Population 
reported that out of Goicuria's colonists numbering 876, only 70 had 
not been hired. And they remained unhired not because there was no 
41 Session October 17, 1851. ANC, Actas de la Real Junta de 
Fomento de Agricultura y Comercio de las Isla de Cuba, 1851, Libro 
200, numero 200, p.157. 
42 Session September 15, 1849, ANC, Actas...1849, leg. 173, n. 
8144. 
43 ANC Real Consulado y Junta de Fomento, leg.197, n.8849. The 
Council considered sufficient two days punishment, July 7, 1852, 
ANC, Actas...1852, Libro 201, numero 201, p.10. 
44 For instance, session March 12, 1851, ANC, Actas... 1851, 
Libro 200, numero. 200, p.36. 
45 Session March 12, 1851, ANC, Actas...1851, Libro 200, numero 
200, p.36. 
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demand but because "they want higher salaries and have an excessive 
number of children". 46 
During the following decades, there would be several other 
attempts to attract contracted workers from Europe. The plans varied 
but in general terms followed the conditions first agreed with 
Goicuria. In 1853, Urbano Feijoo Sotomayor, a planter and Cortes 
deputy for Orense province, presented his plan to import contract 
labourers from Galicia. Sotomayor noticed then that social and 
economic problems in Galicia had been producing a flow of 200,000 
Galicians yearly to Portugal and that this flow could be diverted to 
Cuba. He requested permission to form a company to supply Spanish 
contract labourers to the island. He stressed modest wages and the 
strengthening of the Spanish population, assuring the defense of 
colonial rule within Cuba while the economic and political 
advantages of the plan were obvious. 47  
According to the Sotomayor contract, the company would provide 
each immigrant with an outfit of two shirts, one pair of trousers, 
one shirt, one palm-leaf hat, and one pair of shoes before 
embarkation and another complete outfit after landing. The company 
would house labourers on the Cuban coast for a three month period of 
acclimatization and medical assistance. It committed itself to 
finding work for immigrants after three months and if unsuccessful 
the immigrant would be indemnified during the period according to 
the stipulated wage. Contracts should not exceed five years and the 
wage should not be less than five pesos per month. Other clauses of 
the contract stipulated that immigrants would not be required to 
work on Sundays nor between 8:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. During the 
working day, there would be a three hour break. Contracts were 
transferable but the company undertook to transport immigrants back 
46 ANC, RCJF, leg. 195, n. 8709. 
47 Letter to the Captain General, Havana, June 15, 1853, in 
Urbano Feijoo Sotomayor. Isla de Cuba. Inmiqracion de Trabajadores  
Espafloles: Documentos y memoria escrita sobre esta materia y 
publicada en la Habana en 1853 (Madrid: Imprenta de Julian Pella, 
1855) p.9. Feijoo's plans are discussed in M.Moreno Fraginals, El 
Ingenio, op.cit., I, pp.304-305; J. LeRiverend, op.cit., pp.342-343. 
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to Spain free of charge at the expiring of the contract term. 48 
A company called "Patriftico-mercantil" was accordingly formed 
and a few hundred Galicians arrived in Cuba in 1854. By April 25, 
1855, the Company listed 3,019 people, including 1,800 free 
labourers (braceros libres con sueldo) and 1,000 slaves (braceros 
negros). 49 The Galicians made their discontent known from the 
beginning. As soon as they landed there were rebellions. Sotomayor 
himself complained that there was resistance to work, disturbances 
and desertions. 50 Those who were employed managed to get out of the 
contract and stayed in the cities or found employment in sugar mills 
on their own. According to Feij6o they even sold the shoes - "which 
had been so difficult to find in that great number in Havana". 51 
 Later, it would be admitted that the Galician's frustration was 
perfectly understandable. Their wages were one sixth of the monthly 
hire charge paid for rented slaves and the earnings of domestic 
labourers. 52 Although Sotomayor Company committed to pay 5 pesos a 
month there were complaints that Galicians had been paid only three 
pesos. 53 While slaves had to work 9 to 10 hours in ordinary times 
and 16 during harvest according to article twelve of the 1842 Slave 
Code, the Sotomayor Galicians were supposed to work 13 hours. 
Answering criticisms about his abortive enterprise, Feijoo observed 
that both worker's complaints and bad behaviour, and political 
persecution from the Captain General, contributed to the failure. He 
also denounced political conspiracies and powerful slave-trader 
48 U. Feijoo Sotomayor, Isla de Cuba, op.cit., pp.9-10 and 
pp.19-23. 
49 U. Feijoo Sotomayor, op.cit., p.125. 
50 U. Feij6o Sotomayor, op.cit., p.112. 
51 U. Feij6o Sotomayor, op.cit., p.152. 
52 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 90, n. 19, exp.l. 
53 Exp. relativo a las quejas yreclamaciones de gallegos contra 
el Conde Jaruco, Cardenas, January 29, 1855. ANC, GSC, leg. 1628, n. 
82000. 
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interests contrived to undermined his initiative. 54 
Fraginals agreed that competition among slave traders contributed 
to a partial failure of Sotomayor's enterprise. "The slavers 
together with others whose motives are obscure, promptly mobilized 
against the competition. The result was an uprising of the Galicians 
who had been installed in "acclimatization" barracoons. Many of them 
lost no time in taking illegal jobs in business and small 
factories". The Captain General issued a circular on October 7, 
1854, calling this rebellion "insubordination of colonists brought 
to the island". Fraginals also observed that although he partially 
failed, Sotomayor sold enough Galicians to recover his expenses. 55 
The recruitment of Spanish contract workers proved unsuccessful. 
They quickly rejected the terms of their contracts and sought 
employment in the cities. At the beginning of the 1850s the Council 
discussed ways of retaining the workers on the plantations. Among 
the suggestions were better salaries, exemption from repayment of 
travel expenses and a tighter legislative framework to control 
immigrant workers. At that time a great number of conflicts between 
planters and workers were reported. Planters complained about non-
fulfilment of contracts, demands for higher wages and desertions. 
Workers complained about maltreatment, non-compliance with 
contracts, low salaries and difficulties in repaying debts. In 
October 1852 the president of the Committee on White Population was 
appointed to act as arbiter in the disputes arising between 
colonists and patrons (patronos). 56 There were conflicts between the 
Council and the contractors as well. For example, in 1846 the 
Council complained that Domingo Goicuria's company did not meet 
quotas for males, bringing instead excessive number of women and 
children. Contractors were also accused of filling their quotas with 
the sick, the elderly and individuals whose skills were not 
54 U. Feijoo Sotomayor, Isla de Cuba, op.cit., p.112, subseq. 
and p.152. 
55 M. Moreno Fraginals, El Ingenio, op.cit., I, p.305. 
56 ANC, RCJF, leg. 197, n. 8859. 
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required. 57 Slave trader opposition to these immigrant enterprises 
were also often reported. 
White immigration divided contemporary Cuban opinion. Some like 
FeijOo believed that, facing the precarious condition of immigrants 
in their homeland, the contract's improved conditions would prove 
attractive to immigrants despite problems associated with the 
climate, cultural habits and principally the landholding structure 
of the island. Others considered white immigration a "delirium". 
White labourers would not endure the harshness of plantation work 
and the low salaries. 58 
The failure of these early attempts to promote European 
immigration have been explained by several factors. The contemporary 
excuses of climate and its inconveniences for white Europeans 
combined with the demanding of work on plantations are the least 
acceptable. Indeed, these views are contradicted by the later 
success of European immigration to Cuba as well as to sao Paulo. 
Fraginals, focusing on the Cuban case, pointed out that in addition 
to powerful opposition by slave trader there was a lack of 
enthusiasm from the colonial government. 59 In fact, in Cuba, 
enthusiasm for white immigration varied from time to time and was 
triggered by the circumstances of the period. Initiatives from both 
colonial government and Cuban planters did not always coincide in 
terms of objectives and expectations. Immigration to Cuba had always 
been viewed with suspicion by the colonial government. To a certain 
extent its "lack of enthusiasm" concealed a zealous attitude 
concerning the "security" of the "siempre fiel" island of Cuba. Any 
alien idea or foreigner could promote sentiments of autonomy within 
the island, and might support alliances with foreign powers such as 
England and the United States of America. This was a preoccupation 
57 ANC, RCJF, leg. 195, n. 8706, 8708 and 8709. 
58 For instance see "Voto Particular del comisionado que 
subscribe el Sr. Argudin sobre las cuestiones de inmigracion". 
InformaciOn sobre reformas en Cuba y Puerto Rico. Nueva York: 
Imprenta de Hallet y Breen, 1867, I, p. 161. 
59 M. Moreno Fraginals, El Ingenio, op.cit., I, p.305. 
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of the early 1840s which would resurface in the 1860s. These 
concerns in part account for the equivocal support of the colonial 
authorities for immigration. In theory, Europeans with their own 
resources, who would populate the country and become proprietors 
were always welcome. However, from the point of view of Cubans and 
the Spanish government, they were desirable only to a limited 
degree. For instance, so long as immigrants did not disrupt the 
structure of landholding already established. As sugar plantations 
required a constant supply of new land to sustain production, it was 
difficult to secure adequate land for colonization, unless located 
some distance from the cane fields. Settling immigrants in less 
accessible, marginal regions could relieve the pressure on land 
wanted for prospective plantations, but it did not solve the labour 
problem on plantations. The idea was to have all potential hands 
nearby to accommodate the demand of the seasonal cycle. Sdo Paulo 
faced the same problems with its policy of crown colonies (ntcleos 
coloniais) and demand for plantation labour. 
When, in the early 1840s, Cubans were exercised by the increase 
in the black population in the early 1840s, they sought white 
immigrants. At this time they were preoccupied about the sort of 
immigrant needed to work on the plantations, either replacing or 
supplementing slave labour. This implied a new kind of working 
relationship with prospective immigrants. But plantation work was 
associated with slave labour. Immigrants would try to avoid being 
treated in the same way as slaves. Wages on the plantations were not 
only lower than in the cities; they were also lower than hire 
charges paid for rented slaves and wages earned by native free 
workers. With the continuation of slavery and the availability of 
land in frontier zones, cheap immigrant labour could only be 
exploited under tighter contracts reinforced by repressive 
legislation. In 1847, that was the opinion of the Committee on White 
Population. Rejecting a project for European immigration, the 
Committee stated that work on plantations in the tropics could only 
be performed under draconian regulations which were not acceptable 
to Europeans. Given the harsh conditions, the Committee did not 
believe European workers could replace or supplement slave labour. 
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In the Committee's view (confirmed by experiments in other Caribbean 
islands) Chinese and free Africans might be more appropriate. 60 This 
view was shared by other planters affected by the "labour problem". 
Apart from the ambivalent attitudes of the Spanish authorities 
and the unwillingness of Spanish workers to accept the harsh 
conditions offered to them, it seems the profitability of the 
traffic in workers and rivalry between merchants also played a role 
in defining an immigration policy. Domingo Goicuria and FeijOo 
Sotomayor both had to defend themselves against competition. In 
addition to the opposition manifest by slave traders to colonization 
projects, as denounced by Sotomayor, there was competition among 
merchants seeking franchise to import free or contract workers. 
Disagreement between the trader Domingo Goicuria and the Council for 
Economic Development over Chinese immigration illustrates the point. 
In March 1846 the Council entered into an agreement with Zulueta and 
Company to import six hundred Chinese under eight year contracts. 
The Company was to receive 170 pesos for each coolie delivered. 61 
 When Goicuria submitted another plan to import European workers 
(Germans and Scots) he criticized the Council's initiative. 
According to Goicuria, while the Chinese cost the Council 170 pesos 
(70 pesos of which would be paid by planters contracting Chinese 
workers), Europeans contracted for three years cost only 45 pesos, 
half of which would be repaid by the labourer. In the final event, 
Goicuria's proposal was rejected by the Counci1. 62 Whether this was 
due to conflicts between Goicuria and the Council, to the 
influential interests of those proposing Chinese immigration, to the 
failure to tie immigrants to the plantations or to concerns over the 
security of the island is not clear. 
During the ensuing decades, plans to import European immigrants 
were temporarily abandoned. Prospects of a profitable trade and the 
60 ANC, RCJF, leg. 195, n. 8729. 
61 D.C. Corbitt, A Study of the Chinese, op.cit., p. 4. 
62 ANC, RCJF, leg. 195, n. 8706. 
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search for great numbers of cheaper and more easily coercible 
workers led Cuban planters to consider experiments with free 
Africans, American indians and Asians. As solutions to the problem 
of labour supply, the new labour arrangements resembled very closely 
the existing system of slavery. Perhaps it is not surprising given 
the continued importation of African slaves. 
3.2.2. Recruiting non-whites: free Africans 
In the mid-1840s, as well as proposals to import European contract 
labourers, there were others suggesting Asians, free Africans and 
American Indians. The great number and variety of plans submitted to 
the Council by immigration companies is explained by the acute 
demand from labourers and the profitability of the business. Not all 
the plans would be approved. Some were sanctioned but were aborted 
almost immediately. Political, racial and economic factors affected 
the success or failure of these attempts: all were experimental. The 
idea was to find cheap, diligent and submissive workers for sugar 
plantations. Indeed, when the Council first sanctioned the 
importation of Chinese by Zulueta and Company it stressed the 
experimental character of the enterprise. If it failed, there would 
be trials with free Africans and others. 63 
Importing free Africans was not considered an eccentric idea. 
International agreements against the trans-Atlantic slave trade had 
already created the ambiguous class of liberated slaves 
(emancipados). These liberated Africans were already employed in 
various places and activities." Free Africans had also been 
63 Acuerdo de la Junta, in March 26,1846, ANC, RCJF, leg. 195, 
n. 8709; stressed again on April 23, 1847, ANC, RCJF, leg. 195, n. 
8729. 
64 According to the census of June 1862, there were 4,521 
emancipados in Cuba; emancipados were legally free, and contracted 
out under government authority. In 1836, emancipado contracts were 
sold at 9 ounces, one third of the price of a slave, and contracted 
for five or seven years, most on sugar plantations; Commissioners to 
Palmerston, Havana, February 17, 1836, Parliamentary Papers, 1837, 
v.54; in 1870, Regulations for emancipados stipulated contracts of 
six years, and according to a sample of contracts, the contractor 
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imported into the British Caribbean as a solution to the labour 
crisis provoked by the final abolition of slavery. The alleged 
physical strength of Africans and their adaptation to the tropical 
climate made them appear even more preferable. Planters were 
accustomed to them and a whole structure was already in existence in 
Africa to facilitate the new traffic. There were several attempts to 
promote free African immigration. All failed due to insuperable 
opposition within Cuba. Supporters of the continuation of the slave 
trade and slavery were among the most powerful opponents. Other 
groups argued that the traffic in free blacks could soon become a 
new slave trade and expressed anxiety about threats to white 
supremacy in Cuba. Yet, other opponents also feared for plantation 
discipline if free Africans and African slaves were to be mixed in 
the cane fields. Just as significant as was the apprehension about 
international opposition to such enterprise. 65 
The great advocate of African free labour in Cuba was Jose Suarez 
Argudin, an estate owner in Bahia Honda and Cienfuegos, and a slave 
trader resident in Havana. Argudin first suggested the import of 
free Africans in 1853. 66 Despite domestic and external opposition 
he would persist with the project for nearly ten years. It is 
interesting to examine the basis of his proposal. It is most 
revealing for the opposition provoked by his project. It is also 
illuminating to contrast his proposed terms with contract conditions 
offered to other workers from Europe and Asia. Of these 
was obliged to pay a salary of twelve pesos a month, to provide him 
with food, two suits of clothes and medical care, A.F. Corwin, Spain  
and the Abolition of Slavery, op.cit., p.278. On emancipados in Cuba 
see also, D. R. Murray, Odious Commerce, op.cit., chapter 13. 
65 Colonial government suggested aprendizes negros in Madrid, 
September 3, 1852, AHN, Ultramar, leg.85, n.1, exp. 9; Committee on 
White Population, Council for Economic Development, opposed for 
political and economical reasons (dangers of mixing free black and 
slaves in the sugar estates, and dangers of mixing black and whites 
in the island), April 29, 1853, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85; n. 2, exp. 
10, also ANC, RCJF, leg. 197, n. 8876, or ANC, RCJF, leg. 97, n. 
4074; Cuban representative in the Reform Commission, 1866, against, 
InformaciOn sobre reformas en Cuba y Puerto Rico, op.cit., I, p.186. 
66 Jose Suarez Argudin, Proyecto sobre inmiqracion africana 
(Havana: Imprenta de Spencer y Compania, 1856) p.3. 
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arrangements, the terms proposed for free Africans were those in 
which slavery features were most evident. As ;Lt' „be the case 
with coolie contracts, the language of slavery was employed 
throughout. 
The basis of Argudin's proposal was published in 1856. It 
provided for the introduction of 40,000 African colonos to work the 
plantations. The colonos should be voluntarily engaged. The 
engagement fee should be fixed in ten pesos per head, the price set 
in similar enterprises carried out by the English. Although stating 
that conditions should follow those already established for the 
Asian colonos, Argudin introduced several amendments. For example, 
the wage for Africans was supposed to be the same as for Asians, 
namely 4 pesos monthly. But half the monthly wage should be 
deposited in a special fund to be paid to the African only at the 
end of the ten-year contract (in fact, the average life of a slave 
field hand). This fund would allow the African to go wherever he 
wanted at his own expense after the contract expired. This 
complemented another clause stressing that Africans should not be 
permitted to remain in the country as libertos (that is, freedmen, 
a term usually applied to former slaves). The scheme prioritized 
males rather than females. Women, although sold at the same price as 
men, would receive only half the male wage. Any children born in the 
island should work unwaqed for the planter (patrono) until they were 
eighteen _ "to compensate planter for the expense of their up-
bringing and the time their mother spent caring for them". After the 
age of eighteen they could choose to contract themselves under the 
same conditions as their parents or to leave the island. Labour 
contractors were required to make provision for the health of the 
colonos. If sold, the price would be determined by the state of 
health of the worker. The set price for a ten-year contract was ten 
ounces, and two ounces of that should be kept in a special fund. 
These two ounces together with the two pesos from colono's monthly 
wage would form the worker's fund which he would receive at the end 
of the contract. The funds were to be deposited in a newly created 
bank which would be set up to promote agriculture and help planters. 
Argudin calculated that if about 20,000 colonos were imported, in 
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the first year these specially deposited funds would rise to more 
than one million pesos, and in ten years more than ten millions 
pesos. 67 The financial advantages of the scheme was apparent. Other 
advantages were to provide cheaper workers for the plantations and 
to contribute to the end of the illegal slave trade. According to 
Argudin, "African immigration (surrounded by the already stated 
guarantees) and adjusted to the same terms and equal conditions 
applying to Asian immigration, would supply Cuban planters with 
colonos contracted for works for ten years for an outlay no greater 
than 170 pesos at a time when a slave costs at least 700 pesos (...) 
Why should planters pay such a high price for illegally imported 
slaves (when there is an alternative available)" .68  Thus, 
importation of free Africans could result cheaper than importation 
of slaves. It also would not result more expensive than Chinese 
coolies, whose price had been initially set by rival merchants at 
170 pesos. 
Seeking to obtain a franchise to import free Africans, it is 
expected that Argudin was opposed to the import of Chinese coolies. 
In fact, in his view, the introduction of Chinese instead of free 
Africans would result in greater danger. If allowed into the country 
these Chinese, allegedly whites and quite "civilized", could bring 
undesirable consequences: "...50,000 individuals of this class could 
more frightful than one million of blacks (...) and result in 
continued disturbances". 69 
By this time Argudin, fearing English opposition to free African 
immigration, tried to persuade Spain to counter all objections. 
England had been engaged in the same trade to its colonies and could 
not give any reasonable justification to prevent Spain doing the 
67 Bases of the plan J. Suarez Argudin, Proyecto, op.cit., pp. 
5-11; quotation from p.6. 
68 J. Suarez Argudin. Proyecto, op.cit, p.13. 
69 J. Suarez Argudin. "Estracto de las razones en que se funda 
el vivo empeno de los habitantes de Cuba de ver introducida en su 
suelo la inmigracion africana" in Proyecto, op.cit, Appendix, p.2. 
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same. 70 Argudin's concern was real enough. As soon as news of Cuban 
intentions to introduce free blacks for the island's sugar 
plantations became known, England sent a message to Madrid asking if 
the government was willing to consent. The official note warned that 
the measure would endanger the tranquillity of the island and could 
serve as a cover for the slave trade by bringing in slaves as free 
blacks. 71 These worries had already been expressed in earlier 
discussions when England was considering the promotion of such 
immigration. 72 Argudin re-submitted his proposal to Madrid many 
times and the government's consultations with various Cuban bodies 
such as the Council for Economic Development and Real Universidad 
Literaria revealed divergent, mostly negative, responses. 73 But 
Argudin persisted and other petitioners appeared. 74 The project 
seems to have attracted great publicity in the press and Argudin was 
fearful of losing the contract and the leading of the trade in free 
Africans. 75 In 1857 Argudin presented, together with the original, 
another proposal. This time 10,000 women and 2,000 men for 
procreation were to be contracted. 76 
The answer from Madrid was far from clear. In April 1859, a 
ruling agreed by the State Council (Consejo de Estado) observed that 
projects for the introduction of free Africans into Cuba had 
provoked a variety of views. But Madrid was mostly concerned about 
the potential effects of mixing free Africans and slaves. It might 
70 J. Suarez Argudin, Proyecto, op.cit., p. 4. 
71 ANM, Ultramar, leg. 90, n. 14, exp. 1. 
72 Parliamentary Papers. Reports from Committees on Sugar and 
Coffee Planting, v.23, Part I. First Report from the Select 
Committee on Sugar and Coffee Planting, together with the minutes of 
Evidence and Appendix. February 17, 1848, Cap. Denman examined, p. 
163, for instance. 
AHN, Ultramar, leg. 90, n. 14, exp. 14. 
74 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 90, n. 14, exp. 4, 6, 7, 13, 16, 17 and 
leg. 90, n. 15, exp. 8. 
75 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 90, n. 14, exp. 2. 
AHN, Ultramar, leg. 90, n. 14, exp. 8. 
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contribute to weaken the bonds of subordination, encourage 
indiscipline and produce disruption among other workers. It 
recognised that the African coast was a great source of free 
immigration, which had been tapped by France and England for their 
colonies. However, international opinion opposed importation of free 
Africans to Cuba. But international opinion was also against Asian 
immigration to Cuba. Thus, alleging lack of data to provide "light 
and criteria" for the question, the Consejo abstained from 
delivering a formal decision. However, further information was 
requested from the Captain General on the subject of free African 
immigration, in case there were any obstacles to the importation of 
Chinese already taking place. 77 
Petitioners to import Africans continued to appear. In 1861, 
Argudin, associated with Don Manoel Basilio da Cunha Reis and Don 
Luciano Fernandes Perdones, requested exclusive right to deal in 
free Africans, to be imported to Cuba, Puerto Rico and Brazi1. 78 Two 
months later, the Spanish government considering international 
questions, asked its representative in London to "sound out the 
attitude of British government". The report came soon: the English 
government simply expressed strong opposition to the Spanish 
representative on the matter. Among the reasons, were the existence 
of slavery in Cuba which might facilitate the transformation of a 
free black into a slave. There were no similarities between Chinese 
and free African immigration, since there were guarantees protecting 
the transportation and engagement of emigrants in. China that were 
absent in Africa. 79 
77 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 90, n. 14, exp. 16. 
78 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 90, n. 14, exp. 19; J. Suarez Argudin, 
Proyecto de inmiqracion africana para las isles de Cuba y Puerto 
Rico y el imperio del Brasil, presentado a los respectivos qobiernos 
por los Sres. Argudin, Cunha Reis y Perdones (Havana: La Habanera, 
1860) 
AHN, Ultramar, leg. 90, n. 14, exp. 20 and 21. The Cuban 
planter Juan Poey also called the attention to dangers of 
africanisation of Cuba: "Esclavos disfrazados, africanizacion de 
Cuba, suicidio politico!". See Juan Poey, Informes presentados al  
Excmo. Sr. Capitan General Gob. Superior Civil de la Isla de Cuba 
sobre el proyecto de Colonizacion Africana, y al Excmo. Sr.  
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The Captain General 	was 	soon 	informed of 	British 
Government'opposition to the introduction of free African. 80 
 Argudin's concerns had turned out to be very real. Yet he would not 
give up. One month later he was again asking for permission to trade 
in free Africans based on the same conditions as before. But the 
destination was not Cuba: 20,000 free colonos were to be shipped to 
the island of Saint Domingue. 81 Argudin's persistence points to the 
great profitability associated with the trade in workers. 
Argudin's frustrated attempts to import free Africans highlights 
some issues regarding the labour problem and its solution in Cuba 
that will be interesting to contrast with Brazil, particularly with 
Sao Paulo. One is the extent to which the continuance of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade affected the search for solutions to the labour 
problem in Cuba. Another is the question of colonial rule by Spain. 
In Brazil, proposals for the importation of free Africans touched 
upon the future of the recently-created nation. After the abolition 
of the trans-Atlantic slave trade in 1850 these proposals 
practically disappeared. In Cuba, for almost twenty years proposals 
for the introduction of free Africans were debated, and despite 
clear creole opposition, the response from the colonial government 
was ambiguous, its position influenced by a desire to examine the 
success or otherwise of Chinese coolies and the British opposition 
to the trade. Most anxiety arose due to similarities between schemes 
to import Chinese and the African slave trade and therefore possible 
British opposition to the traffic in free Africans that could 
threaten the security of the colony. Similarities with the 
institution of slavery were barely considered and did not constitute 
the main focus of opposition. On the contrary, it was the difference 
between "free" and slave Africans, mixed on the estates, that gave 
concern. Another point to contrast is the obvious significance of 
Intendente de la Hacienda de la propia isla, sobre derechos de los 
azucares (Madrid: Imprenta de la Compania de Impresores y Libreros, 
n.d.) p.41. 
80 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 90, n. 14, exp. 22. 
81 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 90, n. 14, exp. 23. 
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the trade in workers promoting alternative or complementary labour 
sources in Cuba. 
3.2.3. Recruiting non-whites: Chinese, Yucatecans and the 
development of the trade in "free" workers  
It was from the late 1840s that a prosperous trade in Chinese 
contract labour began. It evolved alongside the African slave trade, 
and would help meet labour requirements supplementing slaves on 
Cuban sugar plantations for more than two decades. Between 1847 and 
1874 about 125,000 Chinese contract labourers were landed in Cuba. 
The significance of this figure can be better appreciated if set 
against the 168,000 African slaves imported to the island during the 
same period. 
By the time this trade began, the British had already sanctioned 
contract labour by importing several thousand East Indians to their 
colonies of Trinidad, Jamaica and Guyana after slavery had been 
abolished in the British Caribbean. Well before Cuba became involved 
in the trade, the flow of contracted labour to the Americas and 
other tropical plantation areas had become an established feature of 
the international economy. Official records show that over half a 
million Asians (Chinese and East Indians) were imported between 1842 
and 1870 into Mauritius, British Guyana, Trinidad, Jamaica, Natal, 
Reunion and other small French colonies. 82 The Spanish, Cubans, and 
soon the Peruvians, quickly followed the example, faced as they were 
with the problems of labour supply to support the expanding 
plantation sector. The Spanish government was already familiar with 
Chinese agricultural labour in the Philippines, a Spanish colony. As 
it had been practised by other nations, and lacking any clear 
international opposition, the Chinese appeared to be a feasible 
alternative source of labour. The success of the "coolie" trade to 
Cuba, in contrast with proposals to import labour from other areas, 
can be explained by the great profitability of the trade and the 
82 Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery. The Export of Indian 
Labour Overseas, 1830-1920. (London: Oxford University Press, 1974) 
p.113. 
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powerful economic interests involved, and by advantageous contracts, 
assuring planters a cheap labour force. Above all there would be 
little effective international opposition until the 1870s. The great 
interests involved in shipping immigrant workers as well as the sale 
of contract workers in Cuba did not find a counterpart in Brazil. 
Vergueiro's attempts to deal with immigrant workers did not reach 
the same scale and organization of the "coolie" trade to Cuba. 
The trade began in March 1846 when, while fostering Domingo 
Goicuria's enterprises promoting European immigrants, the Council 
for Economic Development finalized an agreement with Zulueta and 
Company to import six hundred Chinese under contract to work for 
eight years at 4 pesos a month plus maintenance. The Company was to 
receive 170 pesos for each coolie delivered. 83 The first Chinese 
arrived at Havana Bay in June 1847 and were transferred directly to 
the deposito de cimarrones _ barracoon where runaway slaves were 
placed when caught until they could be returned to their masters. 84 
 In the barracoon, divided into lots of ten, they were "sold" to the 
planters. According to Corbitt "there was not much enthusiasm about 
the purchase of Chinese. Only 124 were disposed of immediately but 
through advertisements in newspapers the Council was able to place 
83 D.C. Corbitt, A Study of the Chinese, op.cit., p. 4. 
84 J. Perez de la Riva, Para la historia de las qentes sin 
historia, op.cit., p.60, observed that despite suggestions that the 
first Chinese arrived in Cuba in 1840 he could not find evidence to 
support the claim: "Pero nosotros no hemos podido encontrar nada que 
corrobore este dato que, de ser cierto, nos daria el triste 
privilegio de ser los primeros en haber recibido culies en el Nuevo 
Mundo". However, there can be found evidence of Chinese in Cuba 
before 1847; see for instance, one "Chinamen" condemned in 1832,in 
Causa seguida de oficio contra el chino Juan de la Cruz por el 
asalto e robo con violencia y arma, June 14, 1832, AGI, Papeles de 
Cuba, Sor Ricafort(1832-34), leg. 2167; and Chinese condemned during 
Escalera Conspiracion, ColXeccion de los Fallos Pronunciados por una 
Seccion de la Comision Militar establecida en la ciudad de Matanzas 
para conocer de la causa de conspiracion de la ciente de color 
(Matanzas, Imprenta de Gobierno, 1844) for instance, causas la, 3a, 
15a, 27a (Cardenas, one Chino condemned to death and another to ten 
years imprisonment in Africa) and 29a. Although one can not deduce 
from the data which kind of work and conditions these Chinese were 
engaged in, one could presume from the reports of militar commission 
that they were workers on sugar estates. 
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both shiploads at the price of 170 pesos per head". 85 By September 
those remaining, the aged, physically deficient or sick were 
distributed at a more modest price." 
The first contracts stated that the coolie (colono asiatico) was 
bound for eight years to work in any kind of customary labour either 
in the field or in the villages for the wage of 4 pesos a month. The 
daily maintenance should be eight ounces of salted meat (tasajo), 
plus one and a half pounds of plantains and boniatos or other edible 
roots. The consignee should provide clothing and, in event of 
sickness, medical assistance; if the period of sickness was over 
fifteen days, wages were to be suspended. During the period of the 
contract the Chinese worker could not leave the island nor refuse to 
work for anyone to whom the contract was transferred. On completion 
of the contract he could do whatever he wanted. Travel arrangements 
from China and a subsistence allowance of 14 pesos were to be 
covered by the agent and later repaid by the worker by deducting one 
peso a month from his wage. 87 
85 D.C. Corbitt, Chinese, op.cit., p. 4 and p. 7. 
86 Committee on White Population, September 16, 1847, ANC, RCJF, 
leg. 195, n. 8726. 
87 J. Perez de la Riva, Para la historia de las gentes sin 
historia, op.cit., pp.112-3, these were the conditions of the 
contract of the first Chinese who arrived on the ship "Oquendo" in 
1847. Riva in "La situacion legal del culi in Cuba" in El Barracdn.  
Esclavitud y Capitalismo en Cuba. (Barcelona: Editorial Critica, 
1978) pp.110-140, by contrasting the coolie contracts in Cuba and 
Peru with the coolie contracts in British colonies suggested that 
for coolies coming from Cuba or Peru, Jamaica, Trinidad or Guyana 
were a "paradise". In the British colonies, food included rice and 
tea. There were payments for extra work, five year contracts instead 
of eight. However, conditions in British colonies were also very 
harsh. According to 1850 Ordinances in Guyana, immigrants from India 
were compelled to enter into five year contract (a condition for a 
return passage to India, modified later to ten year contracts); were 
prohibited from leave the estates without written permission; for 
days away from work, an immigrant not only forfeited his wage but 
was required to pay his employer twenty four cents; immigrants also 
had to pay for lodging and medical expenses. Alan H. Adamson, Sugar 
without Slaves. The Political Economy of British Guyana, 1838-1904. 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972) pp.53-54. According to 
Adamson between 1855 and 1870 there was a "noticeable tightening of 
the controls governing work, wages and freedom of movement, p.111. 
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The favourable opinion of the Spanish government towards this 
initiative was expressed in the July 3, 1847 Royal Order approving 
the importing of Asians (issued about a month after the coolies had 
landed in Cuba). The proposal was considered plausible on the 
grounds that Asians could be an efficient means of counteracting the 
shortage of labour. Earlier experience in the Philippines had shown 
that Asians were "docile, industrious, frugal, temperate, hardened 
to rural labour, especially in the cane fields" and were accustomed 
to the arduous climate. Also it was observed that the expenses of 
transporting them to the island would be compensated "with their 
labour and moderate wages" . 88 Since the Chinese contract workers 
would find themselves far from their homeland and unable to remedy 
any evil that might befall them, the Captain General, by this time 
Leopoldo O'Donnell, was charged with providing them with all 
"consideration, and good treatment that religion and humanity 
demand" and with ensuring that their contracts were fulfilled to the 
letter. The Captain General was also instructed to consult the 
Audiencia Pretorial de Havana about having the prosecuting attorneys 
(fiscarrto act as protectors of the Chinese workers. The government 
advised that contracts should always include a proportion of females 
to promote marriage within the same class. Finally, the order asked 
the opinion of the Captain General about mixing Chinese and blacks. 
Could they work alongside each other or would it be better to place 
them in different fields. 89 
At the time, the Council for Economic Development was considering 
plans to import Indians from Yucatn, "formerly part of the Spanish 
On the conditions of Asian workers in Peru, see Michael M. Gonzales, 
Plantation Agriculture and Social Control in Northern Peru, 1875-
1933 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985) 
88 Real Orden de 3 de julio de 1847", quoted frog D.C. Corbitt. 
A Study of The Chinese, op.cit., p. 6; also reproduced in J. Jimenez 
Pastrana, Los Chinos en las luchas por la liberaciOn Cubana, 1847-
1930 (Havana: Instituto de Historia, 1963) pp.34-35. 
89 " Real Orden de 3 de julio de 1847", D.C. Corbitt, op.cit., 
p.6. 
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territory". The first Yucatecans arrived in March 1849, contracted 
by Carlos Tolme. They included 135 Indians, followed by a further 
75, all prisoners sold by the Governor of Yucatan. Purchased at 25 
pesos a head, their price in Cuba afterwards reached up to 100 
pesos. 90 According to Corbitt, some two thousand Yucatecans were 
imported into Cuba during the next decade, some of whom were 
obtained by kidnapping. 91 Although it is difficult to give a precise 
number of Yucatecans brought to the island they remained a tiny 
proportion of the population. In 1862 they made up less than one 
percent of the population (see table 7, appendix). 
For about six years there were no further landings of Chinese 
contract workers in Cuba. Problems of adjusting relations between 
planters and Chinese workers, along with international obstacles to 
the continuation of the trade, were responsible for the break. But 
Chinese immigration was again proposed in the early 1850s. By August 
1851 the Council for Economic Development discussed a plan submitted 
by Manuel B. Pereda to import more Chinese. Soon after that, the 
firm of Villoldo, Waldrop and Company made an offer to import 6,000 
to 8,000 Chinese contract workers at 120 pesos each, provided the 
Council guaranteed payment. 92 In January 1852 the Council received 
a petition signed by a great number of planters, "among the 
wealthiest and most influential", emphasizing the need for labourers 
and the "absolute necessity" of projects such as that of Villoldo 
and Waldrop. The planters _ willing to remove all obstacles to 
the success of the enterprise, and aware that one obstacle was that 
the Villoldo and Waldrop Company did not want to deal with 
individual planters but through the Council _ decided to subscribe 
in advance for 6,000 Chinese contract workers to guarantee funds to 
the Council. 93 
90 J. LeRiverend, Historia econOmica de Cuba, op.cit., p.344; 
D.C. Corbitt."Immigration in Cuba", op.cit., pp.301-302. 
91 D.C. Corbitt, "Immigration in Cuba", op.cit., p. 302. 
92 D.C. Corbitt, A Study of the Chinese, op.cit., p. 15. 
93 Representacion de hacendados a Concha, January 1852, AHN, 
Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 1, exp. 4. 
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After studying the planters' petition and the proposal of the 
Waldrop Company, the Committee on White Population suggested that 
"instead of buying the coolies outright for resale, the Council 
should simply act as receiving agent for the planters, guaranteeing 
payment of up to 30,000 pesos in case subscribers could not pay". 94 
 Authorization was subsequently granted to Villoldo, Waldrop Company 
and to Manuel B. Pereda, to import 3,000 Chinese each. Planters who 
subscribed were to pay 125 pesos for each Chinese contract worker: 
90 pesos would be paid on arrival and the balance in three monthly 
instalments. Planters were also to reimburse the Company for any 
expenses advanced to the contracted workers in China, up to a 
maximum of 16 pesos a head. 95 
On submitting the contract agreed by the Council to the Royal 
Government in Madrid, Captain General Concha observed that the 
"shortage of hands" _ made worse "every day with the significant 
reduction in slaves" _ encouraged several private people, among 
them Waldrop Company, to ask for permission to introduce Asian 
contract workers into Cuba. Given the circumstances on the island, 
the Council recognized the convenience and necessity of opening the 
door to Chinese "colonization". 96 According to the Captain General, 
another source of labour was needed if the slave trade was to be 
brought to an end without undermining the efficiency of sugar 
production so that Cuban sugar could compete in European markets. It 
was also necessary for the government to reassure planters of its 
concern for their interests, given official support for the 
effective end of the slave trade. The Captain General argued it was 
essential to neutralize the bad effects on the planter opinion 
caused by opposition to the slave trade. He went on to point out 
that the unlimited introduction of Chinese labourers was the 
solution to the labour shortage, the acuteness of which was 
illustrated by a continued contraband in slaves stimulated by the 
94 D.C. Corbitt,  A Study of the Chinese, op.cit., p.15. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Captain General to the Presidente del Consejo de Ministros, 
April 14, 1852, AHN, Ultramar, leg.85, n. 1, exp. 1. 
96 
high prices they now fetched. 97 
Conditions agreed between the Council and the companies 
stipulated that the full number of Chinese should be imported within 
two years, that they were to be between 15 and 40 years of age, and 
that one fifth of the Chinese should be women, whom the planters 
were obliged to buy in the same ratio. The importers would be 
released from this obligation if they could present evidence that 
the Chinese Government prohibited the export of women." The Chinese 
could be contracted for eight years at 4 pesos a month for men and 
3 for women, plus food, shelter, two changes of clothing a year and 
medical assistance. Wages were not to be suspended if sickness 
lasted less than fifteen days. 99 
There were divergences of opinion in the Real Audiencia Pretorial 
but the majority _ according to the Captain General _ favoured 
the initiative. 190 The fiscal Olivares considered the contract 
advantageous, while remarking that initial imports should be limited 
to 6,000, the figure demanded by planters. Olivares believed that 
-k\ncte would be no political problems and moral ones would be solved by the 
introduction of a proportion of women, good discipline in the 
estates and religious instruction. Nevertheless he criticized the 
severe conditions in the contracts: "From the early stage it was 
apparent that these terms are drawn up in the owners favour, rather 
than the colonos, as working hours are not set, nor do they have any 
rest day". He observed that without some limits these circumstances 
could provoke conflicts and lead to despair and suicide _ of which 
there were already examples. He recommended that the government 
should establish more detailed regulations governing Chinese 
97  Ibid. 
98 D.C. Corbitt, A Study of the Chinese, op.cit., pp.15-16. 
99 ,AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 1, exp. 1; D.C. Corbitt, A Study 
of the Chinese, op.cit., p.15. 
100 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 1, exp. 1. 
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labour. 101 Another official statement observed that the few Asians 
who had come in an earlier experiment had revealed their 
insubordination and "perverted" tendencies, a "very bad example for 
the slaves n . 102 Yet opinion had changed. It was observed: "Is it 
possible that the nature of the colono have changed so suddenly? 
Aren't hacendados illuded in the midst of an understandable desire 
to meet, at whatever cost, an urgent need? (...) how do they expect 
submission and humility from free men, who being better educated 
than the mayorales and workers placed in charge of them, live in 
temporary servitude mixed with savage Africans and subjected to the 
same regime as them?". This kind of immigration was problematic. 103  
The above discussion and comment in the official documents is 
revealing. It discloses the position of the interests involved. In 
Madrid, two points were uppermost: whether or not there would be 
problems in mixing Asians and blacks and the dangers of unlimited 
immigration. Both points were linked to the issue of maintaining 
colonial ties. The Consejo recognized the urgent need for labourers 
as claimed by the Captain General, the Council and the planters. 
However, the Consejo believed that there should be a balance between 
the white and coloured population which had to be maintained at any 
price, if the wealthy colony was to be kept tranquil and tied to the 
mother country. Would the Chinese alter that racial balance? "With 
which party would the Chinese race unite in the event of conflict 
and danger?", questioned the Consejo. When the Consejo approved the 
plans, it stressed that the Captain General must always consult the 
Consejo before allowing any further introduction of Asians. It was 
again observed that it was essential to keep a racial balance, 
considering the black race most advantageous for sugar cane 
cultivation. To help solve the labour problem the Consejo 
recommended the increase of the slave population through the 
101 Voto del fiscal Olivares, April 7, 1852. AHN, Ultramar, leg. 
85, n. 1, exp. 6. 
102 Voto em separado, Escosura, March 4, 1852, AHN, Ultramar, 
leg. 85, n. 1, exp. 7. 
103 Ibid. 
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encouragement of marriage, with prizes to be awarded to owners with 
slaves born in the island, and generally better treatment of slaves. 
It also recommended the introduction of free Africans as apprentices 
under fixed contracts with the stipulation that they should return 
home at the end of the specified term in order not to increase the 
free black population of the island. 104 
In Cuba, the Council and the Committee on White Population 
questioned Madrid's argument that the introduction of free Africans 
would be more advantageous than the introduction of Chinese. 
Although recognizing the potential problems of Chinese coolies 
working side by side with slaves _ the former earning wages denied 
to the latter the mixture of free blacks and slaves on the 
estates would produce rivalries and conflicts believed to be of far 
greater consequence. Trying to placate Madrid's fears of alliances 
against colonial rule, the Committee pointed out that Asians were 
not considered people of colour and that they would be imported only 
in limited numbers. Chinese regarded themselves as being very 
different from blacks. On the other hand, the committee believed 
that to maintain both public order and white supremacy, an increase 
of free blacks should be avoided at all costs. From the political 
point of view, projects to import free Africans were more 
troublesome than those to import Chinese and therefore should not be 
adopted. 105 
By February 1853 Chinese workers transported by Villoldo and 
Waldrop started to arrive in Havana. The bad conditions of 
transportation, treatment and food caused a great number of deaths 
which were reported by the Captain General. Of 1,028 contract 
workers embarked in three ships in China, 247 (28%, including 7 of 
the crew) died during the voyage due to a cholera outbreak and 
twelve committed suicide by jumping into the sea. On arrival another 
104 Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, session September 2, 
1852. AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 1, exp. 9. 
105 Copia del expediente n.7452 sobre pedir a S.M. la 
introduccion de diez mil colonos asiaticos en la Isla: AHN, 
Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 2, exp. 10. 
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39 also died because of a lack of sufficient baracoons to 
accommodate all the new arrivals. 106 The first ship sailed from 
Amoy with 803 coolies, but arrived in Havana with only 480. 107 
 Informed of the dramatic death rates in the transportation of 
Chinese contract workers, the government in Madrid expressed concern 
and asked the Captain General to investigate the causes of death. 
Had the deaths been caused by over-crowding, bad treatment, poor 
food or unhygienic conditions? If so the contractors were to be 
fined. The commission in Madrid also objected that only men were 
imported and noted that there should be no further increase in the 
number of Chinese workers until investigations into the causes of 
death had been completed. 108 
In the meantime the Pereda and Waldrop companies had requested 
that their quotas should be increased from 3,000 to 6,000. This 
request was approved despite contradictory views on the advantages 
of Chinese immigration and the strictures of the commission)" The 
Captain General explained that although there had not been enough 
time to judge the success or suitability of the Chinese immigration, 
he believed this sort of immigration could supply the shortage of  
hands brought about by the repression of the slave trade from 
Africa. By mid-1853 the Captain General reported that to complete 
the quotas, 2,221 coolies had to be transported by the first 
contractor, and 3,779 by the other. 110  
The new contracts approved by the Council, and the suggestion 
that the coolie trade be thrown open to anyone willing to enter it, 
106 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 2, exp.4; and Quadro 
demonstrativo, exp. 5. 
107 D.C. Corbitt, A Study of the Chinese, op.cit., p.16. 
108 Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, session April 12, 
1853, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 2, exp.6. 
109 See requests to increase numbers of chinese by both 
Companies endorsed by planters in AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 1, exp. 
11, 12, 14, 15, 16 and 18. 
110 Captain General to the Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros 
June 6, 1853, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 2, exp. 7. 
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gave a new stimulus not only to plans for Chinese immigration to 
Cuba but also to plans to import other labourers. Feijalo Sotomayor's 
plans to import Galicians, and Argudin's of importing free Africans, 
among others, were presented at this time. The transportation of 
immigrant workers, like the traffic of slaves, appeared to be 
profitable. Former slave traders _ Cuban, Spanish and foreign _ , 
trying to avoid the obstacles and uncertainties of the illegal 
trade, struggled to get a share of the new business. The great 
demand for labourers in Cuba made the island a secure market. 
The Chinese trade was by then a complex international venture 
involving British agents in Manila and Amoy, who organized the 
vo!rle, recruitment and embarkation of the Chinese. Zulueta and Company, 3-1  whO 
promoted the first shipments of Chinese, was a notorious slaving 
firm based in London and British shippers were the carriers. But 
shippers of various nationalities, British, French, Spanish, and 
American, were usually contracted to transport the labourers. 
However, the Chinese trade to Cuba was conceived and financed in 
Cuba by the most powerful members of the socio-economic and 
administrative elite. Almost all linked to the Cuban slave trade. 
They possessed the capital, the contacts, infrastructure and 
experience necessary for the enterprise. 111 Associated with their 
old friends, the Portuguese installed in Macao, Spaniards and Cubans 
carried out the trade, under harsh international criticism, for more 
than two decades. 112 Their enterprises involved financial and 
commercial activities in China, the Philippines, Madrid and Havana, 
and they recruited and transported several thousand Chinese contract 
labourers to Cuba, Peru and the United States of America. For 
instance, the ships "Teresita", "Huracan", "Tinita Torices", 
111 J.G. Cayuela Fernandez, "Estado de la cuestion sobre 
intereses hispano-antillanos durante el siglo XIX en Extremo 
Oriente: armadores, traficantes de esclavos y traficantes de 
ctlies", in Francisco de Solano, Florentino Rodao and Luis E Togores 
(ed.), Extremo Oriente Iberico. Investiqaciones HistOricas:  
Metodoloqia y Estado de la Cuestion (Madrid: Departamento de 
Historia de America, CSIC, 1989) pp.485-498, pp. 490-491. 
112 G. Clarence-Smith, "The Portuguese Contribution to the Cuban 
Slave and Coolie Trades in the Nineteenth Century" in Slavery and 
Abolition v. 5, n. 1 (May 1984) pp.24-33. 
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"Francois" and "Santa Eulalia", contracted or owned by Rafael 
Rodriguez Torices's Empresa de Colonizacion, associated with Gabriel 
Lombillo and J.A. Colome, between 1854 and 1868, imported 11,611 
Chinese coolies from Macao harbour to Cuba, Peru and San Francisco. 
The ships "Vasco da Gama", "Ciudad de Oporto", "Maria da Gloria" and 
"Mobil", owned or contracted by the company "La Alianza", whose main 
associates were Colome, Ferran y Dupierres (Zulueta also 
participated in the firm 113 ), imported 12,000 coolies to Cuba, 
Peru and California between 1860 and 1870. And finally, the ships 
"Casilda", "Velos", "Vigilant", "Chieftain" and "Bristol", owned or 
contracted by the London based firm "Zulueta and Company", imported 
8,000 coolies to Cuba and Peru between 1846 and 1860. Torices, the 
largest importer, Pereda and Drake Brothers imported more than 70% 
of the Chinese disembarked in Cuba. British (10%), American (14%), 
Spanish (23%) and French (28%) ships transported the great majority 
of the Chinese landed in Cuba. 114 Cayuela Fernandez, in his 
analysis of the Hispanic-Antillan interests in the Far East, 
observed that the coolie trade gave returns of more than 700 million 
reales for members of the Antillan elite. Rafael Torices, from six 
cargoes of Chinese effected between 1857 and 1860, made 14,280,000 
reales. He sold the Chinese at a price ranging between 140 and 220 
pesos each and his main buyers during the period were the planters 
Pedroso, Alejandro Fuster, Miguel Gaston and the Count of 
Fernandina. Five cargoes handled mainly by Zulueta, between 1850 and 
1859, returned 12,948,000 reales. The Chinese were sold at a price 
of between 170 to 250 pesos each, and among his main customers were 
Francisco Ibafiez, the Arieta Family and the Count of Villanueva. As 
one last example, seven cargoes organized by Colome, president of 
the Company "Alianza", between 1860 and 1865, yielded 15,795,000 
reales. The coolies were sold for between 160 and 300 pesos, and 
among the main buyers were the Diago family, the Count of Vegamar, 
the Marquis of Marianao, the Count of Fernandina, and the Count of 
Diana. Many of the traders became the most rich and powerful 
planters of the island, investing their returns in sugar estates 
113 L.W. Bergad, op.cit., p.251. 
114 Ibid. 
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which they stocked with a very cheap workforce. 115 
The success and profitability of the trade in workers is further 
revealed by the great number of plans and requests to introduce 
"colonos" _ Chinese, Mexican and Venezuelan Indians, Europeans, 
free Africans and so on, in a variety of circumstances and under 
varied conditions of contract. The number of requests to import this 
kind of worker grew during the decade as did the diversity and 
numbers of those to be imported. Further evidence of the 
profitability of this business is shown by the proliferation of 
applicants to engage in the trade. Waldrop and Company and Manuel 
Pereda were not alone in applying for permission to introduce 
Chinese contracted workers to Cuba. By the same year, 1852, 
Fernandez de Castro, a Cadiz merchant and shipowner, made a formal 
request to introduce Chinese to Cuba. 116 About one year later, the 
Consejo in Madrid was discussing an application from Jose Matias, 
also from Cadiz, to ship by about 5,000 Chinese to Cuba. 117 Corbitt 
noted that by the end of 1853, the Council had received petitions to 
import Chinese from six persons, and between 1852 and 1858 at least 
thirty petitions were received. In 1860 there were four before the 
authorities. 118 In the early 1850s Villoldo, Waldrop and Company 
and Pereda asked permission to introduce about 6,000 Chinese 
contract workers; by the end of the decade some petitioners were 
seeking permission for 10,000, 40,000, 60,000 and even 70,000 
115 J.G. Cayuela Fernandez, op.cit., pp.491-492. According to J. 
Perez de la Riva, "Aspectos Econamicos del trafico de culies" in El 
BarracOn. op.cit., (pp.88-110) pp.102-103, the costs of engagement 
in Macao increased from 15 Mexican pesos in early times to the 
"exorbitant" sum of 150 pesos in the 1870s. The coolie landed in 
Cuba cost between 100 and 120 pesos in 1860; ten years later, 150 to 
175 pesos. The price of coolies in the Havana market also increased 
from 125 pesos in 1848-1853, to 340 and 400 pesos in 1855-1859, to 
more than 400 pesos in 1865-1868. 
116 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 2, exp. 2. See also the request 
by Jose Matias, who was associated to Zulueta and Cia., and arguing 
that he had applied for it in 1846, asked extension and preference 
in the Chinese importation. AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n.1, exp. 13; 
117 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 2, exp. 9. 
118 D.C. Corbitt, A Study of the Chinese, op.cit., p.18. 
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Asians. 
As well as numbers to be transported, proposals usually included 
some reference to conditions of shipment and contract selling price. 
The end of the slave trade and the great mortality of Cuban slaves 
were always advanced as justification for such enterprises. But the 
artificiality of the arguments, the faking of a situation "to sell" 
a specific product, that is labourers, was very much apparent. The 
trader's anxiety to profit from the business was exposed in various 
situations. In 1861, for instance, Don Juan Manuel Rodriguez and Don 
Francisco Rovirosa y Arguelles, from Seville, asked permission to 
send 8,000 black women from north Africa to the island to work as 
domestic servants in the cities, on ten-year contracts. The 
undertaking was justified on the grounds that domestic servants had 
been reduced in Cuba due to the great mortality among black women 
and that whites were not good enough for the work, apart from the 
fact that European women would not move to such a remote place. Of 
course, the project was dismissed. The Consejo de Administracibn 
replied that the domestic service was well-served in the island. 
Another report criticized the project's author for its absolute 
ignorance of where and in which sector there was a shortage of 
labour in Cuba. 119 Another example is provided by Jose Suarez 
Argudin's repeated attempts to import free Africans. After his final 
bid for permission to introduce free Africans to Cuba he asked 
permission to introduce them to Saint Domingue. ln 
Speculation involving the trade in workers to Cuba did not go 
unnoticed in Madrid. When the Sociedad General de Cr6dito Moviliario 
Espanol submitted a proposal at the end of the 1850s, Madrid 
expressed its concern about the way concessions had been given and 
119 Exposicion a S.M. de D. Juan Manuel Rodriguez y D. Francisco 
Rovirosa y Arguelles, April 4, 1861; informe del Consejo de 
Administracion de Cuba, March 20, 1862; Dictdmen del Ayuntamiento, 
August 13, 1862, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 90, n. 15, exp. 8. 
120 See justification given by Jose Argudin in his Exposicion a 
S.M. July 9, 1861, to import 20.000 free Africans to Santo Domingo, 
after unsuccessful attempts to import free Africans into Cuba, in 
AHN, Ultramar, leg. 90, n. 14, exp. 23. 
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about the numbers of Chinese contract workers entering the island. 
The Sociedad _ in a printed and very detailed proposal _ asked for 
exclusive permission to introduce 60,000 Chinese workers, "the 
chosen race", within six or eight years. The Sociedad's plan stated 
that the contracts were to be sold for no more than 18 ounces at 
the time other suppliers were charging to 23 or 24 ounces. It also 
promised to pay the Treasury in Madrid the sum of 320,000 reales per 
thousand Chinese disembarked in Havana _ a total of 19,200 
thousand reales! In the end it remarked that to meet the "the most 
important interests", that is, "that of humanity", the society had 
already exclusive shipping rights with a company to bring Chinese 
contract workers to Havana. It added that the ships would be very 
large and fast, to help "to reduce the death rate" on the 
voyage. 121 
The proposition of the Sociedad de Credito Moviliario was 
submitted to the Consejo in Madrid in October 1858. The Consejo 
opened by criticizing the arguments presented by the Society. The 
Chinese were not the "chosen race" among others, but a compromise. 
The point was not one of "colonization", stressed the Consejo, but 
rather to find a continued source of labourers. The Consejo turned 
out to be concerned as much about the methods of allowing the 
introduction of colonos as to their numbers. Exclusive deals and the 
systems of privilege should be avoided leaving room for free 
competition. Commenting further, the Consejo pointed out that 
benefits for the workers or the Treasury should be left out of 
equation: the question was the development and prosperity of the 
colony, considered as the basic resources of the Exchequer. In the 
Consejo's view the plan provided a good example of the scale of 
business that importing Chinese workers had reached. 122 
121 Proposicion presentada a S. M. la Reina por la Sociedad del 
Credito Moviliario Barcelones, para la introduccion de colonos 6 
Trabajadores Chinos en la Isla de Cuba, submitted in September 28, 
1857 and then published in Madrid, Imprenta de Luis Garcia, 1859. 
AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 5. 
122 	• 	- Dictamen acordado en el Consejo, al Ministro de Guerra y 
Ultramar, April 26, 1859, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 6, exp. 3. 
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The commercial character of the trade in Chinese workers would be 
always denounced by planters and policy makers. Regulations would be 
framed in an attempt to prevent abuses. The system of concessions 
regarding the introduction of Chinese labourers in Cuba had been 
discussed since early in the decade. According to Domingo Estorch, 
for instance, by 1853, when the Marquis of la Pezuela assumed the 
government of the island, a monopoly of the colonization _ 
Chinese, Yucatecans and Galicians _ belonged to only three 
enterprises. It was Pezuela who opened the trade to others willing 
to introduce contract workers, and set down their rights and 
obligations in the 1854 Reglamento - "to avoid complaints and 
distress" .123 
By the end of the 1850s, after reports from Spanish consuls in 
China, warnings against granting too many concessions to import 
Chinese were already being sent to Cuba. "It is necessary to bring 
to an end all these introductions", ordered the government in 
Madrid, for they could cause serious complications if due 
precautions were not taken. 124 The Captain General expressed his 
indignation with the order and blamed false reports in the Spanish 
press. The Captain General argued that the ventures were conducted 
in good faith and if profits were high it was due to the initiative 
and intelligence of traders. The trade could not be brought to an 
abrupt halt as many ships were already on their way to the island. 
If the government in Madrid wished to act, it should first instruct 
consuls in China to deny shippers loading certificates for Cuba. 125 
 In December 1859 Madrid replied that Chinese immigration should be 
123 D.M. Estorch, Apuntes para la Historia sobre la 
administracion del Marques de la Pezuela en la Isla de Cuba, desde 
3 de Diciembre de 1853 hasta 21 de Setiembre de 1854 (Madrid: 
Imprenta de Manuel Galiano, 1856) p. 38. The open and favourable 
attitude of Captain General Concha also contributed to the trade. In 
addition to private financial interest, authorities were also 
concerned about the development of sugar production, as observed by 
J. Perez de la Riva, "Aspectos economicos del trdfico de culies", in 
El Barracon, op.cit., pp.93-94. 
124 Real Ordem April 7, 1859, minuta. AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 
6, exp. 4. 
125 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 6, exp. 5. 
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stopped and told the Captain General to set a time limit for the end 
of the trade. It also reported that consuls in China had already 
been informed of this decision. It was stressed that the number of 
Chinese on the island was approaching 50,000 a figure judged to be 
sufficient for the time being. 126 
Just as earlier there had been concern about the security of the 
island resulting from the growth of the slave and black population, 
now in the late 1850s, Spain had reservations about the unrestricted 
arrival of Chinese workers in the colony. There was also 
international opposition to the continuation of the coolie trade. 
Problems in engaging workers in China had been reported by Spanish 
consuls. Uprisings in Shanghai against contracted Chinese embarking 
for foreign countries were reported, as well as virulent press 
opposition in Hong Kong and Macao. Investigations had been made by 
the Chinese government into the conditions of engagement and 
transport. There had been incidents involving the Chinese 
authorities and British consular agents. 127 In early 1860 the 
Captain General reported that the Royal Order was being executed and 
the date has been set: December 31, 1860, a period of time believed 
sufficient for all expeditions that had already left China to 
complete their voyage to Cuba. From the first of January, 1861, new 
expeditions should be prohibited. 128 There were complaints from 
importers. 129 Proposals for the introduction of Asians were still 
being made. They could come from Polynesia, for instance, 
"contracted for a greater number of years and lower prices", 
according to a would-be importer. 130 However, after new regulations 
and international agreements, the coolie trade continued for more 
126 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 50, n. 9, exp. 1. 
127 See reports of the Consul General de Espana in Macao ao 
Ministro de Guerra y Ultramar of May 7, 1859 and September 9, 1859, 
AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 6, exp. 6 and 7. 
128 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 7, exp. 4. 
129 See for instance, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 7, exp. 6 and 
7. 
130 See proposal AHN, Ultramar, leg.85, n. 7, exp. 2. 
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than a decade, ending only in 1874. In 1877 the Chinese government 
halted emigration of Chinese workers to Cuba under contract, by the 
Treaty of Peking. 131 
Between 1847 and 1874 some 125,000 Chinese contract workers were 
landed in Cuba, about 50% of them after 1865, coinciding with the 
last years of the trans-Atlantic slave trade (see table 10, 
Appendix). The majority were male and were absorbed by sugar 
plantations in Matanzas, Cardenas and Colon, then the major areas of 
sugar expansion. In 1867, of 1,337 Chinese and 30 Yucatecans listed 
in the district of Cimarrones, Cardenas, 1,348 were males, and 19 
females; 1,366 were employed in rural labour and only one in 
domestic service; 1,349 were between 15 and 50 years old; 1,291 had 
been contracted for ten to fifteen years. 132 The basic terms of the 
contracts remained virtually the same throughout the period. Wages 
were still far below of those paid to other free labourers in the 
island. During the 1850s and 1860s salaries rarely varied from the 
norm set at 4 pesos per month, while wages for unskilled labour 
ranged between 17 and 25 pesos a month. Like slaves, coolies were 
housed in huts or barracks, organized into gangs, and sent to work 
under armed overseer in the fields and mills. 133 The Chinese were 
openly traded, and a market of Chinese contract workers developed 
alongside ..erthe Cuban slave market. The price of contracted Chinese 
oscillated between 340 and 425 pesos, while 4Arice 06-have was 500 
to 600 pesos. 134 The conditions to which these immigrant workers 
were subjected had an explicit objective: to make contract labour as 
cheap and possibly more productive than slave labour. 
131 On the treaty see D.C. Corbitt, A Study of the Chinese, 
op.cit., p.72. 
132 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 76, n. 1, exp. 4. 
133 R. Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba. The Transition to 
Free Labour, 1860-1899 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) 
p 29 
134 J. Perez de la Rive, El BarracOn, op.cit., p.109. 
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3.3. Legislation and control: contracts, conflicts and laws  
Soon after the first experiments with Europeans, Cuban planters 
realized that there should be clear incentives to encourage 
immigrants to work, as conditions and wages on plantations were not 
very attractive. Labour contracts were just a beginning. General 
regulations were further designed to help to manage the new labour 
relations and to shape them to the need of planters so as to 
increase productivity and discipline. 
From the beginning European, Mexican, African and Chinese 
contract workers in Cuba were usually referred to as "colonist" 
(colono), although the conditions envisaged for those workers were 
far from those generally encompassed by the term, which implied free 
settlers. All these workers were viewed as "hands" (brazos), meaning 
cheap and unskilled labour. However, while the general label colono 
was attached to all these groups, contract conditions varied 
considerably. For instance, the length of the engagement: from three 
to five years for Europeans; eight years for Chinese; 10 years or 
Tilor e large-p for Africans and Indians. Different arrangements also 
prevailed as expire of contracts. Europeans and their families were 
welcome to form part of the population, while Asians and Africans 
should return to their countries if they did not renew their 
contracts. In part these variations in conditions were due to sharp 
differences in the costs of transporting colonos from the Far East 
and Africa as opposed to Europe. But social prejudice and the 
experience of planters in dealing with distinct groups of workers 
also helped determine the particular conditions imposed on the 
Chinese, Africans and Mexican Indians. 
Between the 1840s and 1860s, the shape and character of contracts 
and the regulations governing contracts were fashioned and re-
fashioned as the result of conflicts between planters and immigrant 
workers. It was a dynamic process and while the content of the 
contracts and regulations helped define a specific mode of labour 
relations _ establishing the limits within which plantation work 
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was to be conducted _ the scope of regulations and contracts 
reflected also the experiences of both planters and workers who were 
coming to terms with the new labour organization emerging in the 
island. Hence the changes in the general regulations and in the 
content of contracts illustrate how the process of transition was 
accomplished. 
This section explores contracts applied to Chinese and 
Yucatecans. It focuses particularly on those clauses in labour 
contracts relating to disputes between planters and workers and on 
regulations issued by the government to resolve conflicts that 
emerged during early experiments with free labour. It must be 
acknowledged that, given the workers' isolation in estates or in 
areas where the planter and his representatives prevailed, formal 
contracts and legal assignments were likely to have had very little 
effect and could produce a false picture of the situation. However, 
the question of enforcement does not tell the whole truth about 
legislation. The content of contracts and regulations gives an idea 
of the pattern of labour relations envisaged for non-slave workers. 
Changing conditions, either conceptual or actually prevailing, 
reflect the changing nature of relations between planters and 
workers and can reveal the conflicts and wider dynamics that 
characterize these first experiments with free labour. 
While coolies were entering Cuba, slaves continued to be 
imported. The coolie trade did not differ very much from the slave 
trade. Chinese were bought, sold and hired out in almost the same 
way as slaves. They lived in similar circumstances regarding housing 
and maintenance and performed the same tasks. Planters and 
administrators resorted to the same methods of control and 
punishment. In practice, and by law, they were denied the rights of 
free men who had been contracted for a limited period. Notices about 
runaway Chinese were published in local newspapers in the same way 
as for runaway slaves. For slaves and coolies, the planter was 
paramount. And coolies reacted to the brutality of the plantation 
life in a manner that was very similar to that of slaves: they 
rebelled individually or collectively; they protested to the 
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authorities, even though it was of little effect; they ran away; 
they committed suicide. Contemporary observers and modern historians 
have seen the treatment of free men, contracted for a fixed period, 
as slaves or semi-slavery. 
Very little evidence can be found to mitigate the picture often 
portrayed. Nevertheless, if the daily experience of the coolie 
closely resembled that of slavery, his juridical status as a fixed-
term contract worker contrasted sharply with that of a chattel 
slave. Although laws were often openly ignored, and with them the 
legal status of a free contract worker, the fact that the coolie 
were provided with a formal legal status that may be placed in an 
intermediate position between that of slave and free workers 
signalled a significant change for planters. And, when pressed for 
"free labour", that was what somehow planters envisaged _ a system 
of contract-regulated labour (the system applied to the coolies) 
rather than a free labour market. Besides, the coolies did not see 
themselves as semi-slave, although day-to-day life on the plantation 
was similar to that of slaves. The Chinese were aware that they were 
free men under contract. Numerous protests and complaints filed by 
the Chinese against planters and local authorities can be found in 
Cuban archives. These testify to the Chinese awareness of their 
peculiar status and their struggle to draw a distinction between 
themselves and the slaves. 
From the beginning there were conflicts with, and complaints 
about, Chinese contract labourers: indiscipline, escapes, refusals 
to work and suicides were reported. On September 22, 1847, a few 
months after the arrival of the first Chinese workers, a planter who 
had engaged some of them from the Council complained that one worker 
was sick and demanded from the Council an "exchange" or cash refund. 
(According to a doctor's report, the sickness was provoked by 
"homesick attacks of many individuals who leave their native land 
for the first time (...) far away from home and most of the things 
they are used to (...)". 135 About the same time, the owner of 
135 ANC, RCJF, leg. 195, n. 8726. 
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Atenas sugar mill, who had contracted 49 Chinese, also asked for a 
cash refund for 30 workers. In this case it was explained that the 
workers rebelled since arriving in the plantation, refusing to 
perform their allotted tasks. According to the planter's report, the 
conflicts sharpened when one day, at 6 a.m., they refused to go to 
work. After attempts to understand what they wanted (there were no 
interpreters), it was disclosed that they wanted "a biscuit and 
water with sugar" (una galleta y agua con azdcar) before leaving for 
the fields. Until then they had received only half rations. It was 
explained that the fixed half allowance was temporary, until the 
arrival of supplies from the capital. However, the Chinese did not 
accept this and one of them threatened the owner, pretending to cut 
his neck with a knife. This gesture was sufficient to send the 
Chinese to the stocks. This punishment produced an even greater 
furore. In the end the authorities had to be called and only 19 
Chinese wanted to continue work on the estate. The others were sent 
back to Havana, "to prevent dire consequences and because they could 
set a bad example to the other workers on the estate". 136 In 
neither case did the Council accept the Chinese back nor refund 
money. 
In February 1848, the Council requested those experimenting with 
Chinese contract workers to report on their experiences with a view 
to increasing imports. Diverse opinions were recorded. Those who 
experienced conflicts with the Chinese, such as the owner of Atenas 
sugar mill, were against continued imports. Others, such as 
Francisco, Fernando and Pedro Diago reported favourably and were 
willing to engage more coolies. The Count de Peflalver reported 
initial unease, but took the view that "when accustomed to the 
climate, the food, and plantation discipline" the coolies would no 
longer complain about work and conditions. Urbano FeijOo Sotomayor 
also gave a favourable report. He had engaged 58 Chinese workers, 
who after a period of acclimatization, started plantation work and 
showed themselves to be even better than slaves for certain tasks. 
Although they refused to work at night, and on three occasions 
136 ANC, FRCJF, leg. 195, n. 8738. 
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planned to murder the estate foreman, Sotomayor was willing to 
engage more. In his view, the Chinese were generally intelligent, 
peaceful, obedient and humble; sons of a country governed by the rod 
(hijos de un pais gubernado a palos), they were the most suitable to 
work alongside slaves. And as slaves could no longer be imported, 
contracts were the only way to guarantee the supply of labourers and 
ensure an adequate return on travel expenses. Sotomayor also 
observed that the Chinese would not ally with the blacks in case of 
plantation disturbance and could be useful third party in the 
balance of power. 137 
Problems arising from these early experiments led the authorities 
to reinforce contracts with harsh regulations: first in 1849; again 
in the early 1850s when the imports of Chinese workers resumed; and 
on a third occasion in the 1860s following international criticism 
of the coolie trade and of conditions for contract workers in Cuba. 
On April 10 1849, a set of regulations was passed, the Government  
Regulations for the Management and Treatment of Asian and Indian 
Colonists. 138 According to the circular letter that accompanied the 
Regulation, there had been obstacles to the good management of the 
Asian race: the "coolie" was a new and unknown element in the 
country and there were no rules to guide the planters in their 
treatment of the Chinese. 139 
The 1849 Regulation included twenty articles and referred to 
Asian and Mexican Indian colonists. Most regulations were common to 
both. The only specific difference applied to the Chinese concerned 
137 ANC, FRCJF, leg. 195, n. 8746. 
138 The 1849 Reglamento del Gobierno Para el manejo y trato de 
los colonos Asidticos y Indios has been reproduced in several works, 
J. Jimenez Pastrana, Los chinos en las luchas por la liberaciOn 
cubana, 1847-1930 (Havana: Instituto de Historia, 1963) pp.127-130; 
also D.C. Corbitt.A Study of the Chinese, op.cit., pp.67-69. Cubans 
usually referred to Chinese and other contract workers as colonists 
(colonos), blurring distinctions from other immigrants. Those who 
bought their contracts were called patronos. 
139 1849, Reglamento, in J. Jimenez Pastrana, Los Chinos, 
op.cit., p. 127. 
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religious instruction which was unnecessary for the already Catholic 
Indians. The colonos should be taught to have "obedience and 
respect" for their "superiors" and the authorities. Wages, 
maintenance, food and medical assistance were laid out in terms 
similar to those stipulated in early contracts. In the event of 
sickness lasting more than two weeks, wages were to be suspended. 
Wages were also to be suspended in the case of escape; the costs of 
recapture would be deducted from wages. Working hours were 
prescribed generally only as "horas de costumbre". To assure 
"discipline and subordination", the Regulation sanctioned and 
reinforced contracts clauses relating to corporal punishment. It 
stipulated flogging, leg irons or shackles and stocks in the event 
of disobedience, individual or collective refusal to work and 
running away. To justify the clauses providing for corporal 
punishment, it was stressed that without this kind of correction, 
publicly administered by the planter or his deputies, it would be 
absolutely impossible to secure work and discipline. 140 Those who 
devised the Regulation were aware of Chinese sensibilities about 
being compared with the slaves and attempted to draw a distinction. 
Thus, according to article 10, whenever there were ten coolies on 
any one estate, the planter had to assign a white overseer to 
supervise and help them with the work. Article 17 stipulated that 
only the white overseer could administer corporal punishment to 
coolies and punishment was never to occur in the presence of slaves. 
Rather than simply making a distinction between the status of slaves 
and contracted Chinese, these articles point to the existence of 
conflicts involving Chinese workers who often reacted violently when 
treated as slaves or placed with them. Finally, the authorities were 
instructed to take note of excessive punishment, and of problems 
arising from bad management and control of colonos. 
The Regulations, especially those clauses permitting physical 
punishment, provoked a wave of criticisms from various quarters. The 
fiscal Medina of Puerto Principe observed that the unusual and 
severe power delegated to the owner or his deputies (including 
140 1849, Reqlamento, in J. Jimenez Pastrana, Los Chinos, 
op.cit., p.127. 
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foremen) was without doubt greater than that granted by law to a 
range of public officials, local and regional, including deputies 
governors and governor. The fiscal observed that none of these 
authorities could inflict more than light fines and thirty days 
prison without establishing the facts of a case. It was 
inappropriate to displace the authority of the courts in such 
matters and to establish a private jurisdiction in the plantations. 
To grant planters legal powers usually administered by governmental 
and judicial authorities could weaken the ordinary system of Royal 
justice. Al The Ministro de Audiencia of Puerto Principe also 
censured the Regulation, supporting the arguments developed by the 
fiscal. He observed that Chinese workers should not be legally 
subject to discretionary treatment by those on whom they were 
dependent. As foreigners they were already subject to existing 
police and security jurisdiction. He added that in the case of 
Yucatecans, the situation was even more serious for not only should 
they be accorded "direito comun de las gentes", they deserved 
special treatment because of treaties of friendship with their 
country of origin. 142 
When submitting the Regulation for approval to Madrid, the 
Captain General explained that as blacks outnumbered whites on the 
island, they were subjected to special and severe treatment in order 
to preserve the colony. Although practices had evolved in terms of 
the harshness of the legislation (reference to the 1842 Slave Code), 
blacks were still tightly controlled. Pointing out that blacks "have 
always been a capital enemy of the whites" and were always willing 
to take up arms to exterminate them, the Captain General wondered 
about the Asians and Indians. To which class did they belong? In his 
view, they belonged to the coloured classes and therefore they could 
not be treated as whites. To treat them the same as whites would 
cause great disruption and disorder. Answering criticism from the 
Tribunal of Puerto Principe which questioned his competence to 
141 	Fiscal Medina, Puerto Principe, April 21, 1849, AHN, 
Ultramar, leg. 91, n. 1, exp. 8. 
142 Voto particular, D. Francisco Duran y Cuerbo, Puerto 
Principe, May 15, 1849, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 91, n. 1, exp. 8. 
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promulgate the dispositions, the Captain General stressed that the 
task of keeping those races obedient and subordinate was by its 
nature of the competence of the Governor. He therefore did not need 
to consult anybody. 143 At the end, considering the reasons 
presented by the Captain General and given the "peculiar 
circumstances" of the Asian race on the island _ special 
privileges n ... could alter the subordination of the African race so 
indispensable to peace on the island" _ the government in Madrid 
approved the Regulations. 144 
A few years later, when the introduction of Chinese contract 
workers resumed, the government in Madrid suggested that a new 
framework of regulation establishing working relations and the 
treatment of immigrant contract labour should be prepared. 145 Great 
Britain had officially protested against the 1849 Regulation. 146 
Cubans in exile had denounced its slave-like features and even 
within the island it was regarded as dangerous and excessively 
cruel. 147 Captain General Valentin Cafledo took the initiative of 
preparing a new code. Cafledo's project laid down conditions for the 
introduction, transportation and treatment of contract workers, and 
suppressed the corporal punishment permitted under the 1849 
Reglamento. Protests from the planters and Cafledo's vacillation 
postponed the approval of regulations until the next government. 148 
In a 1853 circular, Captain General Pezuela, Caledo's successor, 
presented the case for further changes in the regulations. He argued 
143 Report, June 9, 1849. AHN, leg. 91, n. 1, exp. 8; the 
Committee on White Population disagreed Chinese were clase de color, 
report, November 26, 1852, ANC, RCJF, leg. 197, n. 8874. 
144 Ultramar, Oficio, Madrid, March 2, 1850, AHN, leg. 91, n. 1, 
exp. 8. 
145 Consejo de Ministros, Session September 2, 1852, AHN, 
Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 1, exp. 9. 
146 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 1, exp. 9. 
147 J. Perez de la Riva, El Barrac6n, op.cit., p.121. 
148 Ibid. 
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that the need to end the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the 
mortality on the plantations made it necessary to find new hands. 
The re-drafted Regulation was an effort to guide "private interests" 
towards the "benevolent intentions" of the government: it was 
concerned to effect the fulfilment of contractual obligations and 
would favour _ "without any privilege" _ all enterprises and 
private agreements to introduce free labourers in compliance with 
government safeguards .149 
A new Reglamento, elaborated during Canedo's government, was thus 
finally promulgated on March 22, 1854. Much more complex than the 
previous statutes, the 1854 Regulation included 66 articles divided 
into three chaptersY 3() The first chapter applied to the trade in 
contract workers and conditions offered to workers; the second, 
established a framework of the duties and rights for colonos; the 
third covered planter's disciplinary jurisdiction. The first chapter 
opened trade in Spanish, Indian and Chinese  colonos to any company, 
for a period of two years. All firms were required to seek official 
approval and the government reserved the right to regulate numbers, 
nationality and condition of those imported. The attempt by the 
government to intervene in all details of the trade and in the 
conditions agreed between contract workers and contractors or 
planters was plainly evident. Thus, it specified that contracts i) 
should be translated in the language of the labourer, and should 
specify the age, sex, place of origin, the period of the contract, 
the monetary value of the wage, the quantity and quality of food and 
clothing, medical assistance; ii) clauses relating to medical 
assistance should specify whether the wages would be stopped in case 
of sickness caused by work or causes outside the master's control; 
iii) contracts should spell out the number of hours to be worked, 
specified by task, and make provision for overtime work; iv) 
149 Circular letter, December 23, 1853. AHN, Ultramar, leg. 91, 
n. 1, exp. 8. 
150 Reglamento para la introduccian y regimen de los colonos en 
la Isla de Cuba (Havana: Imprenta del Gobierno y Capitania General, 
1854); also reproduced in J. Jimenez Pastrana, Los Chinos, op.cit., 
Appendix, pp.130-140. 
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contracts were to state that the colono was obliged to indemnify the 
planter for working hours lost by his own fault and that he was 
subjected to the discipline of the plantation; v) and that contract 
could be transferred to another planter or any other private person. 
A new clause added that the worker was required to signal that he 
was "in agreement with the stipulated salary, accepting that free 
workers and slaves make much more because I feel that this 
difference has been compensated by other benefits which the patrono 
has given me, and which are spelt out in this contract". ("Yo N.N.,  
me conformo con el salario estipulado aunque se y me consta que es  
mucho mayor el que qanan los jornaleros libres y los esclavos en la 
isla de Cuba porque esta diferencia la juzqo compensada con las  
otras que ha de proporcionarme mi patrono y son las que aparecen de 
este contrato."(original stress). This clause was, of course, an 
attempt to compel the contracted worker to accept wages far below 
those prevailing in the island. 
The harsh conditions devised by the Regulations were apparent. The 
number of working hours could not exceed twelve or fifteen a day, 
with six consecutive hours of rest during the night.(The 1842 code 
stipulated from nine to sixteen hours for slaves.) Most of the 
rights granted to the colono, defined in the second chapter, were 
compromised. Marriage, the sanctity of the family, the right to 
acquire property and to redeem the debt early were protected. 
Nevertheless the patrono's disciplinary jurisdiction over the colono 
was paramount despite the law. In the end the colono represented a 
fixed capital investment, and was the property of those who bought 
the contracts. 151 Marriage and the acquisition of property required 
the approval of the patrono. A colono's children, born before the 
engagement, could be contracted under the same conditions as their 
mothers; if born during the engagement they were to bear their 
mother's status throughout the contract, becoming freed only when 
reaching eighteen years old. When reaching the age of twenty five, 
or when six years contract had elapsed, the colono had the right to 
151 Evelyn Hu-Dehart, "Chinese Coolie Labor in Cuba in the 
Nineteenth Century: Free Labor or Neoslavery", unpublished paper 
conference "From Chattel to Wage Slavery", London, 1992, p.8. 
118 
redeem himself by paying out the patrono. This indemnity covered 
the original purchase price of the contract, the balance of the 
contract outstanding, the value that the services of the colono had 
reached at the time and the inconvenience caused to the patrono 
while looking for a replacement. However, the colono could not 
redeem himself during harvest or when urgent tasks were needed. The 
contract worker also had to have written permission to leave his 
place of work, otherwise he could be arrested as a runaway. He also 
needed permission to work in another place and was not allowed to 
trade without permission from the patrono. But he could be "sold" or 
hired to another planter without consultation. Of course, all these 
clauses compromised the right to save and purchase his freedom. 
Unless explicitly stated in the contract, the immigrant worker was 
charged with the cost of a return passage to his country of origin 
or to any other destination he might chose. 
The designation of the Captain General to ensure good treatment 
and the fulfilment of contracts was significant. So was the measure 
giving the authorities the right to visit estates and make inquiries 
about complaints. However, the legal resources available to colonos 
to air their grievances were very limited. And article 19 stated 
that the colono should renounce the exercise of all civil rights 
incompatible with the fulfilment of contractual obligations. Only on 
completion of the contract would the immigrant worker be entitled to 
full Spanish rights of citizenship. This clause was later replaced 
by another obliging the colono to sign up again after completing his 
contract or to leave the island at his own expense (1860 
Regulations). Patronos and their deputies were allowed to impose 
disciplinary measures. Colonos could be punished for 
insubordination, individual and collective refusal to work, a lack 
of punctuality in performing assigned tasks, running away, 
drunkenness, and so forth. Patronos could prevent rebellions and 
collective resistance to work by force, immediately notifying the 
authorities who would thus administer punishment. Corporal 
punishment was prohibited and replaced by imprisonment and the loss 
of wages. However, corporal punishment continued to be applied on 
the plantations. And in the final event, the daily life on the 
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estates was at the discretion of the planters and overseers. 
The British government again protested against the new regulation 
on the grounds that there had been bad faith in the formulation of 
the provisions and that contracted workers were likely to be 
subjected to a new form of slavery. 152 The Spanish government 
replied that the decree ensured that colons were not reduced to 
slavery and it also allowed the colono to purchase his freedom "at 
any time". 153 Despite objections, the conditions contained in the 
1854 Regulations, were re-stated at the beginning of the 1860s and 
would effectively determine relations between master and contract 
worker for more than thirty years. 
By the mid-1850s, the success of Chinese labour was reported by 
Captain General Concha. As a result of a general enquiry into the 
introduction of Chinese contract workers, and based on several 
reports by planters and railways enterprises, the Captain General 
stated that the system had fulfilled all expectations. The Chinese 
performed all tasks ordained to them, were accustomed to the climate 
and "when mildly and tactfully treated, they were respectful and 
their natural submission to the white race was strengthened"P In 
the Captain General's view, the Chinese were the best alternative, 
since white and Yucatecan immigration had failed. And Chinese 
contract workers were better than free blacks. Concha observed that 
improvements in railways would not have been possible without the 
Chinese. Slaves were very expensive and moreover, there was not 
enough of them to supply the demand for labourers on the plantations 
and for railway building. Slave reproduction was enough only to 
cover ordinary deaths, observed the Captain General, and it would 
take some time to institute better treatment and better living 
conditions so that slavery might be sustained through natural 
152 Nota del Ministro Plenipotenciario de S.M. Britanica, 
October 11, 1854, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 3, exp. 7. 
153 Reservado, November 14, 1854, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 3, 
exp. 8. 
154 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 4, exp.6. 
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reproduction as in the southern United States of America. As the 
Chinese presented fewer difficulties the Captain General argued for 
unlimited imports to reduce the price of contracts. 155 
Observing that it had previously been thought that an excessive 
number of Chinese could provoke conflicts, the Captain General 
acknowledged that their proportion in the population must be taken 
into account. But as, "Today Asian immigrants are no more than 
14,065", the proposal should not be considered dangerous. He even 
suggested that more than 60,000 Chinese could be comfortably 
accommodated in the island (given an appropriate number of women 
among the coolies). The principal problem was not the number of 
"Chinamen" in the island, but the price of their contracts. 
Denouncing speculation, Concha reported the rising prices of 
contracts and suggested there should be fixed a maximum price. But 
beyond regulating the price of contracts, policing and public 
security, there should not be any kind of intervention in the labour 
market. The government should allow "absolute freedom, and the free 
immigration of Chinese colonos to individual initiative" so as to 
facilitate the course of continued imports. 156 
Although the Captain General seemed to be absolutely convinced of 
the success of Chinese labour, other reports were less certain. 
Cardenas planters, for instance, reported that Chinese contract 
workers were "insubordinate", had a tendency to drunkenness and to 
take opium, were not inclined to family life, and had prejudices 
against coloureds. It would be better if they left the island and 
returned to their own country. 157 Other reports repeated these 
observations. However, some of these "defects" were considered only 
a matter of adjustment. Echoing the Captain General, others reported 
that strict compliance with contract conditions and special 
treatment segregation from blacks and no use of lash, for 
155 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 4, exp. 6. 
156 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 4, exp. 6. 
157 Informe de la Tenencia de Gobierno de Cardenas, January 19, 
1856, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 4, exp. 6. 
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example 	could resolve some of the shortcomings. The 
disciplinary regime on the sugar estates made it difficult even to 
assess their tendency to family life, argued others, and obstacles 
to the import of Chinese women contributed to these 
circumstances, 158 Only a few were inclined to drunkenness and drugs 
and it was usually those who had fulfilled their contracts, rather 
then those still working them. 159 
Following the general enquiry into the introduction of Asian 
labour, organized by Captain Concha, Madrid focused on two main 
issues: i) whether there should be a limit to the number of 
immigrants imported; ii) the fate of Chinese workers after the 
conclusion of contracts. In its pronouncement the Consejo 
acknowledged that there was a shortage of hands. Faced with the 
failure of attempts to promote white immigration, Africans would 
have been the better choice. The Consejo also regretted that there 
had been opposition from the Mexican Government to the introduction 
of Yucatecan contract workers. Yucatecans could be a good 
alternative for they were Catholic, inclined to rural labour and 
very close at hand. As soon as relations with Mexico improved more 
workers should be sought there. Concerning the Chinese, there had 
been much dissension, observed the Consejo. Their behaviour and 
obstacles to imports of Chinese women had divided opinions. Nor was 
there a consensus about numbers. The Council for Economic 
Development, the Audiencia in Cuba, and administrative sections of 
the Colonial Office, had observed that allowing an unlimited import 
of coolies could jeopardize the country. The Real Acuerdo de la 
Hacienda and the Captain General, on the other hand, favoured free 
and unlimited imports (although the Captain General later stipulated 
a limit of 60,000). In addition, there were opinions flatly opposed 
to Asian colonization. Finally, the Consejo adopted the proposal of 
the Captain General, that there should be a maximum number of 60,000 
158 Informe de la Tenencia del Gobierno de Guanabacoa, December 
31, 1855, and Gandara, January 8, 1856, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n.4, 
exp.6. 
159 Informe de la Tenencia del Gobierno, Mariel, January 6, 
1856, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 4, exp. 6. 
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Chinese contract workers. The Consejo also suggested changes in the 
1854 Regulations regarding the conditions of engagement and shipment 
of Chinese workers to Cuba. There should be a clear and precise 
clause in colono contracts stating that at the end of the engagement 
colonos could not remain in the island unless immediately 
recontracted. Otherwise the colono should leave the island at his 
own expense, failing to do so he would be forced to labour at public 
works. 16 0  
Reflecting these anxieties, Concha enquiry had also gathered data 
on the occupation of the Chinese on completing their first contract, 
their professional success, their inclination to remain in the 
island and whether or not they usually renewed their contracts. The 
answers varied from one area to another. The reports given by 
regional authorities, allegedly based on planter reports, gave a 
wide sample of activities performed by the Chinese after the 
fulfilment of their initial contracts. In Sagua La Grande, for 
example, they were reported to be day labourers, journeymen, and 
masons; it was pointed out that there had not been enough time to 
say if they were making a success of their new activities. In 
Guanabacoa they stayed in the same activities _ domestic and field 
labour _ when the contracts finished. As the Chinese usually spent 
all their wages buying clothes (if they lived in the cities) or 
buying food to supplement that provided by the master if they lived 
in the countryside, they had little opportunity to accumulate the 
capital necessary to "secure their future". In Cienfuegos they were 
employed as tobacco pickers, cigarette makers, interpreters on 
plantations and folk healers (curanderos). In Villa Clara theJ were 
also curanderos as well as fieldworkers. In Jaruco they were day 
labourers and domestic servants. In Bejucal, Gandara, no Chinese had 
yet finished their contracts. 161 Although most of these reports 
160 Dictamen del Consejo, Madrid December 31, 1857, AHN, 
Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 4, exp. 12. This clause was included in the 
1860 Reglamento and turned out to be a troublesome one. In fact, by 
this time some of the Chinese workers, particularly those first 
contracted by 1847 had been freed of their contracts. 
161 AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 4, exp. 6. 
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dealt with the first Chinese colonos imported in 1847, before the 
mass of colonos arrived in the early 1850s, there was already enough 
information to devise new immigration policies. 
Complaints had been made _ and some of the data confirmed such 
a pattern _ that the Chinese were not inclined to engage in rural 
labour and that they rarely returned to their own country on 
completing their contracts. According to the Consejo in Madrid, the 
"Chinamen's" natural propensity was towards industry and commerce 
rather than agriculture. If they were given absolute freedom they 
would abandon fieldwork and therefore not answer the needs of the 
plantations. Furthermore, the Chinese aptitude for industry and 
commerce would lead to their monopoly of those activities and would 
jeopardize the livelihoods of Spaniards already engaged in such 
business. In the Philippines, Chinese were legally prohibited from 
engaging in commercial activities in order to safeguard the 
interests of Spaniards. 162 The inclusion of the clause prohibiting 
them from remaining on the island after their contracts expired 
unless they renewed their engagement was one of the bases of the 
1860 Reglamento. This measure was said to be designed to prevent 
them from forming "an independent race or class in the island". 
According to the Consejo in Madrid, Chinese contract workers were 
simply an answer to the need for labour in agriculture. 163 
Besides the sale and leasing of contracts, forced recontracting 
was one of the features of the "coolie" system that most closely 
162 	. Dictdmen acordado pelo Consejo de Ministros, Madrid, 
December 31, 1857, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 85, n. 4, exp. 12 and 13. By 
the end of the 1860s, during the debates of the Committee on reforms 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the committee in charge of discussing 
Asiatic immigration suggested that clauses requiring workers to 
return to their countries at their own expenses or condemnation to 
public works as means of financing their passage back after the 
expiration of their contracts should be abandoned, for they "cause 
international protests and obstruct new engagements". Yet the 
committee agreed that they should return to their countries. 
Informacion sobre reformas en Cuba y Puerto Rico, op.cit.,  I, p. 
153 
163 Dictdmen del Consejo, Madrid, June 30, 1864(?), AHN, 
Ultramar, leg. 85, n.7. 
124 
resembled plantation slavery. According to the Regulation issued in 
1860, coolies who had completed their first eight years contracts 
were obliged to recontract (for an unspecified period of time) or to 
leave the island at their own expense. Only those whose contracts 
expired before 1861 were exempt. As was observed, these measures 
were necessary to ensure that Chinese who decide to stay in Cuba 
continued to be engaged in agricultural work. However, as it has 
been established that only a few Chinese could save enough to pay 
for his return, it was obviously a device to keep labour force on 
the plantations. According to Cuban historian Perez de la Riva, 
compulsory successive recontracting was a final measure to convert 
the Chinese into a perpetual slave. 164 The 1872 census carried out 
by the Comision Central de Colonizacion listed 58,400 Chinese. Of 
these 14,046 were free, had become naturalized or registered as 
"foreign residents", 34,408 were still under contract, 7,036 were 
runways, 1,344 entered as re-captured runaways, 684 were held in 
jails and only 864 were in the depots awaiting new contracts. 
Nevertheless, of those who had completed their original contracts, 
10,044 remained in agriculture. 165 By this time, recontracting had 
assumed a distinct feature. Instead of engagements with planters, 
the new contracting system involved a free Chinese (enganchador) who 
engaged and organized other free Chinese (or runaways) into gangs 
(cuadrillas). The entire group was hired out to work on plantations 
for a specified period of time or for a specific task. The 
enganchador agreed all terms for the gang, including lodging and 
food, and was responsible for discipline and supervision. Although 
banned for a period of time during the 1870s (during the Ten Years 
War), the cuadrilla system would be revived after the war. 166  
164 J. Perez de la Riva, El BarracOn, op.cit., p.133. 
165 Resumen del padron general de asiaticos llevados a efecto 
por la Comision Central de Colonizacion en el aim de 1872, AHN, 
Ultramar, leg. 87, n. 3; Boletin de Colonizacion, 1:18, October 15, 
1873 
166 E. Hu-DeHart, op.cit., p. 11; R. Scott, Slave Emancipation 
in Cuba, op.cit., pp.99-101. 
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The role of these series of regulations reinforcing the contracts 
was complex and ambiguous. Due to international criticism and 
Chinese protests over excesses and abuses, regulations attempted to 
establish rights for the colonos and address their needs, supposedly 
different from of slaves. However, the series of regulations made it 
clear that during the eight year contract, the Chinese workers were 
under the strict dominion of the patron. And moreover that the 
coolies represented a fixed capital investment, the realization of 
which depended upon the fulfilment of the contract. In this sense, 
the contract was a stratagem to secure immigrant labour tied to the 
plantation for a certain period of time, under terms that would 
cover the investment and yield a direct profit. It was an agreement 
between planter and worker. The regulations represented the 
intervention of the state to secure the fulfilment of the agreement, 
albeit favouring planter interests. Although both the Regulations of 
1854 and 1860 stipulated that government officials could visit the 
plantations and make enquiries about the conditions of colonos, they 
also made it clear that the conditions of daily life, work and 
discipline of the colonos were left to the discretion of those who 
bought their contracts. Nonetheless, the official regulations 
defined the field within which relations between planters and 
workers would develop and created a flimsy framework within which 
workers could struggle for their own interests. And many colonos, 
referring to aspects of the regulations and contracts, did seek to 
further their interests. Planters were, of course, at first 
astonished and then furious. Used to slave labour, and a minimum of 
interference in plantation "affairs", to have to undergo official 
investigations following complaints about maltreatment, the non-
payment of wages, or the excessive number of working hours was an 
ignominy. Even if planters were favoured by judicial decisions, the 
situation was novel and distinctive. Henceforth, state action in the 
labour market _ and in relations between planter and workers _ 
would grow, clearly affecting the processes of abolition and 
transition to free labour. 
Living in the countryside, prohibited from leaving the estates 
without permission, with a different language and culture, Chinese 
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contract workers suffered constantly from unjust and corrupt 
practices. The Chinese response ranged from legal complaints, 
resistance to work, rebellion, and desertion to more desperate acts 
such as suicide and the murder of those in charge of plantation 
discipline. Non-fulfilment of contract conditions in terms of 
regular payments of salaries, quality and quantity of food, and 
housing were among the most common formal complaints. Although 
planters and their deputies usually hesitated to make use of 
corporal punishments fearing the disturbances created by furious 
Chinese, many cases were recorded. In 1854, enquiries following 
complaints of Asians led the vigilant of Casa Blanca to report that 
he found the colono named Manoel in the stocks chained. His Chinese 
comrades further stated that they had been physically punished; that 
the food was insufficient, that they had been made to work from 3 
a.m until 9 p.m without rest; and that their wages were only 3 pesos 
instead of 4 pesos, as stated in their contracts. 167 On May 18, 
1864, three Asians, Leopoldo, Lupercio, and Venancio, workers on the 
Pepilla plantation (jurisdiction of COlon) went to the local 
authority to complain about the death of one of their fellows, Jose 
Baltazar, caused by maltreatment inflicted by the overseer. They 
also complained about delays in the payment of wages. The subsequent 
enquiry revealed that although Baltazar had been in the stocks for 
more than ten days, after being freed he had been working for about 
4 or 5 days. It concluded that the cause of death was dysentery. 
Thus, the overseer was not considered responsible for his death. 
However, he was fined 40 pesos fine or one month's prison for 
contravening the Regulation regarding corporal punishment. The owner 
was absolved for delays in wage payments on the grounds that wages 
could be paid after the harvest though the workers had alleged 
that the harvest had ended more than a month earlier. 168 Asians 
working in the San Laureano sugarmill, in Matanzas, also complained 
about bad treatment and that wages had not been paid for five 
167 ANC, GSC, leg. 636, n. 20102. 
168 Criminales para veriguar el trato que se da en el ingenio 
Pepilla a los colonos asiaticos, ANC, ME, leg. 2836, numero B. 
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months. 169 Abuses committed by importers and planters can also be 
illustrated by the enquiries that resulted from the complaints of 
Asians known as Ramon, Rafael and Enrique. The three, all minors 
(aged 15, 14 and 13 respectively), had been contracted for two 
years. Their grievances included lack of clothing, a bed to sleep on 
and a place to keep their belongings. They all bore marks of 
corporal punishment• 170 
Desertion was a common form of resistance. According to Riva, 
Chinese fled five to seven times more often than African slaves, 
thus representing a great revolutionary element in the system. 171 
 In 1872, about fifteen percent of the Chinese were reported to be 
runaways. With the emergence of cuadrillas, Chinese workers might 
have increased their chances of protection. This might have further 
encouraged flight. That, at least, was the justification of the 
colonial authorities for temporarily banning the system. The 
extraordinary conditions of the Ten Years War also increased 
coolies' desertions. Many Chinese fought alongside the 
insurgents . 172 
Several collective rebellions were reported and they reveal the 
tensions to which Chinese workers were exposed. The following 
detailed examples illustrate that if one common cause of conflict 
was corporal punishment, language and culture also contributed to 
spread disruption. They also reveal the difficulties of dealing with 
a new and unknown class of labourer. In 1854, several Asian contract 
workers in the Desquite sugarmill (tenencia of Jaruco) rebelled and 
injured the cattle man (boyero). According to the statements the 
boyero was injured with a small hoe (guataca). The boyero reported 
that he did not know the reason for the attack, for he had not 
punished the workers and had no problems with them. The only thing 
169 ANC, GSC, leg. 639, n. 20179. 
170 ANC, ME, leg. 4144, n. Cd. 
171 J. Perez de la Riva, El BarracOn, op.cit., p.78. 
172 J. Jimenez Pastrana, Los chinos, op.cit., especially chapter 
V. 
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was that when walking behind them he told them to go faster. The two 
Asians who carried out the assault were in the stocks, and it was 
not possible to question them for lack of interpreters. The overseer 
also claimed not to know the reason. The black Telesforo also said 
he did not know the reason. He had been working in another place as 
blacks work separately from the Chinese. Telesforo opined that the 
Chinese were well treated on the estate _ they were even given 
rice, which was refused to slaves. Investigations could not be 
continued because there were no translators in the area. 
Nevertheless, punishments were prescribed by the Governor: the 
colons Paulino and Felix were to be made to sleep in the stocks 
until their good behaviour showed they had repented. By the time the 
authorities went to the estate to execute the orders one of the 
Chinese, Paulino, had committed suicide. 173 
Another cause of conflict, as alluded to by the black Telesforo, 
was the mixing of slaves and coolies on the same estate, or in the 
same task. Cuban planters and Spanish authorities often expressed 
their reservation about this practice. While for some it could 
enhance conflicts and disrupt discipline on the estate, others 
viewed the mixture as a means of helping to keep a balance of power 
in the event of rebellion. The tension developed between Asian and 
other workers were clearly perceived and manipulated by colonial 
authorities and planters. Chinese workers always made very clear 
their dislike and fear of being placed on the same position as 
slaves in the labour hierarchy, as well as in the same position on 
the colour scale. Their violent reaction to such circumstances had 
led the authorities to include in the regulations the provisions 
prohibiting black overseers and corporal punishment in front of 
slaves. However, the rule was not strictly observed. The rebellion 
of coolies at Miguel Aldama's sugarmill Santa Rosa, in Matanzas, in 
1853 seems to have been a case in point. According to reports, there 
had been 16 Asians working in the fields. When they started to stray 
from where they were supposed to work the driver, who was black and 
173 	• Criminales contra varios asiaticos del ingenio Desquite por 
haberse insubordinado y herido a D. Juan Lopez, ANC, GSC, leg. 636, 
n. 20106. 
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unable to communicate with them, took one of them by the arm and 
pointed him in the direction where they were supposed to continue. 
This displeased the Chinese, who complained to the overseer 
requesting the driver should be flogged. When informed, the planter 
Aldama "tried to correct the abuse" and ordered that the Chinese who 
had protested should be punished. Nothing would happen to the others 
if they worked well. However, the Chinese soon came back demanding 
the punishment of the driver, or they themselves would inflict it. 
According to the planter's account, when the Chinese threatened to 
kill the overseer for delaying punishment of the driver, he himself 
decided to disperse the group using his baltar (a palos). As a 
result many were injured. 174 
Violence against Chinese contract workers was common. In most 
cases of the strategy used to "manage" them was force, either by the 
planter or his representatives or the authorities themselves. In the 
Amistad sugarmill, in Guines, Chinese workers rebelled and enquiries 
made concluded that their injuries resulted from punishment in the 
stocks and from beatings for refusing to work. Chinese workers at 
the Santa Rita sugarmill rioted in October, 1869. The conflict 
resulted in one dead and several injured. According to enquiries the 
dispute arose after a fight involving four Chinese. On being 
reprimanded for fighting and believing that they would be punished, 
the Chinese advanced on the plantation house in an aggressive 
fashion. To disperse them a shot was fired in the air and the Civil 
Guard was called. The dead and injured resulted from the ensuing 
struggle with the Guard. 175 
Opinions favouring the engagement of Yucatecans pointed out the 
similarities of language and culture as a factor that would reduce 
conflicts and abuses perpetrated against contracted workers. 
However, these advantages and the special treatment stated in 
174 Criminales formados por el amotinamento de los asiaticos del 
ingenio Santa Rosa de D. Domingo Aldama, ANC, GSC, leg. 636, n. 
20084. 
175 Criminales por sublevacion de asiaticos del ingenio Santa 
Rita, ANC, ME, leg. 2953, n. Aa. 
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treaties with the "neighbouring and friendly nation" did not prevent 
maltreatment and corrupt practices. Denunciations of irregularities 
in the engagement were also reported by Yucatecans, along with cases 
of kidnapping. Many had been taken straight to the estates without 
being registered with the island's authorities. On the plantations, 
although in theory working under conditions set by contract and the 
regulations, the life of Yucatecans could be even more precarious 
than that of Chinese. In the Santa Rosalia sugar mill, for instance, 
in 1859 there were 15 Chinese and 10 Yucatecans. The Yucatecans had 
been on the estate for four years but the authorities had not been 
informed. The case came to light because two Yucatecan colonos went 
to the authorities to complain about corporal punishment and non-
payment of wages over a four year period! Although their contracts 
should have stated 5 pesos, their wages were 2 pesos (for men) and 
1 peso (for women) a month; the Chinese got 3 pesos. 176 The owner 
later explained that the arrangement was made for this price because 
when he met the Yucatecans both were sick, and that the lower salary 
was compensated by conucos (provision grounds) and pigs and poultry 
and medical assistance for their families. 177 
Conclusion 
Despite the great number of conflicts, grievances and complaints, 
the import of Chinese contract workers would be regarded for nearly 
three decades as the best solution to the labour problem. It 
addressed the general problem of labour supply and facilitated the 
ending of the slave trade. It would also be viewed as a means of 
easing the "transition to free labour". 
The growing labour demand provoked by the expansion of sugar 
production, coinciding with international pressures to end the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade confronted Cuban planters with an acute 
176 ANC, GSC, leg. 638, n. 20151 and n. 20147. 
177 ANC, GSC, leg. 638, n. 20151 and n. 20147; the fondo 
Gobierno Superior Civil (ANC) contain several cases of protests and 
maltreatment of Yucatecans, see for instance leg. 640, n. 20220, 
20223, 20225, 20247; leg. 641, n. 20260; leg. 642, n. 20297. 
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labour shortage. From the 1840s they began experimenting with 
immigrant labourers contracted to work on sugar plantations. There 
were trials with Europeans, Yucatecans and Chinese contract 
labourers. Plans suggesting several other labourers were submitted 
to the authorities. The use of Chinese proved to be the most 
feasible solution. An entire system was organized to promote the 
import of Chinese contract workers. The great profitability of the 
trade and the advantages of the Chinese "coolie" contracts explain 
why the trade continued for almost three decades. 
When Chinese coolies landed in Cuba, slaves continued to be 
imported. The coolie trade did not differ very much from the slave 
trade. Chinese were bought, sold and hired out in almost the same 
circumstances as slaves were. They lived in similar conditions and 
also performed the same tasks. Planters and administrators resorted 
to the same methods of control and punishment. In practice, and in 
laws, they were denied the rights of free men who had contracted 
themselves for a set period. Runaway Chinese were announced in local 
newspapers in the same way as slaves. Coolie reaction to the severe 
plantation regime was also similar to that of slaves: they rebelled 
individually or collectively; they protested to the authorities; 
they ran away; they killed themselves. In addition to occupying an 
intermediate position between slave and free workers in the labour 
hierarchy, neither one nor the other, the Chinese also occupied an 
intermediate position on the colour scale, between black and white. 
Contemporary observers and modern historians have viewed the 
treatment of these free men, contracted for a fixed period, as 
slaves, tantamount to slavery or semi-slavery. 
Cuban experiments with Chinese contract labourers were not 
carried out as an alternative to slave labour nor as a mean of 
effecting a transition to free labour. The Chinese were employed as 
a supplement to slave labour. However, experiments with Chinese 
contract labourers ultimately contributed to the so-called process 
of "transition to free labour". First, the new circumstances of 
employing contract labourers confronted planters with a new view of 
labour relations, distinct from the traditional master-slave 
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bondage. Secondly, the fixed low wages of Chinese coolies helped to 
keep down the average salaries paid to other free labourers in the 
island. And finally, it would contribute to the relative success of 





In Sao Paulo as in Cuba, the "labour question" was prompted by a 
rapid growth in plantation production although, as indicated above, 
the chronology was different. Until the mid-nineteenth century 
Brazilian coffee was grown mainly in the Paraiba Valley, spreading 
from the province of Rio de Janeiro to Sao Paulo. Before coffee came 
to dominate, sao Paulo was agriculturally diverse. Cotton, manioc, 
corn, cattle, horses and pigs were raised together with sugar mostly 
for local consumption) Sugar predominated in the north and centre 
of the province. Coffee production only expanded dramatically after 
the end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. It was at this stage that 
planters, especially those in the "new" coffee areas, became 
particularly exercised by the problem of labour supply. For some, 
slavery was already doomed. They saw free immigrant labour as the 
only means of sustaining and extending coffee production. Others saw 
the internal slave trade as a temporary way of solving the labour 
problem. Consequently, a few planters began experimenting with free 
labour, although retaining large numbers of slaves, while others 
were dependent exclusively on slave labour. 
A further problem for the coffee planters of Sao Paulo was the 
labour intensive nature of all aspects of coffee production. With 
the adoption of new technology, Cuban sugar planters were able to 
substitute capital for labour in the mills. This option was not 
available to coffee producers. With the coming of railways sao Paulo 
coffee planters, like their Cuban counterparts, were able to 
substitute capital for labour in the shipping of plantation products 
but on the plantation itself there were few such opportunities for 
1 A.E. Taunay, HistOria do Café no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: 
Departamensto Nacional do Café, 1939) II, pp.306-349. 
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substitution. 2 
As in Cuba, it is difficult to establish a clear chronological 
progression in terms of labour recruitment in Sao Paulo. While 
individual planters had been experimenting with free labour since 
the 1840s, widespread employment of free labour did not occur until 
the 1880s. Similarly, although substantial numbers of free workers 
may be found in several areas of the province, specialising in food 
staples, slavery remained the predominant form of plantation labour 
until the 1870s and beyond. However some general characteristics did 
apply on the plantations. Free labour was always employed in clearly 
defined circumstances. First, it was invariably used for clearing 
virgin land. For most of the period this work was done by domestic 
free labour. Slaves were used in less risky jobs. Secondly, free 
workers dealt with administration and supervisory tasks and other 
work to do with the running of the estates. Thirdly, in some 
plantations, free labour (domestic and immigrant) constituted a 
semi-skilled work force serving, for example, as carpenters, masons, 
and blacksmiths. These people may also have grown crops on their 
account, or as sharecroppers. Given such a variety, it is difficult 
to establish a predominant form of labour use at any particular time 
during the period studied. Different forms of labour existed at any 
one time in the plantation sector and even on individual 
plantations. Slaves, domestic free labourers and immigrants 
constituted the labour force. At one time or another all of these 
workers were field hands and seasonal harvesters. Native free labour 
and immigrants worked under various arrangements serving as 
sharecroppers, agregados or contract workers. 
2 The impact of railways for Sao Paulo coffee production is 
discussed in A.E. Taunay, op.cit., v. IV, t. II, p.223; Colin M. 
Lewis, Public Policy and Private Initiative. Railway Building in Sao 
Paulo, 1860-1899 (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1991) 
pp.19-20; its impact on labour in E.V. da Costa, "Sharecroppers and 
Plantation Owners: An Experiment with Free Labour" in The Brazilian 
Empire, Myths and Histories (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1985) pp.94-124, pp.113-118. For Cuba see M. Moreno 
Fraginals. El Ingenio. Complejo economic° social cubano del azilcar 
(Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1978) I, chap.4. 
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In Brazil, as in Cuba , white immigration was initially designed 
to populate the country with a prosperous class of industrious 
farmers. However, the debate about ending the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade and the search for alternative sources of labour influenced 
the course of these initiatives. Colonization did not offer a 
solution to the need for hands to work the plantations. Furthermore, 
where large-scale export agriculture prevailed, there were problems 
finding fertile land in good locations for smallholding settlers. 
First experiments with immigrant labour on plantations in Sao Paulo 
can be traced to the 1840s. This was when the planter Nicolau 
Pereira de Campos Vergueiro tried to settle European immigrants on 
his land in a sharecropping scheme) Planters in areas where the 
coffee plantations were expanding hoped that immigrants might 
replace slaves. However, a sustained flow of immigrant workers to 
the coffee zone began only after the mid-1880s, on the eve of the 
abolition of slavery. Before that, a growing number of planters 
debated about the use of immigrant labour, and projects were 
designed to attract it. Naturally, such schemes changed during the 
nineteenth century; at least three distinct forms of organizing 
immigrant labour on the plantations would arise between the 1840s 
and 1880s: sharecropping; labour-leasing (locagio de servigos) and 
the colonato. 
The first section of this chapter will deal with changes in 
immigration policy. Sections 2 and 3 examine the different ways of 
organizing immigrant labour in the coffee zones, together with 
questions of recruitment and control. Unsuccessful experiments with 
sharecropping and a temporary disenchantment with European workers 
prompted ideas of importing contracted Chinese workers and of 
compelling Brazilians to work under contract. This in turn 
encouraged pressure _ largely unsuccessful _ for a revision of 
various regulations and attempts to devise a general labour code. 
Towards the end of the chapter, the use of BrazilianA'free labourers 
3 Tschudi observed that there were Portuguese workers (Azorians) 
in coffee plantations before this date, J.J. von Tschudi, Viaqem as 
Provincias de Rio de Janeiro e Sao Paulo, transl. by E. de Lima 
Castro (sao Paulo: Martins, 1953) p.131. 
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and the efforts to promote Chinese immigration, as alternative 
answers to the labour question will be explored. 
4.1. Early attempts to establish an immigration policy 
From the beginning of the century, there were many attempts to 
attract white immigrants to Brazil as smallholders. The first 
decades of the century saw the establishment of official colonies 
(nucleos coloniais) in various parts of the country. 4 Germans, Swiss 
and Azoreans were settled on crown lands. In addition to promoting 
demographic growth, colonization was designed to initiate the 
transformation of Brazilian agriculture into a freeholding peasantry 
and to reduce the importance of the African slaves _ regarded as 
culturally and racially inferior _ in the total population. 5 
Debates about the extinction of the trans-Atlantic slave trade 
and the catastrophes that might result from the cut in labour supply 
increased anxiety about the issue. Soon after Independence, when 
external pressures to end the trans-Atlantic slave trade mounted in 
the mid-1820s, the Senate assumed the task of submitting to 
Parliament a draft law on colonization. The linkage of the 
initiative to the prospect of abolition of the slave trade was 
clearly stated. In July, 1827, a project of eighteen articles was 
presented. Preference was to be given to voluntary immigration. It 
defined two categories of immigrants: individuals coming to be 
independent proprietors and those arriving already engaged, with a 
contract of employment. Most of the provisions, in practice, were 
concerned with the former. 6 
4 On attempts 
Costa, Da Senzala A 
Humanas, 1982) pp 
Plantation Owners", 
to settle colonies on crown lands see E.V.da 
ColOnia, 2nd ed.(Sao Paulo: Editora de Ciencias 
.49-62; or same author "Sharecroppers and 
op.cit., pp.94-100. 
5 E.V. da Costa 
Rio Claro. A  Brazilian Plantation System, 1820-1920  (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1976) p.89. 
6 A.L. Cervo, 0 Parlamento Brasileiro e as RelacOes Exteriores 
(1826-1889) (Brasil ia: Editora Universidade de Brasilia, 1981) 
p.136. 
, Da Senzala a ColOnia, op.cit., p.49; W. Dean, 
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But criticism was beginning to be expressed about the notion of 
large-scale, subsidized colonization, which granted immigrants the 
status of landowners simply by settling on public lands. Besides the 
great cost and the failures of earlier attempts, there were powerful 
arguments that the country needed labourers for the plantations, not 
settlers to populate the countryside. 
Long before he set up a pioneer sharecropping scheme on his land, 
Nicolau de Campos Vergueiro, who was an established slave trader, 
politician and plantation owner in the province of sac) Paulo, spoke 
out against subsidized colonization. Fear of competition for the 
best land lay behind his objection. When the government consulted 
him about a project to settle German immigrants in Sao Paulo 
province, he argued that it was incompatible with the interests of 
existing landowners. Granting settlers fertile, well-placed land 
near towns and cities implied denying such land to planters. 
Further, the land planters could make available for colonists would 
be infertile, in the backlands far from markets, and therefore 
unsuitable. The creation of crown colonies, moreover, seemed too 
costly. Apart from paying for travel expenses, the government had to 
build homes and roads and maintain the colonists until they could 
produce enough for their own subsistence. 7 
This polemic, 	colonization versus immigration, 	between 
encouraging the settlement of smallholders for demographic reasons 
and recruiting plantation labour, set the tone of the debate for 
several decades. The divergences were deep. There were distinct 
interests among the various provinces and the Imperial and 
provincial governments could not always agree. But, at that time, 
the mounting pressures to end the slave trade forced action from the 
Imperial government. In the face of opposition from some planters, 
the first crown colonies were founded in the provinces of Espirito 
Santo, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do 
7 D. Forjaz,  0 Senador Verqueiro: sua vida e sua epoca, 1788-
1859 (Sao Paulo: Oficinas do Diario Oficial, 1924) p.34.; E.V. da 
Costa, Da Senzala a ColOnia, op.cit. p.50, or also same author, 
"Sharecroppers and Plantation Owners", op.cit., p.95. 
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Sul. In 1828, 928 German colonists, some 149 families and 72 
individuals, were despatched to the province of Sao Paulo. Between 
1827 and 1837, about one thousand two hundred colonists were 
established in different parts of the province. 8 At the same time, 
as coffee plantations expanded in the Paraiba Valley, labour for the 
growing number of public works projects grew scarcer and more 
expensive. By 1838 the president of Sao Paulo ordered the engagement 
of one hundred workers in Europe to build and maintain roads, 
bridges and other similar projects) 
This problem was not peculiar to Sao Paulo. In 1836, responding 
to a request from the Companhia de Colonizagao da Provincia da 
Bahia, the Brazilian consul in Spain sent a list of poor Spanish 
families who wanted to emigrate to Brazil. ° A few years later, the 
consul Wenceslao Antonio Ribeiro reported the establishment of three 
consular agents in Canary Islands to assist Brazilian ships calling 
at the islands and to promote emigration. There were requests from 
immigration promotion societies in many parts of the Empire. Ribeiro 
duly arranged publicity in Spain about conditions of engagement, 
together with the provisions of the 1837 labour law (lei de locagao 
de servigos de 1837) which regulated the conditions of immigrants in 
Brazil. The consul also commented on the advantages of Spain and its 
islands as a source of labour. Culture, religion and language were 
similar. Spain's precarious political condition might spur 
8 E.V. da Costa, Da Senzala a Colonia, op.cit., pp.50-51; also 
by the same author "Sharecroppers and Plantation Owners", op.cit., 
 p.95. In 1827, 926 German colonos arrived in the province, of whom
336 were directed to the capital; the provincial government provided 
for maintenance and medical assistance for one and a half year and 
immigrants were granted a plot of land. Colonos were obliged to take 
up arms if necessary and their children were subjected to 
conscription, see J.J. Machado de Oliveira, Quadro Historico da 
Provincia de Sao Paulo para o use das escholas de Instruccao Publica 
offerecido a Assemblea Leqislativa Provincial (sao Paulo: Imparcial, 
1864) p.338-339. 
9 E.V. da Costa, Da Senzala a ColOnia, op.cit., p.51. 
10 Letter of the General Consul in Spain, Jose Francisco 
Guimaraes, to the Secretario de Estado dos Negocios do Imperio, 
Barcelona July 2, 1836. AHI, RepartigOes Consulares Brasileiras, 
Correspondencia Geral, Barcelona, caixa 239/1/4. 
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emigration. The potential immigrants were reputed to be strong, 
sober, and used to toil in the fields, especially the Canary 
Islanders , 11 
Following parliamentary debate about immigration, the Imperial 
government approved new legislation on labour leasing contracts 
which was to apply to Brazilians workers as well as foreigners. The 
1830 and 1837 labour laws were both approved at moments when the end 
of the trans-Atlantic slave trade seemed to be imminent, and 
attention devoted to immigration grew as a consequence. The first of 
these laws was approved in September 1830. It attempted to set out 
condition for hiring labour (empreitada) and covered contracts 
involving advance cash payments (whether between Brazilian planters 
and immigrants or between planters and Brazilian workers). The 
second piece of legislation, approved in October 1837, defined the 
previous act in more detail with regard to contracts with 
foreigners. 12 Despite their simple wording, both laws sought to 
shape and promote structures for free labour, as the following 
examination demonstrates (see section 4.4). 
Early debates between "colonization" and "immigration" had 
implications beyond those of populating Brazil and the perceived 
need to replace of slaves. The attempt to tap new sources of labour 
was linked to the emergence of the independent nation and the 
reordering of institutions and society. Meeting the labour shortage 
was important, but it was not the only challenge to the 
administration. The debate also encompassed who should own land and 
the racial composition of the recently created nation. Policies 
about colonization for demographic purposes usually meant land 
grants aimed at foreigners. But what about the native population? 
Would it be fair to give land to foreigners given the large numbers 
Letters from Madrid, March 16, 1839 and Barcelona April 10, 
1842, AHI, Repartigoes Consulares Brasileiras, Correspondencia 
Geral, Barcelona, caixas 239/1/5 and 239/1/4. 
12 Colleccao das Leis do Imperio do Brazil (Ouro Preto: Typ. 
Silva, 1832) Pt.9, v.3, pp.42-3; Colleccao das Leis do Imperio do 
Brazil (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 1861-1880) v.year 1837, 
pp•76-80. 
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of landless Brazilians, living a marginal existence on the fringe of 
export agriculture? Crown colonies also implied an increase of the 
free population as a counter to the increasing slave population. 
Their proximity to cities and villages could be helpful in the event 
of slave insurrections. European immigration also meant "whitening", 
an adjustment in the national mix. Free labour would bring with it 
new relations between employers and workers, along with changes in 
cultural and social habits. As in Cuba, the racial and religious 
backgrounds of immigrants, or prospective free labourers, were of 
great importance. Were they to be European, Asian, or African; 
Catholic or Protestant; freedmen or poor white Brazilians. While for 
Cuba and Spain these were issues debated within the context of 
preserving colonial ties, for Brazil the question was of forging the 
new nation. 
The views of a French emigré, Carlos Augusto Taunay, in the early 
1830s, illustrate such preoccupations. He advocated immigration to 
enable a gradual abolition of slavery. Taunay argued that it could 
not be done overnight. He reported that there were two million 
slaves in Brazil, and thought that it would take at least ten years 
to introduce one twentieth of that number of immigrants. However, 
Taunay, with his European perspective, believed that immigrants 
would transform Brazilian workers, rescuing them from ignorance, 
idleness and bad habits. 13 This task, however, could only be carried 
out by immigrants from certain European countries. He planned a 
careful geographical matching. Climate and other questions of 
adaptation made northern Europeans better suited to southern Brazil, 
and immigrants from southern Europe would be better in northern 
provinces. Hard work in the fields, though, should be allocated to 
the Chinese and Canary Islanders. 14 
13 C.A. Taunay, "Algumas consideragoes sobre a colonisagao como 
meio de coadjuvar a substituicao do trabalho cativo no Brasil, 
offerecido a Sociedade Auxiliadora da Industria Nacional". Appendix 
to his Manual do Agricultor Brasileiro. 2nd. ed. (Rio de Janeiro: 
Villeneuve e Comp., 1839) pp.123-36, pp.128-29. 
14 C.A. Taunay, "Algumas ConsideragOes sobre a Colonisagdo", 
op.cit., p.130. 
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In the late 1830s two different projects to promote immigration 
were presented to the Lower House for study by the Commission of 
Trade, Agriculture and Industry during the same session. 15 They 
reveal the main points of controversy of the time. The first project 
was presented by Sr. Manoel Maria do Amaral. It sought to authorize 
government spending of 1,200:000 reis to bring in immigrants. They 
would be settled in the provinces of Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, 
Pernambuco, Maranhao, Para, Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul. 
Immigrants brought over at government expenses would be made 
available to those planters or employers willing to implement 
written contracts validated by government officials. Those 
contracting immigrants to work in the fields would have up to three 
years to reimburse the government for its outlay in promoting 
immigration. 16 The second project, was put forward by Aureliano de 
Oliveira e Souza Coutinho. This provided for the formation of crown 
colonies. Coutinho believed that the settlement of colonies was the 
only way to reduce "cautiously and slowly" the "cancer of slavery" 
that "corrodes Brazil and threatens its future". According to 
Coutinho, some former settlements had declined because of a lack of 
government attention and protection. Another reason, he said, was 
that they had been established in inhospitable and isolated areas. 
He argued that the colonies should be sited near existing villages 
and towns, where colonists would find a market for their products 
and would be less vulnerable to banditry and runaway slaves. And 
colonists could prove helpful in the event of disturbances in urban 
areas. There would be better communication between settler and their 
native lands, and that, he believed could encourage 
immigrant'relatives and others to follow them to the Empire. This 
plan authorized provincial governments to apportion crown lands to 
both Brazilians and foreigners. It stipulated methods of payment, 
size of plots, number of colonists, the supervision of colonies and 
of contracts, and other details such as housing and tools.' ?  
I, pp.351-53. 15 APB, 16 June 1838, 
16 APB, 16 June 1838, I, p.351. 
17 APB, 16 June 1838, I, pp.351-353. 
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After due consideration by the congressional commission, a new 
version of these proposals was presented for preliminary discussion 
in the Lower House in May, 1840. 18 The main emphasis of the project-
bill was the creation of crown colonies with European immigrants. 
But proponents of the other project made their fears plain. They 
criticised colonization. It was inappropriate to grant foreign 
settlers land near established urban centres. They questioned how 
such a scheme would help the plantations. At the outset of debate, 
the project's opponents wanted it revised and argued that full 
debate should not take place until it had been referred back to the 
Commission. The objectors deployed a range of further criticisms. 
For a start, they said there was no way of knowing exactly the 
location of crown lands. This could engender conflicts between old 
and new occupants. 19 But more contentious, still, was the underlying 
purposes of the legislation. For example, Sr. Maciel Monteiro argued 
that it was of little importance to the country to have urban areas 
populated with colonists if the fields continued to be cultivated by 
slaves. 20 According to Sr. Souza Franco, the plan fell short because 
it would not attract large numbers of industrious immigrants to 
replace or supplement African slaves. He argued that ceding crown 
lands obstructed this aim. There was plenty of vacant land, he said, 
so it should be easy for colonists to disperse and establish 
themselves anywhere in the country. Further, easy access to land 
would intensify all the problems facing a colonist in terms of 
management, of understanding the soil and cultivation techniques, 
and would prove disheartening to the immigrant at the beginning. 
Moreover, bad results, usually attributed to poor soil and other 
conditions, rather than to the inexperience of the immigrants, would 
discourage further emigration. His main point against granting crown 
lands was that easy access to ownership would discourage settlers 
from hiring out their labour. Much better to engage them for three 
18 Projeto n.119 de 1838, APB, 7 May 1840, I, p.214 and pp.218- 
9. 
19 Sr. Rezende, APB, 7 May 1840, I, p.214, and 22 May 1840, II, 
p.415. 
20 APB, 7 May 1840, I, p.218. 
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or four years, to gain the experience to become proprietors. 
Moreover, if they began as proprietors, they would immediately want 
slaves. His conclusion was that to use immigrants to replace or 
supplement slaves, their access to land should be restricted, 
obliging them to sell their labour. 21 The point was echoed by 
another deputy: "...if we want a law to provide our agriculturalists 
with many hands to work our fields, many hands for hire to 
landowners, to free us of the necessary but leprous slavery; if we 
want hands for employment in sugar and coffee cultivation, this law 
is the most fatal one because colonists will become proprietors and 
would never hired themselves for work..." . 22 As a result, the draft-
project was rejected and the debate was once again postponed. 
A few weeks later, the Commission presented another proposal, 
broader in scope. 23 It sought to promote immigration and the 
settlement of colonists, both foreigners and nacionais, on crown and  
on plantation land. It included incentives for estate owners to 
settle on their land immigrant workers brought by governmental 
initiative. Sales of crown lands would provide immigrants with the 
incentive of becoming owners. 24 The plan had a farsighted ingredient 
pertaining to the landless poor of Brazil. "Among us there are many 
poor families without means of subsistence (...) it is thus 
necessary to protect these families, to provide them with land and 
the means of constituting, under certain conditions, agricultural 
colonies. Preferably this should be on crown lands close to the 
towns and cities". 25 Debate was again taken up almost two months 
later. One speaker drew attention to a reluctance to discuss the 
project. 26 This time, costs were singled out as the main objection. 
21 APB, 22 May 1840, I, pp.417-418. 
22 Sr. Alvares Machado, APB, 22 May 1840, I, p.425. 
23 APB, 16 May 1840, I, pp.739-742. 
24 APB,16 May 1840, I, pp.739-743. 
25 APB, 16 May 1840, I, p.740. 
26 Sr. Souza Franco, APB, 20 August 1840, II, p.661. 
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There was no quorum even to vote for a postponement. 27 
In the years that followed, efforts to establish an immigration 
policy continued. By the mid-1840s, the lack of any clear policy on 
immigration was evident. In June 1845, in a long speech to the Lower 
House, Bernardo de Souza Franco pointed out that existing 
immigration "policy" did not correspond to the needs and 
expectations of the nation. The disadvantages of granting privileges 
to companies engaged in bringing immigrants to the country, the 
facilities conceded to immigrants (travel expenses, land, financial 
aid, exemption of taxes and recruitment), represented huge costs and 
pointed to the inefficiency and inconvenience of the system. 28 All 
agreed that there was a need for change, but there was no consensus 
on the outlines of an immigration policy. 
One of the main sticking points was the granting of land to 
prospective immigrants. This united protagonists such as Vergueiro 
and Vasconcelos, with divergent interests. It was their views which 
had primacy in Congressional debates in the late 1840s. They both 
strongly opposed simple grants of land. The initiative would involve 
great costs, produce conflicts and would not address the problem of 
labour supply for plantations. Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos was 
an advocate of forced labour. He had always considered African 
labour more productive and better suited for Brazilian agriculture. 
But as the advocacy of importing slaves becPMe less tenable so 
VasconcelosrLovr favoured free immigration from Asia and Africa. He 
was sceptical about immigration from Europe on grounds of cost and 
plantation requirements. Existing wage rates would not satisfy 
European immigrants and they would be even less appealing if large-
scale immigration depressed them further. 29 Vergueiro agreed that 
the system of promoting immigration ought to be changed. It had 
failed in the past; high costs to the Treasury would make it 
unsupportable in the future. His agenda included the sale of crown 
27 APB, sessions of 20, 21 and 22 August 1840. 
28 Sr.Souza Franco, cf. A.L. Cervo, op.cit., p.145. 
29 A.L. Cervo, op.cit., p.146. 
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lands, attracting colonists with capital or loans to cover their 
travel expenses and promoting an influx of free immigrant 
labourers. 30 More progressive in outlook than Vasconcelos, Vergueiro 
anticipated positive results from depressing wages by large-scale 
immigration _ a strategy to be used by the planters in the late 
century. 31 
Two laws were approved in 1850, underlining how entwined were the 
issues of alternative labour supply, immigration and landownership. 
These were the Euzebio de Queiraz law (passed on September 4th), 
which sought to stop the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the Land and 
Colonization law (September 18th), which guaranteed private property 
rights and attempted to regulate the acquisition of land by 
immigrants. 32 The sanction of both laws also reveals that by this 
time promoting immigration to supply the plantations with a 
workforce had taken precedence over settlement policy. Yet, the 
question remained controversial. If the Imperial government leant in 
favour of either policy it would attract criticism. 33 Changes in the 
structure of landholding designed to favour an ideal of white 
smallholders, and to look beyond slavery, were the basis of many 
proposals until late in the century. This was, for example, the idea 
that nourished the Sociedade Central de Immigragao on the eve of 
30 A.L. Cervo, op.cit., pp.147-148. 
31 See V. Stolcke and M.M. Hall, "The Introduction of Free 
Labour on Sao Paulo Coffee Plantations", Journal of Peasant Studies  
10:2 (1983) pp.170-200, p.182. 
32 The approval of the Land law was clearly linked to the 
substitution of slave labour by immigrant colonos. The project was 
first discussed in the Council of State in 1842. Between 1842 and 
1850, it was discussed, amended and postponed several times until 
its approval in 1850. A.L. Cervo, op.cit., p.146. The 1850 Land Law 
is discussed in E.V. da Costa, "Land Policies: the Land Law, 1850, 
and the Homestead Act, 1862", in The Brazilian Empire, op.cit., 
pp.78-93; see also J.S. Martins, 0 cativeiro da terra (Sao Paulo: 
Ciencias Humanas, 1979). 
33 E.V.da Costa, Da Senzala a Colonia, op.cit., p.53; S.B. de 
Holanda, "Pref.acio" in Thomas Davatz, MemOrias de um colono no 
Brasil Transl. S.B. de Holanda, 2nd ed.(Sao Paulo: Martins, 1951) 
p.12. 
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abolition of slavery in the 1880s. 34 
Various factors bore on the process of defining a policy about 
labour supply. For the next decades, the question of solving the 
labour problem divided opinion. Regarding immigration, many agreed 
that Europeans were the most desirable but there were often 
differences about aims and strategies. In the new frontier areas of 
sao Paulo, planters hoped immigrants would replace slaves. 
Accordingly, they supported legislation that would prevent easy land 
access for immigrants in the hope that they would be forced to turn 
to plantation work. Planters in the traditional areas well furnished 
with slaves and intellectuals who saw Brazil from a European 
perspective, viewed immigrants as civilizing agents. They favoured 
the distribution of land to immigrants and the creation of crown 
colonies. 35  The creation of crown colonies in plantation areas were 
also viewed as a feasible way of meeting seasonal labour needs. This 
policy was later envisaged for coffee-growing regions of Minas 
Gerais province. 36 
Predictably attitudes differed from province to province. 
Individual provinces with distinct populations, staple commodities 
and patterns of landholding would struggle for their particular 
interests. Success or failure of particular initiatives would depend 
on local conditions. For instance, crown colonies would achieve 
34 The Society was founded in Rio de Janeiro in 1883 and 
operated until 1891. The Society was founded by three German 
immigrants, Karl von Koseritz, Herman Blumenau and Hugo Gruber, and 
later headed by Brazilian leaders. The abolitionist leader Andre 
Rebougas was the first secretary and the most active member, and its 
vice-president, was Alfredo d'Escragnolle Taunay. During the whole 
decade the Society campaigned vigorously for the promotion of 
European smallholders immigrants and related reforms. On the 
Society, see Michael M. Hall, Reformadores de Classe Media no 
Imperio Brasileiro: A Sociedade Central de Imiqracao. Separata da 
Revista de Histaria n.5 (Sao Paulo, 1976). 
E.V. da Costa, "Sharecroppers and Plantation Owners", 
op.cit., p.94. 
36 A.L.D. Lanna, A transformacao do trabaiho: a passaqem para 
o trabaiho livre na Zona da Mata Mineira, 1870-1920. (Campinas: 
Editora da UNICAMP, Brasilia: CNPq, 1988) chapter III. 
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better success in Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul than in Sao 
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In the later areas the existence of large 
landholdings made it impossible for small proprietors to participate 
successfully in the commercial economy. During the first half of the 
century, when coffee began to expand in the province, Sao Paulo 
coffee plantations were for the most part self-sufficient. They 
produced practically everything they needed to function and at this 
stage also supplied staple food to the urban population. The 
immigrant could find no markets for his produce. In addition, roads  he were bad, and immigrant smallholder' predicament was aggravated by 
the difficulties in acquiring prime land in a good location. 37 The 
monopoly of land exerted by a few landowners made it difficult for 
both foreigners and Brazilians to obtain land titles. Land disputes 
and squatting had been a tradition since colonial times. There were 
doubts about titles and boundaries. The expansion of coffee 
plantations had intensified the dispute: "... squatters, settling on 
public lands without titles, (...) can in the future be the cause of 
disorders as can already be seen in Sao Paulo, where there had been  
many deaths, because of squattine(my stress). 38 The 1850 Land Law 
failed to put an end to land speculation. Plantation owners 
continued to monopolise the best land, leaving immigrants with 
remote, unproductive areas. 39 
Thus, the dominance of large properties within some provinces had 
a profound effect upon initiatives to promote immigration. Where 
coffee was expanding, the owners would accept foreign labour only if 
it was compatible with large landed property, for example through 
sharecropping. 
E.V. da Costa, Da Senzala a Colonia, op.cit., p.55; same 
author "Sharecroppers and Plantation Owners", op.cit., p.97. 
38 APB, 22 May 1840, I, p.415. 
E.V. da Costa, "Sharecroppers and Plantation Owners", 
op.cit., p.97. 
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4.2. Sharecropping in no Paulo 
The first experiments with immigrants working on plantations, either 
to replace or to supplement slave labour, took place in the province 
of Sao Paulo. This was a private initiative carried out by Senator 
Nicolau Vergueiro. 40 Whereas in other provinces effort to foment 
immigration resulted from official initiative, in Sao Paulo it was 
primarily due to individual, private enterprises. Attempts to 
transfer to private individuals the responsibility of promoting 
immigration occurred early in the 1840s and in part reflects the 
anxiety of Paulista planters over the problems of labour supply. In 
1846 a provincial law authorized a grant of funds to stimulate 
recruitment of immigrant workers from northern Europe. The 
government was to contract either with individuals or national and 
foreign companies for the transportation of immigrants. Immigrants 
were to repay transportation expenses with their labour. Anyone 
could contract their service, paying the transportation expenses to 
the provincial treasury, either by a single payment or in 
instalments. In the same year, another law empowered the provincial 
government to contract the firm of C. Delrue & Co. of Dunkirk (or 
with any other enterprise or individual) to establish agricultural 
colonies of Germans and Belgians in the province. As before, the 
government would guarantee financial support. 41 
The experiments of the expanding coffee area was unique. The 
question of who should bear the costs of immigration was very 
significant. However as long as the liability was borne privately, 
40 On sharecropping colonies in sao Paulo see E.V. da Costa, 
"Sharecroppers and Plantation Owners", op.cit.; same author, Da 
Senzala a Colania, op.cit., especially chap.2; W. Dean, Rio Claro, 
op.cit., especially chap.4 J.S. Witter, Ibicaba, uma experiancia 
pioneira, 2nd ed. (Sao Paulo: Edigoes Arquivo do Estado, 1982); S. 
Buarque de Holanda, "Prefacio" in T. Davatz, op.cit.; V. Stolcke and 
M.N. Hall, op.cit., pp.171-176. 
41 E.V. da Costa, Da Senzala a Colonia, op.cit., p.62; S.B. de 
Holanda, "Prefacio", op.cit., p.11. Provincial law n.11, 19 February 
1846, Provincial law n.27, 16 March 1846, in Colleccao das Leis  
promulqadas pela Assembleia Leqislativa da Provincia de Sao Paulo 
desde 1835 ate 1850 (Sao Paulo: Typ. D'Aurora Paulistana, 1853). 
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repeated attempts to load the costs onto immigrants, or even to make 
a profit from the business, would provoke serious disputes. The 
issue would be debated time and again in the subsequent decades. In 
the end, Sao Paulo planters would succeed in transferring labour 
supply costs to the government. 
In 1846, Vergueiro was _ according to his own account _ 
invited by the president of the province, on behalf of the Imperial 
government, to receive immigrants under the liability to pay their 
transportation expenses. To carry out the undertaking, Vergueiro, in 
association with his sons, founded Vergueiro and Company (Companhia  
Patriotic° Mercantil, coincidently with the same name as FeijOo 
Sotomayor's in Cuba). The first and main objective of the company 
was to foster agriculture and immigration in Limeira and Rio Claro. 
The company was also engaged in the coffee trade at Santos. 42 
Vergueiro had already attempted to settle immigrants on his lands in 
the early 1840s when he imported 90 colonists from the Province of 
Minho in Portugal, in a sharecropping scheme. 43  In 1847, Vergueiro 
and Company received 423 German immigrants, who were settled at 
Ibicaba. The Company was responsible for ntrinta e dois contos e 
duzentos e tantos mil reis", subsidized by the Imperial government 
and to be repaid in three annual instalments. 44 
With some OPortuguese, the remainder of the earlier experiment, 
and the newly-arrived Germans, Vergueiro founded a "colonian on his 
estate Ibicaba. It seems that at the beginning the firm offered 
contracts based on a labour leasing arrangement (locagao de 
42 D. Forjaz, op.cit., p.45; M.L. Lamounier, Da Escravidao ao  
Trabalho Livre. A Lei de Locacao de Servicos de 1879 (Campinas: 
Papirus, 1988) p.29; Vergueiro reports to the president of province 
about his experiments with immigrants and the creation of the 
company in "Relatorio das colejnias", Discurso com que o Illmo. Exmo.  
Sr. Dr. Jose Thomaz Nabuco de Araujo, Presidente da Provincia de Sao 
Paulo, abrio a Assemblea Legislativa Provincial no dia primeiro de 
maio de 1852 (Sao Paulo: Typ. de Antonio Louzada Antunes, 1852) 
pp.11-14. 
" Relatorio das colonias" in Discurso... Dr. Jose Thomaz  
Nabuco de Araujo... 1 maio de 1852, op.cit.,  p.11. 
44 " Relatorio das ColOnias", in Discurso...1852, op.cit., p.12. 
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servigos). However, given a choice, the immigrants opted for 
sharecropping. There were still 215 slaves working on the plantation 
at that time. 45 
Under the terms of the early contracts, Vergueiro and Company 
financed the immigrant's passage to the port of Santos, advanced the 
cost of transport from Santos to the plantation, and provided funds 
to buy food and tools until the first harvest. On the plantations, 
immigrants were assigned a number of coffee bushes to tend and 
harvest. They were also allotted a subsistence plot where they could 
grow their own food. The net profits yielded by selling coffee were 
shared, fifty-fifty, between Company and immigrant, as was the 
production of the food plots in excess of subsistence needs. The 
immigrants were to conduct themselves according to regulations 
established in the colony. They were to tend and carefully harvest 
the coffee plants assigned to them, to deliver the harvested 
cherries to a specified place, and to contribute (in proportion to 
the amount of coffee delivered) towards the costs of preparing and 
transporting coffee to market. Advances to the immigrants, on which 
interest was charged at the rate of 6%, would be re-paid out of 
sales income. The initial contracts did not specify a particular 
period of time but immigrants could not legally move off the 
plantation until they had repaid their debts." 
Vergueiro's plan was an ambitious one. As already observed, he 
opposed the granting of land to foreign immigrants and did not 
believe that the concession of land for the creation of settlements 
_ populating the "desert" _ would answer the most urgent problem 
of the Empire which was a need for hands in agriculture. 
Nevertheless he was not against the creation of a numerous class of 
small landholders. That was highly desirable. But it was a project 
that could and should be postponed until circumstances would ensure 
45 J.J. von Tschudi, op.cit., p.134. 
46 Contracto de parceria celebrado entre Verqueiro & Cia. e os  
abaixo assinados, por intermedio do Sr. Dr. Scmidt, em Hamburg°, em 
nome da referida sociedade. Appendix in T. Davatz, op.cit., pp.223- 
237; J.J. von Tschudi, op.cit., p.137. 
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success. In his view, the sharecropping system did not place 
immigrants in an ideal position but it would prepare them to be 
proprietors. Establishing sharecropping colonies could allow the 
immigrants a period of adaptation, in which they could acquire 
skills essential to their later success as small farmers. In this 
sense, he believed his plan would attend the planter's needs and 
would benefit the country through the creation of independent crown 
colonies. 47 
In a letter to the President of the province in 1853, Vergueiro 
presented his views on the advantages of the sharecropping system: 
"Admitting, as everybody does, the great need for labourers to 
replace slaves and to contribute to the increase of free population, 
I examined all the means of achieving this aim (...) I concluded 
that sharecropping was the most suitable to our circumstances (...) 
being evident the utility of this system to the country (...) it is 
not less to the colonists, who on arrival find someone who supplies 
the necessary means, and provides labour without facing the hardness 
of backlandsu . 48  Twenty years later, the Swiss representative 
Tschudi, conducting inquiries on the failures of the system, would 
agree with Vergueiro, highlighting the same advantages of the 
system. According to Tschudi, those who wished to emigrate to 
Brazil, without the necessary means would find in sharecropping the 
solution to his problem while retaining the prospect of becoming a 
proprietor of land. With the travel expenses advanced and 
maintenance and supplies provided, the immigrant would survive the 
most difficult period. The first years were alleged to be of great 
importance for the immigrant: "Meanwhile he could learn the language 
of the country and could become familiar with tropical agriculture". 
Tschudi observed that many colonists complained of having lost a 
whole year because they did not know how to take proper care of 
their crops and because they were ignorant of certain basic 
47 S.B. de Holanda, "Prefdcio", op.cit., p.13; M.L. Lamounier, 
op.cit., p.31. 
48 D. Forjaz, op.cit., p.48. 
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principles of Brazilian agriculture. 49 
Tschudi suggested that the situation of agregados in many 
plantations had served as model to Vergueiro. The sharecropping 
system had already been used in sugar producing areas, where land 
was exclusively monopolized by big landholders. Sugar planters used 
to give land tenancies were sugar cane could be cultivated on a 
small scale. After cutting and transportation, the tenant was given 
half the sugar produced. 5° According to Tschudi, the situation of 
these agregados combined with the other method often used on the 
coast, especially in coffee plantations, of using the labour of poor 
Azorean immigrants in exchange for the expenses of their 
transportation, inspired Vergueiro's initiative. 51 
According to Stolcke and Hall, planters adopted the sharecropping 
system instead of a straight wage system in Sao Paulo because in a 
situation of labour scarcity it was more efficient. Sharecropping 
was a way of securing extra effort from labourers for only a small 
increase in total remuneration over that of wage labourers. As 
remuneration depended on the amount produced, there was an incentive 
for the labourer to intensify his efforts and to cultivate with 
great care. In addition, supervision would be insignificant, since 
control of labour was exercised by the labourer himself. It was 
anticipated that sharecroppers would tend more coffee bushes than 
wage labourers. Hence, fewer workers would be required and initial 
investment would be lower. The immigrant's families constituted a 
cheap labour reserve and the assignment of a subsistence plot was a 
another way of reducing costs. 52 
Yet Vergueiro reported obstacles from the beginning. It seems 
that changes in central government policy removed the promised 
49 J.J. von Tschudi, op.cit., pp.149-150. 
50 J.J. von Tschudi, op.cit., p.130. 
51 J.J. von Tschudi, op.cit., pp.132-133. 
52 V. Stolcke and M.M. Hall, op.cit., p.174. 
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financial support. He then turned to the provincial government and 
succeeded in getting some aid. 53 Also, there were problems with the 
immigrants. In 1852, Vergueiro reported that some of the immigrants 
were not inclined to, or familiar with, rural labour. It was 
necessary to let many leave ever at risk of losing their labour 
advancements". According to Vergueiro that was a problem inherent to 
all contract immigration importation schemes, since the business of 
immigration was in hands of shipowners and their agents. The first 
was primarily interested in the cargo of his ship; and the second 
was interested only in the commission paid for those engaged. The 
only way to avoid this evil was to have an abundance of immigrants 
so that each could be used according his abilities. Despite 
Vergueiro's initial problems, he reported that he had extended 
coffee cultivation in his plantations and had created better 
facilities to settle from 3,000 to 4,000 colonos! 54  
It was after 1850, with the prohibition of the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade, that the achievements of Vergueiro's initiative 
attracted greatest interest. The need for an alternative source of 
labour had grown even more urgent with the expansion of coffee 
cultivation. The immigrant colono seemed to be the solution. 
Encouraged by the success of Vergueiro's experiences on his Ibicaba 
plantation and concerned about the effects of the end of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade, many planters from the pioneering western 
areas turned to Vergueiro and Company requesting immigrant workers. 
Others following Vergueiro's example, set up their own immigration 
enterprises. As soon as Vergueiro got the necessary financial 
support, the Company actively began importing immigrants. The 
success of the enterprise was widely reported. The 1852 contract 
agreed with the provincial government to import 1,500 colonos within 
three years was reported fully accomplished in July, 31, 1854. 55 
53 E.V. da Costa, Da Senzala a ColOnia, op.cit., p.63. 
54 Relatorio das Coltinias", in Discurso...1852, op.cit., pp.12- 
13. 
55 E.V. da Costa, "Sharecroppers and Plantation Owners", 
op.cit., p.101; J.J. von Tschudi, op.cit., p.137. 
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In 1851 Senator Francisco Antonio de Souza Queiraz was arranging 
the settlement of Germans on his land. In the same year Luiz Antonio 
de Souza Barros had requested some Portuguese islanders from Fayal 
for his estate in Constituigao and was planning to settle some 
Germans in his other estate, sao Lourengo in Rio Claro. Luiz Ribeiro 
de Souza Rezende had already settled four families in his estate, 
Boa Vista. 56 During the next year, other colonies were set up in 
Campinas, Limeira, Constituigao and Rio Claro. The colony Sete 
Quedas, was composed of "Protestant, regular disciplined", Germans; 
Sao Lourengo was also composed of Germans, a total of 127, part 
Catholic and part Protestant. A total of 149 Germans were reported 
to have arrived on Souza Queiroz' estate of sao Geronimo. Jose Elias 
Pacheco Jordan and Benedito Antonio de Camargo had each established 
18 immigrant families. Many of these immigrants came under the 
auspices of Vergueiro and Company. With minor changes, the majority 
of planters applied Vergueiro type contracts. 57 At the beginning of 
1853 the president of province observed that the sharecropping 
scheme was almost exclusive in sao Paulo. 58 
Most of the colonies were founded between 1852-1854, with 
immigrants imported in increasing numbers by Vergueiro & Cia. By 
1855 about 3,500 immigrants of various origins were located in the 
province, working on 30 plantations. 59 Between 1840 and 1875 about 
15,000 immigrants arrived. Most of them were Europeans engaged to 
work on coffee plantations. 60 Between 1847 and 1874 about 50 Sao 
56 " Relatorio das Coltinias", in Discurso...1852, op.cit., p.16. 
57 Relatorio com que o Illmo.Exmo.Sr. Dr. Josino do Nascimento 
Silva, Presidente da Provincia de Sao Paulo, abrio a Assemblea 
Leqislativa Provincial, no dia 16 de fevereiro de 1853 (Sao Paulo: 
Typ. Dous de Dezembro, 1853) pp.10-11. 
58 Relatorio... 16 de fevereiro de 1853, op.cit.,  p.10. 
59 V. Stolcke and M.M. Hall, op.cit., p.172. 
60 n Quadro de immigrantes vindos a Provincia de Sao Paulo de 
1827 a 1877", in Relatorio apresentado ao Illmo. Sr. Tenente Coronel  
Francisco de Barros e Accioli de Vasconcellos, Inspetor Geral de 
Terras e Colonisa ao da Provincia de Sao Paulo 1888, loc. Museu 
Republicano de Itu, Sao Paulo. 
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Paulo coffee planters established European immigrants on their 
land. 61 In most cases free workers coexisted with slaves, although 
the tasks of each group were strictly defined and separate. It was 
observed that only colonists from Portugal and the Azores could 
consent to work alongside slaves. 62 Although slave labour continued 
to predominate, a number of estates did employ a large free labour 
force. 63 There was a certain division of labour. Tasks beyond coffee 
cultivation and harvesting, requiring constant supervision or 
inappropriate for sharecropping, continued to be carried out by 
slaves. For instance, soil preparation, planting coffee seedlings, 
sowing annual crops for consumption of the plantation and later, 
increasingly, the processing of coffee." 
Vergueiro's attempts to supply immigrant workers for Sao Paulo 
plantations did not reach the same scale and organization as the 
trade in workers in Cuba. However, the engagement of immigrants to 
work on Paulista coffee plantations impressed a new character on the 
experiments with sharecropping. The emphasis on a contractual 
relationship with workers confronted planters with a wholly new 
situation. Used either to the compulsory labour of the slave or to 
the special-task labour of the agregado, planters now confronted a 
new figure. Instead of the black slave, or the familiar Brazilian 
part-time workers, there was the European sharecropper. Mediating 
the relationship, there was no longer the right of property or the 
traditional "clientelism", but a formal contract, written and 
subjected to nominal state supervision. The limits and content of 
the new relationship had still to be determined. 
61 A.E.Taunay, op.cit., VI, p.19. 
62 J.J. von Tschudi, op.cit., p.131. 
63 For instance, Luis Antonio de Souza Barros had 329 Germans 
and Swiss in his estates; Joao Elias Jordao 180 foreign colonists, 
see E.V. da Costa, "Sharecroppers and Slaveowners", op.cit., p.103. 
In 1856 in the colonies of A. Souza Queiroz there were 325 
immigrants and 182 Brazilians engaged in sharecropping, day and task 
labourers, cf. APESP, Colonias, ordem 7213, caixa 1(1827-1858). 
64 V. Stolcke and M.M. Hall, op.cit., p.172. 
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Changes made in the conditions of early contracts caused 
complaints, provoking grievances and conflicts between planters and 
immigrant workers. Transformed into an importer of colonists, acting 
as agent for other planters, Vergueiro and Company started to charge 
a sizeable commission for each immigrant brought into the province; 
namely 10 thousand reis per adult, and 5 thousand reis per child. 
Later there would be dispute over the payment of the commission. 
Although it was not included in the contract some colonos would have 
this fee included in their debts. 65 Further alterations in the 
contracts caused serious disadvantages to the immigrants. Presented 
with difficulty in regulating the collective task of preparing 
coffee for market, plantation owners entrusted the activity to 
slaves. As a result the colono had to pay a fee of 400 reis per 
arroba of coffee processed. According to earlier contracts, interest 
on sums advanced to cover the expenses of maintenance and goods 
would start being computed after one year, and to cover transport 
expenses after two years. Revised clauses established that interest 
should be paid from the first day of advancement and sometimes at a 
rate of 12% rather than the 6% previously agreed. Equally 
disadvantageous to the colonos, new clauses extended the notice to 
be given by colonos before leaving the plantation. Hitherto, the 
colono was allowed to give six months notice: new contracts would 
require one year. Moreover, additional alterations granted the owner 
the facility of transferring the contracts to other persons. The 
expedient was of course a venue to fraud and speculation in the 
price of contracts. New contracts also stated that the entire family 
was collectively (solidariamente) responsible for the debt of each 
member. 66 These new terms offered the planters more solid guarantees 
to recovering their capital invested but clearly the conditions were 
very unfavourable for the colonos and caused serious discontent. 
Failure to clarify some clauses, such as the size of subsistence 
plots, the provision of shelter, the payment of the fee charged by 
Vergueiro and Company, and the length of the contract, compounded 
65 J.J. von Tschudi, op.cit., p.135; T. Davatz, op.cit., p.72. 




Colonias, ordem 7213, caixa 1(1827-1858), 
difficulties for immigrants and opened the system to mistrust and 
fraud. 
The results were very different from what had been expected. 
Besides a new form of labour, immigrants also represented a stock of 
invested capital. Cautiously experimenting with contracts, planters 
were seeking a way to guarantee their expectations of profits from 
coffee and of recovering capital invested in labour contracts. 
Careful attention was therefore given to costs, discipline and 
control. Soon, the scheme devised to substitute immigrants for 
slaves and ease the differences in "culture, tradition and habits" 
turned out to be a failure. 
Conflict and discontent were present from the beginning. Small 
uprisings characterized the whole decade. The growing disillusion of 
immigrants with their living and working conditions was expressed in 
several ways _ not least a refusal to work. A series of labour 
disputes arose out of the contracts; strikes and desertions were 
reported. For instance, in 1853, troops were called to suppress 
disturbances provoked by colonists at Luis Antonio de Souza Barros' 
estate. 67 In 1855, Joaquim Franco de Camargo, the owner of Morro 
Azul estate, with 204 workers, dismissed 14 families for "vagrancy", 
"intrigue" and "theft". At the same time he reported that another 8 
families had departed without permission. 68 In 1856 the Swiss 
colonos of Nova Olinda (Francisco Jose de Castro's plantation near 
Ubatuba) rebelled. The Swiss immigrant workers had been engaged by 
Vergueiro and Company. The trouble apparently started when questions 
over cattle invading their subsistence plots led to the intervention 
of the police. 69 The incident provoked the intervention of the Swiss 
consul who visited the colony. Grievances were general. Immigrants 
complained about the quality of the subsistence plots, their 
housing, the high prices of articles sold to them on the plantation, 
68 APESP, Colonias, ordem 7213, caixa 1, pasta Limeira. 
69 V. Stolcke and M.M. Hall, op.cit., p.173 
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having the commission on contract transfer charged by Vergueiro 
added to their debts, fulfilment of contracts, and so forth. After 
the Consul's intervention, the conflict was solved when the Imperial 
government demanded the transference of the colonists to a 
government establishment. 70 
However, the most serious revolt began in December 1856 involving 
Swiss and German workers on Senator Vergueiro's plantation, Ibicaba. 
Troops were called and tensions lasted for several weeks. The 
workers complained of grave irregularities in the fulfilment of 
their contracts. A list of grievances was drawn up and presented to 
Vergueiro along with a request for an official investigation. 71 The 
Swiss commissioner, J. C. Heusser, confirmed most of points raised 
by the workers, with the result that a new director was appointed 
for the colony. 72 The revolt ended when the leaders of the revolt 
were expelled from the estate. 
These events in Ibicaba provoked wider inquiries by the imperial 
and foreign authorities. Further protests came to light. There were 
protests at the non-fulfilment of contracts, the ill- treatment of 
immigrant sharecroppers and the imposition of conditions similar to 
slavery (either by debt or sale of contracts). Planters were 
concerned about order and discipline within the plantation and were 
7() Relatorio do Delegado de Policia, Bernardo Correia Moragdo 
ao Presidente de Provincia Francisco Dioqo Pereira de Vasconcelos, 
Ubatuba, 31 July 1856, APESP, Colonies, ordem 7213, caixa 1, pasta 
J.J. von Tschudi, op.cit., p.141; V. Stolcke and M.M. Hall, 
op.cit., p.173. 
71 T. Davatz, op.cit., contains a detailed account of the events 
in Ibicaba. See appendix n.8, pp.249-255, for the list of principal 
complaints draw by the colonists which included, unfair exchange 
rate applied to advanced expenses; debt increased by high interest 
rates, tax commission per head, travel expenses from the port of 
Santos to the estate; high rental charges for poor housing; 
subsistence plots not yield sufficient to that did maintain the 
family, and its products have to be shared with the owner; colonists 
are obliged to buy goods sold in the estate store, although they are 
more expensive than elsewhere; changes of contract stipulations 
signed in Europe, frauds in accounts, weighing and selling coffee. 
72 W.Dean, op.cit., p.103. 
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suspicious of possible links being forged between immigrant 
labourers, slaves and some dissatisfied Brazilians on the 
plantations. The latter fear was proved to be unfounded by an 
investigation made by Police Chief of sao Paulo, Jose Tavares 
Bastos. 73  
By the end of the 1850s' the sharecropping system was considered 
to have failed. Protests against sharecropping contracts and their 
bad results in Sao Paulo's coffee plantations interrupted the flow 
of immigrants to the province. Several European governments, mainly 
Prussia and Switzerland, took measures against colonizing agencies 
directing emigrants to Brazil and prohibited emigration to Sao 
Paulo. 74 The burden of the initial debt is one of the several 
explanations for the failure of the sharecropping system. 75 
73 Exposicao do Senador Verqueiro diriqida ao vice-presidente 
da Provincia sobre as occorrencias de Ibicaba,  and Relatorio de  
Tavares Bastos sobre a colonisacao de Sao Paulo, Colonia de Ibicaba 
denominada Senador Verqueiro, 1857 in T. Davatz, op.cit., Appendix, 
pp.264-276. 
74 J.J. von Tschudi, op.cit., p.143; S.B. Holanda, "Prefacion, 
op.cit., pp.29-30. 
75 For explanations of the failure of sharecropping experiments 
see S.B.Holanda, "Prefacio", op.cit.; E.V. da Costa, "Sharecroppers 
and Plantation Owners", op.cit.; W.Dean, op.cit., chap.4; V.Stolcke 
and M.M.Hall, op.cit., pp. 170-176. 
According to the Police Chief Tavares Bastos, the "deep and 
permanent" evil that had been many times "molesting planters and the 
public authorities" were provoked among others by deficient 
legislation, the terms of engagement of immigrants, the 
sharecropping contract itself, see Relatorio...de Tavares Bastos,  
1857, in T. Davatz, op.cit., p.272. Tschudi, the Swiss 
representative, concluded in his inquiry that the failure was due to 
ambiguity of contracts drawn up by Vergueiro and Company and the 
scale of charges that had to be paid by planters and workers; he 
also mentioned the deficient legislation, op.cit., p.145-146. Other 
contemporary explanations included the poor character and 
inexperience of immigrants. Current literature, however, has 
questioned the capability of planters to deal with a free labour 
force. According to Viotti da Costa, "Sharecroppers and Plantation 
Owners, op.cit., pp.110-122, planters were accustomed to slave 
labour and were not prepared to deal with the problems posed by a 
free labour force."The landowner's original intention was to create 
an effective substitute for slave labor on the coffee plantations. 
The solution they choose intended to reconcile the interests of the 
planters, accustomed to slave labor, with those of the colonists, 
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According to Stolcke and Hall, the debt eventually eliminated the 
intended incentive mechanism of the system. Since the recruitment of 
immigrant labour required an initial investment by the planter, one 
of their main concerns was to safeguard their investment. But the 
contract debt pressed heavily on immigrant's income and their 
returns from coffee cultivation turned out to be lower than 
expected. 76 Amortisation demanded a level of exploitation which 
planters were unable to enforce and the sharecropping contract did 
not adequately address the challenge of creating a reliable 
workforce. 77 It would take several years to repay the debt to the 
landowner. The cash income of the immigrant depended on the 
productivity of the trees under his care and prevailing world coffee 
prices. Although under sharecropping workers shared any loss equally 
with the landowner, the sharecroppers were more vulnerable to the 
vagaries of nature and coffee market. In addition, as it was the 
planter who commercialized the production, the system was open to 
fraud in operations such as weighing, shipping and selling. 
After the 1860s, sharecropping was gradually replaced by labour-
leasing contracts. Instead of receiving a share of the value of 
production, labourers were paid a fixed piece rate for each measure 
who were eager to acquire property, improve their living conditions, 
and rise in the social scale. The result did not please either 
group. The planters felt they had been swindled. The colonists 
believed that they had been reduced to the condition of 
slaves"(p.110) There was a conflict of interest between planter and 
colonist that made it impossible to reach an agreement. Also given 
to high cost of production of coffee at the time, its labour 
intensive nature, low level of mechanization, and low coffee prices, 
margins of profit were small, thus discouraging planters and 
workers. Sharecropping could not provide enough profits to the 
planters nor enough cash income to the immigrants to enable them to 
cancel their debts in a reasonable amount of time. Warren Dean in 
Rio Claro, op.cit., chapter 4, argued that the sharecropping system 
was in fact more profitable than slave labour but planters were 
unable to deal with workers on a contractual basis. He attributes 
its failure to the fact that after the first years free labourers 
could only be kept working by the use of coercion, as planters were 
unwilling to agree with more favourable contract conditions. 
76 V. Stolcke and M.M. Hall, op.cit., p.172. 
77 V. Stolcke and M.M Hall, op.cit., p.173. 
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of coffee harvested from the trees under their care. For his part, 
the landowner retained the right to one half of the food crops 
cultivated by the immigrant, reduced the size of the plot and 
sometimes charged rent in order to discourage immigrants diverting 
labour from coffee to other crops. 78 This had been one of the 
defects of sharecropping for planters. In protest at what they saw 
as an unfair contract, and in order to increase income, 
sharecroppers had neglected coffee and concentrated instead on food 
staples. Nevertheless, although the new arrangement reduced some of 
the risks to immigrant labour arising from sharecropping, it did not 
solve the problem of the burden of initial debt nor planter anxiety 
about the initial investment. 79 
The problem of debt would not be removed until the 1880s when the 
provincial and Imperial governments began to subsidize European 
immigration to Sao Paulo. It is at this time that a new arrangement, 
the colonato, a system based on mixed task and piece rate form of 
remuneration became standard in western sao Paulo. By establishing 
a fixed rate of pay for the cultivation of the coffee groves 
separate from the harvest piece-rate, the labourers had a guaranteed 
stable income independent of coffee yields. In addition, since part 
of the worker's remuneration under the new arrangement dependent 
directly on the number of trees tended and no longer on their 
productivity, the worker and his family would feel encouraged to 
cultivate a larger number of trees. Also, as another part of total 
income nevertheless depended upon the yield of the coffee harvest, 
workers were encouraged to tend coffee bushes carefully as this 
would lead to higher yields and earnings. Thus fazendeiros had a 
guaranteed supply of plantation labour and immigrants were protected 
from some of the abuses and uncertainties of the old sharecropping 
system. 80 
78 V. Stolcke and M.M. Hall, op.cit., p.177. 
79 V.Stolcke and M.M. Hall, op.cit., pp.177-180. 
80 V. Stolcke and M. M. Hall, op.cit., pp.179-186. For studies 
about the operation of the colonato system in Sao Paulo see also T. 
Holloway, Immigrants on the Land: Coffee and Society in Sao Paulo,  
1886-1934; and by same author "The Coffee colono of Sao Paulo, 
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4.3. Legislation and control: contracts, conflicts and laws 
With the "failure" of sharecropping, planters responded first by 
making minor changes to contracts and subsequently by changing the 
whole system, seeking to solve problems of control of productivity, 
discipline and debt amortisation by demanding more severe mechanisms 
of coercion to oblige the workers to fulfil contractual 
obligations. 81 To these systemic amendments planters added internal 
regulations within plantations. They spelt out duties and rights in 
more detail to define boundaries of potential disputes. But these 
changes also created new labour relations. As new conflicts arose, 
planters started demanding fresh general regulations for contracts. 
Despite these demands, the government was reluctant to act. One of 
the main reasons was the need to attract further European 
immigrants. When in 1879 the government approved a draconian piece 
of legislation on rural labour relations, the harsher measures were 
aimed at former slaves and domestic free labour not at immigrants. 
The majority of the planters who contracted immigrant workers 
followed the general stipulations of Vergueiro's sharecropping 
contract; this also applied to those who obtained immigrants 
directly from Europe. However, on the basis of experience, some 
applied minor amendments. This was the case, for instance, of the 
planter Francisco Antonio de Souza Queiroz, whose colonies were 
reported to surpass Vergueiro's in "order, administration and 
fame". 82 In 1857, when a government official visited sao Paulo 
sharecropping colonies, Souza Queiroz had three colonies, 
Brazil: migration and mobility, 1880-1930, in K. Duncan and I. 
Rutledge (ed.) Land and Labour in Latin America (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977) pp.301-323; J. de S. Martins, 0 
Cativeiro da Terra, op.cit.; B. Sallum Junior, Capitalismo e  
cafeicultura: Oeste Paulista, 1888-1930  (Sao Paulo: Duas Cidades, 
1982) and V. Stolcke, Coffee planters, workers and wives: class  
conflict and gender relations on Sao Paulo coffee plantations, 1850-
1980. (London: McMillan, 1988). 
81 V. Stolcke and M.M. Hall, op.cit., pp.177-178; M.L. 
Lamounier, op.cit., pp.37-75. 
82 Cf. S.B. de Holanda, "Prefacio", op.cit., p.30. 
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Cresciumal(in Pirassununga), Sao Geronimo and Santa Barbara (both in 
Limeira). They were composed of 653 people, a total of 136 families: 
55 Brazilian, 78 German and Swiss German and 3 Portuguese. 83 In an 
1852 contract agreed in Hamburgo, Souza Queiroz followed Vergueiro's 
contract but introduced some minor alterations: i) the period of 
contract was stipulated as five years, after which it could be 
renewed; ii) at the end of the contract, the contractor was to lease 
a piece of land where the immigrant could be settled; iii) the 
colono agreed to deliver the harvested coffee after drying and would 
receive a written receipt; iv) the colono was required to help clean 
and repair the canals taking water to the engenho de café; v) the 
period for repaying advances money or goods, was stated as four 
years. 84 In 1856, Souza Queiroz reported that the system he 
generally adopted was sharecropping, but that he "did not exclude 
leasing and day labour". 85 Similarly, the planter Joaquim Bonifacio 
do Amaral decided to introduce another stipulation in the contracts 
of some colonos transferred from Souza Queiroz which exempted 
colonos from the obligation of delivering a share of the produce 
from subsistence plots for two years. On the other hand, colonos 
received a much smaller area on which to grow food crops in between 
the coffee bushes or on another appointed area if the plot was not 
enough. The arrangement of planting in between the coffee bushes was 
also another way to prevent colonos from diverting their labour away 
from coffee areas. It made the task of keeping coffee bushes cleaned 
and weeded "at least five or more times, during the first two years" 
easier. 86 
Many of these alterations did not deviate radically from the 
sharecropping contract framed by Vergueiro and Company. The new 
83 According to mapa of colonies visited by Valdetaro in 1857, 
in S.B. de Holanda, "Prefacio", op.cit., pp.28-29. 
84 " Contracto", E.V. da Costa, Da Senzala a Colonia, op.cit., 
Appendix, pp.175-177. 
85 APESP, Colonias, ordem 7213, caixa 1 (1827-1858), pasta Limeira. 
86 APESP, Colonias, ordem 7213, caixa 1, pasta Campinas. 
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arrangements usually resulted from particular conflicts or 
complaints and that resolved as they arose by planters and workers. 
These contract adjustments represented attempts to accommodate the 
expectations of both parties. The contract was away of establishing 
agreed parameters within which relations and obligations between 
planters and workers would be detailed and defined. Conflict both 
revealed "lacunae", "vagueness" or "defects" in the contracts and 
provided a mechanism to close loopholes or fill lacunae. Changes 
were thus an attempt to bring within the framework of the contract 
points of divergence (already existent or foreseen) between planters 
and workers. The increasing detail of clauses and conditions 
reflected this process and was an attempt to make even more explicit 
the duties and responsibilities of planter and workers and the 
reality of their functional relationship. Amendments to contracts 
reflected the content of the struggle between planters and immigrant 
workers. That is what one might think when carefully examining, for 
instance, the conditions of the contracts agreed in the 1860s with 
the planter Joaquim Bonifdcio do Amaral in his fazenda Sete 
Quedas. 87 Sizes and prices of subsistence plots were prescribed in 
detail by art.4, parag. 3: 
For the first 1,000 sq bragas 	R. 2,000 
For the second 1,000 sq braces 	R. 3,000 
For the third 1,000 sq braces 	R. 4,000 
For the fourth 1,000 sq bragas 	R. 6,000. 
Larger families could lease up to four subsistence plots. Equally, 
according to the same article 4, paragraph 4, the planter was to 
provide free housing during the period of the contract and "  grazing 
for his animals which should not exceed one cow and a horse, to be  
kept most of the time in stable  (my stress). Article 5, paragraph 
7, stated that the colono should maintain the house as well as the 
pasture for his animals as well as enclosures, and weeding "should 
be performed at least twice a year" (my stress). According to 
87 Contrato entre o Comendador Joaquim Bonifdcio do Amaral e os 
colonos da sua fazenda Sete Quedas, no municipio de Campinas,  
186(4), BN, Manuscritos, BN 3.11-35, 21, 56n4. 
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article 5, paragraph 2, the contracted worker was to cultivate 
properly the coffee bushes in his charge, and harvest only the 
cherries "that are dry and ripe, free of dirt, leaves or any other 
extraneous material, to be delivered to a specified place (...) All  
green cherries that become dislodged when picking shall be 
separately delivered without measure and at no charge.(my stress). 
Disputes over the length of working hours spent on the 
cultivation of subsistence plots seemed to have been common. 
Planters usually considered subsistence plots as a "favour" or a 
non-monetary incentive granted to workers. Workers could produce for 
their own consumption and sell the surplus. Arrangements relating to 
the distribution of profits made from subsistence plots, however, 
differed. Planters were aware that, while contributing to reduce 
labour maintenance expenses and cash expenditure on wages, the 
restriction or enlargement of subsistence plots also constituted a 
way of controlling labour. For instance, if workers hoped to derive 
additional profits from subsistence cultivation and diverted labour 
from coffee cultivation, planters could restrict plot size and/or 
charge rent. The clear drafting in the contract and precise detail 
providing for all eventualities was another way of pre-emptying 
future problems. As illustrated by the detailed contract provisions 
mentioned above, dispute also centred on the amount and quality of 
coffee harvested, which profits were to be shared by planters and 
immigrant workers, as well as the cost of housing. 
When the Swiss representative Tschudi visited sao Paulo colonies 
in 1860, he commended the Amaral Sete Quedas colony. All the 
families from Holstein had paid off their debts and they were so 
content with the system that they had renewed their sharecropping 
contracts. "Sete Quedas is the most evident proof of the great 
advantage that the sharecropping system offered to the colonos", 
observed Tschudi. However, the landowner, Joaquim Bonifacio do 
Amaral, continued Tschudi, was not very happy with the Holstein 
immigrant workers, for "great patience and indulgence" was needed 
when dealing with them. "As much as they save, as exigent they 
become, to the point of refusing to maintain enclosures and pasture 
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for their animals, doing it only if properly indemnified. Although 
satisfied with the results from the system, he does not feel 
encouraged to prolong the experience because he was fed up and 
refused to receive more colonos" (my stress). 88 The difficulty and 
reluctance of planters to conform to the new relationship was 
evident. Immigrant workers were aware of their contract conditions 
and would often refuse to perform tasks beyond those explicitly 
stated. Added to the fact that contracts were not often very clear 
on their provisions, planters also expected workers to fulfil tasks 
on demand. One of the arguments developed later favouring Chinese 
immigration, for instance, was that planters needed workers to 
perform unexpected tasks as the need arose. These, they complained, 
European immigrants refused to do. 89 
Although contract refinement was a form of accommodating 
conflicts, the great diversity of arrangements led to a variety of 
problems regarding labour control. On the one hand, although legal 
contracts gave certain rights to colonos, the various arrangements 
allowed planters some flexibility to find the best way to deal with 
workers and to exercise authority over them. On the other hand, the 
variety of labour agreements increased the possibility of dispute 
and reduced planters' grounds for appeal to the authorities. As a 
result, planters began asking the government to create a general 
regulation, to shape uniformly and thus reinforcing the contracts. 
However, distinct from their Cuban counterparts, who had resource to 
Reglamentos de colonos for guidance and coercion, Brazilian planters 
would have no more expedient than the "famigerada" locagao de 
servigos laws. 
The existing legislative framework did not match up to the 
requirements of the new relations that had evolved. From the early 
1850s there had been attempts by the Imperial government to regulate 
the sharecropping system. Existing laws regulating sharecropping 
88 J.J. von Tschudi, op.cit., p.168. 
89 Congress° Agricola. Colleccao de Documentos (Rio deJaneiro: 
Typ• Nacional, 1878) p.189. 
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contracts were very inefficient and provided planters only with 
mechanisms for rescinding contracts or for their compensation. These 
solutions meant the loss of the initial investment and did not 
create mechanisms to force the immigrant to work to pay off debts." 
Several drafts of new regulations were presented. Troublesome 
issues such as travel expenses, settlement and mode of engagement 
with private individuals were the main subjects. There was also a 
desire to clarify differences between sharecropping and labour 
leasing contracts, combining both systems in a single piece of 
legislation. These draft peregulations did not differ much from the 
conditions spelt out in the contracts. However, they attempted to 
set out obligations more clearly. According to an 1855 draft, 
planters were obliged i) to advance the travel expenses of those 
below eight years old and not to keep immigrants in the port for 
more than three days, ii) to provide housing, food, tools and a plot 
of land for growing subsistence crops, iii) to provide transport and 
marketing of the final product, iv) to provide machinery for 
processing, and v) ghoul& not employ the colono in other tasks and 
keep them on the same land and in the same house during the period 
of the contract, stipulated as four years. The colonos undertook a) 
to take care of bushes entrusted to them, b) to live peacefully and 
to accept the internal regulations of the colonies, c) not to own or 
employ slaves, and d) to repay the expenses of the planter. Besides 
spelling out general conditions, further mechanisms were envisaged 
to fulfil contract conditions. Thus, according to same draft, if the 
planter did not comply with contractual obligations he would be 
fined and the contract could be rescinded. If the colonos did not 
comply with the contracts they would be punished with prison for 
eight days or three months, or be ordered to pay all debts plus 
interest of 6% a year. 91 
90 V. Stolcke and M.M. Hall, op.cit., pp.96-97. 
91 Regulamento para a colonizagdo por parceria auxiliada pelo 
governo" in Documentos sobre: Colonizacdo, Telegrafos eletricos,  
Sistema Penitencidrio, Colonias Penais, e Fundicao de tipos,  
compilados e reunidos em livro pelo Conselheiro Nabuco de Araujo 
(1852-1869). IHGB, Manuscritos, Col. Senador Nabuco, lata 384, livro 
02. The regulation is probably dated by 1854, for it was sent to the 
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Many planters stressed the need for such regulations. As early as 
1854, after a series of disputes with immigrant sharecroppers, 
planter Souza Barros stressed to the president of the province the 
need for new legal provisions to oblige colonos to fulfil contracts. 
In his view, most of his problems were due to lack of interpreters 
and his limited experience managing immigrant workers. 92 At the same 
time, Vergueiro was helping the authorities lay down rules based on 
his own experience. 93 Another planter, Joao Ribeiro dos Santos 
Camargo from Rio Claro, observed the need to coordinate and 
harmonize the sharecropping system in a common "code to be easily 
enforced against transgressors". His proposal was to reform the 1837 
Marquis of Olinda, with a note from Luiz Pedreira de Couto Ferraz in 
1 January 1855. Projeto de requlamentos para colonizacao por  
parceria auxiliada pelo Governo, para contratos de colonizacao e  
locacao de servicos agricolas e para transporte de imiqrantes. Rio 
de Janeiro, 1855/1858. IHGB, Manuscritos, Col. Marques de Olinda, 
lata 212, documento 24; Estudos para os requlamentos e contratos de 
oolonizacao e locacao de servicos agricolas, inclusive minuta de  
contrato entre o govern() e o proprietario da Colonia Nossa Senhora 
do 0, na Ilha das Oncas (Para); decreto aprovando o contrato aceito 
pela Associacao Central de Colonizacao e termo do mesmo, feito por 
intermedio da Reparticao Geral das Terras Pablicas. Palacio do Rio 
de Janeiro, 1 May 1858, IHGB, Manuscritos, Col. Marques de Olinda, 
lata 212, documento 29. 
92 APESP, Colonias, ordem 7213, caixa 1, pasta Limeira. 
93 Vergueiro's comments on projects of regulations of the 
Associacao Central de Colonizacao in Documentos referentes a 
Colonizacao e imiqracao: observacoes sobre o ultimo requlamento da 
Associacao Central de Colonizacao; bases para o contracto de colonos  
da mesma associacao (reparos feitos pelo Senador Verqueiro);  
observacoes de Luiz Pedreira de Couto Ferraz ao Marques de Olinda 
sobre o requlamento para transporte de colonos; carta ao Senador  
N.P. de Campos Vergueiro ao Marques de Olinda, a proposito do  
referido requlamento e sobre seus proprios metodos de colonizacao;  
um contrato de parceria entre Vergueiro & Cia e uma familia de  
colonos StlicOS. Hamburgo, Rio e Ibicaba, 1855/1858. IHGB, 
Manuscritos, Col. Marques de Olinda, lata 545, pasta 65. When the 
government attempted to regulate Vergueiro's contracts, on 
conditions of engagement and tried to forbid any kind of commission 
besides the travel expenses, Vergueiro and Company protested and 
refused to comply on the grounds that the conditions infringed its 
rights, see Relatorio com que o Illmo.Exmo.Sr. Dr. Josino do 
Nascimento Silva, Presidente da Provincia de Sao Paulo, abrio a 
Assemblea Leqislativa Provincial, no dia 16 de fevereiro de 1854.  
(Sao Paulo, Typ. Dous de Dezembro, 1853) p.16. 
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labour law to embrace the sharecropping contracts. 94 After the wave 
of revolts at the end of the 1850s the pressure from the plantation 
owners for change was even greater. 
In 1858, new Instructions were issued, attempting to establish a 
general rubric for voluntary and engaged immigrants coming to settle 
in the Empire. The 18 November Instructions were divided in two 
parts. 95 The first section dealt with immigrants coming as 
independent proprietors to settle in government colonies. The second 
laid down conditions for agreements with contracted immigrants. It 
provided for a three-year supply of a fixed number of colonos and 
outlined the mode of engagement with planters. To those engaging for 
plantation work, the government would provide free travel from 
Europe. The transfer of contracts without the permission of the 
colono was prohibited and the term of engagement should not exceed 
five years. At the end of the contract colonos were free of all 
obligations. After performing the daily shift established by the 
planter, the colonos could do whatever they wanted. Most of the 
other conditions set out in the Instructions were aimed at 
immigrants who could afford to buy land and wished to settle freely 
as proprietors in official colonies. As was underlined by the 
Director of Public Land a few years later, these Instructions 
designed to attract immigrants coming with their own savings _ a 
guarantee that they were thrifty, inclined to work and to save. In 
his view, the Instructions did not address the question of immigrant 
workers, who "always make unreasonable demands and unfounded 
complaints", resulting from engagements and contracts. 96  
94 APESP, Colonias, ordem 7213, caixa 1, pasta Piracicaba. 
95 Portaria de 18 de Novembro de 1858, Colleccdo das Decisoes  
do Governo do Imperio do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, Typ. Nacional, 
1858) pp.356-360. 
96  "Relatorio do Diretor das Terras Publicas", Brazil, Relatorio 
da Re•arti &o dos Ne•ocios da A•ricultura Commercio e Obras 
Publicas (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Universal de Laemmert, 1861) 
Appendix, p.34. 
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In fact, the Instructions were an attempt to improve 
sharecropping contracts and their adverse results on the 
plantations. They were an answer to the series of conflicts and 
complaints involving planters and immigrant workers and 
international protest that was aroused by the end of the decade. 
From the process, at least two main rules regarding the engagement 
of European workers emerged: that contracts should not exceed five 
years and that contract transfer would not be valid without the 
agreement of the colono. 97 
Besides amendments to the contracts, changes in several 
regulatory arrangements, and the momentum towards more detailed 
contractual specifications, planters had recourse to both the 
internal plantation regulation and the existing, fragile, legal 
framework. Internal plantation regulations were another expedient 
employed to ensure order, discipline and regular work. These rules 
attempted to stipulate in precise detail, and according to local 
conditions on the plantation, the daily life of the colonos. They 
sometimes overlapped and reinforced contract clauses. But they could 
also fill gaps or contradict the stipulation of contracts. In all 
cases the results appeared to be unfavourable to colonos, who often 
got trapped between formal contracts and estate rules. When colonos 
complained that they had been required to fulfil obligations not 
specified in the contract, the complaint could be considered 
unfounded if those obligations were detailed in the internal 
regulations of the colony. This happened, for instance, to the 
German colono Adam Frey. During official enquiries following 
rebellions in the colonies of Martirios and Sao Lourengo Frey 
complained, among other things, that he had been unjustly fined 
twice for infringing contract stipulations and that the contract 
made no reference to those fines. Weighing his grievances the 
committee observed that, they could not get information on the 
events, but that in fact the internal regulations authorized those 
97 W. Dean, op.cit., p.116. 
171 
fines. 98 During the same inquiries another colono, complained that 
having given notice to leave within six months, he had not been paid 
for the weeding he had been carrying out. The committee retorted 
that neither the contract nor the internal regulation anticipated 
such an event, therefore its resolution depended on the "good will" 
of the administrator or the proprietor. 99 Infractions by colonos 
seemed usually to have been punished with fines. Augusto Bruhmuller, 
carter in sao Lourengo, was charged 100$000 reis, five times his 
wage, for an accidental fire in the coffee bushes caused by his 
wife. 100  Henrique Munich, another immigrant worker in Sao Lourengo, 
was charged 150$000 reis, "for contravening internal regulations" 
and damage to part of the plantation. Also in sao Lourengo, two 
other colonos, Miguel Metz and Valentin Gungeiman, reported being 
fined with 50$000 and 30$000 respectively for fires on the 
plantation. 101  
Besides reinforcing contracts, there was at least one example of 
internal regulations replacing contracts. This was the case of Joao 
Elisario de Carvalho Montenegro's colony of Nova Louza. The colony 
was formed by Portuguese immigrants and the system adopted was that 
of the "monthly wage" (at the time, the so-called "tipo Nova 
Louza"). According to Montenegro this was the only system that did 
not provoke discontent or commotions among colonos as had occurred 
elsewhere. 102 On the plantation, the work was supervised by an 
overseer, and the workers had housing, meals in common, laundry and 
clothing repairs, and medical assistance. They were also given a 
plot of land to cultivate on holidays and holy days. In fact, 
98 Relatario da Commissao encarreqada de examinar as colanias 
Martyrios e Sao Lourenco na Provincia de Sao Paulo (Rio de Janeiro: 
Typ. Nacional, 1874) p.11. 
99 Relatorio...Martyrios e Sao Lourenco, op.cit., p.15. 
100 Relatorio... Matyrios e Sao Lourenco, op.cit., p.16. 
101 Relatorio... Martyrios e Sao Lourenco, op.cit.,  p.27, 42 and 
54. 
102 J.E. de Carvalho Montenegro, Opasculo sobre a colonia 
Nova Louza (Campinas: Typ. da "Gazeta de Campinas", 1872) p.2. 
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observed Montenegro, with the approval of the Free Birth Law (1871) 
the country had entered the period of "transition": "the 
sharecropping system has been condemned; that of tasks (empreitada) 
is only accepted in part; the only substitute that can help 
agriculture is that of wage labour" .103 
In Nova Louza the daily life of the colonos was regulated by a 
code of practice. The code stipulated that all violations or 
questions were to be discussed in a common assembly, that would 
consist of all male workers over eighteen and women over sixteen, 
presided over by the landowner. The "president" retained the right 
to warn or dismiss anyone, if he considered it necessary to maintain 
the "order" and "morality" of the establishment. The regulations 
stipulated the time to get up and to go to bed and fixed times for 
meals. It also laid down wages, different for men, women, nursing 
mothers, and children. Wages were also scaled according to years of 
service on the plantation. Arrangements for cleaning and maintaining 
living quarters were stipulated in detail. It was expressly 
forbidden to be noisy, to fight or issue threats within the 
plantation, to swear at meal times, wear the clothes of other 
colonos, to steal fruit and vegetables, to leave the plantation 
without permission, and so forth. Fights could result in fines of up 
two weeks salary. 104 
In 1875, the owner, Carvalho Montenegro, reported good results 
from the regulations and system adopted in Nova Louza. He declared 
the colony was "at peace, harmony and morality". According to 
Montenegro, written contracts had only recently been introduced. 
"Notwithstanding a clause in the said contract, which forbids the 
employees concerned from leaving the establishment without three 
months' notice, I do not take advantage of this or any other clause 
103 J.E. de Carvalho Montenegro, Opasculo, op.cit., pp.14-15. 
104 “ Regulamento administrativo e policial da Colonia 
Nova_Louza", in J.E. de Carvalho Montenegro, Relatorio apresentado 
ao Exmo.Sr.Dr. Presidente da Provincia de Sao Paulo, sobre as 
colonias Nova Louza e Nova Colombia, em 6 de fevereiro de 1875 (Sao 
Paulo: Typ. da "Provincia de Sao Paulo", 1875) p.16. 
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in the contract between us, to keep them against their 	, 105  
Montenegro started the colony with 30 people in 1867; in 1879 there 
were 152 colonos. 106 
However, the strong role played by internal regulations in 
Montenegro' colonies seemed to be unique. It was more usual for 
planters to use the existing legal framework. There were already two 
pieces of legislations' setting out conditions for contracts agreed 
between planters and workers. The 1830 labour law (lei de locagao de 
servigos de 1830) which applied to contracts arranged with Brazilian 
and foreign workers, and another approved in 1837 (lei de locagao de 
servigos de 1837) which applied only to contracts involving foreign 
labourers. 
The 1830 law was sanctioned soon after Independence, when the 
focus of attention was the organization of institutional life and 
the administration of the country. It was not, however, a purely 
administrative device like so many other pieces of legislation of 
that period. The 1830 act already anticipated consequences of the 
abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the resulting need 
i-0 pf 
 
promotes p immigration. 107 Although confined to a few simple 
stipulations, the law was undoubtedly designed to shape future 
labour relations. The 1830 law regulated agreements with Brazilian 
105 J.E. de Carvalho Montenegro, Opusculo, op.cit., p.16. 
106 J.E. de Carvalho Montenegro, Opdsculo, op.cit., p.2; 
Brazil, Relatorio do Minis -M. 1. i° da Agricultura, Commercio e Obras  
Publicas,1879 (Rio de Janeiro: Universal, 1879) p.76. 
107 "Lei de locagao de servigos de 13 de setembro de 1830", 
Colleccao das Leis do Imperio do Brazil (Ouro Preto: Typ. Silva, 
1832) p.9, v.3, pp.42-43. Ademir Gebara points out that this law 
cannot be considered an attempt to organize the free market. Rather, 
it reflects attempts to organize institutional life and 
administration after the Independence. By contrast, the 1837 law was 
dictated under the pressures for extinction of the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade and promotion of immigration, when the labour demand was 
more acute. What has been argued here is that both pieces of 
legislation were enacted as attempts of rearranging free labour 
relations. See A. Gebara, The Transition from Slavery to Free Labour 
Market in Brazil, 1871-1888: Slave Legislation and the Organization 
of the Labour market Thesis, Ph.D. London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 1984, chapter III. 
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and foreign workers, when the arrangement related to a specific task 
or fixed term engagement. It referred to written contracts and those 
involving advance payments. This piece of legislation did not 
specify the period of the contract. There had been attempts during 
the discussions in the Lower House, to set a fixed term. There were 
suggestions of a maximum term of ten or eight years and that the 
contracts should be subject to annual renewal. A specified period 
was thought necessary to prevent contracts becoming perpetual. For 
the same reason there were concerns about the related issue of the 
transferability of the contracts. "With the right of transfer the 
contracted worker could be moved from one to another in perpetuity 
if the term was not fixed. Thus, there should be a stipulated period 
n 108 . 	But these voices appear to have been ignored. In its final 
form the law stated that contracts could be transferred to anyone, 
providing that transfer did not adversely affect the conditions of 
contracted workers. The contractor (locatArio) could not dismiss the 
worker (locador) if the contracted task had been fulfilled, without 
paying for the work done plus half the agreed price. Equally the 
worker could not break the arrangement without paying all advances 
made (deducting the value of the tasks already accomplished) plus 
half what he would have made discharging the whole agreement. The 
law provided for imprisonment (for an unspecified period) in case of 
non-compliance by workers. 
The 1837 labour law covered only agreements with foreigners. 109 
 Like the 1830 law, it did not specify the period of the contract. 
Foreign adult workers could contract themselves for as many years 
"as they wish".'The contracted worker could leave the agreement if, 
among other things, the contractor did not comply with stipulated 
conditions and if he or his family had been physically harmed by the 
contractor. The worker need not re-pay any debt to the contractor if 
he (the contractor) broke the agreement. The contractor in turn 
could dismiss the worker in the event of sickness, conviction or 
108 APB, 12 August 1830, p.374. 
109 "Decreto n.108 de 11 de outubro de 1837", Colleccao das Leis 
do Imperio do Brazil (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 1861-1880) v. 
year 1837, pp.76-80. 
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imprisonment or any other circumstance that prevented him from 
performing his tasks. Workers could also be sacked for drunkenness, 
harm caused to the contractor or his family, damage to the 
plantation, or due to his inabilities to perform the tasks agreed. 
In event of dismissal for any of these reasons the worker had to pay 
off all his debts. Failing that he was to be punished with prison or 
sent to public works until his earnings had indemnified the planter. 
If there were no public works the worker would be sentenced to hard 
labour for two years. If the worker broke the agreement without a 
well-founded reason, or deserted without fulfilling the contract, he 
could be imprisoned and would not be freed until paying double his 
debts to the contractor. If he could not pay he would work for free 
until the contract was completed, or again be jailed. 
Both pieces of legislation remained on the statute books until 
1879. Cases of enforcement were reported. However, as the number and 
variety of arrangements increased, attempts to enforce these laws 
were widely criticized. Apart from the simplicity of their terms, 
leaving room for abuses, both lacked effective mechanisms to oblige 
the completion of contracts. The 1837 law, for instance, providing 
for labour leasing contracts (locagao de servigos) was dubiously 
applied to sharecropping contracts, an initiative that was often 
censured. 110 Stolcke and Hall have argued that the growing planter 
preference for a labour-leasing arrangement was a means of making 
use of existing legislation without anyone questioning its 
110 See for instance, J.J. von Tschudi, "Memoire presente a Son 
Excellence monsieur le Senateur Joao Lins Vieira Cansansao de 
Sinimbu, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, par Monsieur J.J. von 
Tschudi, Envoye Extraordinaire de la Confederation Suisse pres S.M. 
L'Empereur du Bresiln, October 1, 1860, Brazil, RelatOrio Reparticao  
dos Negocios da Agricultura, 1861, op.cit., appendix, p.8. For 
strong criticism of the locagao de servigos legislation in Brazil 
see statements from representatives of foreign governments such as 
Paul de Turenne, "L'Immigration et la Colonisation au Breslin, in 
Revue Britannique t.1, (February 1879): 437-461, pp.452-453; 
Constantine Phipps, in his report to the British Parliament, 
published as Emigration to Brazil (London: Harrison and Sons, 1872); 
and D.A. Gomes Percheiro Portugal e Brazil (Emiqracao e Colonizacao)  
(Lisboa: Typ. Luso-Hespanhola, 1878) chapter V. 
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application. 111 Efforts were made in the mid-1850s to design a 
general rubric addressed this "defect" of the 1837 law. Equally, 
imprisonment for those evading contractual obligations stipulated by 
both pieces of legislation did not solve the problem of immigrants' 
debts, and thus did not solve the problem of the initial investment. 
Nor did imprisonment solve the problem of the "labour shortage". In 
1859 the president of Sao Paulo reported on events that occurred at 
Luciano Teixeira Nogueira plantation in Campinas: "Having deserted, 
the discontented and complaining colonos were captured and dealt 
with according to the 1837 law were condemned to pay their debts to 
the owner from prison. However, if kept in prison they could never 
pay their debts, so they were transferred, as requested by the 
owner, to the House of Correction, from where they started with the 
fruits of their work to redeem their debts"(my stress). 112 
Evasion of contracts and a refusal to work by colonos could also 
mean less labour at harvest time, damage to the coffee bushes, fires 
and, even worse, collective violence. And there was no adequate 
mechanism to combat a collective refusal to work. In 1878, the 
president of sao Paulo reported a revolt of Tyrolean colonos at 
Joaquim Bonifecio do Amaral's plantation. 113 "The colony Salto 
in V. Stolcke and M.M. Hall, op.cit., p.178. 
112 	• Discurso com que o Illmo.Exmo.Sr. Senador Jose Joaquim 
Fernandes Torres, Presidente da Provincia de Sao Paulo abrio a 
Assemblea Legislativa Provincial no ano de 1859 (Sao Paulo: Typ. de 
Joaquim Roberto de Azevedo Marques, 1859) p.21. 
113 The colony was formed by 18 families of Tyroleans who had 
arrived in September 1877. They were tied by one single contract to 
the planter. The estate had 250,000 coffee bushes, of which 131,187 
were distributed to the immigrant families. The strike began at the 
beginning of the harvest. According to the report of the commission, 
of 2 July 1878, the colonos were discontent with the prices of goods 
sold by the owner. It was reported that at the beginning the colonos 
laboured only on their subsistence plots as a way of preventing the 
increase of their debts. The planter then required colonos to work 
exclusively on to tasks related to coffee cultivation. The colonos 
had drawn up a list of grievances including housing, high prices and 
bad quality of food supplies sold in the estate store, prohibition 
to have cows, bad quality of subsistence plots; that they had to 
abandon the plots already cultivated, medical assistance and tools 
177 
Grande _ belonging to the Baron of Indaiatuba _ established in 
the county of Amparo, has been on strike since June". When the 
landowner formally complained _ the report continues _ "that the 
colonos were refusing to work and had stepped up their protests with 
hostile signs, (...) finding a pretext to abandon work and even 
threatening the administration of the colony", a committee was 
appointed to examine the grievances of the colonos and limit 
disruption. The results of inquiries made by the committee and by 
the Police Chief, "who did not spend a long time in Salto Grande", 
was that the colonos complaints "were unfounded and on the part of 
the honourable owner there had been no violation of contract". 114 
Both also concluded that the colonos had been incited, and because 
of advice from strangers to the colony, "created for themselves the 
current difficult situation, injuring their own interests, which are 
the same as those of the owner". 115 Amaral had two other colonies, 
Sete Quedas and Saltinho, in Campinas. It was feared that the strike 
might spread to other estates. According to the president's report, 
the owner, having unsuccessfully tried discussion, brought the two 
strike leaders to the judicial authorities, "whom having been 
condemned as violators of the contracts according to the 11 October, 
1837, law were sent to the Amparo jail". But, "The situation of the 
colony did not improve: the strike continues". (my stress). 116 One 
month later, another strike on the Saltinho estate, also owned by 
Amaral, was reported. As a result, twelve immigrant workers were 
were debited from their accounts, among others. The commission 
reported that the planter had stopped providing foodstuffs to force 
them to return to work. The planter had even made some concessions, 
such as raising the piecerate, but the strike continued. "Parecer da 
Comisseo nomeada pelo Exmo. Sr. Presidente da provincia em 2 de 
julho de 1878, para examinar e emitir seu parecer sobre o estado da 
colonia denominada "Salto Grande" pertencente ao Sr.Exmo Bare() de 
Indaiatuba". APESP, Colonias, ordem 7214, late 3(1870-1877). 
114 The July Committee found irregularities over the payment of 
interest (higher rates) on debts. Ibid. 
115 Relatorio com que o Exmo.Sr.Dr. Joe() Baptista Pereira,  
Presidente da Provincia de Sao Paulo, passou a administraceo ao 2o.  
vice presidente Exmo. Sr. Bardo de Tres Rios, em dezembro de 1878  
(Santos: Typ. do "Diario de Santos", 1878) p.59. 
116 Ibid. 
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jailed for violations of contracts under the terms of the 1837 
law. 117 By this time, planters were gathered for the Agricultural 
Congress in Rio de Janeiro, and the situation of labour unrest, 
much publicised, enhanced their concerns. 
If workers collectively refused to work there was no legal 
mechanism to force them to do so, other than to arraign each 
separately. In fact, in such cases planters opted many times for 
more effective expedients such as force. Police troops were usually 
called in. However, a legal mechanism would give more legitimacy to 
the deed in case of protests to consular representatives by foreign 
workers. 
When, from the 1860s, the temporary disenchantment with European 
immigrants led planters to consider domestic labour the lack of 
effective legal mechanisms to force and enforce contractual 
agreements or specific obligations became even more evident. The 
short-comings of the 1830 labour law and the need to design a more 
up-to-date legal framework for Brazilian workers were already 
observed. This piece of legislation was not suited to the complex, 
intricate structure of relations that had been forged between 
planters and workers. The experience of the Baron of Porto Feliz as 
reported in "0 Direito" in 1874 is a case to point. According to the 
journal account, in 1872 when the Baron requested one month's 
punishment for a Brazilian colono who had evaded his contractual 
obligations to weed and replant, the Justice of the Peace (Juiz de 
Paz) of Rio Claro stated that: "...the contract at issue, cannot be 
regulated by the 13 September, 1830, law for the contract did not 
stipulate the amount to be paid to the person contracted for the 
completion of the contract". Therefore, the question was beyond his 
competence. The case was then sent to the Judge (Juiz de Direito), 
who did not approve the application of 1830 law, because the 
contract had been amended with fees and fines. However, in an 
117 The immigrant workers refused to accept the new clauses 
inserted in their contracts. They complained that the planter had 
also violated the contract and that they had for eight months been 
assigned tasks that were not included in the contracts. APESP, 
Coltinias, ordem 7214, lata 3 (1870-1877). 
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earlier appeal by the Baron in 1871, against the same colono, under 
the same contract conditions, the colono was condemned under the 
terms of 1830 law to "eight days of corrective imprisonment, and to 
return to complete the contract". The colono was also condemned to 
pay costs. 118 
From the 1870s, planters viewed legal provisions regulating 
labour contracts as even more precarious. Still anxious about the 
labour supply, planters and policy makers frequently complained 
about the inadequacy of existing contract law, especially in areas 
relating to costs, discipline and control and a lack of effective 
mechanisms to guarantee a return of their outlay. How could 
legislation that did not guarantee the fulfilment of contractual 
obligations, did not answer the circumstances of increasingly 
frequent strikes, nor the recovering of the initial investments, and 
which could not be enforced without frequent dispute be adequate? As 
will be shown (section 4.4.1), the situation appeared to be even 
worse when Brazilian workers, rather than foreigners, were involved. 
Efforts to compel the domestic labour force to enter contractual 
agreements had become more important with the sanction of the Free 
Birth Law, in 1871, which initiated the gradual abolition of 
slavery. This law freed the children born to slave mother (ingenuos) 
and establish mechanisms to facilitate the freeing of remaining 
slaves. Those freed by this law were obliged to assume a contract 
for a certain period of time. But what about afterwards? New 
provisions were required to cover these new categories of labour and 
%to guarantee the labour of former slaves. Mass desertions from 
plantations and vagrancy were anticipated and would have to be 
countered. There had been some suggestions to extend the 1837 labour 
law to Brazilians (a term that now included ingenuos, and those 
supposedly freed by the law) as well as vagrants. In 1872 a report 
sent to the president of Sao Paulo observed: "The current 
118 	Direito 	(Revista 	de 	Leqislacao, 	Doutrina 	e 
Jurisprudencia). Ano II, 1874, v.3, pp.93-94. In 1875 the colonies 
of Baron of Porto Feliz, Cafeeiral, Boa Vista and Cascalho, had 76 
families, including 23 Portuguese, 23 German and 30 Brazilians, see 
Brazil, Relatorio do Ministerio da Agricultura, Commercio e Obras 
Publicas, 1875 (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Americana, 1875) pp.286-287. 
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legislation is completely ineffective against vagrancy. The vagrant 
can only be forced to sign a pledge of good behaviour, on pain of 
prison for a few days if he break it (...) If the vagrant should 
sign an undertaking to find work, within a certain period, and 
should this expire without his being able to show he is employed in 
honest work, he could be compelled, in the presence of the 
authorities, to sign a contract hiring out his services with the 
claimant who offers most advantages (...) Once signed up, the 
vagrant would be subject to the 1837 law, which should be extended 
to nacionais, and they would be accustomed to work". 119 
In the end, given the weakness of existing legislation, the best 
solution was the formulation of another law. There had been enough 
criticisms from planters and foreign authorities, although for 
different reasons, against the existing framework. A new measure was 
then approved in March 15, 1879. It laid down conditions for 
agreements made exclusively in agriculture. Clearly more complex 
than its predecessors, the act comprised 86 articles divided into 7 
chapters. It set down conditions i) of different forms of 
engagement: shared cattle-raising, sharecropping and hired labour 
(empreitada); ii) contracts signed by Brazilians, immigrants and 
freedmen. Maximum lengths of contract were stipulated for each 
category: 5 years for European immigrants; 6 for Brazilians; and 7 
years for freedmen; iii) penal and legal matters. The act prohibited 
the transfer of contracts without the permission of the contracted 
party, the payment of interest on debts, and reduced debt incurred 
through travel and setting up expenses by half. Immigrant contracts 
could be redeemed in the first month after arrival, once all the 
advances had been paid. The reasons for which the contracted worker 
could be dismissed were the same as those included in the 1837 law, 
with the addition of insubordination. New grounds were included in 
case of the contracted worker wished to leave the agreement: 
marriage in another area, if the contractor forbade him to buy goods 
119 n Relatorio da Reparticao da Policia da Provincia de sao 
Paulo", in Relatorio apresentado a Assembleia Legislativa Provincial  
de Sao Paulo pelo Presidente da Provincia Ill.Excmo. Sr.Dr. Jose 
Fernandes da Costa Pereira Junior, em 2 de fevereiro de 1872 (sao 
Paulo: Americana, 1872) Appendix, p.24. 
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from third parties, and if the contractor constrained the contracted 
worker to sell his produce only to him (the contractor). The decree 
provided for imprisonment from 5 to 20 days for those who left the 
estate without good cause, or who refused to work. Collective 
resistance to work would be tried in one single court case, making 
the decree the first anti-strike legislation in Brazi1. 120 
Some of these provisions were an evident attempt to reduce 
conflicts with immigrant workers and to promote further European 
immigration at a time of acute scarcity in the southern coffee 
provinces. The law addressed earlier problems which had provoked 
controversy such as interest rates, debts, transfer, marriage 
outside the area, and so on. It provided planters with a more 
efficient framework to obtaining a regular, stable supply of labour 
and to ensure levels of profit, plantation discipline and an 
adequate return on the initial investments tied up in immigrant 
labour contracts. But the law also attempted to embrace all labour 
relations in agriculture. Coupled with the gradual abolition'lavery 
in 1871 law, and the simultaneous approval of plans to import 
Asians, the 1879 provisions envisaged a very distinct mode of 
transition to free labour, by forcing the various categories of 
workers to enter long-term labour contracts. 
Nevertheless, the 1880s witnessed unforeseen developments. The 
1879 labour law _ which envisaged a system of contract labour 
embracing Europeans, domestic labour, freedmen and poor Brazilians, 
and Chinese contract workers _ would never be effectively enforced 
and was revoked in 1890. 121 As it will be shown the project was 
abandoned with the arrival of thousands of immigrants, who, entering 
into the country in family groups, were seen as cheaper and more 
productive. 
120 Decreto 2827, March 15, 1879, Colleccdo das Leis do Imperio 
do Brazil, 1879 (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 1861-1880) v.1879, 
pp.11-20; on the law see M.L. Lamounier, op.cit., chap.3 and 4. 
121 Decreto n.213 de 22 de fevereiro de 1890,  Decis5es do 
Governo Provisorio; also reproduced in 0 Direito (Revista de 
Leqislacdo, Doutrina e Jurisprudencia) XVIII, 1890, v.51. 
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4.4. Brazilians under contracts and Chinese contract workers 
By the end of 1850s, some Paulista coffee planters, disenchanted 
with the failure of European sharecroppers, temporarily returned to 
slave labour. The practice of buying slaves from the decaying 
northeastern sugar plantations that started soon after the abolition 
of the trans-Atlantic slave trade intensified over the next decades. 
Others, while still attempting to promote the immigration of 
European workers, were also looking for alternative solutions to the 
problem of labour supply. Recruitment from among the domestic free 
labour force and importing Chinese contract workers were the main 
schemes proposed. 
Efforts to stimulate imports of Chinese workers and to encourage 
Brazilian workers developed apace during the 1860s and 1870s. The 
perceived failure of the sharecropping system and problems arising 
from contracts made some planters unwilling to engage additional 
European workers. However, they did not totally reject the idea of 
contract labour. On the contrary, as a result of the experiments 
with sharecropping, implementing contracts seemed to be a process of 
"experience" and "adjustment". It required a flexibility that 
included changes in individual contracts conditions or in the system 
as a whole or a search for alternative supplies of workers. At issue 
was the search for a worker inclined to accept the discipline of 
plantation life while guaranteeing stability, order and the recovery 
of the expenses of recruitment. Hence, further projects continued to 
stress the importance of contracts as a means of shaping working 
arrangements and labour regulations. This was an important phase in 
the process of transition and the establishment of a new code of 
labour practices. 
4.4.1. Brazilians under contract  
In contrast to Cuba, Brazilian planters and policy-makers repeatedly 
suggested the use of local free white and coloured labourers as an 
alternative to, or supplement for, slaves. Scholars have failed to 
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explore 	this 	subject 	adequately. 122 	Whether 	by natural 
reproduction, immigration or manumission 
Brazil, like Cuba, had a growing free population. In most provinces 
of Brazil, the number of free people outnumbered slaves since the 
early nineteenth century. In sao Paulo, despite the great increase 
in the slave population triggered by the expansion of coffee 
production, slaves constituted no more than one third of the total 
population. Even in the heart of the coffee region, the free 
population was in a majority. 123 Brazilians appeared to be a great 
potential resource if a way to "compel" them to work on plantations 
could be found. 
References to the employment of Brazilian free workers, white and 
coloured, in the export sector were frequent in the nineteenth 
century. It is apparent that they participated in various 
activities. Smallholders usually constituted a part-time labour 
122 Very little research has been done on the participation of 
Brazilian workers in the plantation sector. The lack of studies on 
the subject is observed by Peter L. Eisenberg in his article "0 
homem esquecido: o trabalhador livre nacional no seculo XIX, 
sugestOes para uma pesquisa" in Homens Esquecidos. Escravos e 
Trabalhadores Livres no Brasil, seculos XVIII e XIX. (Campinas: 
Editora da UNICAMP, 1989) pp. 223-244. Also as Warren Dean, Rio 
Claro, op.cit., p.118, observes "The Brazilian workers, much less 
visible than the Europeans, were passed over in government reports 
because they presented no diplomatic difficulties, nor did they 
present the problem of credit for an initial transport 
indebtedness". 
123 Peter L. Eisenberg, "0 homem esquecido: o trabalhador livre 
nacional no seculo XIX: sugestoes para uma pesquisa", op.cit., 
pp.224-225. The free coloured in Sao Paulo corresponded to about 28% 
of total free population by mid-1830s and about 32% in 1872. H.S. 
Klein, "Nineteenth-Century Brazil" in David W.Cohen & Jack P. Greene 
(ed.), Neither Slave nor Free. The freedmen of African Descent in 
the Slave Societies of the New World, (Baltimore and London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972) pp.309-334, table 10, p.314. 
According to Klein, the free coloured population grew vigorously 
even in the new coffee regions of sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. 
Nationally, the Brazilian free coloured population within the total 
coloured population is estimated to have been about 40% and 60%. As 
Klein observes this figure is unusually high, particularly if 
contrasted with the Cuban and United States, where the proportions 
were about 36% and 11% respectively. Natural reproduction as well as 
a steady process of emancipation might explain the rapid expansion 
of free coloureds in Brazil. 
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force for coffee estates. As proprietors, entitled to vote, they 
formed the electoral following of the planter oligarchy. As planters 
occupied most of the political posts, smallholders were in many ways 
dependents within the plantation system. They only survived through 
favours from the planter oligarchy, usually exchanged for their vote 
and occasional employment. In addition, planters often admitted to 
their estates a certain number of landless farm labourers. Like the 
smallholders, the "tenants" (agregados) were allowed access to 
marginal lands in exchange for occasional labour. Independent 
workers, hired to perform a given task for a daily wage (camaradas), 
were also common on coffee estates. They were recruited as a private 
police force, administrators, or foremen. In addition, they were 
employed on other tasks, such as clearing forests, road-building and 
carting. Usually they assisted at harvest time and grew subsistence 
crops for the plantation. 124 Although not fully available for 
regular work, these groups constituted a potential source of 
occasional labour for the plantations. 
It is difficult to estimate the number of free Brazilian workers 
employed on Paulista coffee plantations. But the numbers of those 
employed under a wide range of arrangements must have been 
considerable and clearly increased with the expansion of coffee 
production. In the county of Rio Claro, for example, there were 10 
tenants and labourers in 1822 and 372 in 1857. In 1822 they 
constituted 27.7% of the total of rural households; in 1857, 
45.40 25 Warren Dean noted that by 1857 the appearance of 
minifundia, strongly implied that many smallholders were being 
marginalized: they ceased to be suppliers of commodities and became 
instead part-time suppliers of labour. 126 
Beyond the increase in numbers, it is interesting to note that 
124 Warren Dean, op.cit., pp.19-20; E.V. da Costa, Da Senzala a 
Colonia, op.cit., p.13. M.S. de Carvalho Franco, Homens livres na 
ordem escravocrata, 2nd.ed. (Sao Paulo: Atica, 1976) discuss aspects 
of these relations. 
125 W. Dean, Rio Claro, op.cit., p.18. 
126 W. Dean, Rio Claro, op.cit., pp.18-19. 
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after the mid-century there was a growing tendency for Brazilian 
workers to establish their relationship with the plantation system 
on a more stable and fixed basis by means of contracts. Experiments 
with sharecropping and contracts, while designed mainly for 
immigrant workers clearly influenced these developments. As observed 
by the Paulista Senator Floriano Godoy, one of the main results 
produced by "private colonization" in Sao Paulo was "to call 
Brazilian families to agricultural labour, subjecting them to the 
system of the colonies". 127 
Although agregados who achieved a certain security of tenure 
could be reliably depended upon to provide plantation labour and 
serve as a private security force, this was not the case with the 
camaradas. Camaradas, a transient element among the free population, 
deprived of land and the protection granted to smallholders and 
agregados, were free to leave the plantation. Of course, without the 
protection of a powerful planter, they could be seized and arrested 
as vagrants. But there was also new land and the prospect of 
employment elsewhere. Thus it was fairly easy for them to abandon 
the plantation _ a tendency perceived by planters as indicating 
laziness and improvidence. The insecure circumstances of these 
labourers made them even more liable to exploitation. For some 
planters, contracts would be a way of securing discipline and 
ensuring a steady source of labour. For others, contracts also 
served to draw free labourers into a distinct form of labour 
relationship, to teach them the ethics of discipline and regular 
waged work. This tendency became more pronounced with the final 
abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the first 
experiments with sharecropping contracts and immigrant workers. 
However, it was from the 1860s, after a temporary disenchantment 
with immigrant workers, that there were systematic attempts to 
subject Brazilians (whites, coloureds, free and freedmen) to long-
term, detailed labour contracts. 
127 J.F. de Godoy, A 	Provincia de Sao Paulo. Trabalho 
Estatistico, Historico e Noticioso, 2nd ed.(Sao Paulo: Governo do 
Estado, 1978) p.133. 
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Scattered evidence points to the number and type of arrangements 
made with free Brazilians by coffee fazendeiros in the 1850s. In 
1853 the colony on Morro Grande estate employed 23 Portuguese and 17 
Brazilians. In 1857 the colony had 24 Portuguese and 43 Brazilians. 
Contrasting the problems with immigrant workers, the owner Joao 
Ribeiro dos Santos reported in 1859: "The Brazilian families or 
single individuals that form part of the colony are subject to the 
same sharecropping system as immigrants and as their debt is 
smaller, they repay it more easily and increase their savings". 128 
 In 1855, the Souza Queiroz colonies had 87 Brazilians and by 1857 
there were 305 Brazilians out of a total of 625 colonos. Souza 
Queiroz adopted both sharecropping and labour-leasing contracts. 129 
 In 1856 the Benedito Antonio de Camargo's colony Boa Vista in Rio 
Claro included 42 Brazilians in a total of 228 colonos. At Boa Vista 
colony Camargo had begun mainly with Portuguese immigrants, but in 
1857 started to engage Brazilian families, providing them with 
subsistence plots on condition that they tend and harvest coffee 
bushes. 130 According to a 1854 report to the president of the 
province, there were 2,618 coffee plantations in Sao Paulo province 
with 55,834 slaves, 2,159 colonos and 4,223 agregados. (By contrast, 
on 667 sugar plantations there were 15,641 slaves, 10 colonos and 
698 agregados.) 131 The Swiss representative Tschudi, in 1860, 
encountered Brazilian colonists among sharecroppers in some coffee 
plantations, for instance in the Laranjal estate, owned by Luciano 
128 APESP, Colonias, ordem 7213, caixa 1 (1827-1858), pasta 
Piracicaba. 
129 Ibid. 
130 APESP, Colonias, ordem 7213, caixa 1, pasta Limeira. 
131 Quadro estatistico de alguns estabelecimentos ruraes da 
provincia de Sao Paulo, organizado pelo Brigadeiro Jose Joaquim 
Machado de Oliveira" in Discurso com que o Sr. Dr. Jose Antonio 
Saraiva, presidente da provincia de Sao Paulo, abrio a Assemblea 
Leqislativa da Provincia de Sao Paulo, no dia 15 de fevereiro de 
1855; A.E. Taunay, op.cit., v.111, t.I, p.134. In one of the major 
coffee districts, Rio Claro, in 1872 about 1,700 free persons were 
employees or tenants on plantations and small farms, compared to 
2,753 slaves. In 1876, 45 plantations in Rio Claro employed some 
free as well as slave labour and there were 22 other plantations 
with no free hands, W. Dean, Rio Claro, op.cit., p.122. 
187 
Teixeira Nogueira. 132 At the end of the 1870s in the Barao de Souza 
Queiroz's coffee plantations Sao Jeronimo and Cresciumal there were 
688 free workers, including 339 Brazilians; in QueirOz's Santa 
Barbara colony of 304 free workers, 250 were Brazilians. 133 
As already stated, the advantages of the colonisagao patria 
started to be highlighted after unsuccessful attempts to introduce 
European immigrant workers. The president of sao Paulo, in his 1859 
report, suggested that free Brazilians were the best solution to the 
labour problem and asked for support to promote local 
recruitment. 134 For much of the nineteenth century, official 
statements contained only negative references to Brazilian workers. 
They were usually depicted as indolent, lazy or work shy. But during 
the 1860s and the 1870s the tone of the official documents changed. 
In Sao Paulo, officials now supported the promotion of free 
Brazilian labour which was increasingly presented as the best 
alternative to slavery. Brazilians were viewed as at hand and as an 
immediate solution to an urgent problem. Immigration projects were 
not set aside but were seen as a long-term solution. 
Opinions diverged on the best form of labour recruitment. 
However, coercion was present in most. For instance, in 1860 the 
Exchequer official Ferreira Soares in his Notas Estatisticas 
enquired about the possibility of compelling Brazilians to hire 
132 J.J. von Tschudi, op.cit., p.159 and p.186. 
133 Brazil, Relatorio do Ministerio da Agriculture, Commercio e 
Obras Publicas (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Americana, 1879) pp.74-75. By 
the end of the 1870s, numerous lists of retirantes (northeastern 
free poor people forced off the land by the drought) were sent to 
the Colonizing Agent in sao Paulo, to be directed to various estates 
in the province, see Solicitacoes de passagens ao Sr. Joaquim Jose 
do Rego Rangel, 1878, APESP, ordem 7215, late 3. 
134 	• Discurso com que o Illmo.Excmo.Sr. Senador Jose Joaquim 
Fernandes Torres, presidente da provincia de Sao Paulo abrio a 
Assemblea Legislative Provincial, 1859 (Sao Paulo: Typ. Joaquim de 
Azevedo Marques, 1859) p.19. This suggestion was repeated in his 
1860 report, Discurso com que o Ilmo.Excmo.Sr. Senador Jose Joaquim 
Fernandes Torres abrio a Assemblea Legislative Provincial de Sao 
Paulo, 1860 (sao Paulo: Typ. Joaquim Roberto de Azevedo Marques, 
1860) p.14. 
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themselves out as field labourers even "against their will". He 
pointed out that "it is an accepted principal that no well-organized 
state can countersense having ill employed citizens... Each 
individual should contribute his (or her) share for the well-being 
of the society to which he or she belongs. This is why houses of 
corrections are built and the colonies I propose are in fact houses 
of correction where agricultural work is learnt". 135 
In May, 1866, a draft-law to regulate and encourage the 
employment of free Brazilians was submitted to the Lower House of 
Parliament by Barros Barreto, a deputy from the province of Ceara. 
Barros Barreto saw Brazilians as the best solution to meet the 
urgent demand for labourers. However, as he pointed out, to make 
them available there should be changes in legislation. There was a 
need for legislation to "incentive" Brazilians to the work and to 
ensure that they cohered into a "stable" labour force. 136 His 
proposal included exemption from military service for all those 
employed in the cultivation of the main export staples, that is, 
coffee, cotton and sugar. 137 Although this was not a new 
suggestion, it appeared more attractive since at that time Brazil 
was fighting a war against Paraguay (1865-1870). Incentives to work 
by offering exemption from conscription appeared later in various 
other proposals. However, it would always produce a great amount of 
criticism for the abuses it might open up. And when "incentives" 
were not easily found, coercion was the alternative. The mid-1870s 
proposal of Domingos Jaguaribe, a planter in Rio Claro, attempted to 
force all "Brazilian labourers and freedmen" into an "agricultural 
135 S.F. Soares, Notas Estatisticas sobre a Producao Agricola e  
Carestia dos Generos Alimenticios no Imperio do Brasil, reprint. 
(Rio de Janeiro: IPEA/INPES, 1977) p.355. 
136 APB, session 14 May 1866, pp.72-73. Barros Barreto sent the 
same draft to Nabuco de Aradjo pointing out that he wanted it to be 
discussed very soon, Carta do Deputado Inacio de Barros Barreto ao 
Conselheiro Nabuco de Araujo remetendo (incluso) um anteproleto seu 
sobre locacao de servicos, Paco da Camara, 1 May 1866, IHGB, 
Manuscritos, Col. Senador Nabuco, lata 362, pasta 49. 
137 The first debate took place on the 7th of June, 1866; see 
APB, session 7 June 1866, pp.40-41 and same session in appendix, 
pp.282-284. 
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militia", to be used when and wherever necessary. 138 
More common would be suggestions to compel Brazilian free 
labourers to sign contracts for a certain number of years. Several 
projects intended to regulate the so-called locaga.o de servigos 
embodied ways of "encouraging" Brazilians to engage in contracts, 
and outline conditions for those contracts. When under pressure by 
an urgent demand for labour or confronted with an act of 
indiscipline (such as desertion, strikes or rebellions) Brazilian 
planters and policy makers invariably called for a "uma boa lei de 
locagao de servigos". A desperate call for more coercive measures to 
ensure a stable, disciplined and cheap labour force _ and in the 
case of immigrant workers to facilitate the recovery of plantation 
owners' investments _ it was considered a panacea for the evils. 
By the end of the 1860s, the gradual change embodied in, and 
symbolized by, the 1871 Law coupled with the certainty of the end of 
slavery made the use of Brazilian free workers increasingly 
appealing if not essential. The Free Birth Law (1871) while freeing 
the newborn, subsequently called ingenuos, also liberated other 
slaves (libertos). Planters were guaranteed the labour of the free-
born until they reach the age of 21. This was a form of repayment to 
compensate planters for the costs of maintaining the free-born 
children of slave mothers. Libertos freed under the law were 
compelled to sign a seven-year contract with their former 
masters. 139 From this time, changes in the pattern of manumission 
might have also changed labour relations. The Free Birth Law 
highlighted the need for more precise legislation to regulate labour 
arrangements with "Brazilian labourers", a term that from this time 
onwards would also include former slaves. Of course, the immediate 
138 D. Jaguaribe, Algumas palavras sobre a emigracao. Meios 
Praticos de colonisar. Colonias do Bard() de Porto Feliz e 
Estatistica do Brasil (S&o Paulo: Typ. do "Diario", 1877) p.15. 
139 Law 2.040, September 28, 1871, Colleccao das Leis do Imperio 
do Brasil, 1871, (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 1861-1880) year of 
1871; "The Rio Branco Law" is reproduced in R.Conrad, The 
Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, op.cit., Appendix II, pp.304-309 
and A. Gebara, op.cit., Appendix I. 
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concern was over the future labour of the ingenues and others freed 
by the 1871 Law. However, the legislation was to apply to other 
Brazilian labourers as well. 
During these years, the late 1860s and the 1870s, most efforts to 
formulate adequate locageo de services legislation was aimed 
especially at Brazilian workers. When hopes of promoting European 
immigration again arose, they too would be covered by these attempts 
to devise an integrated, national labour code. The object was to 
formulate a tight legal framework that covered all kinds of 
arrangements and all types of labourers. 
In 1867, during the early debates on the Free Birth Law, 
Aureliano Candid() Tavares Bastos submitted to the Lower House a 
project for labour regulations embracing locageo de services and 
sharecropping schemes and contracts agreed with Brazilians 
(including ingenues, freedmen, and slaves) and foreigners. 140 The 
inclusion of freedmen and ingenues was a new element. One of the 
main concerns was clearly to resolve problems that might arise 
following the approval of a Free Birth Law and the gradual 
emancipation of slaves. Emancipation and vagrancy were phenomena 
that politicians and planters had always linked. It was necessary to 
find mechanisms to guarantee "free" labour arrangements with 
recently freed slaves. Tavares Bastos' proposal was an attempt in 
this direction. 
Two years later, in 1869, another draft was submitted to the 
Lower House of Parliament, providing for the locageo de services 
specifically for native Brazilians. In the first article the draft 
provided for the punishment of 5 to 20 days imprisonment for 
contracted workers (locador) who did not fulfil contractual 
obligations. This punishment could be imposed as many times as there 
were infractions by the worker. Exemption from Army recruitment was 
also suggested as a way of encouraging Brazilians to engage in 
140 APB, session 19 July 1867, pp.285-286. 
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contracts. 141 But the main intention was to guarantee to planters 
the fulfilment of contracts. 142 At the time it was suggested that 
planters did not employ Brazilians because they did not have 
confidence in Brazilian labour. "They know that if they make labour 
arrangement with a worker they can not count on his labour for a 
guaranteed term. Even with agreed arrangements, the worker, from one 
moment to the next abandon the work leaving the proprietor without 
any means of carrying on with the tasks". 143 The planters, it was 
observed, had the means to guarantee the payment of agreed salaries. 
But that was not the case of the workers, who had no means of 
guaranteeing their contractual obligations, other than "guaranteeing 
alth his person" .144  According to the project law, the exemption 
from military recruitment would encourage many people "who at 
present wander with no honest occupation, disposed to commit 
crimes", to transform themselves into useful and productive 
citizens". 145 The project was criticized as "vexatious and 
repressive", for it compelled the poor among the free population to 
work for nothing. Someone recalled that with the end of military 
recruitment (an allusion to the end of\(Pg-aguay War) it might be 
that the government intended to "capture the free so as, more 
easily, to free the captives" ("cativar os livres para poder melhor 
libertar os cativos"). 146 However, the project was approved (with 
the exception of articles on recruitment) and sent to the Senate. 
141 The draft-law was signed by the members of parliament T. 
Alencar Araripe, M.J. Mendonga de Castello-Branco and M.C. Aratjo 
Lima, APB, session 7 August 1869, p.36. The nearly ten year debate 
of this project would result later in the approval of the 1879 
locagao de servigos law. Submitted in 1869 it was re-considered for 
debate (Project n.93) in August 1874 and with several amendments 
rapidly approved at first, second and third discussions and in 1875 
was sent to the Senate. 
142 n ., when contracting their 
of carrying on their plantations and harvesting 
law, APB, 	session 7 August 1869, p.36. 
services planters will be sure 
their crops", draft- 
143 APB, 	session 20 August 1875, p.138. 
144 APB, 	session 20 August 1875, p.140. 
145 APB, 	session 20 August 1875, p.138. 
146 APB, session 20 August 1875, p.136. 
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But when it returned for debates there were new developments to be 
considered and, as will be seen, there was another draft more 
suitable to new circumstances. 
The connections between locagao de servigos and gradual 
emancipation became more evident during debates taking place in the 
Council of State and the Lower House of Parliament. Among several 
"cautious measures" suggested as necessary to effect gradual 
emancipation, locag&o de servigos was often cited as an efficient 
mechanism. In 1867, Nabuco de Aradjo, a very influential policy 
maker and jurist, discussing projects for Free Birth and gradual 
emancipation in the Council of State, commented on provisions 
required to "oblige freedmen to engage their services for a 
specified term to his former owner or any other master of his 
choice, on penalty of being seized as a vagabond (...) Vagabonds and 
vagrants should not be imprisoned for that is what they want; they 
should be sentenced to labour in disciplinary establishments and 
colonies". To accomplish that _ Nabuco pointed out _ there 
should be reform of locagao de servigos legislation to adapt it to 
needs of "colonization" and to the "consequences of  
emancipation". 147 Nabuco de Aradjo later produced the draft Free 
Birth Law and gradual emancipation proposal for the Council of 
State. With only a few changes Nabuco's draft was approved as the 
Free Birth Law in 1871. Provisions to enforce freed slaves to engage 
in labour contracts were framed and incorporated in the law. But 
Nabuco's role in the formulation of that policy did not end there. 
After the approval of the Free Birth Law in 1871 he struggled to 
devise a legal framework regarding locagao de servigos to complete 
the task already started. 148 
147 J. Nabuco, Um Estadista do Imperio 5th 
Nova Aguilar, 1975) p.620; and M.L. Lamounier, 
ed. (Rio de Janeiro: 
op.cit., p.86. 
148 Notas, pareceres, decretos, noticias e discursos compilados  
em volume encadernado pelo Conselheiro Nabuco de Araujo, acerca da 
locacao de servicos. IHGB, Manuscritos, Col. Senador Nabuco, lata 
3 87, cad. 05. 
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By this time, Brazilian workers seemed even more to be the hope 
of resolving the labour problem. In 1875 the committee appointed by 
the Lower House of Parliament to determine means of helping 
agriculture, suggested that nacionais were the salvation of sugar 
and coffee plantations. In the committee's view, the government 
should provide both "serious and effective protection" to planters 
who settled Brazilians on their estates and limit the mobility of 
Brazilian workers. The committee believed that governed by "uma boa 
lei de locagao de servigos" "this seed of labour, rooting itself in 
the soil is bound to develop in great numbers, constituting the best 
and cheapest forms of field labourers". 149 The committee included 
the Viscount of Rio Branco, the future leader of the reform and 
after whom the Free Birth law was named. Another member was Cardoso 
de Menezes whose proposals on locagao de servigos would be very 
important for Nabuco de Araujo at that time again attempting to 
draft another proposal for locagao de servicos. 150 
Concurrently, in September 1875, the Sdo Paulo senator Joaquim 
Floriano Godoy submitted his proposal on locagao de servigos to the 
Senate. It dealt with agricultural labour contracts involving 
Brazilian and foreign workers. In 45 articles Godoy's extensive 
project stipulated contract details such as the nature of the tasks 
to be performed, the method of payment, the duration of contracts, 
advances, and guarantees and legal procedures in case of non-
fulfilment. Some clauses were clearly an inducement to Brazilian 
workers. For instance, workers contracted for more than two years 
were exempted from recruitment in the armed forces. Workers who 
149 	Melhoramento da Lavoura, APB, session 20 July 1875, 
p.129. 
150 The project of law on locagao de servigos submitted to the 
Ministry of Agriculture in 1875 by J.C. de Menezes Souza stipulated 
that hiring of services and sharecropping contracts agreed with 
Brazilians, freedmen, slave hired with the permission of the owner, 
or immigrants, was to be regulated by the 1837 labour law.; 
contracts could be agreed for a period up to one year, and 
violations and evasion of contracts should be punished from two to 
six months imprisonment. J.C. de Menezes Souza. Theses sobre a 
Colonizacdo de Brazil (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 1875) appendix 
B. 
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abandoned the agreement for no good reason before the specified 
term, were to "work for free for the contractor for the remaining 
time" to complete the specified term. Those contracted could be 
redeemed by the contract by cash payment of the outstanding time. 
Failing to do so or for absence from the estate without permission 
was an imprisonable offence _ ten days for a first offence and 
thirty days for the second, and sixty days for each subsequent 
infraction. 151 Godoy believed that one of the best results of the 
1850s experiments with immigrant colonies in Sao Paulo was the 
incentive it gave to Brazilian families to engage in similar 
arrangements. In 1887, on the eve of the abolition of slavery, Godoy 
was still suggesting that "Brazilian workers were so numerous that 
they could for a long time fill the gap opened by emancipation" and 
insisted that he had "complete reliance on Brazilian workers" who, 
in his view, had a "mission" to replace slave labour. 152 
During the Agricultural Congress (Congresso Agricola) held in Rio 
de Janeiro in 1878, to inquire into how to solve the labour problem, 
southern planters gave a wide range of suggestions. Opinions varied 
from the creation of rural militia, the coercion of free Brazilians 
to enter contracts reinforced by rigorous legislation, the use of 
contracted Asians to free European immigrants. The proposal of Sao 
Paulo planters clearly favoured the promotion of European 
immigration. It opposed Asian contracted workers and viewed the 
Brazilian worker as "indolent" and resistant to "regular 
labour". 153 But during the debates, several Paulista planters 
suggested Brazilians and argued for mechanisms to encourage them to 
undertake regular work. To the Queluz planter Manoel de Freitas 
Novaes, for example, Brazilians were the best of workers. He proudly 
151 Projeto de lei sobre contratos de locacao de servigos com 
aplicagao a lavoura, Anais do Senado, session 20 September 1875, 
pp.280-283. 
152 P.L. Eisenberg, "0 homem esquecido: o trabalhador livre 
nacional no seculo XIX. Sugestoes para uma pesquisa", op.cit., 
p.230. 
153 Comi ssao nomeada pelos lavradores de sao Paulo, Congresso 
Agricola, op.cit., p.72. 
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reported to have had for almost 28 years a colony. with Brazilian 
workers, that started with 4 families (without contracts) and now 
had over 500 workers, some sons and grandsons of the early families. 
His workers were subjected to a variety of arrangements: 
sharecroppers who were usually paid on the harvest day; others 
delivered coffee already processed, and still others were day 
labourers, paid by day or task. 154 He also believed Brazilians were 
better than foreigners: "Caboclo is better than foreigner because he 
goes into the interior and clears the virgin forest; whereas a 
foreigner sets foot in the forest and he is incapacitated by 
insects". 155 The Sao Carlos do Pinhal planter, Francisco Geronymo 
Bittencourt Coelho, also reported that most of his workers were 
Brazilians. 156 Domingos Jaguaribe, a planter from Rio Claro, 
expressing the views of members of the Rio Claro planters 
association (Club de Lavoura), advocated Brazilian workers. He 
strongly rejected proposals to import Chinese contract workers. In 
fact Jaguaribe said he was opposed to any immigrant contract worker. 
The best choice in his view was spontaneous European immigration. 
However, as this might take long time to happen, the solution for 
the urgent labour problem was the creation of "agricultural militia" 
from the poor Brazilians dispersed throughout the country: "Let'g us 
make use of native labour, exempting them from conscription and 
regimenting them in an agricultural militia, without pressures on 
the poor, but making agricultural services obligations in the areas 
where they live (...)." 157 According to planter Rodrigo Lobato 
Marcondes Machado of Taubate, there should be incentives to 
Brazilians to engage in contracts. He proposed exemption from 
recruitment in the armed forces and amend to political dependence 
(clientelismo). To address the latter he suggested the 
disenfranchisement of workers subject to labour contracts.' 58  For 
154 Congress° Agricola, op.cit., p.139. 
155 Congress° Agricola, op.cit., p.160. 
156 Congresso Agricola, op.cit., p.168. 
157 Congress° Agricola, op.cit., p.160. 
158 Congress° Agricola, op.cit., p.195. 
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many Paulista planters there was no scarcity of labour. In the 
opinion of F. Jose de Queiroz if "bem empregados" there was no 
scarcity of labour. That was also the opinion of Moreira de Barros, 
a Taubate planter, and a member of the Commission of Sao Paulo 
planters. He went on to observe that the number of labourers was 
even enough to meet future increases in coffee production. The issue 
was how to mobilize this potential labour force. 159 Although 
perceived by many as`iviable alternative to immigration and slavery, 
the employment of Brazilian workers seemed to demand complex 
reforms, all of which were very controversial and of uncertain 
political and economic costs. There was strong opposition to 
exemption from military service and little faith in legislation 
against vagrancy. 
A few months after the Rio Agricultural Congress, the new 
legislation, the 1879 locag&o de servigos law, was formally 
approved. Nabuco had completed his draft and discussions in the 
Senate had already taken place. Its provisions were restricted to 
labour contracts in the agricultural sector. In an extensive text it 
covered Brazilians, freed slaves and foreigners contracted under 
various arrangements. "It is virtually a Rural Code"! Nabuco died 
before seeing his project fully approved in 1879, almost without 
changes. Approval of the 1879 law on locagao de servigos was the 
culmination of efforts set in motion by the process of gradual 
emancipation. 160 
The 1879 law, relating strictly to free labour, was manifestly 
envisaged as an answer to potential adverse consequences of gradual 
emancipation. By that time, slave rebellions and strikes by 
immigrant workers had shocked plantation owners. The 1879 labour law 
was an attempt to encourage various categories of workers to enter 
into contractual agreements and established conditions for each 
category. For instance, the length of contracts: 3 years for 
159 Congress° Agricola, op.cit., p.40 and pp.186-187. 
160 For the parliamentary debates and final approval of the 1879 
law, see M.L. Lamounier, op.cit., chapter II. 
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European immigrants; 5 for Brazilians; and 7 years for freedmen. It 
provided severe punishments (prison and forced labour) for those 
breaking contracts or participating in collective strike action. 
This was the first anti-strike legislation in Brazil. 161 Parallel 
provisions against vagrancy and strict control over movement of 
freedmen were discussed. 162 
Although the law was an answer to problems that had been 
affecting the country as whole, it tried to answer problems specific 
of province of Sao Paulo. Nabuco himself when introducing his draft 
law to the Senate made it clear that he had consulted many reports 
on labour problems in the province of sao Paulo. (He referred 
specifically to the Cardoso de Menezes report, but had also 
consulted Joaquim Floriano Godoy's draft, and took ideas from it). 
Nabuco also knew that the bad reputation in Europe of previous 
legislation on the issue had been an obstacle to the promotion of 
immigration. And of course the views of Sao Paulo planters were 
already widely known in favour of general regulations relating to 
immigrant contracts. Experiences with immigrant workers had been 
difficult and raised the spectre of strikes and rebellions. In 
contrast toinorth, southern provinces had a great number of slaves 
engaged in coffee production. The gradual emancipation and the 
certainty of final abolition, enhanced fears about security and 
labour shortage. The complementary provisions of both pieces of 
legislation, Free Birth and 1879 locagao de servigos, finally 
charted a way of easing the process of abolition and the transition 
to "free" labour. The strategy had another compounded element _ 
attempts to import Chinese contract workers. 
161 Decreto 2827, March 15, 1879, Colleccao das Leis do Imperio 
do Brazil, 1879, Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 1861-1880, v.1879, 
(p.11-20). 
162 Project n.241, 1882, APB, September 19, 1882, pp.45-46, for 
instance. 
198 
4.4.2. Efforts to import Chinese contract workers  
Despite numerous proposals _ following the example of experiments 
in the British colonies, United States, Cuba and Peru _ Chinese 
workers would be imported into Brazil but not in large numbers. 
Conrad gives the following data: 
Table T.1: Chinese Workers Said to Have Reached Brazil During the 
Nineteenth Century 
Year 
About 1810 	500 	(approximate) 
1856 360 
1859 and 1866 	612 
1874 1,000 
About 1893 	475 
Total 2,947 
Source: R. Conrad, "The Planter Class and the Debate Over Chinese 
Immigration to Brazil, 1850-1893" International Migration Review 
(Spring 1975 ) pp.41-55, p.42. 
There had been attempts to promote Chinese immigration to Brazil 
since the beginning of the century. However, while the African slave 
trade supplied labour needs, no serious venture was undertaken. But 
every time the traditional source of labour, the African slave 
trade, or slavery itself were threatened there were attempts to 
import Chinese workers. This happened at the beginning of the 
century, in the mid-1850s after the end of the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade, and in the 1870s, after gradual abolition started. In 1843 
the British Government, trying to stop the slave trade to Brazil, 
had recommended importing 60,000 Chinese, but the idea was not 
approved by the Brazilian Lower House of the Parliament. 163 The 
suppression of the international slave trade in 1850 stimulated 
renewed interest in Chinese workers. Despite international and 
163 R. Conrad, "The planter Class and the Debate over Chinese 
immigration to Brazil, 1850-1893", International Migration Review, 
(Spring 1875) pp.41-55, p.43. 
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domestic opposition and the earlier lack of success, definitive 
action was being taken. 
Importing Chinese workers was discussed in the Lower House in 
1854. At the beginning of 1855, instructions to the Brazilian 
legation in London to arrange the shipment of 6,000 Chinese workers 
stipulated that the workers were to be thrifty and diligent, aged 
between 12 and 25. It is interesting to examine the conditions 
devised for contracts with Chinese. They usually followed the Cuban 
model. Examples of the Cuban experiment were always invoked and 
samples of Cuban contracts can be found in several official reports. 
The conditions drawn up for Chinese in Brazil seem to have been more 
liberal than those framed in Cuba. However, they seem to lack the 
sophistication and refinement that experience had taught the Cubans. 
Thus, contracts were to be agreed before embarkation and should 
include the following: i) terms of between five and eight years; ii) 
wages between 4 and 5 pesos (!) a month plus maintenance, lodging 
and medical assistance, or six to seven pesos (!) plus a plot to 
grow their own food; iii) contracts could be transferred to planters 
appointed by the Brazilian government; iv) they should state the 
number of working hours (not exceeding 9 hours per day), a clothing 
allowance, food, methods of punishment (payment of fees and, for 
serious offenses, imprisonment). Chinese workers were to pay one 
peso (!) a month to repay debts. The Brazilian government was to pay 
from 15 to 20 sterling pounds for each Chinese worker disembarked 
(not including expenses before embarkation and the travel expenses 
of wives and children). On completion of the contract period Chinese 
workers who intended to settle in the country were to be given 
(free) a plot of land in frontier areas or they could buy a piece of 
crown land. 164 These conditions would be tightened later. 
There was hesitation and uncertainty over the initiative. Another 
official note instructed the legation in London to not agree the 
164 Reparticao Geral das Terras Pdblicas. Aviso no.1 ao Ministro 
Brasileiro em Londres de 19 de janeiro de 1855. Mandando contractar 
a importacao de Chins.Colleccao das Leis do Imperio do Brasil, 1855 
(Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 1856) t.XVIII. 
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price of 25 pounds for each Chinese worker demanded by Company 
contractors because it was more than the price England and other 
countries had paid for Chinese destined for areas more distant than 
Brazil. Also, instead of 6,000 Chinese the government advised that 
only two thousand "would serve the purpose of an experimental first 
contract, which can be useful to the government and businessmen". 
And the Government would not pay the return passages of Chinese 
workers. 165 In the same year a contract was agreed with an American 
company, Sampson and Tappan, based in Boston, to import 2,000 
Chinese workers, and later another contract with the Associa0o de 
Colonisa0o to import 25,000 to the northeastern provinces of 
Pernambuco, Paraiba and Alagoas. The contracts drafted by Sampson 
and Tappan stated the name, age, origin, of the workers, and 
stipulated that 15 patacas should be advanced to the Chinese, to be 
deduced monthly from their wage. The contracting company promised to 
find jobs within one day of arrival, and offered a five year 
contracts. Those contracting Chinese workers should provide 
clothing, shoes, socks, a hat and blankets, medical assistance, 
maintenance and food (ten pounds of rice, 3 and a half pounds of 
beef, pork or salted fish, half pound of sugar, three ounces of tea 
per month) and a plot of land to be cultivated in their free time. 
It also stipulated holidays at the beginning of the year and a day 
off on Sundays (or overtime payment if Sunday work was required). 
The Chinese worker could redeem himself after one year by repaying 
expenses and paying off the contractor for the remainder of the 
contract. He could be sent to work in sugar or coffee plantations, 
in mines, tea cultivation or any other project. The length of the 
working day was again fixed at nine hours. 166 
165 Repartigao Geral das Terras Publicas. 
Brasileiro em Londres, em 14 de main de 1855. 
colonos Chins e proposta do Monsieur Forster. 
Imperio do Brazil, 1855 (Rio de Janeiro: 
t.XVIII. 
Aviso n.3 ao Ministro 
Sobre a importagao de 
Colleccao das Leis do 
Typ. Nacional, 1856) 
166 Termo do contracto feito pelo Agente de Sampson & Tappan, em 
Cantao, a 20 de dezembro de 1855, in J.P. Xavier Pinheiro. 
Importacao de Trabalhadores Asiaticos. Memoria apresentada ao 
Ministerio da Auicultura, Commercio e Obras Pdblicas (Rio de 
Janeiro: Typ. de Joao Ignacio da Silva, 1869) pp.147-149. 
201 
In the end, these attempts had little result. According to 
Conrad, by 1856 only 360 Chinese workers had reached Rio. The United 
States government allegedly prohibited American vessels from 
engaging in the trade and contracts were suspended. 167 Furthermore, 
experiments with Chinese workers were said to be unsatisfactory. 
Conflicts between planters and Chinese workers were reported. 
Chinese workers rebelled, complaining that their wages were cut by 
half and that they had been physically punished. Inquiries confirmed 
both grievances. 168 
Strong opposition had already unfolded in the 1850s. The 
experiment with European sharecroppers in Sao Paulo at that time 
seemed a better way of addressing the labour problem. For those 
concerned with the future development of a white nation (identified 
with progress) any fusion with the Chinese seemed to be even worse 
than with Africans: "it will mean an infusion in our population of 
a decrepit race of retrograde ideas, of principles which _ more 
than is realized _ can actively stagnate the country's moral and 
material progress". 169 
The temporary disillusion with European sharecroppers, however, 
again stimulated a new interest in the Chinese. Once more there were 
suggestions from the government to encourage the importing of 
Chinese workers to solve the labour problem. In 1862, authorities at 
the recently created Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio da 
Agricultura) observed that failed attempts by England and France to 
promote European immigration to their colonies had shown that the 
167 R. Conrad, "The Planter Class", op.cit., p.43; and Aviso 
n.153 de 25 de abril de 1856, denegando a rescisao de contrato pare 
importacao de Chins, Colleccao das Leis do Imperio do Brazil, 1856  
(Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 1857) t.XIX. 
168 J.P. Xavier Pinheiro, op.cit., pp.51-54; A. de Carvalho, 0 
Brazil. Colonisacao e emiqracao (Porto: Imprensa Portuguesa, 1876) 
p.176. 
169 L.P. de Lacerda Werneck, Ideas sobre a Colonisacao  
precediddas de uma succinta exposicao dos principios geraes que 
reqem a populacao (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Universal de E.H. Laemmert, 
1855) pp.79-80. 
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European did not abandon his country to be a wage earner or 
sharecropper in far away lands. It was only the hope to become an 
independent proprietor that would encourage him to risk all the 
chances of a life in exile and to look for new and distant 
countries. The examples of England, France and Spain had shown that 
"we should direct our gaze towards Asia and try to take workers from 
there, who are better than slaves, which are disappearing from the 
coffee, sugar and cotton plantations". 170 Repeatedly, Chinese 
workers were praised as cheap, "frugal, "sober" and work-loving. 
Experiments elsewhere were recalled to show that Chinese could be 
the best solution either to supplement or replace slave labour. The 
fact that clauses could be inserted into their contracts inhibiting 
the creation of family bonds within the Empire _ which could spoil 
the ideals of the Brazilian nation _ was emphasized to allay the 
fears of those opposed to any measure that could further 
"bastardize" the Brazilian population. Nonetheless, despite 
persistent interest, only 612 Chinese entered the country between 
1859 and 1866. 
As was to be expected, by the end of the 1860s, the debate about 
the Free Birth legislation, and the gradual abolition of slavery, 
again led to renewed interest in Chinese immigration. A heated 
debate revived. Books and pamphlets on the subject appeared. Opinion 
was again divided. A vast range of arguments, based on racial 
theories and (mis) conceptions of the political and social life of 
the Chinese and results of experiments elsewhere were presented to 
support or oppose the importing of Chinese workers. 
In A Crise da Lavoura published in 1868, Quintino Bocaidva argued 
in favour of Chinese "colonization" as a means of countering the 
effects of imminent slave emancipation. At the time he wrote this 
book, Quintino had been appointed by the Minister of Agriculture to 
promote immigration from the United States. Quintino's main concern 
was slave emancipation and its consequences. Although he did not 
170 Brazil, Relatorio do Ministerio da Agricultura, Commercio e 
Obras Pliblicas (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Universal de Laemmert, 1862) 
pp.55-56. 
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argue against the long-term viability of white immigration, he 
believed _ as did many others _ that there was also a need for 
a short-term solution that might entail different forms of labour 
arrangements. This was mainly because immigration implied big 
reforms such as the end of slavery and the subdivision of large 
properties which could not be accomplished in a short time. Also, 
according to Quintino, Brazilian planters should accept that wage 
labour was already established: "Rotation and harvesting time is 
already, for many, a time of (financial) sacrifice, of immediate 
wage payments, of inevitable outgoings". 171 The question was one of 
the price of labour. The challenge was to find a source of cheap 
labour. Where in the world should Brazil look for the workers she 
lacks? asked Quintino. 172 In all other areas where emancipation had 
taken place, experience had shown that former slaves were not the 
solution. Colonization with "coolies", Chinese or Indians, was a 
fact "confirmed and authenticated". In these cases, "necessity has 
killed prejudice". 173 Therefore, Brazil should turn to Asia. The 
Indian "coolie" was docile, easy to manage, delicate but indolent. 
The Chinese was industrious, thrifty, suited to field work and 
rigorous over the fulfilment of contract conditions. Thus, Chinese 
were better than Indians. Above all Chinese never settled in the 
reception country. This feature of the Chinese character, usually 
viewed as a defect, could be an advantage. Quintino believed that a 
rotation of labourers and short term engagements could improve 
planter practices, discipline, economic rationality, and the 
productive use of land. In short, a regular rotating supply of 
reliable coolie labour would remedy defects in the plantation system 
associated with slavery. 174 He considered the British and French 
contracts for Chinese better than the Spanish. Thus, he did not 
171 Quintino Bocaiuva, A Crise da Lavoura (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. 
Perseveranga, 1868); reproduced in Eduardo Silva (ed.). Ideias 
Politicas de Quintino Bocaitva. Cronologia, introducao, notas 
bibliogrdficas e textos selecionados (Brasilia: Senado Federal, Rio 
de Janeiro: Casa de Rui Barbosa, 1986) pp.239-262, pp.240-241. 
172 Q. Bocailiva, op.cit., p.246. 
173 Q. Bocailiva, op.cit., pp.248-249. 
174 Q. Bocaillva, op.cit., pp.255-256. 
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consider Cuba a good example and even less a model for the 
experiment to be carried out in Brazil. In his view, in Cuba the 
contract was more restrictive and boundersome. He explained that in 
Cuba, during harvesting the working day was fixed at 16 hours. The 
planter cared for the slave, that represented his property, and the 
colono "with excess use and waste". As the Spanish government was 
not so zealous as the English and French, there was no sanctions to 
restrain this exploitation. Public sentiment in Cuba was used to it, 
and the transfer of contracts and the choosing of Chinese workers 
were similar to the selling of slaves. The price of Chinese 
contracts in Cuba was about 700$000 a 800$000 reis and the average 
monthly expenses, wages and maintenance, was about 20 a 25$000". 175 
 To Quintino the French contract was more suitable to Brazil. 
However, he would reduce the duration of the contract. "It has been 
acknowledged that the shorter the term of engagement, the more 
willing is the worker. The closer the holiday or pay day, the 
greater disposition he shows to work". 176 
Quintino calculated the expenses Chinese workers might incur and 
concluded they were below than current labour costs: 
Advances to the colono before embarkation 	40$000 
Travel expenses 	 150$000 
5% deduction for mortality 	 9$500 
Agency costs 30$000 
Maintenance, lodging etc 30$000 
259$500 
Salaries at a rate of 10$000 a month during 7 years 840$000 
Life insurance for 7 years at a value of 500$000 
and average age of 30 	 84$000 
TOTAL 	 1:183$500 
175 Q. Bocaitiva, op.cit., pp.258-259. 
176 And Quintino added:"...gold or silver coinage is worth more 
than prison and police action", Q. Bocaidva, op.cit., p.259. 
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If divided by 84 months the total outlay was thus 14$000. 177 
 According to Quintino, the average wage in rural and urban areas was 
25$000. There was thus a substantial advantage for the planter. In 
Quintino's view it was impossible, in the short term, to transform 
the labour system by subdividing large properties. And the import of 
Chinese was the only means to avoid a sudden emancipation of slaves 
and to preserve the form and essence of large properties, the basis 
of agricultural industry and of the main crop, coffee 
production. 178 
In his 1869 Memory to the Ministry of Agriculture, Xavier 
Pinheiro also advocated importing Chinese workers. Pinheiro pointed 
out that unsuccessful experiments of the 1850s should be forgotten. 
He referred to Cuban and Peruvian experiments as examples from which 
useful evidence could be extracted to devise new policies. In 
contrast to Quintino, Xavier praised the Cuban case as the best 
example for Brazil. Cuba's experience was useful in showing which 
Chinese province had the most suitable population for rural labour, 
the most convenient ports of embarkation, the methods of engagement 
and contracts, shipment, the treatment of diseases, the landing, 
reception, their distribution to planters, wages, methods of labour, 
their habits, and "the means of keeping them disciplined and 
subordinate" without "resentment and disaffection" to comply with 
contractual conditions. 179 Xavier's ideas were at the same time 
recalled by the Minister of Agriculture in his annual report. The 
Minister repeated that Asian workers were cheaper and more suited to 
field work than Europeans. Chinese workers _ he proclaimed _ were 
the ideal solution. They would be merely "work machines". They did 
not mix with the local population and returned to their country 
after the expiry of the contract. 30 Disillusioned with European 
177 Q. Bocaidva, op.cit., pp.260-261. 
178 Q. Bocaidva, op.cit., pp.260-262. 
179 J.P. Xavier Pinheiro, op.cit., p.27. 
180 Brazil, Relatorio do Ministerio da Agricultura, Commercio e 
Obras Publicas (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. do Diario do Rio de Janeiro, 
1869) p.61. 
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immigration, the 1870 special Committee for Reform of the Servile 
Element also believed that the government should assume the task of 
promoting Chinese immigration: "it is incumbent on the powers of the 
state to facilitate imports of [Chinese] workers who _ claiming 
modest wages _ would meet needs. Examples from countries in which 
lesser crises were caused by emancipation recommend it", observed 
the Committee. 181 
In July of the same year, responding to all these demands, the 
Imperial Government approved a decree granting permission to Manoel 
Jose da Costa Lima Vianna and Jo&o Antonio de Miranda e Silva to 
import Asian workers and to establish the Sociedade Importadora de 
Trabalhadores Asiaticos. It is interesting to examine some of the 
conditions under which the importing was to be carried out. Harsh 
conditions, contrasted with those devised in the 1850s, now show 
similarities with contracts offered at that time in Cuba. Workers 
were destined specifically for field work. The company had a ten-
years monopoly in importing of Chinese workers. Contracts were to 
state name, age, sex, origin and duration of hire; they were to 
specify wages, subsistence allowance, clothing, and medical 
assistance. Hours of work should not exceed ten per day, but could 
be increased to twelve with compensation. Workers should indemnify 
the landowner against loss of their labour and were to be subjected 
to the discipline of the plantation. Following examples from Cuban 
contracts the worker was to renounce the right to complain about 
stipulated wages, knowing that they were lower than those of other 
free labourers and slaves in the country. The Chinese contracted 
worker could rescind his contract on payment of all the contractor's 
expenses and by indemnifying the contractor for the time remaining, 
and for any losses incurred in replacing him, especially if it was 
harvest time. These controversial and severe stipulations echoed 
Cuban regulations of the 1860s. If the worker wanted to stay in the 
Empire he should recontract himself within two months or he would 
have to return to his country of origin at his own expense. Workers 
should be younger than 45, strong and healthy _ not addicted to 
181 Elemento Servil. APB, session 16 August 1870, p.178. 
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opium. 182 Again, this new attempts brought few results. The harsh 
treatment endured by Chinese workers in countries such as Cuba and 
Peru had been already condemned by international opinion. And the 
Chinese government, aware of conditions abroad, had began to 
restrict emigration to certain areas. It appears that Brazil had 
homed in too late on this promising source of cheap labour. 
However, the revival of these attempts to promote Chinese 
immigration again provoked a fervent debate that would endure for 
the rest of the decade. There were still grounds of hope. At the end 
of the year 1870 the issue was extensively discussed in the Society 
for the Promotion of the National Industry (Sociedade Auxiliadora da 
Industria Nacional). Opinions were once again divided. The Society's 
Committee on Colonization and Statistics believed that China was the 
only source that could supply the labour required to supplement 
slaves. The coolie system was considered not only of advantage but 
a necessity. The Committee viewed the Chinese worker as "sober, 
economical, diligent, and intelligent". It was again repeated they 
would not come as colonists, to settle and mix with the local 
population and even less would constitute a future nationality. More 
important at that time, however, was to assert that they were 
perfect as "a means of transition", a temporary solution to the 
"scarcity of labour" and would be of help to the implementation of 
a gradual emancipation. After all, the existence of slavery was 
inhibiting European immigration and Chinese could help to end 
slavery without disrupting production. 183 
182 Decreto n.4547 de 9 de julho de 1870. Concede a Manoel Jose 
da Costa Lima Vianna e Joao Antonio de Miranda e Silva, ou 
companhia que organizarem, autorizacao paraimportaremtrabalhadores 
asiaticos. Colleccao das leis do Imperio do Brasil, 1870, (Rio de 
Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 1870). 
183 Sociedade Auxiliadora da Industria Nacional, Discurso  
pronunciado pelo Dr. I.C. Galv&o, na sessao de 3 de outubro de 1870.  
Ouest&o dos Chins (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Universal de Laemmert, 1870) 
p.5; Discurso pronunciado em sessao do Conselho Adminstrativo de 3  
de outubro de 1870 por Joaquim Antonio de Azevedo (Rio de Janeiro: 
Typ. Universal de Laemmert, 1870); Discurso pronunciado por Miguel  
Calmon Menezes de Macedo na sessao de 30 de dezembro de 1870.  
Duestao dos Chins (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Universal de Laemmert, 
1871); Discurso pronunciado pelo Dr. Nicola° Joaquim Moreira 
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Notwithstanding fears of the "catastrophic" consequences of a 
gradual emancipation and serious attempts to import Chinese workers, 
the results were minimal. The 1872 census listed but 436 throughout 
the country. According to Conrad, only one thousand Chinese had 
entered the country in 1874, mostly to cultivate tea. 184 By this 
time Britain and Portugal had banned immigration from their Asian 
colonies. The Chinese government had also banned emigration to 
certain areas under contract conditions. Yet despite the failures, 
the idea of encouraging Chinese immigration lived on in Brazil. The 
debate still interested those involved in the labour question. As 
Quintino had observed "Without immigration, without white 
colonization, without Asian colonization, nor from Africa, with no 
slaves _ finally, without productive hands, what will becoming of 
agriculture?" , 1 85 
At the end of the decade the idea of importing Chinese workers 
once again gained force. The approval of the Free Birth Law in 1871 
was a fact. There had not been enough time to judge its consequences 
but the future seemed bleak. Slaves were restive as the law had 
created a certain euphoria among them. The activities of the pro-
abolition movementleaValso causing concern. Spontaneous European 
immigration was still an ideal but the few immigrants engaged on 
plantations had demonstrated that there were problems and strikes 
had again provoked international criticism. The domestic labour 
force was not an entirely reliable alternative. The moment was 
somehow open to different courses of action. The solution of the 
labour problem touched upon internal needs of plantations and the 
agricultural industry as a whole. Yet it also involved long-term 
questions of the future composition of the Brazilian nation. But any 
temporary solution involving Chinese immigration with long-term 
contracts and draconian legislation, could in turn provoke a 
discutindo-se o parecer da secao de colonisacao e estatistica.  
Questao: convird ao Brasil a importac&o de colonos chins? (Rio de 
Janeiro: Typ. Universal de Laemmert, 1870). 
184 R. Conrad, "The Planter Class", op.cit., p.44. 
185 Q. Bocaidva, op.cit., p.269. 
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permanent problem. As voiced by one fervent opponent of Chinese 
immigration: "No-one understands better than you, Sirs, how in this 
blessed country the provisional becomes permanent" .186 
The idea of importing Chinese workers was discussed in planter's 
Agricultural Congresses, in Recife and in Rio de Janeiro, organized 
in 1878 by the Minister of Agriculture, Joao Lins Vieira Cansansao 
de Sinimbu. Planters at both meetings were aware of the sympathy of 
the Minister to the idea of promoting Chinese immigration. 
Advantages and disadvantages of engaging Chinese workers were 
extensively debated. A great range of reasons _ medical, 
physiological, racial, cultural, economic, social, political etc. 
were invoked to support opinion for and against Chinese 
immigration. Former attempts were reviewed. Earlier debates in the 
Sociedade Auxiliadora da Industrie Nacional were repeated as were 
the results from experiments with Indian and Chinese coolies in 
other areas, such as the United States, Peru, Cuba, Mauritius and 
the Guyanas. Features of Chinese character and personality, as well 
as patterns of Chinese immigration were called either to support or 
oppose opinions on the issue. Attributes were transformed into 
virtues or faults according to the argument advocated. For instance, 
for some the "sober, hard working and low wages" Chinese were the 
solution to the gradual emancipation process already in motion. For 
others, because of these same attributes, Chinese would discourage 
further European immigration, compete with domestic labour and would 
be subjected to thinly disguised slavery. 187 However, among those 
supporting the idea of importing Chinese workers there was at least 
one main point of agreement. Most of them agreed that they could 
only be admitted to the country as a provisional expedient, as 
"labour machines", before the arrival of "more developed races". 
That was the opinion of the sao Paulo commission presented during 
the planters' Congress in Rio: "The commission condemns this race as 
186 Letter of Dr. Nicolau Moreira to Sr. Quintino Bocaitva, 13 
September 1870, in Colonizacao Asiatica. Polemica entre o Sr.  
Quintino Bocaiuva e o Dr. Nicolau Moreira, reproduced in E. Silva 
(ed.) op.cit., p.273. 
187 M.L. Lamounier, op.cit., p.137. 
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a future element of the population, but states that it can be 
accepted in the role of agricultural workers as a temporary 
device . . 188 Reporting on the results of both Rio and Recife 
Congresses, Agriculture Minister Sinimbu stressed the opinion 
"evident and confirmed" that the "European does not supply, will not 
supply" the vacancies in slave labour caused by deaths and the 
gradual emancipation. Europeans would only come when changes in the 
labour system have been accomplished. Meanwhile, as a temporary 
means to ease the transformation in labour "for southern and 
northern agriculture, and for the cultivation of so-called colonial 
products, Asians could be the preferred work machines". M 
Based on planters' opinion expressed in the two 1878 Congresses, 
Sinimbu asked the government to support the initiative to import 
coolies. By 1879 the Lower House of Parliament was voting and 
discussing a credit to finance a mission to China, aiming to promote 
Chinese immigration. The intention of importing Chinese as a 
temporary "expedient" and as a "labour machine" was still the main 
reason. 
During the debates in 1879 in the Lower House of Parliament, 
questioned on the means of introducing and distributing the Chinese 
workers and on the conditions of labour agreements with these 
workers, Minister Sinimbu pointed out that the government did not 
plan to be involved in the conditions of contracts. Official effort 
was designed merely to remove any obstacle posed by the Chinese 
government to emigration. It was up to planters to promote 
immigration. However, it was again stressed that Chinese would come 
as "labour machines". The expression was defined by one of the 
members: "without women, without family, obedient, servile, 
accepting the stick, and performing a specified task with no 
188 Congresso Agricola, op.cit., p.189.  
189 " Congresso Agricola do Rio de Janeiro", Brazil. Relatorio do 
Ministerio da Agricultura, Commercio e Obras Mblicas, 1879, 
Appendix, p.23 and p.25. 
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resistance and reaction". 1" The aim was to promote the arrival of 
Chinese as labourers, "as substitutes for slaves, as an immediate 
remedy, in order that agriculture did not perish", explained the 
Foreign Minister, the Paulista planter Moreira Barros. 191 
A few months earlier the government had approved the new labour 
legislation, the 1879 locagslo de servicos law. During debates to 
approve the legislation, those opposing the measure had denounced 
its "draconian provisions" and the "hidden" intentions of "mongolize 
the country", referring to the importing of Chinese workers. Of 
course, the idea of Chinese as a temporary expedient to ease the 
final abolition of slavery and the transition to free labour was 
supported by the evidence of the way the Chinese had been employed 
elsewhere. Thus, conditions of Chinese workers in the country was 
not the main issue in 1879, for it was widely acknowledged what 
conditions was suppose to apply to "coolies". It seemed to be a 
common idea that contracts were the best way to solve the perceived 
problem of a temporary "shortage of hands" and to keep the processes 
of transition and abolition on track. Thus, those opposing the idea 
of Chinese workers were not necessarily against the conditions of 
contracts or the idea of contracts. Chinese were not welcome because 
they were Chinese. It is true that the ways of introducing them and 
the form of labour contracts were identified by some of those 
opposing the proposal as disguised slavery: "official thinking in 
this case is no more than the restoration of slavery, and the 
introduction of Asian slavery. Labour machine! A worker without 
family, obedient, passive, incapable of resistance ... is a slave! 
(...) If the government restricts itself to opening the doors, 
leaving the planters in league with the traders, dealing with the 
introduction of Asian workers, according to their understanding of 
what is best and most advantageous, we shall see a new [slave] 
traffic, leading to a new era of the infamy that has cost us such 
humiliation" . 192 
1" APB. session 8 October 1879, pp.303-304. 
191 APB, session 4 November 1879, p.32. 
192 APB, session 8 October 1879, pp.299-300. 
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One of the most eloquent opponents of the idea of importing 
Chinese workers, Joaquim Nabuco, called attention to the fact that 
the government instead of seeking to create a new "form of slavery", 
should look for ways to conform existing slaves and those that have 
been born free to the needs of agriculture. It should encourage and 
open a future for the slave family to work in agriculture. In his 
view, if slavery could be ended and slaves transformed under a 
system of "colonato", tied to the land, during a short "transition 
period", "I am sure the country would have a better outcome (...) 
than in trying to renew a source of trafficking, making of Asia what 
it did with Africa, going on search of a yellow slavery to stir in 
the slave quarters, in the fields, with black slavery". 193 
However, for many, Chinese immigration had to be condemned 
because it was Chinese. Because there was danger of "mongolizing the 
country" and because they might compete with the domestic labour 
force and obstruct European immigration. That was why it could not 
be accepted even as one short-term alternative amongst others. To 
the opposition, slaves, freedmen or Brazilians could be transformed 
into "colonos" (meaning either workers under contracts or controlled 
settlements on both private and public land), but not the Chinese. 
Brazilians and former/ slaves could be organized in "agricultural 
militia" but not the Chinese. Slaves could be transformed under the 
"colonato" as defined by Joaquim Nabuco, but the creation of a 
"Chinese colonato" was utterly rejected. Locagao de servigos 
contracts could be agreed with Europeans, Brazilians, freedmen and 
even slaves, but with Chinese they could result in a "true slavery" 
for "we know that since Roman times through hiring out their 
services, a man sometimes becomes more enslaved than a true slave, 
being in the hands of the landlord, no more than an instrument from 
which everything useful is extracted, a machine of which he wants to 
make full use, in short, a being whose health he does not care for, 
whose morality means nothing to him, to whom his family is a matter 
of indifference, beyond the term of the contract". 194 
193 APB, session 1 September 1879, p.308. 
194 APB, session 8 October 1879, p.310. 
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During the debates, the proposal to import Chinese workers was 
denounced many times as having a "local colour": "Those who want the 
Chinese are the southerners"; "...to which point the love for 
importing coolies, because Sao Paulo agriculture shows a desire for 
it despite all the evidence, that the province itself admits, of the 
dire effects on our country...". 195 The Minister of Agriculture, 
Sinimbu, and the Foreign Minister, Moreira de Barros, were both 
planters in sao Paulo. Coincidently or not, the supporters of the 
initiative in the Lower House were Paulistas as well. During the 
debates in the 1878 planters' Congress in Rio, Moreira de Barros, a 
representative of Taubate planters, spoke for the Sao Paulo 
commission on the solution of the labour problem and defended 
Chinese immigration. According to Barros, sao Paulo needed Chinese 
as labourers, because immigrant workers with contracts to weed and 
harvest coffee did not meet all the needs of plantation work, mainly 
the urgent and unexpected tasks (such as mending broken fences, 
building or repairs of roads, dams, and help during harvesting). In 
the event of a shortage of slaves planters needed labourers they 
could "trust" and feel "free" to assign to the various urgent and 
unforeseen tasks. This is an interesting point, because of the 
reference here to the problems that had arisen with other contract 
workers. Experience had shown that European contract workers usually 
declined to execute tasks that had not been specified in contracts. 
On the Martyrios and Sao Lourengo plantations, for instance, 
immigrant workers considered it a waste of time to perform extra 
tasks, either because it was usually low paid or because it diverted 
their labour from their own plots. The conflicts with planters over 
these "extra tasks" reflected an ambiguity in planter behaviour. 
Workers complained that they were poorly paid for these tasks on the 
plantation, although they observed that they were very well paid 
elsewhere. However, they had to have the permission of the planter 
to execute similar tasks elsewhere. But planters had no other means 
of compelling the immigrant workers to perform these "unexpected 
tasks". In Moreira Barros's view the Chinese workers could be a 
solution, as planters might have felt more freedom to demand the 
195 APB, session 1 September 1879, p.302. 
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execution of unspecified jobs from them. 
According to Moreira Barros a great deal of coffee for export was 
already produced by free labour. But slaves were still important. 
Although that was no "shortage of labour" in the province at that 
time, manumissions and death would led to future scarcity. 
Incentives to encourage Brazilians to work needed several "complex 
measures" (a reference to recruitment and franchising) and 
Brazilians were usually indolent with no capacity for work in the 
fields. There was a need for measures to compel ("This is the word: 
to compel?", someone retorted during the debates). Therefore Chinese 
should be accepted as a transitory expedient. 196 
The credit was finally approved and a diplomatic mission was sent 
to China, to negotiate a treaty of friendship and commerce between 
the two governments, though the principal aim was to arrange the 
shipment of Chinese workers to Brazil. The Chinese-Brazilian treaty 
of friendship was signed in Tienstsin on September 5, 1880, and 
another revised treaty was agreed to on October 3, 1881. However, 
neither of them contained any provisions directly approving the 
transport of Chinese workers to Brazi1. 197 There would be further 
attempts by coffee producers to encourage Chinese immigration to 
Brazil but mass Chinese immigration never occurred. Despite domestic 
opposition, the international situation again contributed to 
frustrate renewed attempts to import Chinese. In an open and hostile 
Brazilian press, abolitionists often denounced the plans of 
replacing slaves with Chinese workers. The appalling conditions of 
the "coolie" trade and the fate of the Chinese workers was widely 
publicized and stimulated strong international opposition. But by 
the end of the 1880s, Sao Paulo interest in the subject had 
diminished in the face of the arrival of a massive influx of 
European immigrants. Other provinces not so lucky would still 
support _ unsuccessfully _ initiatives promoting Chinese 
immigration. 
196 APB, session 11 September 1879, p.89. 
197 R. Conrad, "The Planter Class", op.cit., p.45. 
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CONCLUSION: PART I  
A series of factors accounted for the very different pictures of 
early experiments with free labour in Cuba and Sao Paulo. In Cuba, 
pressures to end the trans-Atlantic slave trade occurred at the same 
moment as an acute demand for labour in the expanding sugar 
plantations. The island's colonial status and geographical position 
affected choices of and attitudes to particular sources of labour. 
The Spanish government and its representatives were very cautious 
when considering possible substitute for, or supplement to, slave 
labour. Neighbouring islands of the Caribbean, sharing similar 
concern in the search for alternative labour supply, provided not 
only examples to be followed but in fact made available a wider 
range of choices of labour sources. As in Brazil, Spaniards and 
Cubans would have preferred Europeans to solve the labour problem. 
However, pressed by a great demand for labour, the solution was 
found in the importation of thousands of Chinese workers. Slaves had 
been entering the country simultaneously with Chinese workers. 
Chinese contract workers at the end eased the process of transition 
to free labour but policies to foment Chinese immigration were not 
devised to help the abolition of slavery nor the transition to free 
labour. These policies were merely coincidental concerned to address 
the labour problem. Chinese workers were viewed as "labour machines" 
and an "element of transition", however not as an element of 
transition between "slavery and free labour" but transition "between 
the slave and the free labourer". 
In Sao Paulo the perception of the labour problem was quite 
different. The end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, although 
taking place sooner did not produce the same urgency. Paulista 
planters would thus experience more flexibility when experimenting 
with distinct sorts of labourers and labour systems. However, for 
many Brazilian (not least Paulistas) planters and policy-makers, the 
end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade meant eventually the end of 
slavery itself. For those who believed so, the search for 
alternative labour sources meant, beyond the immediate problem of 
labour supply, the search for another system of labour that could 
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also result in a different society which would become the new 
Brazilian nation. And these forward-looking men were those who were 
searching and experimenting with alternative labour systems and 
labourers. As in Cuba, the preference was for white Europeans, who 
with their "industriousness" could contribute to an ideal Brazilian 
nation, endowed with more "civilized and positive" labour habits. 
Chinese and African immigration, and the system of labour usually 
attached to them, were considered but there was a strong domestic 
opposition to its promotion. And when, after the unsuccessful 
attempts to promote European immigration _ and pressured by the 
labour demand and concerned about the outcome of the abolition of 
slavery _ Brazilians opted for Chinese contract workers, the model 
had already been condemned and was strongly attacked by 
international public opinion. However, policies devised to draw 
Chinese workers to Brazil embodied views that were different from 
those expressed in from Cuba. Although, as in Cuba, Chinese were 
considered "labour machines" and "elements of transition", the idea 
was to employ Chinese contract workers to ease and allow a gradual, 
very gradual, abolition of slavery. Chinese contract workers would 
provide temporary, cheap labour gradually replacing slaves, reduced 
by death, flights or freed by the gradual abolition legislation. 
The experiments with free labourers in both areas led to attempts 
to devise a general legal framework governing new labour relations. 
In Cuba severe regulations were issued guiding planters in the 
management of workers, and stipulating guarantees for the fulfilment 
of labour contracts. In Brazil, efforts to devise a new locag&o de 
servicos pointed in the same direction. However, the creation of a 
general regulation for labour, although approved in 1879, would not 
be enforced. And the situation was completely different from Cuba. 
First the regulations, were issued within the broader context of a 
policy for the abolition of slavery and transition to free labour. 
It sought to rearrange labour relations to help abolition, and the 
situation that might exist after abolition. It covered all kinds of 
"free" labourers, including freed slaves. In effect, the 1879 law 
was a general labour code that envisaged a new organization of 
labour relations, based on long service contracts and severe 
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measures obliging the fulfilment of contracts. The idea mentioned 
during the debates that locagao de servigos legislation was an 
expedient to "capture the free to ease the freeing of slaves", was 
very close to the truth; for the idea was to homogenize all forms of 
free labour under a general regulation, embracing former slaves and 
Brazilian free workers engaged under long-term service obligations. 
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PART II 
PATTERNS OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION AND 
TRANSITION TO FREE LABOUR 
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Introduction 
The evolution of free labour relations was inextricably linked to 
the issue of the future of slavery. Attempts to transform slaves 
gradually into free labourers, without political and economic 
disruptions, and the search for alternative labourers and systems of 
labour control lay at the crux of the problem of establishing a 
framework for the transition to free labour in Cuba and Brazil. 
Gradual abolition began to be implemented in both areas from the 
1870s. By this time a variety of experiments with different labour 
systems had informed the growing debate about the labour question. 
While the Moret Law (Cuba) and the Rio Branco Law (Brazil) initiated 
the process of slowly freeing slaves, a broader process to 
accomplish a transition to free labour had been devised. The concept 
of free labour fashioned (and re-fashioned) in early experiments 
with non-slave labour shaped ideas of freedom and emancipation. By 
means of multiple methods of individual manumissions and contracts 
to bind former slaves to the plantations and by the promotion of 
immigration based on long service contracts, policy makers and 
planters were trying to define a joint framework for gradual 
abolition and transition to free labour without disrupting the 
existing economic and political order. Legislation on the issue 
reveals repeated attempts to achieve greater control over all types 
of labour, and hence of the process as a whole. Discussion about the 
labour question and experiments with free labour would condition 
gradualist policies implemented in the 1870s and 1880s and 
eventually helped to effect a relatively non-violent transition to 
free labour. 
Ending slavery was but one element in the process of transition. 
Schemes to abolish slavery will be considered in Part II of the 
thesis. Chapter 5 examines early proposals on the issue and explores 
changing concepts of slave emancipation and of free labour embodied 
in these proposals. Efforts to keep general emancipation tied to 
individual manumission were clearly an attempt to ensure gradualism 
in both processes of slave emancipation and of transition. In Brazil 
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and Cuba manumission was envisaged as both the ideal form of 
individual freedom and as a mechanism facilitating eventual 
abolition. The concept of freedom embodied in patterns of 
manumission shaped also ideas and models of free labour relations 
during the period. These plans, while providing for the 
transformation of the slave into a free labourer and for the future 
of the freedmen, also contributed to ideas about the development of 
free labour. At the time, many of these proposals provoked a wave of 
protest and were abandoned. However, it is possible to see how ideas 
on the issues disclosed in these frustrated projects affected (and 
were affected by) concurrent experiments with free labour. More 
important, some of the ideas presented earlier in the century would 
profoundly influence policies for gradual abolition implemented in 
the 1870s. Chapter 6 compares and contrasts actual legislation for 
gradual abolition in Brazil and Cuba implemented from the 1870s, and 
discusses their contributions towards a "transition to free labour". 
The circumstances in which the Moret and Rio Branco Laws were 
approved were quite different from those prevailing earlier in the 
century when initial proposals had been debated. Attempts to buil, 
a coherent legal framework embracing both gradual abolition and 
transition was a distinct feature of the Brazilian case. 
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CHAPTER 5  
EARLY PLANS FOR SLAVE EMANCIPATION: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF  
SLAVE EMANCIPATION AND FREE LABOUR 
Efforts to formulate emancipation policies in Brazil as in Cuba were 
rooted in international pressures to end the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade. Throughout the century, several projects and projects-of-law 
on the abolition of the slave trade as well as on the abolition of 
slavery would appear in books, newspapers and official publications. 
Formally or informally debated, the recurrence of the theme 
indicated the significance of the matter. Emanating from various 
quarters and revealing distinct views and concerns within Cuban and 
Brazilian society, these texts also underscored the intricacies of 
ending the African trade and reorganizing labour relations. 
Decisions on the future of existing slaves and on the position of 
freedmen in society were related to questions such as the 
preservation of colonial ties, the constitution of the nation, the 
distribution of land and wealth, the rising proportion of blacks to 
whites and the possibility of insurrections. Labour discipline on 
the plantations and the profitability of agriculture were paramount 
and immediate. 
While dealing narrowly with the severance of the African trade 
and thus trying to secure a slave population growth by means of good 
treatment and incentives to natural reproduction, some of these 
early proposals timidly started to question the status quo of 
slavery itself. Although not going further than to suggest a very 
gradual process of emancipation, these proposals had little or no 
result. Nevertheless, they stimulated protest and by provoking 
planter anxiety might have worse theworking conditions of slaves. 
More to the point here, these plans voiced the ideas about the 
conservation or extinction of slavery, the search for new sources of 
labour and what would follow in terms of the reorganization of 
labour relations. Contributors to the debate often pondered the 
profitability of slave labour against free labour, the growth of 
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anti-slavery sentiment in Europe and the results of abolition 
elsewhere. Some ideas presented early in the century would remain 
valid half-century later. Some would be enlarged while in the 
meantime others simply disappeared. The prevailing social, political 
and economic environment affected changes. But what is most 
important is that these shifting perspectives subsequently fashioned 
actual attempts to establishitag distinct patterns of slave 
emancipation and the reorganization of labour relations. 
In both countries many proposals treated the promotion of 
immigration, and multiple ways of individual manumission and 
controlled degrees and kinds of freedom as interrelated themes, 
intrinsic to the process of slave emancipation. Gradualism seems to 
have been a constant feature of these proposals during the whole 
period. Gradual abolition would provide incentives for slave 
reproduction and the better treatment of existing slaves. It would 
also encourage individuals _ either by self-purchase or lotteries 
to seek manumission. Gradualism was considered essential because 
planters, the government and the whole economy needed enough time to 
adjust to the new circumstances. And because the slaves needed time 
to prepare themselves for freedom, as labourers and citizens. Hence 
the emphasis on long contracts of service for freedmen and strict 
vagrancy laws. 
5.1. Cuba 
Manumission policies offer insight not only into the way that Cuban 
society sought to cope with the liberation of slaves but also 
indicates how the problem of accomplishing the larger transition to 
a free labour market might be achieved. Most proposals for the 
abolition of slavery in the 1830s and in the 1860s envisaged 
gradual, individual manumission as the ideal form of freedom and as 
a mechanism for facilitating eventual abolition. The traditional way 
of manumitting slaves in Spanish law through gradual self-purchase 
(coartacion) was the form usually recommended. Achieving freedom 
through gradual self-purchase was believed to prepare slaves for 
participation in a free society and in the labour market. Self- 
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purchase was assumed to inculcate in the slaves characteristics such 
as thrift, hard work and self-discipline. 
In Cuba, as in Brazil, attempts to restrict emancipation to 
individual manumission was a clear way of keeping control of a very 
gradual process of abolition. But proposals for the abolition of 
slavery in Brazil almost always included some debate about the 
future of freedmen. For example, contracts of services, laws against 
vagrancy, or re-exportation to Africa. Brazilian proposals also 
invariably included reference to alternatives to slave labour. For 
instance, promotion of immigration and recruitment of domestic 
labourers. In this sense, the processes of abolishing the slave 
trade (or that of freeing slaves) and the search for ways to effect 
the "transition to free labour" seemed to be reverse and obverse of 
a single process. By contrast, slave emancipation projects in Cuba 
always dealt narrowly with the means of improving slaves living 
conditions and of bringing about individual manumission. Schemes to 
end slavery and experiments with immigrant free labour were regarded 
as totally separate processes. Abolition of slavery and promotion of 
immigration appeared to be a very political matter. Abolition of 
slavery was presented as a gradual process and as a means of 
reducing the dangers of, and fears about, the increase in the black 
population. Experiments with free labourers seemed not to be 
designed primarily to facilitate the ending of slavery nor as 
alternative to slave labour but rather addressed the general problem 
of labour supply provoked by the great expansion of sugar 
plantations in the 1840s and in the 1850s. And, most significant, 
white immigration would maintain a racial balance within the island. 
Cubans knew that with the end of the slave trade, slavery would end 
soon. High mortality among the slaves and the negative rate of slave 
population growth would lead to the end of slavery. Coartacion would 
also contribute to this end. 
Discussions about the abolition of slavery did not occur as 
frequently in Cuba (or Spain) as in Brazil. The issue of the future 
of slavery _ as well as that of labour supply, as was said before 
would be inextricably woven in the question of the maintenance of 
Spanish rule. Indeed, the most significative distinction ascribed to 
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the process of formulating emancipation policies and defining a 
framework for the transition to free labour, in contrast with 
Brazil, was due to the character of the island's ties with Spain. 
Fears about the loss of planter support, and thus of control of 
Cuba, made Spain very cautious about projects for immigrant labour, 
even more so when approaching strategic issues like abolition of the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade, the abolition of slavery and control 
over the free coloured population in Cuba.' 
Spain did not, or could not, respond to the abolitionist wave 
that sprouted in Europe during the first decades of the nineteenth 
century. Domestic affairs such as the French invasion, questions of 
papal concordats, anticlerical reforms, Carlist wars among others 
helped to prevent in Spain the creation of a strong sentiment anti 
slavery. 2 Moreover, progressively stripped of her Empire, Spain had 
to rely on the Cuban sugar trade to sustain her public treasury 
which was always in penurious circumstances. During these times, 
when ideas of independence spread over other Spanish colonies in 
America, conservation of slavery was alleged or fated to be the only 
way to preserve "the jewel" Cuba and its revenues. Conservation of 
slavery in Cuba would be a matter inextricably woven in the 
relationship between the colony and metropolis and in all Spanish 
foreign policy during the greater part of the nineteenth century. 
The first important abolitionist initiative, in Spain, took place 
during the revolutionary Cortes of Cadiz at the beginning of the 
1 During the 1830s and 1840s, Cuban authorities, backed by the 
Spanish government, took several precautions to protect Cuba from 
abolitionist agitation taking place in the surrounding islands; on 
the issue see D.R. Murray. Odious Commerce. Britain, Spain and the 
abolition of the Cuban slave trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980) especially chapter 7. Discussion over slavery by the 
press was carefully controlled by the Spanish authorities. In 1869, 
for instance, Captain General, General Dulce, excluded from the 
press the discussion of any issue that threaten the stability of 
slavery, R. Cepero Bonilla, Azdcar y Abolition. Apuntes para una 
Historia critica del Abolicionismo,lst ed.1948 (Havana: Editorial 
Echeverria, 1960) p.19. 
2 A.F. Corwin, Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba, 1817-
1886 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967) pp.20-22. 
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1810s. From this time until the mid-1860s there would be few other 
initiatives, most of them concerning the extinction of the slave 
trade. The Spanish Abolitionist Society was founded only in 1864 
when domestic and external pressures would force Spain to consider 
the abolition of slavery in its colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico. 3 
 Meanwhile, there were voices from inside the colony challenging the 
continuance of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the institution of 
slavery. The large number of slaves entering the island, 
particularly in the 1840s when the slave population surpassed the 
free population, generated fears of uprisings and provoked demands 
for the end of the slave trade and the promotion of white 
immigration. 
By March 26, 1811, at the Cortes Constituyentes of Cadiz _ an 
extraordinary gathering during the French occupation and with 
representants from the overseas provinces as well as the peninsular 
the Mexican Jose Gurudi Alcacer proposed the immediate  
suppression of the slave trade and the gradual abolition of slavery. 
His abolition project included granting freedom to all children born 
to slave mothers and incentives for self-purchase. Existing slaves 
should remain in their servile condition, working for their owners 
but were to be treated as free servants (criados libres) earning a 
wage proportional to their skills and behaviour. These wages were to 
be fixed by the justice of the territory. At the same time Don 
Agustin Arguelles, a liberal, presented a more limited project 
3 The Spanish Abolitionist Society appeared in December 1864, 
under the leadership of the Puerto Rican Julio Vizcarrondo. It was 
formally legalized in April 1865,"to propagate the principle of 
immediate abolition of Negro slavery; to discuss the means to carry 
this out without infringing on the rights of anyone, and to prevent 
disturbances in the moral and material order of our Antilles". It 
would be outlawed for two years, reappearing again in 1868. On the 
Society, see P. Arroyo Gimenez, "La sociedad abolicionista espaflola 
(1864-1886)", in F. de Solano and A. Guimera (ed.) Esclavitud y 
Derechos Humanos. La Lucha por la libertad del negro en el siglo XIX  
(Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1990) 
pp.169-181, p.170; see also A.F. Corwin, op.cit., especially chapter 
9. 
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asking only for the immediate abolition of the slave trade. 4 
 Although there had been individual voices challenging both the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade and the institution of slavery before, 
these were the first formal projects on the issue in Spain. Despite 
strong attacks from colonial representatives both projects were 
considered for debate. At the end a committee was formed to study 
only the issue of the abolition of the slave trade. 5 However, even 
this weak effort came to nothing. 
These proposals and their public discussion in the Cortes caused 
great alarm in the Antilles. In Cuba news that motions questioning 
the status of slavery were about to take place in the Cortes caused 
a wave of fear, indignation and complaint. Soon bodies such as the 
Ayuntamiento of Havana, the Royal Consulate of Agriculture, Industry 
and Commerce and the Economic Society designated Francisco de Arango 
y Parrefio, _ influential historian and publicist _ to write a 
polemic against any alteration of the existing labour regime in 
Cuba. 6 Arango y Parrefio's Representation, Representacion de la 
Ciudad de la Habana, challenging the debates in the Cortes is a good 
starting to grasp the issues and circumstances involved in the 
abolition of slavery as viewed from Spain and Cuba. 7 The document 
4 C. Navarro Azcue, La abolicion de la esclavitud neqra en la 
legislacion espanola, 1870-1886 (Madrid: Instituto de Cooperaci6n 
Iberoamericana, 1987) pp.14-15; J.U. Martinez Carreras, "La 
abolicion de la esclavitud en Espana durante el siglo XIX", in F. 
Solano and A. Guimera (ed.) Esclavitud y Derechos Humanos, op.cit.  
pp.63-77, esp. p.67. 
5 J.U. Martinez Carreras, op.cit., p.68. It was suggested that 
the proposals should be discussed in secret to prevent problems in 
the colonies, according to F. Armario Sanchez, "Esclavitud y 
abolicionismo en Cuba durante la regencia de Espartero" in F. Solano 
and A. Guimera, Esclavitud y Derechos Humanos, op.cit.pp.377-405, 
esp. p.379. 
6 A.F. Corwin, op.cit., p.24. 
7 n Representacion de la Ciudad de la Habana a las Cortes, en el 
20 de julio de 1811, con motivo de las proposiciones hechas por D. 
Jose Miguel Gurudi Alcacer y D. Agustin de Argiielles, sabre el 
trafico y esclavitud de los negros; extendida por el Alferez Mayor 
de la Ciudad, D. Francisco de Arango, por encargo del Ayuntamiento, 
Consulado y Sociedade PatriOtica de la Habana", in F. de Arango y 
Farrel°, Obras de D. Francisco de Aranqo y Parrefio (Havana: 
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constituted a strong defence of Cuban slavery. Remarking that it 
concerned "our lives, our wealth and that of our descendants", 
Arango y Parreflo first asked whether the moment was opportune to 
discuss publicly such a significant matter. The initiative seemed to 
him even worse since it was proposed with no regard to the domestic 
situation of the colony and without providing adequate means of 
replacing the usual source of labour. Arango also pointed out that 
those plans challenged the sacred right of property which according 
"to the laws, and as provided by the first chapters of every 
Constitution should be inviolate". Caution, prudence and wisdom were 
essential. In his view, those questions _ the abolition of the 
slave trade and the abolition of slavery _ should not be discussed 
before the debate about the Constitution. And there were political 
problems to be addressed. For instance, the status of Cuba and the 
position of the free coloured population. Attention should be 
directed to what Parreflo called "uniformidad 6 unificacion de 
derechos". More thoughts should be given to the free coloured 
population rather than to the negros bozales: "It is known that in 
countries where political liberty means little, there is in effect 
civil slavery". 8 "Before discussing the political slavery [of 
blacks], consider the civil slavery [of Spanish citizens]; before 
deciding who shall be citizens [of the island of Cuba], consider 
what opportunities shall be open or closed to coloured people. 9 "In 
the current circumstances, one has to fear more the political 
activity of the free coloured people, than that of those dependent 
and subjected to slavery...". 10 The mere public discussion of this 
explosive issue _ Arango y Parreflo emphasized _ could spread 
Publicaciones de la Direccion de Cultura del Ministerio de 
Educacion, 1952) II, p.145-187; also reproduced in H. Pichardo 
Viflals, Documentos para la Historia de Cuba (Havana: Editorial 
Nacional de Cuba, 1965) pp.240-278, version used here. 
8 F.de Arango y Parreflo, "RepresentaciOn...1811", op.cit., 
 p.254. 
9 F.de Arango y Parreflo, "Representacion...1811", op.cit., 
 p.265. 
10 F.de Arango y Parreno,"Representacion...1811", op.cit., 
 p.272. 
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misunderstandings among the negroes. Risks inherent in the island's 
close proximity to Haiti should also be considered: "...we are 
surrounded by fire and all the time sparks are falling...n. 11 
Arango emphatically opposed the idea of the immediate abolition 
of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. It would not be convenient for 
the planters and less yet for the slaves themselves. In his view, 
the assumption that prohibition of the slave trade could improve 
slave reproduction was unreasonable. And so was the idea that this 
initiative together with the granting of freedom to children born to 
'Alave mother could end all the horrors employed in their raising. 
Both assumptions were unreasonable because, first, there was no 
plantation in the island with the necessary number of hands and, 
second, most of the plantations ha not got the appropriate number 
of women. In some plantations there were no women at all, observed 
Arango. Thus, asked Arango, how would the sudden prohibition of the 
slave trade produce the better treatment of existing slaves, if we 
are not allowed to furnish plantations with the required hands? 
Could slaves reproduce themselves when there are no women? 12 
Furthermore, since the owner's right of property over the children 
born to a slave mother had already been conferred by law it would be 
unjust to dispose of it without compensation. 13 Besides, previous 
to the prohibition of the slave trade, the government should 
facilitated the search for white labourers _ "wherever they could 
be found and by any possible means" _ to address the labour 
problem and that of "our threatened safety". Thus, Arango y Farrell° 
criticized the Spanish policy on immigration which at this time was 
restricted to Spaniards. "We tolerate and have always tolerated the 
import of infidel blacks (...) but we cannot tolerate white 
op.cit.,  11 F.de Arango y Parreno, 	"Representacion...1811, 
p.274. 
12 F.de Arango y Parreflo,"Representacion...1811", op.cit.,  
p.259. 
13 F.de Arango y Parrefio,"Representacion...1811", op.cit.,  
p.262. 
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Catholics unless they are Spanish". 14 It is worth recalling that a 
bill allowing for the first time non-Spanish, Catholic immigrants, 
would be issued only a few years later in 1817. 
A more threatening abolition motion arose suddenly in the session 
of August 13, 1813, when the deputy Isidro Antillon attempted to 
reopen the debate. Antillon had already been publishing his 
abolitionist ideas in magazines and periodicals together with Jose 
Marchena and J.M. Blanco-White. He seemed to be the first Spanish 
writer to openly attack slavery and to argue for the immediate 
abolition of the slave trade and the gradual abolition of slavery. 
He read a dissertation against the commerce and enslavement of 
negroes before the Real Academia Matritense de Derecho Espanol, and 
the Academy of Spanish Law, as early as 1802. He remained unheard 
then and in 1813. 15 
In Spain, the question remained in abeyance after these early 
efforts. Only after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, was the Spanish 
government compelled to deal with the problem of the slave trade. 
From then until the 1860s, apart from a few measures regarding the 
abolition of the slave trade taken under British pressures and some 
isolated abolitionist voices, Spain seemed to be un-affected by the 
anti-slavery movement sweeping the rest of Europe. It had to wait 
until changed domestic and international circumstances impelled a 
more vigorous abolitionist action. But the issue could not be 
avoided in the. colony. In 1822, eleven years after the 
Representation written by Arango y Parreflo, the priest and 
philosophy teacher Felix Varela (1788-1853), a deputy elected to 
represent Cuba in the Cortes of 1822 and 1823, presented before that 
body his Memoir accompanied by a project-bill for abolition of 
slavery in Cuba. 16 
14 F.de Arango y Parreflo,"Representacion...1811", op.cit., 
 p.265. 
15 J.U. Martinez Carreras, op.cit., pp.67-68. 
16 F. Varela, Memoria que demuestra la necesidad de extinquir 
la esclavitud de los nerfros en la isla de Cuba, atendiendo a los 
intereses de sus propietarios, por el presbitero Don Felix Varela,  
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Like Arango, Varela started by stressing the political problems 
produced by Spanish rule in Cuba. The "esclavitud politica" of the 
island was his main concern, followed by the status and increase of 
the black population. Labour in Cuba depended on Africans, either 
free or slaves. Their refusal to work, observed Varela, would ruin 
the island. This fragile situation, he believed, was further 
complicated by the proximity of Saint Domingue and its example as a 
potential spark for rebellion. 17 Like Arango, he feared the growth 
of the free coloured population: "Fear increases with their rapid 
instruction (...) the press instructs them of their rights that are 
equal to those of any man; and makes them wish to be so happy as 
those from whom nature only made them different in colour". 18 
 According to Varela, potential dangers could only be prevented by a 
process of controlled, gradual abolition. Planters should be 
guaranteed the investment already committed to the purchase of 
slaves; disturbance in the cities and disruption of agriculture 
should be avoided; and there should be precautions that slaves did 
not attempt to get more than what has been granted to them. 19 He 
then proposed a controlled process of freeing slaves by three means: 
i) freedom to all slaves that had served his master for fifteen 
uninterrupted years; ii) self-purchase; the price of which should 
take in consideration years already served and those needed to 
complete the fifteen years; and iii) freedom to all children born to 
a slave mother, giving the owner the right to use their services 
until they were twenty years old, without paying wages and no 
obligation other than to provide maintenance and care in event of 
sickness. To improve the process Varela detailed a series of 
Diputado a las Cortes. Proyecto de decreto sobre la abolicion de la 
esclavitud en la Isla de Cuba y sobre los medios de evitar los dafios 
que puedan considerarse a la poblacion blanca ya la aqricultura, 
reproduced in E. Torres-Cuevas and E. Reyes (ed.), Esclavitud y 
Sociedad. Notas y Documentos para la Historia de la Esclavitud Neqra 
en Cuba (Havana: Editora de Ciencias Sociales, 1986) pp.148-162, 
version used 	here; 	partially 	reproduced 
op.cit., 	pp.291-299. 
in 	H. 	Pichardo 
17 F. Varela, 	Memoria, 	op.cit., p.152. 
18 F. Varela, Memoria, 	op.cit., p.153. 
19 F. Varela, 	Memoria, 	op.cit., p.154. 
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provisions for the creation of municipal boards, to oversee 
registers of all slaves, transference of contracts, the selection of 
those to be freed by public and private funds, rules for lotteries 
to finance slave freedom and the guarantee of self-purchase. 20 
 Although his project did not receive much public attention, news did 
reach Cuba where Varela's action was condemned. 21 
By the early 1830s another Representation by Francisco de Arango 
y Farrell° showed signs of changes. 22 His new arguments seemed to be 
very far from those presented almost twenty years early. First, he 
now supported the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade as 
well as the better treatment of the slave in order to prolong life 
expectancy and increase reproduction. 23 To combat la preocupacion 
del color, Arango proposed the promotion of white immigration and 
the easing of restrictions against interracial marriage (mestiz0e). 
Legislative reform and white immigration would help to solve 
anxieties about the coloured and black population. He went on to 
suggest the establishment of colonies in appointed locations formed 
half and half by "European colonists and honest coloured women". 24 
In contrast with his 1811 Representation, Arango now proposed the 
extinction of slavery based on the better treatment of slaves and on 
20 F. Varela, Memoria, op.cit., pp.155-156. 
21 A.F. Corwin, op.cit., p.38. At the same time, in 1821, it was 
published in Spain the Juan Bernardo O'Gavan (another Cuban 
deputy)'s Observaciones sobre la suerte de los negros de Africa,  
considerados en su propia patria y reclamacion contra el tratado 
celebrado con los ingleses, claiming the Cortes protected the slave 
trade against the British, see A.F. Corwin, p.39. 
22 RepresentaciOn al Rey sobre la extincion del trdfico de 
negros y medios de mejorar la suerte de los esclavos coloniales, por 
Francisco de Arango y Farrell°, en 28 de mayo de 1832", in Obras, 
op.cit., pp.529-536; reproduced in E. Torres-Cuevas and E. Reyes 
(ed.), op.cit., pp.164-169, version used here. 
23 F. de Arango y Farrell°, "Representacion...1832", op.cit., 
p.165 and p.167. 
24 F.de Arango y Parrefio,"Representacion...1832", op.cit., 
p.166. 
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incentives for gradual self-purchase. 25 He believed that the current 
system of slavery should be changed. Slaves should be declared 
glebae adict, who could not be bought nor moved from the plantations 
where they lived. 26 This was in marked contrast to his earlier 
criticism of Guridi's plan, "to introduce a capital novelty in the 
property right, namely curtailing the right of property owners to 
sell". 27 According to Arango, there should be efforts to promote 
better treatment and preservation of slave families as well as 
official protection for the savings of slaves. He observed that 
urban slaves had better living conditions compared to rural slaves. 
Field slaves indubytable needed the protection of the law. "They are 
not fed, clothed or assisted in their sickness properly. They are in 
effect allowed to save: but they are not granted the necessary time 
to cultivate their conuco and raise their animals". 28 To improve 
slave living conditions, he planned prizes to be awarded to masters 
who showed a high proportion of live birthsamongst slave mothers and 
penalties against planters whose plantations returned high death 
rates. He advised better treatment and incentives to slave mothers 
and their children. This was an evident shift from 1811 when he had 
noted, "The pregnant slave woman or nursgqing slave mother is 
useless for several months, and during this long period, she ha to 
be fed with more and better quality food. Her absence from work, and 
the increased expenses of the mother, come from the pocket of the 
owner. Planters also have to provide resources to pay the expenses 
of the new born (...) and the added risks taken by the mother and 
child. The expenses of the owner are so high that the slave who is 
raised at home, if he can work, is more expens0 than those purchased 
op.cit., 25 	F.de Arango 
pp.167-169. 
y Parrefto, 	"Representacion...1832", 
26 F.de Arango y Parrefio,"Representacion...1832", op.cit., 
p.169. 
27 F.de Arango y Parreflo,"Representacion...1811", op.cit., 
p.272. 
28 F.de Arango y Parreno,"Representacian...1832", op.cit., 
p.167. 
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in a market". 29 But Arango y Parreno's concern about the growing 
black population seemed to have increased. He now argued that 
incentives for self-purchase could reduce the potential dangers 
produced by a large black population. However, he stressed, "it is 
too dangerous to open new doors to manumission". n 
It's not easy to disentangle all the themes involved in schemes 
relating to abolition devised by Varela and Arango y Parreno. Both 
authors seemed to agree on the need to abolish slavery. Both were 
apparently very concerned about the great increase in the black 
population. Varela pointed to the great dependence of Cuba on black 
hands. Arango y Parreno was concerned also about the dangers arising 
from a large black population divided into free and slave. For both 
writers, abolition should be gradual, with regard to planter needs 
so as not to disrupt the conditions of production and jeopardize 
capital already invested. The means of implementing abolition was 
focused on the individual slaves. Gradual self-purchase, 
guaranteeing the planter compensation in money or labour, through 
long term labour agreements. Immigration was devised to address, 
besides the actual need of labourers, a political matter. Promoting 
mestizait as proposed by Arango or increasing the white population 
would counterbalance increases in the black population. Better 
treatment of slaves would increase their working life and self-
reproduction and would also diminish the tendency to runaway or 
revolt. These measures might, in addition inhibit a combination of 
freedmen and slaves against whites. 
By this time, the growing number of blacks entering Cuba had 
intensified fears about revolt. Demography in part accounts for 
white anxieties of the period. The black population, free and 
slaves, outnumbered the white population for the first time in 1817. 
This balance would not change, according to the census until the 
period from 1846-62. At the beginning of the 1840s, slaves 
29 F.de Arango y Parreflo,"RepresentaciOn...1811", p.255. 
30 F.de Arango y Parreflo,"RepresentaciOn...1832", op.cit.,  
p.169. 
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outnumbered whites. 31 
During the 1830s, under Governors Tacon and Espeleta, rules were 
issued to secure the isolation of the slaves. 32 Increased numbers 
of blacks was dangerous but _ it was believed _ would be even 
more dangerous if influenced by abolition and abolitionist 
sentiments occurring on surrounding islands. The British 
Commissioner at Havana in 1830 reported that "although the native 
planters are, of course, glad to procure slaves at the lowest 
possible price, yet, I believe, the majority of them would have 
little objection to sacrifice a temporary profit, to the solid 
advantage of not having their lives and properties endangered by the 
unlimited increase of black population". 33 Cuban anxieties about the 
31 According to the 1841 census, slaves (436,495) outnumbered 
whites, 436,495 and 418,291 respectively. According to 1846 census, 
there were 323,759 slaves and 425,767 whites. See Cuba, resumen del  
censo de poblacion de la isla de Cuba a fin del alio de 1841 (Havana: 
Imprenta del Gobierno, 1842); Cuba, Cuadro estadistico de la siempre  
fiel Isla de Cuba, correspondiente al afio de 1846 (Havana: Imprenta 
del Gobierno, 1847), data compiled from both censuses, see K.F. 
Kiple, Blacks in Colonial Cuba, 1774-1889. (Gainesville: The 
University Presses of Florida, 1976) appendix. 
32 See Circular issued by the Captain General of the Island of 
Cuba, Havana, July 28, 1832; restated by Miguel Tacon, January 3, 
1835, saying "The most efficacious vigilance to prevent the 
introduction into the island of that dangerous class of negroes and 
mulattoes, contaminated with the fallacious doctrines invented by 
the revolutionists of both worlds, should be a most privileged 
object of the care and attention of the authorities"(p.76); and 
again Circular June 12, 1838, also pointing out that "For the 
purpose of preserving the security of the island, and that on no 
pretext black or mulattoes, proceeding from foreign countries be 
introduced in to it, I have thought proper to ordain that (...) the 
Captain [vessel] shall present bail in 1,000 dollars, to answer for 
the said freed negroes not coming on shore...", Second and Third 
Enclosure n.50, Lord William Hervey to Viscount Palmerston, Madrid, 
September 1, 1838, Correspondence with Foreign Powers (class B) 
Parliamentary Papers, 1839. v.48. On the issue see also G. M. Hall, 
Social Control in Slave Plantation Societies. A Comparison of Saint  
Domingue and Cuba (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971). 
33 W.S. Macleay, Esq. to the Earl of Aberdeen (received March 
9). Report on the Slave Trade. Havana, January 1, 1830, in 
Correspondence with the British Commissioners at Sierra Leone, The 
Havana, Rio de Janeiro and Surinam relating to the Slave Trade, 
1830, Parliamentary Papers, 1831 v.19. 
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dangers of a majority black population would serve Britain as a 
means of pressure against the Spanish Government. "You will remind 
them, moreover, of the danger which recent circumstances have shown 
might accrue from an overwhelming number of new negroes in Cuba at 
a time it might be difficult to keep down the temper and spirit of 
those already long imported..." wrote Viscount Palmerston to the 
British representatives in Havana in 1833. 34 
The opinions of distinct groups within Cuba regarding the slave 
trade and the increase of black population were contained in an1840 
• ■ report on the slave trade by the British Commissioner ot Havana: "We 
trust, there may be found here many persons in favour of the 
suppression of the Slave Trade, from the worthiest motives; but we 
are also convinced, that there are many who would coincide in it 
from policy. Among the richer classes, many fear that the number of 
negroes introduced may hereafter lead to disastrous consequences; 
while the poorer classes of the whites are almost unanimous in 
expressing a wish for the suppression of the Slave Trade, partly 
because they are repugnant to labour with the blacks, and partly 
because they believe that these continued importation tend to keep 
down the price of labour". 35 These fears reached a peak in the early 
1840s. Slave uprisings in plantations and in the cities frightened 
all concerned. By this time England and British abolitionists were 
pressing the Spanish Government to fulfil former treaties for the 
abolition of the slave trade. Attempt of agreement between the two 
governments considering the freedom of all slaves illegally imported 
from Africa since 1820 caused indignation and fears of a British 
34 Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Villiers. F.O., November 22, 1833. 
in Correspondence with Foreign Powers (class B) Parliamentary 
Papers, 1834. v.44. 
35 H.M. Consul to Viscount Palmerston. Havana, January 1, 1840 
(Received March 12), Report on the Slave Trade. Further Series. 
Correspondence with the British Comm. at Sierra Leone, The Havana, 
Rio de Janeiro, and Surinam relating to the Slave Trade (class A) 
Parliamentary Papers v.46. 
236 
invasion. 36 The Informe reservado del Real Consulado in Habana, in 
1841, foresaw this catastrophe if the slave trade continued. Dangers 
of revolution were reported, "...the slave is always trying the 
resistance of his chains and these chains are today imaginary. We 
have slept in danger. It is necessary to wake up and provide for 
efficient means that can yet save us. At issue are our lives, 
plantations, the honour of our wives and daughters (...) off our 
coast we face immediately Saint Domingue and Jamaica from where a 
mass of one million blacks can in one night swarm into our beaches 
(...) with the cry of freedom for the blacks and death to whites". 37 
 To avoid this catastrophe, the Informe advocated the effective 
suppression of the slave trade, the promotion of the white 
population, effective Cuban representation in the Cortes and the 
removal of the "fanatic" English consul Turnbull. 
The Bando de Gobernacion y Policia de la Isla de Cuba issued by 
Captain General Geronimo Valdes in 1842 crystallized these ideas. 38 
 The Bando included 261 articles and covered various themes ranging 
from Religion and Public Morals, Public Order, Public Safety to 
Public Health, Public Hygiene and Public Spectacles, including 
sections for Plaza de Toros and  Bailes de Mascaras. It attempted to 
cover in great detail several aspects of public life, from the 
movement and activities of the free coloured, slaves and runaways, 
to the temperature and colour of the milk to be sold and 
36 Documentos relativos al proyecto de convenio que el gobierno 
inqles presento al espanol el aflo de 1840 para declarar libres a los  
ne•ros im•ortados de Africa des lies del 30 de octubre de 1820 and 
Acuerdo de la Junta de Fomento sobre manumisiOn de los negros  
introducidos desde el afto 1820, reprod. 
in E. Torres-Cuevas and E. Reyes, op.cit., pp.192-198. See also 
"Informe dado al Excmo Sr. Capitan General por una persona 
respetable de La Habana sobre la emancipacion de los bozales, 21 de 
octubre de 1841", Appendix V in C. Madan, LLamamiento de la isla de 
Cuba a la nacion espaflola, diriqido al Excmo. e Illmo. Set-1°r Don 
Baldomero Espartero (New York: Hallet, 1855). 
37 Informe Reservado del Real Consulado (1841), reprod. in E. 
Torres-Cuevas and E. Reyes, op.cit. : pp.198-201, pp.199-200. 
38 Bando de Gobernacion y Policia de la Isla de Cuba espedido 
por El Escmo.Sr.D. Geronimo Valdes Presidente Gobernador Capitan 
General (Havana: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1842). 
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uncontrolled dogs on streets. The main point, however, was to 
facilitate the registration and control of the black population, 
free and slave. According to article 17, "No master will accept a 
free coloured worker without written evidence from the 
authorities..."; and to article 21 every slave needs a written 
license from the owner or overseer to leave the estate. Article 23 
forbad entry to, and provided for the re-exportation of any black 
either free or slave coming from abroad. Article 40 conferred 
an inhabitant the obligation to detain runaway slaves. Article 77 
required that the overseer of estates must be white. These articles 
were included in the Bando. The Bando was accompanied by a 
Reglamento de Esclavos, InstrucciOn de Pedaneos  and several 
Appendices, among them the Reglamento y Arancel que debe qobernar en 
la captura de Esclavos profugos o cimarrones aprobado por S.M. en 
Real Orden de 20 de Diciembre de 1796..., and Instruccion para las  
causas de vagancia publicada en el ano de 1834 por mandado del Exmo 
Sr. Dr. Miguel Tacon. 
The Slave Code (Reqlamento de Esclavos) included 48 articles. 39 
 In the Circular attached to the Bando, Valdes observed that special 
attention should be given to field slaves. The object was "to seek 
by all possible means the conservation and propagation of these 
hands to ensure a continued humane treatment while keeping them 
under a severe discipline and undisrupted subordination"(my 
stress). 40 The Reglamento covered working practices such as working 
hours on holidays, ordinary days (nine to ten hours) and during 
harvesting (16 hours a day). It provided for the quality and 
quantity of food, clothing, formal marriage, conservation of 
families, and the care of children, the elderly and sick slaves, 
fines for mistreatment, and self-purchase. At the same time the 
Reglamento imposed greater control over the activities and movement 
39 The Reqlamento de Esclavos, included in the Bando, op.cit, 
pp.59 - 68, is also reproduced in H. Pichardo Vinals, op.cit., pp.331- 
340; for an English translation see R.L. Paquette, Sugar is Made 
with Blood. The Conspiracy of la Escalera and the Conflicts between 
Empires over Slavery in Cuba (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 
1988) pp.266-272. 
40 Bando de Gobernacion, op.cit., p.4. 
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of slaves: there were to be licenses to leave the estates, no mixing 
of slaves from different estates nor with free coloureds. 
Most of the proposals suggested during the 1840s were driven by 
growing concern about the balance of black-to-white, and slave-to-
free population. In November, 1843, for the first time a number of 
planters openly questioned the continuation of the slave trade and 
asked for its suppression in a Exposition to the Gobernador General. 
According to the Exposicion de los hacendados de Matanzas the 
measure was necessary for the safety of rural districts. 41 Late in 
December the investigation and suppression of an insurrection on a 
plantation near Matanzas would turn into an island wide 
investigation of a suspected mass slave conspiracy. This event, the 
so-called Escalera conspiracy, despite all the controversy 
enveloping it, conveys accurately the paranoia provoked over the 
previous years by the influx of African slaves and by British 
abolitionist activity in Cuba. As Murray pointed out, "the black 
discontent building up within Cuba was matched by the growth of a 
paranoid fear of race revolution among the whites. When the 
explosion came, the force of repression produced by this paranoia 
far exceeded the reality of any of the slave uprisings which had 
occurred". 42 The investigation and suppression of the supposed 
conspiracy was entrusted by Captain General O'Donnell, Valdes' 
replacement, to military commissions which operated with unlimited 
powers in all the major areas of Cuba. The savage repression of 
anyone even remotely connected to the conspiracy resulted in an 
unknown number of deaths from torture. Hundreds were imprisoned, 
deported or condemned to death. Free blacks were one of the most 
persecuted groups. 43 According to Pastrana, whites took advantage 
41 ExposiciOn de los hacendados de Matanzas al Gobernador 
Capitan General, pidiendo la supresion de la trata (1843), reprod. 
in E. Torres-Cuevas and E. Reyes, op.cit., pp.202-205. 
42 D.R. Murray, op.cit., p.173. 
43 Coleccion de los Fallos Pronunciados por una Seccion de la 
Comision Militar establecida en la ciudad de Matanzas Para conocer 
de la causa de conspiraciOn de la gente de color, Matanzas: Imprenta 
del Gobierno, 1844; on la Escalera see R.L. Paquette, op.cit. New 
provisions were add to the 1842 Reglamento de Esclavos and slaves 
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of the widespread panic inasland, first, to protect slave interests 
by neutralizing by means of terror slave rebellions and the effects 
of British abolitionist activity; second to extinguish the recent-
born coloured petit bourgeoisie and intellectuals, either as 
economic competitors and as potential anti-slavery ideologues; and 
third to avoid the diffusion of abolitionist ideas among whites. 44 
 Fear of further uprisings and British intervention moved Cuban 
planters to ask for more effective measures to stop the slave trade. 
Spanish politicians then worked to fashion the Law of Abolition and 
Repression of the Slave Trade sanctioned on March 2, 1845. 45 The law 
was an attempt to stop the slave trade and for a short-time it 
achieved its aims. However, the initiative did not represent a 
challenge to slavery. On the contrary, it was clearly committed to 
the preservation of slavery. Article 9 ensured slaveowners that they 
would not be questioned on the origin of their slaves, that is 
whether any had been illegally imported since 1820. 46 
were even more restricted in their movements and faced severe 
punishments. These were included in the Slave Regulations of 1844, 
which also instructed owners and their representatives to be more 
vigilant on the estates. For instance they should "arrest and send 
to the district judge any person of colour, free or slave, and any 
suspicious-looking white man" who comes on the estate without a 
letter or paper signed by the person who sent him. The same measures 
applied to any peddlers. Owners should order only whites to be 
employed as carters, muleteers, porters; white employees should make 
up at least 5% of the equivalent of the coloured labourers. These 
regulations also imposed strict control on the movement of free 
people of colour. See J.M. Zamora y Coronado Biblioteca de  
Legislacion Ultramarine en forma de Diccionario Alfabetico 7 vols 
(Madrid: Imprenta de Alegria y Charlain, 1844-1849) 3, pp.139-141; 
these regulations are translated into English in R.L. Paquette, 
op.cit., pp.273-274. 
44 J. Jimenez Pastrana. Los chinos en las luchas por la 
liberacion Cubana (1847-1930) (Havana: Instituto de Historia, 1963) 
p.13 and 14. Same opinion, see P. Deschamps Chapeaux, El negro en la 
economia Habanera del siglo XIX (Havana: Union de Escritores y 
Artistas de Cuba, 1971) pp.24-26. 
45 J.M. Zamora y Coronado, op.cit., 4, pp.467-469; the law is 
reproduced in H. Pichardo Viflals, op.cit., pp.341-344. 
46 On the law see A.F. Corwin op.cit., pp.84-87; see also D.R. 
Murray, op.cit., chapter 10. 
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At this time, several pamphlets were published addressing the 
problem of the end of the slave trade and abolition of slavery. 
Besides growing fears about the black/white population balance, the 
debate also revealed a growing discontentmefit- with Spanish rule and 
its policy regarding those problems. Spain had showed itself 
ambiguous and weak when facing British pressures against the trans-
Atlantic slave trade. The abolition of slavery in surrounding 
countries and the growing international antislavery movement were 
viewed as real challenges to the existence of slavery in the island. 
However, the continuation of slavery in Cuba was viewed as essential 
to the preservation of Spanish rule. The uncertain and manipulative 
Spanish policy on the slavery and the trade drew Cuba closer to the 
United States of America. The powerful neighbour represented not 
only a promising secure market for Cuban sugar but could be a more 
assertive supporter for the continuance of slavery in Cuba. 
Annexionist ideas would spread in the island during the 1840s and 
1850s, and would decline only with the American Civil war and the 
end of slavery in the United States of America. The political 
connection between the end/continuance of the slave trade and the 
Spanish colonial rule was underscored by the political activist and 
writer, Jose Antonio Saco, in several pamphlets. 47 
Saco, a representative of the Creole culture, believed that the 
slave trade and slavery were an obstacle to Cuban autonomy. In his 
view, free labour was cheaper and more efficient than slave labour, 
although he conceded that with the cheap prices of slaves at the 
time the system was temporarily more profitable than free labour. 48 
 However, the cheap price of slaves would not be permanent. In his 
view, sugar could be better produced under the system of a white 
"colonate. Free labourers were ingenious and diligent and could be 
47 J.A. Saco, Obras. Compiladas por primera vez y publicada en 
dos tomos, por un paisano del autor 2 vols,(New York: Libreria 
Americana y Estrangera de R. Lockwood, 1853) 
48 " La supresion del trefico de escravos africanos en la Isla 
de Cuba, examinada com relacion a su agricultura y seguridad" in J. 
A. Saco, Coleccion de papeles cientificos, histOricos, politicos y 
de otros ramos sobre la Isla de Cuba, reprint. 3 vols,(Havana: 
Direccion General de Cultura, 1930) II, p.115. 
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easily dismissed. By contrast, slaves were indolent, undisciplined, 
and the owner was charged with several expenses in event of 
sickness, flights, capture, christening, marriage, and funerals. 
Free labourers would not steal sugar and provisions, and would not 
rebel. 49 Saco supported the abolition of the slave trade and 
believed that slavery was not essential to the Cuban economy. Above 
all he maintained that the continued trade in Africans was a threat 
to the security of the island, either because of potential dangers 
from the large black population or because constant British 
intervention could result in conflicts involving Spain, the United 
States of America and Britain. To reduce Cuban planter anxieties on 
the issue, he argued many times that there was no connection between 
the abolition of the slave trade and the abolition of slavery. 50 In 
his view, the end of the slave trade did not mean the end of 
slavery, on the contrary, it could provoke an increase in the value 
of slaves and in their numbers by self-reproduction as had happened 
in other countries. 51 
By contrast, contemporary writing in Spain by the distinguished 
Spanish scientist, historian and representative of peninsular 
culture in Cuba, Ramon de la Sagra believed that the end of the 
slave trade would provoke the end of slavery. 52 Liberal Spanish laws 
on manumission, the system of coartacion and the high death rate 
would eventually contribute to its end. 53 Like Saco, Sagra was 
against the continuance of the slave trade. Further, he believed its 
49 J.A. Saco, " La supresion...", op.cit., pp.118-119; and same 
author, "Mi Primera Pregunta? La Abolicion del Comercio de esclavos 
africanos arruinara 6 atrasara la agricultura cubana? Dedicada a los 
hacendados de la Isla de Cuba" (Madrid: Imprenta de Don Marcelino 
Calero, 1837); also reproduced in J.A. Saco, Obras.,op.cit., 1:75-
97, pp.88-89. 
50 Repeated in various articles, see J.A Saco, "Mi primera 
Pregunta", op.cit., p.91; and "La supresi6n del trafico", as 
reproduced in J.A. Saco, Obras, op.cit., 1:171-232, p.174. 
51 J.A. Saco, "Mi Primera Pregunta", op.cit., p.91 and subseq. 
52 R. de la Sagra, Estudios coloniales con aplicacion a la Isla 
de Cuba (Madrid: Dionisio Hidalgo, 1845). 
53 R. de la Sagra, op.cit., p.78. 
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end was inevitable for it was universally condemned and the treaties 
demanded it. In his view the organization of free labour relations 
in Cuba would have at least two beneficial purposes. From one side, 
it would led to the development of a "scientific agriculture", to 
the reorganization of rural land property and to the application of 
capital invested in the trade to extend cultivation. From another 
side, it would provide slaves with education, moral sentiments and 
family ties. And it would change the idea of labour from "pain" into 
a "condition inherent to the social nature of humanity". In slavery, 
"degradation and brutality" were necessary to keep obedience and 
peace. It lacked ingenium cleverness and love of work, essential 
elements for the prosperity. 5=1 In his view, Cuba should follow the 
new labour system developed by the Dutch in Java. The planter would 
no longer control both the industrial and agricultural sides of 
sugar production. The latter process should be conceded to free, 
independent cultivators who would sell their products to the mill 
owners  
At the same time, the fiscal of the Superightendencia General 
Delegada de Real Hacienda, Vicente Vazquez Queipo, also argued 
against the continuance of the slave trade and proposed a gradual 
extinction of slavery. He presented his report, concerning the 
promotion of white population and gradual slave emancipation in the 
island of Cuba, as an attempt "to preserve the prosperity of the 
island without weakening the ties with the metropolis". 56 Vazquez 
was not concerned with Saco's preoccupation about the need for white 
immigration to neutralize the growing number of slaves. Recent slave 
conspiracies, explained Vazquez, had produced a "healthy" shift in 
public opinion concerning the necessity of promoting white 
R. de la Sagra, op.cit., pp.15-16. 
55 R. de la Sagra, op.cit., pp.80-86. 
56 V. Vazquez Queipo, Informe fiscal sobre fomento de la 
poblacion blanca en la Isla de Cuba y emancipaciOn progresiva de la 
esclava con una breve resefia de las reformas y modificaciones que  
para consequirlo convendria establecer en la legislacion y 
constitucion coloniales: presentado a la Superitendencia General  
Deleqada de Real Hacienda en diciembre de 1844 por el fiscal de la 
misma (Madrid: Imprenta de J. Martin Alegria, 1845). 
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population growth but the alarms of the abolitionists were 
groundless. Fears about black uprisings were for the most part ill to founded. The rats lack to white in Cuba was very smallontrasted 
to other countries. Moreover the permanent Spanish garrison was 
sufficient to put down any insubordination from the black 
population, and to ensure the tranquillity of the white population. 
In his view, white population should be promoted as a measure to 
increase the general population and to populate deserted areas of 
the island. According to Vazquez, slave labour was much cheaper than 
free labour. 
Criticizing the Council for Economic Development's policy on the 
promotion of white immigration, Vazquez observed that the Council 
misunderstood points such as that of the increase of hands and  the 
replacement of the black population by the white population. 57 
 Promotion of European labourers to work on sugar plantations in the 
manner that haA been attempted by the Council was inappropriate, 
not least because whites preferred non-rural activities. The 
economic viability of the Council's plans was questionable in 
Vazquez opinion. There was the example of previous experiences. The 
high price of European labourers would cause the ruin of sugar 
plantations and besides abuses of engagement, there was the 
promiscuity to which young men and women would be exposed on estates 
where they live together with the black population. In his view "the 
important point now is not to increase production but reduce 
production costs; and this cannot be achieved by the immigration of 
European labourers". 58 Vazquez proposal was to substitute whites for 
the black population by promoting the immigration of families. "True 
colonists", he observed, working their own land. To achieve this, he 
proposed radical changes. Among them the separation of sugar 
processing from cultivation; the later process would be entrusted to 
small cultivators  
op.cit., p.14. 57 	V. Vazquez Queipo, 
58 	V. Vazquez Queipo, op.cit., p.28. 
59 	V. Vazquez Queipo, op.cit., p.44. 
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Together with the increase of the white population, Vazquez 
suggested the gradual extinction of the slave population. For 
Vazquez, the end of the slave trade would produce an increase in the 
slave population due to the promotion of marriages and more humane 
treatment. Thus, the gradual extinction of slavery, without 
"resorting to the violent, unjust and political means of sudden 
emancipation", should begin with the creation of taxes for non-field 
slaves. 60 After that, taxes should be extended to other slaves. By 
this means "to gradually impose taxes on slaves until the cost of 
using slaves would be equal to that of employing white wage 
labour... so ending advantages of employing [slaves] at which point 
their price would naturally decrease easing manumission through 
self-purchase". 61 And Vazquez added, that was a way of encouraging 
the slaves to work diligently, and of liberating the island from the 
"leprosy that corrodes her" . 62 This plan, Vazquez conceded, would 
take about one century, "but that was just a moment in the life of 
a nation"! 63 After the ending of slavery the government could then 
‘c think about the security of the island. AntagonteGA  and distinct, the 
races could hardly be expected to live together. Expelling all the 
freedmen would be unjust and violent. Therefore, Vazquez Queipo's 
proposal was to commute all prison penalties for black people into 
exile; they should leave the country within specified time." 
On several occasions, Saco criticized Vazquez' entire plan, and 
especially his weak commitment to the end of slavery. Both agreed on 
the need to end the slave trade and to whiten the population. For 
Saco, this was vital for the safety of Cuba. And while Saco believed 
in an eventual assimilation of the black population through a 
process of interracial marriage, Vazquez was clearly against it. He 
considered miscegenation would produce individuals endowed with the 
60 V. Vazquez Queipo, op.cit., p.56. 
61 V. Vazquez Queipo, op.cit., pp.56-57. 
62 V. Vazquez Queipo, op.cit, p.57. 
63 V. Vazquez Queipo, op.cit., p.58. 
64 V. Vazquez Queipo, op.cit., pp.57-58. 
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worse vices of black race and who aspired to be equal to whites. 65 
 Various means to facilitate mestizaie would be proposed from time to
time during the nineteenth century. It was argued that in addition 
to whitening the island, the production of a mulato population could 
help to increase labour supply. Nevertheless, restrictions on 
interracial marriage would not be lifted until 1881. 66 
When in 1866 the Spanish government called together a meeting 
including delegates from Cuba and Puerto Rico (Junta Informativa de 
Ultramar) to discuss colonial, political and social reforms, the 
debate on slavery moved into the open and the ideal of gradual 
emancipation surfaced again. The government agenda for the Colonial 
Reform Commission did not at first include the issue of the 
abolition of slavery, although the means of regulating the work of 
the coloured and Asian population and the means of facilitating 
immigration were topics to be discussed. 67 
The government interrogatorio designed to shape discussion of the 
labour regulation is a good indication of the government's 
intentions with regard to slavery and the reorganization of labour. 
Concerning slaves, the government posed the following questions: i) 
whether it would be desirable to establish missions to administer to 
65 V. Vazquez Queipo, op.cit., p.33; J. A Saco, Carta de un  
Cubano a un amigo suyo en que se hacen alqunas observaciones al  
informe fiscal sobre fomento de la poblacion blanca en la Isla de  
Cuba, etc., presentado en la Habana en diciembre de 1844 a la  
Superintendencia General Deleqada de Real Hacienda, por el Sr. D.  
Vicente Vazquez Queipo, Fiscal de la misma, y publicado en Madrid en  
1845" (Sevilla: Imprenta de J. Gomez, 1847) and Replica de D. Jose  
Antonio Saco a la contestacion del Senor Fiscal de la Real Hacienda  
de la Habana, D. Vicente Vazquez Queipo, en el exame del Informe  
sobre el fomento de la poblaciOn blanca, etc. en la Isla de Cuba  
(Madrid: Imprenta de "La Publicidad", 1847) both reproduced in 
Obras, op.cit., pp.233-275 and pp.277-341 respectively. 
66 Jose Antonio Saco advocated the foment of mulato population 
to increase the labour supply, cf. J. and V. Martinez Alier, Cuba:  
economia y sociedad (Madrid: Ruedo Iberico, 1972) p.14; the 
segregationist policy and the manipulative role of the Spanish over 
the issue, see same work especially chapters I and II. 
67 Informacion sobre reformas en Cuba y Puerto Rico 2 tomos (New 
York: Hallet y Breen, 1867). 
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the religious needs of the slaves; ii) the means to promote marriage 
among and good treatment of slaves (prizes, sex balance on 
plantations, separation of families, etc); iii) how should working 
hours be regulated; iv) whether existing disciplinary measures 
should be preserved; v) the process of coartacion and the use of 
labour of coartados. 68 The abolition of slavery was not in question. 
Most of those concerns reflected rather the general sentiment that 
with the end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade (the final bill to 
stop the slave trade has been discussed at this time), efforts 
should be taken to preserve and upgrade the existing slave 
population. The questionnaire also reflected another general feeling 
that emancipation was eventually inevitable and there should be some 
preparation for it. Coartacion, the process whereby a slave 
gradually acquired his freedom, was the way to assure a smooth, 
transitory period to prepare the slave for eventual freedom. And so 
too would religious education and regulations constraining to engage 
work. 
Provisions about free blacks, Asian workers and immigrants were 
also related to the end of the slave trade and anticipated problems 
of labour supply. Concerning free blacks, the interrogatorio posed 
two questions: i) what measures should be adopted to restraine 
vagrancy; and if it was convenient to exile vagrants from the island 
ii) whether it was convenient to oblige free blacks to work and on 
which bases. On the Asian workers, the government was concerned 
about i) measures to assure their good treatment; ii) whether labour 
contracts should be reformed; iii) the convenience of replacing 
corporal punishment by fines on this c, Lrlass'4ffender; iv) their 
situation after contracts and tunder whishrnirditions should they be 
allowed to remain in the country after the expiration of contracts?' 
Finally, on white immigration and efforts to find an alternative to 
slave labour: i) what type of immigration was more convenient; ii) 
should it be promoted by the government or private interest; iii) 
should foreign immigrants be admitted on equal terms with those from 




The issue of the future of slavery was forced into the agenda 
when the Puerto Rican delegation presented an explosive manifesto 
calling for immediate abolition of slavery. M The Puerto Rican 
delegates refused to accept the thrust of the existing agenda as the 
whole questionnaire presumed the existence of slavery in perpetuity. 
The manifesto, presented by Ruiz Belvis, J. Acosta and F. Quinones, 
demanded therefore immediate abolition in Puerto Rico, with or 
without compensation, with or without labour regulation 
(reglamentacion del trabajo). 
The proposal caused a great commotion among the commissioners. 
The government delegates protested that abolition was not on the 
agenda. Cuban delegates agreed and stressed that the Committee 
should not consider the proposition from Puerto Rico. According to 
a Cuban manifesto signed by J. Estefani, Manuel de Armas, F. 
Jimenez, Jose Argudin, V. Vazquez Queipo, Ramon de la Sagra among 
others, the Puerto Rican proposal was dangerous to the tranquillity 
and interests of both islands. Abolition in Puerto Rico would 
naturally affect Cuba. 71 In a separate vote, Manuel de Armas feared 
the consequences of an immediate abolition. What would become, he 
asked, of 360,000 Cuban slaves, all of them without religious 
instruction, predisposed to ,I1115: vagrancy, inclined to savage 
instincts and in open opposition to the whites? Could they be freed 
suddenly without ruining the island? And, moreover, what if they 
ally to the others "466,680 of the same class existing in the 
Antilles" and attempted to destroy their former owners? In his view, 
abolition should be a gradual process, preparing the conditions in 
which slaves would find "moral and material restraints to subjugate 
the overflow of their passion". 12 Also abolition implied 
I, pp.43-46; 	A.F. 	Corwin, 	op.cit., 69 
p.192. 
Informacion, 	op.cit., 
70 Informacion, 	op.cit., I, pp.47-48. 
71 Informacion, 	op.cit., I, pp.54-55. 
72 Informacion, 	op.cit., I, p.58. 
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indemnification and there were no means of providing it. His opinion 
on the issue was very clear. All slaves had to be prepared a 'rtheir 
future "emancipation and prosperity". They should have religious 
instruction and be trained for family life and labour. That would 
require time and financial compensation from the government. 
Besides, there should be respect for the legal rights already 
acquired by planters and measures against "vagrancy or crime" that 
might come from an immediate emancipation. 73 
Even the more reformist deputies from Cuba, such as Pozos Dulces, 
Echeverria, Azcdrate, Terry were reluctant to endorseYPuerto Rican 
proposition. In their "Contestacion sobre la manera de reglamentar 
el trabajo", they pointed out that circumstances in Puerto Rico were 
distinct from those in Cuba. The fortunate circumstances of Puerto 
Rico, had succeed g demonstratPthe practical advantage of free 
labour, the coexistence and cooperation of the white and black races 
in agricultural tasks", were not present in Cuba. 74 The more complex 
situation in Cuba made it impossible to realize abolition 
immediately. They did not seek the perpetuation of slavery in the 
island. However, they believed that abolition should be phased to 
allow time to prevent disturbances "in the march of civilization and 
Informacion, op.cit., I, pp.62-65. 
74 	• Circumstances of Puerto Rico were different from Cuba. 
Although this Spanish colony had also enjoyed an economic boom 
during the first decades of the nineteenth century, it had not been 
flooded with slaves. Sugar estates were smaller, less capitalized 
and technically more backward than in Cuba. There had been a steady 
mixing of races and miscegenation helped to encourage manumission. 
In 1860 slaves numbered only 41,746 in an overall population of 
541,445. Slave imports ceased around 1845; in 1849 the Spanish 
authorities and Puerto Rican hacendados inaugurated compulsory 
labour, through the Reglamento de Jornaleros, to force the large 
peasant population to work on the plantations as wage labourers. 
According to Sacarano, the Reglamento imposed through a series of 
coercive measures "to hold down the price of wage labour, and more 
important, to force jornaleros into a slave like productive system 
on the plantations" (p.34), see F.A. Scarano, Sugar and Slavery in 
Puerto Rico. The Plantation Economy of Ponce, 1800-1850 (Madison: 
The University Press of Wisconsin Press, 1984). Final abolition of 
slavery would occur earlier in Puerto Rico, in 1873. 
249 
the moral and material progress of their country". 75 They also 
believed the issue "relevant to the future prosperity and 
conservation of the island". Abolition could not be treated in 
isolation but should be implemented in harmony with political 
reforms. As Corwin observed, the creoles expected to liberate 
themselves from Spain before freeing their slaves. 76 
The majority of Cuban commissioners believed in the eventual 
extinction of slavery. The great mortality among slaves, the 
negative rate of procreation and the liberality of Spanish 
legislation towards self-purchase would all contribute to this end. 
Some even agreed on the need to abolish slavery, given the 
anticipated dangers of Africanisation of the island and of losing 
suddenly their property rights if Spain surrender to British 
pressures. Equally important was the possibility of a boycott of 
slave products by the United States of America, already Cuba's major 
market. This issue had already been raised in the United States 
Congress. 77 However, whatsoever the reasons for abolition, as their 
Brazilian counterparts, most Cuban planters insisted that any 
movement towards emancipation should be gradual, preparing masters 
and slaves for the new future and in order to prevent any 
disturbance of plantation production. This was very clear on the 
last day of the meeting (April 27, 1867) when they submitted their 
project for slave emancipation in Cuba. Any proposal should try to 
avoid the dangers of creating a great expectation of immediate 
freedom on the part of slaves. It was also necessary to avoid the 
disruption of labour on the plantations and the possible "flood of 
ignorant and undisciplined hordes into urban areas" if ex-slaves 
abandoned the fields. There IfliW'also fears about labour costs and 
the ability of hacendados to pay wages. "We believe that taking into 
account all these concerns, it is possible to consider a project of 
emancipation [without offending justice] not only with regard to the 
75 Informacion, op.cit., I, pp.73-75, and A.F. Corwin, op.cit., 
p.194. 
76 A.F. Corwin, op.cit., p.195. 
77 A.F. Corwin, op.cit., p.203. 
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slaves as a group, but with respect to each individual slave". A 
project that would leave them "for a certain period subject to a  
discipline, similar to that of serfs in the middle ages (...) 
gradually introducing to the estates a new regime to allow owners 
time to get used to the new workers, to find suitable ways of making 
'needman inclined to remain on the estate, and to guarantee that the 
freedman achieve his freedom through existing, secure means..." (my 
stress). 78 The Cuban commissioners also recommended the bases on 
which a project of emancipation should be presented by the 
government. The most important recommendations were i) the 
positively suppression of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, ii) free 
birth while guaranteeing the labour of the freeborn, iii) that no 
plan on emancipation would be decreed without compensation nor 
without previous consultation with bodies on the island. 79 
Coartacion would be the way of facilitating individual freedom, a 
goal acquired progressively through labour and thrift. 80 
The plan of emancipation elaborated by the Cuban delegates to the 
commission included among other% provisions, freedom for the elderly 
and free birth, guaranteeing to the planters the patronship over the 
free born till the age of 18 or 21 for women and men respectively. 
The main route to freedom would be through coartacion sucesiva y 
anuales and individual manumission financed by lotteries. An average 
price of 450 pesos was suggested for coartacion and compensation. 
The main points of the plan were: first, slaves would be freed but 
not suddenly; second, it would prevent the possibility of any 
private initiative to free all slaves simultaneously; third, the 
gracia of the coartacion would be equally distributed across all 
regions of the island; fourth, preference in manumission would be 
given to older slaves but there was a probability that any slave 
could get his/her freedom; fifth, based on the coartaci6n sucesivas, 
freedmen would remain seven years subjected to the discipline and 
78 InformaciOn, op.cit., II, pp.285-286. 
79 InformaciOn, op.cit., II, p.287, and A.F. Corwin, op.cit., 
pp.203-204. 
80 InformaciOn, op.cit., I, p.70. 
251 
the masters would have time to prepare to the substitution of the 
system of labour; sixth, coartacion was a customary practice and not 
a dangerous innovation and would thus contribute to tranquillize the 
slaves as since all would surely expect to be freed; eighth, the 
small but regular payments to the planters for the manumissions of 
their slaves would give them yearly the resources from which to pay 
the wages to the new class of labourers. 81 
The Cuban plan of gradual abolition presented to the Committee 
received the approval of a majority of the members and was 
recommended to the Minister for the colonies. 82 However, the failure 
of Cuban delegates to secure major reforms would soon become 
apparent. Besides an extensive opposition to any move towards 
emancipation within Cuba, the Spanish government was reluctant to 
lose Cuban planter support and the revenues from the-Ant4-1-len-island 
that might result from the anticipated disruption of the sugar 
industry following the initiative. Also Spain could not afford any 
scheme of compensation for slave property. Together with those 
"social reforms" Cuban delegates had also asked for economic and 
political reforms which would also remain unanswered. Over the 
following decades, attempts to link general emancipation and 
individual emancipation became more evident as part of the 
policy implemented with the approval of Moret Law in Spain. This was 
also a feature of the Brazilian case. 
81 Informacion, op.cit., II, pp.288-294. 
82 A.F. Corwin, op.cit., p.205. 
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5.2. Brazil  
Superficially, Brazil and Cuba shared common anxieties. At world 
level, abolitionist sentiments were growing and there was an 
increased pressure to end the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Internal 
conditions also seemed similar, given the rapid growth in demand for 
plantation labour and the perceived need to secure a gradual process 
of reform so as to prevent disruption of production and to ensure 
social stability. 
However, pressures to end the African trade and the influence of 
the abolitionist movement had a different impact on plans for slave 
emancipation and concepts of free labour in the two areas. Attitudes 
to the black population and the creation of a nation also differed. 
The major factor was the colonial situation of Cuba. The abolition 
of the Cuban slave trade involved mostly questions about the 
security of the island, facing American and British threats of 
intervention. Spain confronted a difficult dilemma. How to preserve 
its "jewel" and a profitable trade dominated by Spaniards in the 
face of powerful external pressures. Cubans, in turn, feared the 
abolitionist movement in the surrounding islands and the growth of 
the insular black population. But above all Cuban planters were 
driven by the need to secure cheap and reliable labour for the 
expanding sugar economy. Facing the threats over the African trade, 
immigrant labourers were required to supplement slave labour. As 
long as Spain supported the planters interests on the issue, it 
would have their support within the colony as well as the revenues 
from the sugar colony. These circumstances affected Cuban and 
Spanish perspectives about the future of freedmen as well as about 
immigration policies. In Cuba, as well as in Brazil, both themes 
were clos'related to a growing labour demand and to prevailing 
racist ideas. But the circumstances of colonial Cuba made the issues 
more political and manipulable. Spanish threats that "Cuba would be 
Spanish or African" ("Cuba sera espanola o africana") influenced 
profoundly the choices and attitudes of Cubans and their views on 
"national identity". In this sense, when Cubans supported white 
immigration in the 1840s, they did so fearing the continued flow of 
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African slaves that was favoured by Spain. The origin of the 
immigrants was however controlled by Spain who did not want to 
diminish the presence of Spaniards. Spanish policy of segregating 
the distinct races within the island was designed to prevent the 
formation of a free mixed class "more dangerous than the black 
slaves", and to control various groups within the island, to better 
manipulate them. This situation would be repeatedly denounced at 
that time and would become more explicit during the struggle for 
Cuban independence at the end of the 1860s. 
In Brazil, debates about the abolition of the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade coincided with the process of Independence. Most early 
emancipation plans brought together issues relating to the 
consequences of the end of the African trade and ideas about the 
composition of the new Brazilian nation. The time was opportune to 
devise an emancipation strategy attuned to the needs of a new 
society. In this sense, the search for alternative labour supply 
would be clearly shaped by attempts to fashion a "national 
identity". Thus, in contrast with Cuba, plans of emancipation in 
Brazil almost always included the promotion of white immigration to 
solve the labour problem and to "whitening" the population. But more 
than that, white immigration was devised as a feasible substitute 
for slave labour, that is the physical replacement of slaves. 
Vergueiro's experiments and immigration policies pursued in the late 
nineteenth century clearly demonstrate this. In addition, Brazilian 
emancipation plans almost always touched on the future of freedmen. 
Although they did not go further than propose "measures against 
vagrancy" and "obligation to work" as a way of integrating former 
slaves into Brazilian society, it was a distinctive feature in 
contrast with Cuban plans which either avoided the issue or proposed 
the physical removal of the coloured population. Although this later 
point was also included in some Brazilian proposals, it did not 
acquire the emphasis that it did in Cuba. 
These points can be better clarified by an examination of early 
emancipation plans in Brazil. To facilitate a comparison with Cuba, 
the plans will be analyzed according to three main points: when and 
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how emancipation should take place; proposals on the future of 
former slaves; and alternatives to slave labour. 
From the beginning of the century, the issues of the 
end/continuation of the trans-Atlantic trade and slavery were linked 
to the need of forming a homogeneous, integrated, Brazilian society. 
On several occasions, the debate about the consequences of an 
eventual abolition of the trade served as a pretext for the re-
arrangement of the various groups within the society. This was the 
case, for instance, of a Memoir presented by the Paulista Antonio 
Rodriguez Vellozo de Oliveira to the Portuguese sovereign in 1810. 83 
 Oliveira, who studied Law in Coimbra and later would be a member of 
the Council of State of the Emperor D. Pedro I, was concerned about 
the existing composition of the Brazilian society. From one side, 
there were a great number of free, poor Brazilians, who lacked land 
and could aspire to be no more than tenants or sharecroppers. From 
another side, there were the Indians dispersed in the backlands. 
Finally, there were "savage" African slaves, who had cost 
substantial amounts of money but lived for only "eight to ten 
years" . 84 Oliveira was also concerned about the future of slavery 
and the effects on labour supply of the treaty recently agreed with 
Great Britain (February 19, 1810) which stipulated the cooperation 
of the Portuguese government for the gradual abolition of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade. Confronted with all these problems, Oliveira 
suggested a plan to solve the labour problem involving free, poor 
Brazilians, Indians, freedmen and European immigrants. Vellozo 
supported several schemes for the settlement of free poor Brazilians 
and European immigrants _ seeds, monetary advances, exemption from 
83 The Mem6ria was presented in 1810 but only published in 1822, 
when Vellozo de Oliveira was a member of D. Pedro I's Council of 
State. Version used here, Antonio Rodriguez Vellozo de Oliveira, 
Memoria sobre o melhoramento da provincia de S. Paulo, applicavel em 
grande parte a todas as outras provincias do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: 
Nacional, 1822); reprinted (sao Paulo: Governo do Estado, 1978). 
Vellozo's proposal is commented in C.M.M. de Azevedo, Onda Negra,  
medo branco. 0 Negro no imaginario das elites, seculo XIX (Rio de 
Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1987) pp.37-39. 
84 C.M.M. de Azevedo, op.cit., p.38. 
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land taxes for ten years would have to be granted. 85 He believed 
that free labour was more productive than slave labour." The 
"spirit of association" and "mutual aid", exemplified by the 
mutirao, form of collective labour that existed in cotton production 
as well as the task of clearing forests, should be promoted by the 
government. 87 Although supporting the continuation of the trade and 
the "rescue" of Africans, he argued for the granting of freedom to 
all children born to slave mothers. Slave children should be raised 
by the owner, who would be entitled to their services until the age 
of 25 years. He also supported legislation to facilitate self-
purchase. 88 
The adverse consequences of a sudden end of the African trade and 
slavery were cause of concern for the baiano Domingo Alves Moniz 
Barreto. 89 In 1817, he presented a Memoir to D. Joao VI where losses 
of profits and the stagnation of agriculture were predicted as 
inevitable. To prevent this he proposed gradual emancipation coupled 
with measures against vagrancy. He envisaged a society of 
industrious, useful, worker* Barreto believed that with good 
treatment and the encouragement of marriage amongst slaves, the 
consequences of the end of the African slave trade could be eased. 
Masters should be obliged to free all slaves who could afford their 
self-purchase price." Self-purchase was the "healthy and cautious" 
way of gradually ending the trans-Atlantic slave trade and slavery 
without disrupting production. This was the way to prevent the 
85 A.R.V. de Oliveira, op.cit., pp.95-98. 
86 A.R.V. de Oliveira, op.cit., p.101. 
87 A.R.V. de Oliveira, op.cit., p.105. 
88 A.R.V. de Oliveira,op.cit, p.93. 
89 D.A.B. Moniz Barreto, Memoria sobre a abolicao do commercio 
da Escravatura (Rio de Janeiro: Imparcial de Brito, 1837). The 
chapter about means of extinguishing slavery is reprod. in A.M. 
Perdigao Malheiro, A escravidao no Brasil: ensaio  
historico,juridico, social 3rd ed. (PetrOpolis: Vozes,1976) II, 
appendix, pp.226-227. 
90 D.M. Barreto, op.cit., pp.28-33. 
256 
spread of vagrancy as well as to allow time to formulate mechanisms 
to encourage freedmen to work. Time was also necessary to find an 
alternative source of labourers, possibly involving free Africans. 
This was a task to be carried out by the state. 91 The state should 
also devise regulations to compel all the others who lived without 
occupation, among them Indians, beggars, criminals and disabled to 
work _ that is all those who did not have gainful employment. 92 
With the Independence suggestions for a new order of the 
Brazilian society became more frequent. The abolition of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade lay at the centre of the whole discussion. 
Abolition of slavery itself although always on stage _ 
appeared as something very distant and requiring prior social and 
economic adjustments. Cautious steps to avoid political and economic 
disruption were essential. Most of the proposals therefore were 
primarily devised to cope with the adverse short-term consequences 
anticipated from the end of slave trade. The principal suggestion 
was that planters should pay more attention to the physical needs of 
their slaves so as to prolong their working existence. Good 
treatment, incentives to natural reproduction and the creation of 
families, as well as more humane forms of punishment were proposed 
to achieve this end. This implied that the state should supervise 
relations between masters and slaves. These were critical times. 
Fears of rebellion, the belief that African labour was only 
effective under coercion and that when freed ex-slaves would return 
to barbarism and viciousness, a tendency enhanced by the great 
amount of free land, meant that labour would require strict 
supervision. All these views shaped potential patterns of slave 
emancipation. Policies tended to emphasise individual manumission, 
according to merit and subjected to the master's will _ which 
could be revoked in the event of slave ingratitude or a loss of 
order and discipline. Self-purchase was the mechanism usually 
devised to control the route towards an eventual process of slave 
91 D.M. Barreto, op.cit., p.37. 
92 D.M. Barreto, op.cit., p.42; see also C.M. de Azevedo, 
op.cit., pp.48-49. 
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emancipation. Moreover, individual manumission was considered the 
ideal mechanism to transform the slave into a diligent free 
labourer. Contracts would be imposed on those to be freed either 
before or after being manumitted. At the same time policy makers 
were concerned with the constitution of the nation, in terms of the vi\le racial composition of population and the need to unite all groups. 
Slave uprisings and their associations with political disputes 
triggered by the process of Independence raised fears of secession. 
The great increase of the black population inspired visions of a 
"Black Empire". 
In a Memoir published in 1821, the mineiro Joao Severiano Maciel 
da Costa, subsequently Marquise of Queluz, expressed his concerns 
about the evils caused by the continued slave trade and the 
institution of slavery. 93 According to Costa, the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade and the system of slavery itself had adversely 
influenced habits of labour in general. He pointed out that slavery 
had turned the free population against industrious labour. 
Innumerable white and mixed-race families regarded manual labour as 
a matter for slaves and consequently lived in idleness, misery and 
immorality. Hardly any improvement was to be expected from slave 
labour, from labour performed by forced and unhappy men. "The body 
can be dominated but not the will; without free will, industrious 
behaviour does not exist". 94 Costa was also concerned about the 
"true population" of the Empire, which could not rely on a mass of 
negroAt slaves. They were barbarians by birth, education and life 
style; they lacked culture and property; they had no interest in 
93 J.S. Maciel da Costa, Memoria sobre a necessidade de abolir  
a introducao dos escravos Africanos no Brasil; sobre o modo e  
condicoes com que esta abolicao se deve fazer; e sobre os meios de 
remediar a falta de bravos que ela pode ocasionar, (Coimbra: 
Imprensa da Universidade, 1821); commented in E.V. da Costa, Da 
Senzala a ColOnia 2nd ed. (sao Paulo: Ciencias Humanas, 1982) 
pp.326-329; and C.M. de Azevedo, op.cit., p.40. Maciel da Costa was 
governor of the French Guyana from 1809 to 1817, president of the 
province of Bahia in 1825-26, and served as minister several times 
during the 1820s, see E.V. da Costa, Da Senzala a Colonia, op.cit., 
p.326. 
94 E.V. da Costa, op.cit., p.327. 
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social relations, they responded only to the fear of punishment. By 
their very condition, slaves were the enemies of the whites. The 
true population of any Empire should be a great mass of citizens 
faithfully concerned about the conservation and prosperity of the 
state. 95 
Maciel da Costa recognized the evils produced by slavery. Society 
was divided into antagoni de groups which frustrated the formation of 
national identity and threatened the security of the state. In 
addition, slavery was less profitable than free labour. It corrupted 
the idea of "labour". Borrowing from the liberal ideas of authors 
such as Bentham, Smith, Say and others, Costa argued that free 
labour was more profitable than slave labour. Nevertheless, he did 
not agree with an immediate end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade 
and sudden emancipation. He viewed the slave trade as a necessary 
evil that should continue at least for the short-term. With some of 
his contemporary, he believed Africans really obtained some benefit 
coming to the New World. But slaveholders should not hesitate in 
abandoning slave labour if alternatives could be found. But any 
change in labour relations must seek to prevent losses and 
disruptions. Time was an important component. There should be 
sufficient time for planters to recover the capital invested in 
slavery, to search for new labourers and to find new directions to 
their investments. Equally the government needed time to take 
complementary measures to reduce planters' dependence on African 
hands. Costa suggested conserving slaves by means of good treatment 
and incentives to natural reproduction. All classes should be 
encouraged to work..Planters should also employ native Indians and 
foment European immigration. 96  
Similar ideas permeated a Memoir, MemOria sobre a escravatura e  
projeto de Colonizacdo dos Europeus e Pretos da Africa no Imperio do  
Brasil, published a few years later by the baiano Jose Eloy Pessoa 
da Silva. Silva pointed out that all the misfortunes of the country 
95 E.V. da Costa, op.cit., p.328. 
96 E.V. da Costa, op.cit., pp.326-327. 
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were produced by slavery: no good could result from the institution. 
Slaves constituted enemies within. They were immoral and vicious: 
they corrupted society. 97 Exaggerating the evils of slavery and 
praising the advantages of free labour, Silva suggested the gradual  
abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Parallel measures such 
as incentives to encourage native Indians to work and European and 
African colonization were proposed to oft___set the effects of a 
phased ending of the trade." 
However, all these issues were not easily approached during the 
first decades of the nineteenth century as signalled by the fate of 
the 1823 Constitution and Jose Bonifacio Andrada e Silva's 
Representation, Representacao a Assembleia Geral Constituinte e  
Legislativa do Brasil. The draft of ‘18231Constitution stated that 
the state would create establishments for the "catechism and 
civilization of the native Indians", the gradual emancipation of  
slaves, their religious and industrial instruction (art.254). The 
government also would recognize contracts between masters and  
slaves, and supervise their execution(art.265). 99 However, the 
Constituent Assembly was dissolved, and the new Constitution 
approved in 1824 did not mention these measures. In 1823, Jose 
Bonifacio Andrada e Silva, the leader of the Constituent Chamber, 
drew up a representation followed by a project for the extinction of 
the slave trade, the better treatment of slaves and the gradual 
abolition of slavery. 100  This project would never be discussed due 
to the dissolution of the Assembly. Later it would be argued that 
97 C.M. de Azevedo, op.cit., p.42. 
98 E.V. da Costa, op.cit., p.332. 
99 A.M. Perdigao Malheiro, op.cit., II. p.87. 
100 J.B. Andrada e Silva, Representacao a Assemblea Geral  
Constituinte e Legislativa do Imperio do Brasil sobre a Escravatura  
(Paris,1825); reprod. in Octavio Tarquinio de Sousa (ed.) 0 
pensamento vivo de Jose Bonifacio (sao Paulo: Martins, 1944), pp.39- 
66; also partially reprod. in R.E. Conrad, Children of God's Fire.  
A Documentary History of Black Slavery in Brazil (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), pp.418-427; the incluso project 
of law on slavery is reproduced in A.M.P. Malheiro, op.cit., II, 
pp.228-231. 
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Andrada's views and proposals on the "servileregime" contributed to 
the fall of the Ministry, the first constituted after Independence. 
His schemes antagonised powerful interests engaged in the 
maintenance of the slave trade _ planters and slave traders. 101 
Andrada's proposal encapsulated most of the themes related to the 
issue. From the point of view of emancipation, it advanced many of 
the measures later claimed by the abolitionists. Like many of his 
contemporaries, Andrada argued for a gradual end of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade. In the meantime there would be incentives 
favouring the importation of African women to promote slave 
families. The project highlights the need for good treatment of 
slaves, self-reproduction, and attempted to limit corporal 
punishment. Self-purchase occupied a very special role in the 
process of abolition of slavery as envisaged by Andrada. The slave 
who offered to the master a purchase price equal to his market value 
was to be immediately freed. If he could not afford the full amount 
required, he could start by offering one sixth. This allowed him one 
free day a week. When offering two sixths two days, and so on 
proportionately until he had paid the other shares making\ahe 
amount.VlaveXcould be freed by his master or anyone else who could 
afford to purchase his freedom. Masters were allowed to retain the 
labour of a freedman for a certain period, labour that would be 
regulated by a contract. According to article 7, the master who 
freed the slave gratuitously could retain the freedman in his 
service for five years as a "reward for his generosity", without 
paying daily wage, providing only food and medical care. 102 If the 
slave was freed by a third person, the latter could arrange with the 
freedman the means of compensation, possibly by a contract 
specifying so many days of work. These contracts were to be 
101 E.V. da Costa, Da senzala a colonia, op.cit., p.331; the 
role of Jose Bonifacio in the events that followed Independence is 
examined in Costa's article "Jose Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva. A 
Brazilian Founding Father" in E.V. da Costa, The Brazilian Empire.  
Myths and Histories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 
pp•25-52. 
102 J.B. Andrada e Silva, Representacao, op.cit., transl. by 
R.E. Conrad, op.cit., p.425. 
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supervised by the government. According to Andrada, manumissions 
should be applied according to a hierarchy, first, coloured 
(mulatos); then Brazilian-born (criolos); finally Africans. 
Andrada's scheme also covered larger issues relating to the role 
of the mass of freedmen after abolition. For instance, the proposal 
that all coloureds, blacks and freedmen who could not make a living 
from wage labour should be granted a plot of land by the state. That 
was a burning issue. Patterns of landholding, the extensive nature 
of coffee and sugar production as well as established patterns of 
settlement, the small population relative to land available for 
cultivation as well as the assumed prospective labour habits of 
those to be freed all touched on the issue of emancipation. This 
implied the re-distribution of land, something that would never be 
a matter of serious consideration during the Empire and nor in post-
slavery society. But reflecting the need to guarantee the required 
supply of "hands", Andrada also favoured the enforcement of the 
existing vagrancy laws. 
Jose Bonifecio Andrada e Silva recognized that Negroes "are men 
like us, and do not constitute a separate race of irrational beasts" 
and that their condition was contrary to the "voices of the justice 
and to the precepts of the Gospel". Denouncing the "countless deaths 
and martyrdoms of thousands and thousands of Negroes who die 
suffocated in the holds of our ships", he stressed that it was time 
to put an end to a traffic so "barbaric and butcherlike". He also 
considered the low profitability of slave labour contrasted to free 
labour and the resultant idleness and vagrancy, and material and 
financial damages that resulted from slavery. Nevertheless, Andrada 
did not want to see slavery abolished suddenly. Such an event would 
be accompanied by great evils, he observed. In order to emancipate 
slaves without injury to society, it was necessary first to make 
them worthy of freedom: "Reason and law require that we convert them 
gradually from vile slaves into free and active men" (my 
stress) ,103 
103 J.B. Andrada e Silva, Representacao, op.cit., transl. by 
R.E. Conrad, op.cit., p.423. 
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Gradual emancipation necessitated time and the fulfilment of 
certain prerequisites. Andrada accepted that it would be a 
considerable period before Brazil could be freed of the cancer of 
slavery. In the meantime it was essential to reduce the suffering of 
the slavesand enhance their civil and social status. "Let's instruct 
them in the true religion of Jesus Christ...". By these means "we 
will convey to them all the civilization they are capable of in 
their degraded condition". Andrada pointed out the advantages of 
transforming slaves into good citizens. "By allowing them the hope 
of one day becoming our equals in the rights they possess (...) they 
will serve us with loyalty and love: from enemies they will be 
turned into friends and protegees" . 1°4 "In order to stimulate a 
fondness for labour among slaves, and their greater happiness", 
article 28 of Andrada's project stated, "the Government will create 
in all the provinces savings funds, like those existing in France 
and England, where the slaves may deposit the pecuniary products of  
their labour and industry" (my stress). Article 12 reinforced this 
measure, stating that "the slave is the legal owner of his savings". 
This last substantive issue was intrinsically explosive. It was a 
way to encourage slaves to work and save to buy their own freedom. 
It was also a device to instruct slaves in the ways and the rules of 
the labour market. But this was also an obvious intrusion of the 
state in the area of relations between masters and slaves and 
infringed upon the principle of private property. In the final 
event, state protection of slave savings would not be sanctioned 
until the Rio Branco Law of 1871, and even then the right of self-
purchase or manumission through the emancipation fund would be 
subjected to a master's consent. 
If at the time Andrada's project had little impact, it would 
serve aAodel for many other proposals about the abolition of 
slavery. The idea of accomplishing a gradual end of slavery through 
individual manumission, granted or achieved by self-purchase, would 
constitute an important element in many proposals and would finally 
be implemented in the 1870s with the Free Birth legislation. Equally 
104 J.B. Andrada e Silva, Representac&o, op.cit., transl. by 
R.E. Conrad, op.cit., p.424. 
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important was the idea that the act of freedom should be followed by 
a period when the recently-liberated slave should be forced to 
provide labour, subject to contract conditions. 
During the 1830s and 1840s, there were several proposals from 
various quarters suggesting the end of slavery. Increasing pressures 
against the continuance of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, as well 
as the diffusion of abolitionist ideas, opened space for more 
"radical" plans. In 1831, three projects were presented to the Lower 
House of Parliament, a clear reaction to the mounting pressures to 
fulfil the treaties with Britain. The first project included three 
articles stating: i) that slavery would end in Brazil, ii) that 
slaves belonging to the state were to be freed immediately and iii) 
that a phased liberation of the remaining slaves would take place 
within fifty years. 105 The second project's main provisions were: 
i) that all Africans who had entered illegally in the country, after 
the slave trade had been stopped to be declared free; ii) that all 
those who retained Africans illegally made slaves were to be 
punished with ten years forced labour in public works; and iii) that 
anyone, even the slaves, could denounce owners of illegally enslaved 
Africans. 106 The third project provided for the right of self-
purchase, declaring that no owner could refuse freedom to a slave 
who could afford his purchase price. It stipulated how prices were 
to be evaluated and sought to appoint agents to defend slave 
rights.'" None of the projects were considered for discussion. The 
freedom of slaves illegally entering the country were part of the 
agreements with Britain; but sanctions against those buying illegal 
slaves and the issue of self-purchase continued to be ignored. These 
"radical" proposals, elicited the disapproval of the jurist Perdigao 
Malheiro thirty years later: "The reading [of these projects of law] 
105 APB, 16 June 1831; Projeto de Antonio Ferreira Franga e 
Ernesto F. Franca, see A.M. Perdigao Malheiro, op.cit., II, 
appendix, p.284. 
106 APB, 16 June 1831, Projeto do Deputado Lessa, A.M. Perdigao 
Malheiro, op.cit., II, appendix, p.285. 
107 APB, em 16 June 1831, Projeto do Deputado Pereira de Brito, 
A.M. Perdigao Malheiro, op.cit., II, appendix, p.284. 
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is sufficient to understand the imprudence and the danger of solving 
such a delicate and grave question in this wayn. 108  
Several proposals emphasised the need for regulations to 
encourage the better treatment of slaves as well as the promotion of 
immigration as a means of avoiding the catastrophe that might result 
from the end of the slave trade. Most proponents viewed the end of 
slavery as a positive means of transforming habits of labour and 
encouraging the free population to work _ a task expected to be 
performed by the immigrants and by strict provisions against 
vagrancy. Several proposals for the end of slavery also raised the 
matter of what to do with former slaves. Suggestions varied. It 
seems, however, to have been agreed that whatever their fate, they 
should not be permitted to disturb the idea of a homogeneous 
society. They could be integrated either through mestigagem and 
through labour. Or they should leave the country. The fate of former 
slaves was a further explanation why emancipation should take a long 
period of time. 
In 1834, the french emigre Carlos Augusto Taunay suggested 
colonization as the solution to end slavery. 109 As mentioned above, 
Taunay believed that subsidized immigration would be insufficient to 
replace the required number of slaves. He pointed out that free 
labour was cheaper and more productive than slave labour. But under 
the existent circumstances, Brazil could afford neither the 
cessation of the African trade nor the end of slavery. Hence efforts 
should be directed to reduce the bad effects of both institutions 
and to prepare slaves for future freedom. 110 In Taunay's view, the 
effects of slavery were bad not only for the slaves but also for the 
108 A.M. Perdigao Malheiro, op.cit., II, p.88. 
109 C.A. Taunay, Alqumas consideracOes sobre a Colonisacao, comp 
meio de coadjuvar a substituicao do trabalho cativo pelo trabalho 
livre no Brazil (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. de Traz do Hospicio n.160, 
1834). 
110 C.A. Taunay, Manual do Aqricultor Brazileiro, 2nd. ed.(Rio 
de Janeiro: Typ. de Villeneuve e Comp., 1839). It seems that the 
first edition of the Manual was published in 1830. 
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masters. Slavery corrupted behaviour, morality and education. 111 
The way to reduce the "brutal appetites" of Africans was the fear. 
Thus, a rigorous discipline was necessary to oblige blacks to 
perform regular work. Fear was the impulse to make them fulfil their 
duties: "Fear, and only fear, but sophistically employed", because 
excesses could lead to adverse consequences. 112 Humanity, religion 
and the public interest made it necessary to devise a code for 
slavery and to make uniform rules for the treatment of slaves that 
reflected masters'and slaves' interests. According to Taunay, a law 
was required to harmonize throughout the Empire the mode of 
treatment and the working conditions of the slaves. "For ignorance, 
avarice, and carelessness together blind the owners" causing them to 
harm their own interest, by ill-employment, over-exploitation and 
injury of their slaves. 113 Those who argued that to allow the state 
to legislate over slavery was to attack a privilege of slaveowners 
were wrong. Taunay suggested several measures for the discipline, 
maintenance, clothing, housing, punishment, overseeing, and sexual 
behaviour of slaves. How to end slavery? With the end of the slave 
trade, immigration should be promoted. Immigrants could help, 
through their example, to rescue domestic workers from ignorance, 
bad habits, laziness and prejudice against manual labour. Parallel 
to promotion of immigration, a very gradual emancipation, starting 
by the coloured slaves and in a long-term the remaining slaves. 114 
Highlighting the bad effects of slavery for the country continued 
to permeate most of the proposals. Alongside views that slavery 
corrupted morals, costumes, and habits of labour _ 	in sum, 
"civilization" 	was the idea that "slavery and liberty" were 
incompatible. Considerations that both conditions, "slavery and 
liberty", were discordant referred to the structure of social 
relations within the nation, and the development of a "positive 
C.A. Taunay, Manual do Agricultor, op.cit., chap.II, p.6. 
112 C.A. Taunay, Manual do Agricultor, op.cit., pp.6-7. 
113 C.A. Taunay, Manual do Aqricultor, op.cit., p.7. 
114 C.A. Taunay, Algumas Consideracoes, p.129. 
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society" according to the liberalism ideal. This related also to 
questions of sovereignty of the nation which was at risk given 
frequent British intervention in domestic affairs, such as the 
abolition of the slave trade. Although embracing several meanings, 
the idea of the incompatibility of "slavery and liberty" was 
integral to the debate about building of an ideal nation. 
Some of these points can be illustrated by the ideas of Frederico 
Leopoldo Cezar Burlamarque, a mathematician born in Piaui. 115 
 According to Viotti da Costa, Burlamarque's Memoir (published in 
1837) is the most complete work and included the main arguments 
against slavery then current. 116 He also argued in favour of the 
abolition of the slave trade. Burlamarque condemned the slave trade 
as well as evils provoked by slavery. In his view, slavery hindered 
enlightenment, the development of industry, the progress of 
civilization and the propagation of a free and homogeneous 
society. 117 Slavery provoked the corruption of people and 
denigrated labour. It fostered the division of society into 
oppressors and oppressed and represented a permanent threat of civil 
war between the cast. The bad effects of slavery over labour, 
prevented an equal distribution of wealth and prevented a class of 
free individuals from finding honest, productive work. In addition, 
the class of owners was permanently threatened: from one side by the 
domestic enemies, the slaves. And from another side, by those who 
supported the slaves, the foreign nations. 118 
In Burlamarque's view, slave labour inhibited the development of 
free labour. Slave labour was less productive than free labour. As 
115 F.L.Cezar Burlamarque, Memoria Analytica 	acerca do 
Commercio de escravos e acerca dos males da escraviddo domestica 
(Rio de Janeiro: Comercial Fluminense, 1837); partially reproduced 
in A.M.P. Malheiro, op.cit., appendix, pp.233-40; commented in 
C.M.M. de Azevedo, op.cit, p.43, and E.V. da Costa, Da senzala  
colonia, op.cit., pp.333-340. 
116 E.V. da Costa, Da Senzala a Colonia, op.cit., p.340. 
117 E.V. da Costa, Da senzala a colonia, op.cit., p.333. 
118 E.V. da Costa, Da Senzala a Colonia, op.cit., p.335. 
267 
slaves had no incentive to work, they worked badly and with less 
effort than free workers. Further, the immobilization of capital in 
slaves prevented the development of other productive activities. The 
persistence of slavery explained the backwardness of Brazilian 
agriculture, the prevalence of extensive pattern of production and 
its export orientation. Among the advantages of free labour, 
Burlamarque pointed out the formation of a capital market and 
increased rural productivity. Besides, free labour meant the 
possibility of dismissing part of the labour force according to the 
yearly cycle. Free labour was more economic and efficient. Free 
workers could be easily dismissed after performing the required 
tasks. By contrast, whether or not there was any task to be done, 
slaves had to be provided with clothing, food, medical assistance, 
and so forth. 119 Thus, confronting all the evils of slavery and 
stressing the greater profitability of free labour, Burlamarque 
stated that the abolition of slavery should damage neither the 
state, nor the planter. On the contrary, the extinction of slavery 
would raise Brazil to the level of other nations. The country could 
not hope for civilization, freedom and true independence while the 
institution of slavery existed. 120 
Burlamarque believed better treatment of slaves could be a means 
of easing the process of abolition. But this would require an wh; attitudinal change on the part of Brazilians about jahat he was 
sceptical. How to persuade owners to treat their slaves better? 
Fees, punishment, regulations were of no use on their own. But even 
if force was employed in an attempt to change planters behaviour 
towards slaves, self-interest was a stronger force than fear. 
According to Burlamarque, no legislation, special juries or policial 
authorities, could prevent owners mistreating their slaves. If the 
owners violated the laws, who was to condemn them? Slaves would 
__‘JCQ.0 0.YneverWitness against their owners. Less yet, would ownersWitness 
against one of their own class in favour of a slave. No one wanted 
119 E.V. da Costa, Da Senzala a Coleinia, op.cit., p.336. 
120 E.V. da Costa, Da senzala a colonia, op.cit., p.337. 
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to see anowner punished for offenses all committed. 121 Therefore, 
things should be left as they were: the governmentlAgattempted to 
make such a change might cause a disastrous revolution. He observed 
that the government was aware of current sentiment on the issue, and 
asked cautiousness to not risk the ruin of the patria. Ln 
Like others Burlamarque favoured smooth, gradual abolition. 
Slaves should be made worthy of freedom; they should be converted 
from machines into active, laborious men. 123 He did not accept the 
current ideas that former slaves would refuse to work. As a base for 
the emancipation process, Burlamarque suggested that all children 
born tolave mother should be set free when reaching the age of 25 
or 30 years for males and 20 to 25 years for females. In addition, 
he suggested the creation of an emancipation fund, which should be 
used to buy the freedom of slaves according to a certain hierarchy: 
urban slaves before rural, the elderly before the young etc. He also 
suggested taxes on urban slaves to encourage their transfer to rural 
areas. In the meantime, the government should provide for the 
replacement of slaves and the transportation of the freedmen to 
Africa where settlements would be founded to receive them. Re-
exportation to Africa was favoured due to the dangers of revenge 
being attempted by ex-slaves and difficulties of forming a nation 
with the distinct races. The creation of settlements on African 
40 soil, would contributejer the "glory and greatness" of Brazil, 
which therefore would be at the same level of North America and 
Britain 	contributing to 	the 	"civilization 	of Africa". 124 
 Burlamarque believed that, as former slaves emigrated, the free 
121 A.P. Maiheiro, op.cit., II, pp.238-239; also E.V. da Costa, 
Da Senzala a Colonia, op.cit., pp.338-339. 
122 A.P. Malheiro, op.cit., p.240. 
123 A.P. Malheiro, op.cit., p.233. 
124 A.P. Maiheiro, op.cit., II, p.234. There were schemes to re-
settle ex-slaves from the U.S. Southern states in Liberia and from 
the British Caribbean in Sierra Leone. M.C.C. da Cunha, Negros  
estrangeiros. Os escravos libertos e sua volta a Africa  (sao Paulo: 
Brasiliense, p.1985) examines Brazilian attempts to return freedmen 
to Africa, the freedmen private initiatives to return and 
communities they formed in African soil. 
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population (increased by self-reproduction and immigration) would 
find industrious employment. As parallel measures, Burlamarque 
recommended colonization, namely the settlement of small 
proprietors, and the engagement of immigrants to work as wage 
labourers on the plantations. Planters would be responsible for 
travel and initial expenses. He considered the Swiss, the Germans 
and the Azoreans the best workers. In his view, these were the means 
of effecting a gradual abolition of slavery without menacing the 
safety of the white race. Such schemes would also contribute to the 
constitution of an homogeneous nation. 125 
Still connected to questions of the building of the independent 
nation _ and an interesting point to contrast to Cuba _ was the 
perceived link betweenN(tolonial system and slavery. This was raised 
by some of those proposing the end of slavery. In 1845, for 
instance, the judge of the Court of Justice of Pernambuco, Henrique 
Velloso de Oliveira, pointed to the connections between slavery and 
the colonial system. In his view, slavery was of advantage to the 
metropolis, which wanted to make the most of its colony, limiting 
cultivation to a convenient staple and importing everything else 
from the mother country. That was the way to keep the "colony 
productive and subjugated; to make them unsuitable for the 
blossoming of illustrious and patriotic men who would advocate the 
interests of the colony or fight for autonomy". But a free people 
should have a different thinking and should be able to build their 
own existence through their labour, and not that of someone 
else. 126 
These sentiments against slavery converged during the 1840s, when 
pressures to end of the trans-Atlantic increased considerably. The 
issue of the end of the trade as well as of slavery became closely 
entangled with that of preserving the sovereignty of the nation, 
given the powerful British attacks. Discussions about alternative 
125 E.V. da Costa, Da Senzala a Colania, op.cit., p.340. 
126 Quoted from E.V. da Costa, Da Senzala a Colonia, op.cit., 
p.340. 
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labour sources that would meet the aspirations of the homogeneous 
society intensified and involved government and planters. The debate 
in the Lower House of Parliament, over "colonization and 
immigration" illustrates concerns within the government. Nicolau 
Vergueiro's initiative, engaging European immigrants for his coffee 
plantations, reflected the approach of planters in search of 
substitutes for slaves (see chapter 4). 
With the final abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade in 
1850, the search for alternative labour supplies to replace, or to 
supplement, slaves became more incisive. Better treatment and 
incentive for self-reproduction were suggested as means of either 
preserving slavery or allowing time for a gradual emancipation. The 
acute problem of labour supply affected mostly the frontier areas 
where coffee continued to expand. The high prices commanded by 
slaves after the end of the African trade added to planter fears 
about finding alternative labourers, domestically or externally. 
Initial failures of early experiments with Europeans on sao Paulo 
coffee plantations led many planters to search again for slaves who 
might be transferred from other sectors or areas within the country. 
However, this temporary solution did not weaken feelings that the 
cutting off of the African source was a significant blow to the 
institution of slavery. In this sense, proposals on the issue of 
slavery became more concerned with deferring the end of slavery and 
at the same time extending its existence for as long as possible. 
Thus, several of the means suggested during previous years were once 
again recalled: better treatment of slaves (non-separation of 
families, limitation of punishment, regulation over working 
conditions and so forth), self-purchase, the granting of freedom to 
children born to slave mother were among the repeated proposals. The 
difference was that these expedients were now much more detailed, 
carefully attempting to ensure a very gradual abolition and 
transition to free labour. The privilege given to individual 
manumissions and interrelated measures regarding contracts of 
services of freedmen, promotion of immigrants and regulations of 
immigrant contracts, as well as the need to include poor Brazilians 
under a general labour regulation permeated most of the second wave 
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of proposals. 
The difficult task of defining a framework for the transition 
from slavery to "freedom", simultaneously seeking to preserve the 
status quo in social relations while at the same time beginning a 
process that would ultimately dissolve .marrelations required care 
and attention. Emancipation would have to target individuals instead 
of all slaves at once and would have to be gradual _ for reasons 
of order and security of production. Agriculture needed time to 
rearrange labour relations and find new sources of labour. Slaves 
needed time to adjust themselves to new condition, learning how to 
live in a "free society", as citizens and labourers. The state also 
needed time to legislate and guide the process in a smooth and safe 
way. The end of slavery involved also the issue of whether and how 
to transform slaves into "free labourers". It also involved the 
search for alternative systems of labour. Yet, "free labour" was a 
vague idea. At the end it meant non-African slave labour and would 
assume different forms contingent "''whether workers were former 
slaves, Africans, American Indians, Asians or Europeans. Proposals 
and suggestions on how to end the trans-Atlantic slave trade and 
slavery itself envisaged distinct forms of "free labour". The early 
trials with free workers might also act as model for possible ways 
of reorganizing labour given an eventual end of slavery. Proposals 
on abolition of slavery during the decisive years of the 1860s shed 
light on this point. 
In the 1860s the legal historian Perdigao Malheiro reiterated 
many of the arguments _ "unanswerable arguments" as he observed _ 
expounded forty years earlier by Jose Bonifecio Andrada e Silva. 
Circumstances did not appear to have changed very much in the 
intervening decades. As Malheiro observed, when emancipation started 
being openly discussed in the 1860s, aspirations seemed to be 
different but the problems and obstructions seemed to be quite the 
same. 127 According to Malheiro, immediate emancipation, that is, 
"to declare today or in a short time that all existing slaves in 
127 A.P. Malheiro, op.cit., II, p. 147. 
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Brazil should be free was absolutely inadmissible". To liberate such 
a great number of slaves would necessarily result in great 
disruption of labour supply and production and undermine the wealth 
of the country. Family life would be disturbed and public order 
threatened. 
How did Malheiro envisageq / emancipation? To begin with, as the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade had already ceased, the only means of 
providing new slaves was natural increase _ the birth of slaves to 
slave mothers. Therefore, it was necessary to set a date from which 
all children born to slave mothers would be declared free. Malheiro 
suggested December 25, Christ's Birth. Such a date would impart a 
"solemn and religious significance to the act". 128 What should then 
happen with those freeborn? In his opinion (he recalled the example 
of United States of America), they should be kept with their 
mothers, and the masters would be obliged to provide for their 
maintenance and instruction. To compensate the masters, they would 
be entitled to receive the labour services of the freeborn for a 
certain period. 129 In addition, Malheiro was concerned about 
existing slaves. Should a date also be arranged for the emancipation 
of all remaining slaves? Recalling the examples of emancipation in 
the British and French colonies, his answer was negative. To 
preserve the public order and the safety of the state it was 
essential to avoid a general, sudden emancipation. 130 Emancipation 
had to be gradual, preferable through indirect means, with self-
purchase playing an important role. Hence he favoured measures 
facilitating and guaranteeing slave savings as the way of 
encouraging self-purchase. In the meantime, there were to be 
measures providing for better treatment of slaves, incentives to 
foster the formation of slave families, limits to corporal 
punishment and the creation of an emancipation fund. 131 
128 A.M.P. Malheiro, op.cit., II, p.157. 
129 A.P. Malheiro, op.cit., II, pp.157-158. 
130 A.P. Malheiro, op.cit., II, p.164. 
131 A.P. Malheiro, op.cit., II, pp.165-167 and pp.168-172. 
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Malheiro believed his gradual emancipation plan to be of great 
advantage in extinguishing slavery while at the same time promoting 
an increase of the free population. Besides absolving the public 
treasury of the cost of compensation, the plan would inculcate the 
work ethic amongst slaves. By promoting the work ethic and allowing 
slaves to work on their own account, they would gradually become 
accustomed to the rules of the market. With an opportunity to work 
and with their earnings and savings protected by the government, 
slaves would be restored to a condition of freedom. 
As others before, Malheiro's proposal was gradual emancipation. 
However gradual emancipation did not just mean the freeing of slaves 
in stages. Rather it meant providing a period necessary for the 
reorganization of labour and controlling or establishing degrees or 
kinds of freedom. Slaves as well as freedmen were to be acclimatized 
to the discipline of the labour market and taught how to participate 
in the market economy. "Labour and freedom _ explained Malheiro 
are correlated ideas; there is no freedom without labour". Real 
freedom _ liberty with civil rights _ meant the ability to 
contribute to human development and the right to 
participate/contribute to human progress. 132 
It is interesting to focus on the idea of freedom associated with 
labour advanced by Malheiro. It seems that manumission and freedom 
did not mean the same thing. According to Malheiro, bondage could 
end with the natural death of the slave, by a voluntary act on the 
part of the master called manumission or alforria, or it could be 
granted by the disposition of law. 133 When freedom was conferred by 
legal disposition, it could be either according to an act of the 
master or by legislative fiat, with or without compensation. 134 In 
the case of manumission, Malheiro observed that with this act the 
owner resigned his power and dominion over the slave, restoring him 
to his natural condition of freedom. Thus, "alforria is not but the 
132 A.P. Malheiro, op.cit., II, p.108. 
133 A.P. Malheiro, op.cit., II, p.82. 
134 A.P. Malheiro, op.cit., II, p.94. 
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renunciation of rights of the owner over the slave, and resultant 
reintegration of the slave to his [latent] freedom". The term 
alforria _ added Malheiro _ is of Arabian origin (al horria), and 
has the figurative meaning of "exempted from services", "free of 
obligations to others", "free from the burden". 135 
According to Malheiro, manumission could be granted with or 
without conditions, namely types of freedom known as contracts a 
titulo oneroso and a titulo gratuito respectively. 138 Alforria a 
titulo oneroso, that is, the grant of freedom under certain 
conditions, meant that the liberated man or woman would have to 
compensate the master by means of money, goods, prestag&o de 
servigos (service for a specified number of years, or until the 
master's death) or a combination of the above. The "freedman" who 
was granted conditional freedom is free but cannot practice his 
liberty, being constrained by certain terms or obligations. He was 
not a slave and his free status was similar to particular categories 
of "free people". This conditional freedom was not a great paradox: 
"It is sufficient to point to many other categories of free people 
(...) minors, those under legal processes and so forth". 137 In this 
Malheiro made a significant contribution to the debate. The former 
slave who obliged himself to serve another for a certain period of 
time was free, although he may be bound by a contract. Such 
contracts were in accord with locag,ao de servigos laws of September 
13, 1830, and October 11, 1837. 138 This legislation regulated 
contracts between employers and free labourers. It is important to 
recall that the 1837 law was specifically designed for immigrants. 
In spite of the particular status attributed to freedmen, free but 
not truly free, the former slave was thus compared with free workers 
"freely" contracted under certain labour conditions. 
135 A.P. Malheiro, op.cit., II, p.118. 
136 A.P. Malheiro, op.cit., II, p.105. 
137 A.P. Malheiro, op.cit., II, p.121. 
138 A.P. Malheiro, op.cit., II, p.121. 
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It is most important to understand this perception of "free 
labour" conveyed by Malheiro because it pervaded what was then 
envisaged as a "transition to freedom" and a "transition to free 
labour". In this, the position of freedmen was not so different from 
that of "free labourers", however conditional their freedom was 
supposectto be. Malheiro made these observations in the 1860s and his 
conclusions, as it will be shown in the next chapter, greatly 
affected emancipation plans actually implemented from the 1870s. It 
influenced the prospective status of liberated slaves as well as the 
prospective status of those engaging in contracts of services. 
5.3. Conditional manumission: a route to freedom 
A favourable attitude towards freedom and race has always been 
remarked as a distinctive feature of Latin American slavery. 
Manumission, generally free from legal restraints and at times even 
encouraged in Latin America, were more common in Brazil and Cuba 
than, for instance, in the United States of America or in the 
British West Indies. A reasonable chance of becoming free, and the 
expectations of being accepted as an equal in white society had been 
viewed as significant evidence of the distinct character of slavery 
in Latin America. And it has been stated that manumission associated 
with a growing tolerance of racial diversity, might have helped 
Latin Americans to avoid the hatreds and discriminations that 
followed the abolition of slavery in North America. These views had 
been challenged. 139 One of the main lines of criticism is that by 
highlighting milder features of the legislation, these views ignored 
the limited impact of laws within Latin American societies, where 
formal legal execution was usually undermined by the authority of 
slaveholders. A problem even more acute in rural areas where 
executive, legislative and judicial powers were vested in the 
139 The view that slavery was more humane in Latin America than 
in U.S.A, due to paternalism, state laws and Church practice, has 
been contested by many writers.For distinct positions in the 
controversy see D.B. Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western 
Culture (London: Oxford University Press, 1988) esp. chap. 8; C. 
Degler, Neither Black nor White (New York: McMillan, 1971), esp. 
pp.39-47; E.D. Genovese Roll, Jordan, Roll. The World the Slaves  
Made  (New York: Vintage Books); see also M.C. da Cunha, op.cit.  
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slaveholder himself, or delegated to his managers and overseers. 
Local justice meant planter justice. However restrictive or mild 
laws do not tell the whole story. With respect to manumission, if 
the law was easily bent, ignored or violated, that is only one 
aspect of the question. In Brazil, for instance, manumission and 
self-purchase were customary practices; therefore, enforcement of 
legislation had very little to do with the issue. It is more 
relevant to enquire about the meaning of manumission and to ask why 
individual manumission would become the ideal form of gradual 
emancipation. 
Manumission had different meanings and purposes which varied from 
area to area and period to period. It could be a reward for a 
lifetime of service, a device employed by the owner to relieve 
himself of a liability for sick and elderly slaves or an incentive 
encourage  the slave to work. It could also be an encouragement to 
good behaviour, through the example of a few whose loyalty and 
obedience had been rewarded by the grant of freedom. But it always 
reflected the interest of the owner, and contributed very little to 
change the position of the freedmen, which would be similar to the 
"dependent condition" of existing free workers. In Cuba and Brazil, 
society valued manumission and praised the generosity of the planter 
who granted freedom. During the nineteenth century the granting of 
freedom to individual slaves, on the condition of cash payment or 
services, became the most preferred expedient to end slavery and was 
included in most emancipation plans. Either through gradual self-
purchase or indemnification by services, it was suppose to produce 
a return from the slave in the form of labour or cash, to compensate 
for the loss of invested capital and property rights, and to prepare 
the slave for life in a free society. 
Although generally speaking slaves had more opportunities for 
individual emancipation in Brazil and Cuba, it is also true that a 
reasonable chance of becoming free by manumission was not one 
sustainable in all regions and all periods of Brazilian and Cuban 
history. Patterns of manumission varied widely in Brazil and Cuba. 
The frequency of manumission and the profile of those who achieved 
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freedom also varied. Influencing the changes there were several 
factors such as slave prices, total number of slaves, balance 
between free coloured/slave/white population and means of earning an 
income in rural and urban areas open to slaves. 
The lack of records showing the number of slaves who received 
their freedom either by outright manumission or self-purchase, is 
the main problem encountered by those who examined the issue of 
manumission in Cuba. According to Knight, it is possible that the 
practice of manumission was more common during the pre-plantation 
era. Knight suggested that as the demand for labour increased toward 
the end of the eighteenth century and continued at a high level 
throughout the nineteenth century, slaveowners became less willing 
and less able to grant manumission voluntarily. 140 Kiple also 
pointed out that the rate of manumission undoubtedly slowed 
considerably during the second decade of the nineteenth century 
after the slave trade became illegal. 141 Studies also show that the 
rate of manumission accelerated during the 1850s and the 1860s. 142 
Under Spanish law, a slave who make a substantial down payment on 
his or her purchase price becomes a coartado. The 1842 Slave Code 
established that a master should not oppose the coartacion if slaves 
presented at least fifty pesos of their price on account (art.33). 
The slave coartado gained certain autonomy and privileges. The slave 
could not be sold for a price greater than the appraised value at 
the time of the coartacion. Slaves coartados had the right to change 
masters and the right to work on their own account, keeping a 
portion of the wage earned. 143 Coartados represented an 
140 F.W. Knight, "Cuba", in D.W. Cowen and J.P. Greene (ed.) 
Neither Slave nor Free. The Freedmen of African Descent in the Slave  
Societies of the New World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1972) pp.278-308, esp. p.285. 
141 K.F. Kiple, op.cit., p.46. 
142 Cf. K.F. Kiple, Blacks in Colonial Cuba, op.cit., p.61. 
143 R.J. Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba. The Transition to 
Free Labor, 1860-1899. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) 
p.82. 
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intermediate status between slave and free. The inclusion of gradual 
self-purchase in the several plans of emancipation is an indication 
of how efficient this mechanism was considered to be in the process 
towards a gradual transition to freedom, to establish good behaviour 
and delay emancipation. From one side, as said above, there were the 
benefits to slaves, who could by these means be instructed in the 
rules of the market. From another side, it was a way of reimbursing 
owners. 
Coartacion became a matter of public record only in 1854. 144 
Limited existing data suggests that the number of those becoming 
coartados, and of those achieving full freedom, at any given time 
was small. The following table shows the number of manumission 
papers, including self-purchase, issued between 1858-1862. The 
average number of manumissions was less than 2,000 a year. 
Table T.2: Cuba, Manumission, 1858-1862  
Year Men Women Total 
1858 895 1,161 2,056 
1859 845 1,147 1,992 
1860 761 1,158 1,919 
1861 694 935 1,629 
1862 822 1,044 1,866 
Total 4,017 5,445 9,462 
Robert L. Paquette. Sugar is Made with Blood. The Conspiracy of La 
Escalera and the Conflict between Empires over Slavery in Cuba 
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1988) p.64. 
When the slave population was counted in 1871 there were only 
2,137 coartados: 890 males and 1,247 females. The figure 
corresponded to less than 1% of the total slave population. Over 40% 
of the coartados lived in the urban area of Havana, while the sugar 
144 K.F. Kiple, op.cit., p.42. 
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areas had very few. 145 By analysing a sample of 302 manumissions 
effected from 1840 to 1875 in the jurisdiction of Matanzas, Bergad 
provides a profile of those who were able to obtain their own 
freedom. The majority were females (63.6%); more than two thirds 
were creoles and the rest Africans; a substantial portion, 43.1%, 
were prig-age slaves between fifteen and forty years old; 22% were 
over forty one year old; and 34.8% were younger than fourteen. In 
the jurisdiction of Colon, between 1864 and 1878, of 208 
manumissions examined, 58.7% were females; 41.3% were males; creoles 
accounted for 72.6%, the remainder were Africans; prime-age were 
38.5% of the total; slaves older than forty one made up 34.4% and 
those younger than fourteen were 27.1% of this sample. 146 
The number of coartados increased from the 1870s, rising from 
2,137 in 1871 to 3,531 in 1877. Curiously, as noted by Scott, there 
was an increase of about 65% in a period when the slave population 
itself had fallen to by about 25%. 147 Cuban urban areas continued 
to account for a disproportionate amount of manumission. Forty 
percent of the new coartaciones were granted in four districts of 
Havana, though the area contained only about 8% of Cuba's 
slaves. 1 '18 The greater mobility and resources of slaves in urban 
areas were undoubtedly the major determinants of this pattern, but 
the attitudes of masters may also have been significant. Hubert 
Rimes suggests, that, in the last years of slavery, some masters 
were increasingly interested in the steady income provided by 
coartacion. It also demonstrated opportunities for employment 
available to urban slaves. By the 1870s coartacion also spread in 
the countryside. According to Scott, restrictions placed upon 
slaves' right to work on their own account and on the right to 
change master which were implemented at the beginning of the 1870s 
145 R.J. Scott, Slave Emancipation, op.cit., p.14. 
146 L.W. Bergad, Cuban Rural Society in the Nineteenth Century.  
The Social and Economic History of Monoculture in Matanzas  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) p.238. 
147 R.J. Scott, Slave Emancipation, op.cit., p.76. 
148 R.J. Scott, Slave Emancipation, op.cit., p.76. 
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suggested that slave had made use of coartacion and that both rural 
masters and the colonial government were eager to limit the further 
development of coartacion in the countryside. 149 
The role of self-purchase as a suitable route to freedom became 
more evident after its effective implementation with the Patronato 
system in the 1880s. The Patronato Law extended the right to self-
purchase, establishing procedures and fixing amounts to be paid. 
Formal self-purchase, to be called "indemnification for services" 
was accomplished by paying a decreasing price for freedom, 
calculated as thirty to fifty pesos for each remaining year of the 
first five years of the patronato, plus half of that much for each 
of the last three. Coartacion was thus employed as a means of 
compensation and a mechanism of retaining control over slaves 
labour. But in spite of its limited impact in theory coartacion 
represented a possible avenue for self emancipation. It also 
provides an interesting point of contrast with manumission policies 
in Sao Paulo. 
The patterns of alforria varied widely in Brazil. It seems that 
alforria gratuita predominated for most of the colonial period and 
in the first half of the nineteenth century in the province of 
Bahia. Conditional manumission or alforria onerosa preponderated on 
parts of the Capitania and city of Rio de Janeiro by the end of 
eighteenth and first half of nineteenth century as well as in the 
provinces of Bahia, Espirito Santo and Campina Grande after 1850s. 
And both kinds of alforria were observed in Paraty, Rio de Janeiro, 
between 1789-1820, and parts of Paraiba between 1850-1888. 150  
149 R.J. Scott, Slave Emancipation, op.cit., p.82. 
no P.L. Eisenberg, "Ficando Livre: As Alforrias em Campinas no 
Seculo XIX" Estudos Economicos 17(2) pp.175-216 May/Aug 1987 p.196. 
For different patterns of alforria in Brazil, see S.B. Schwartz, "A 
manumissao dos escravos no Brasil colonial, 1684-1745", Anais de 
HistOria VI (1974) pp.71-114, on the colonial period; in the 
province of Bahia, K.de Q. Mattoso, "A proposito de cartas de 
alforria, Bahia, 1779-1850", Anais de Historia IV (1972) pp.23-52 
and by same author, Ser escravo no Brasil (Sao Paulo: Brasiliense, 
1979); in the province of Espirito Santo, see V.P. Almada, 
Escravismo e transioao. 0 Espirito Santo (1850-1888) (Rio de 
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According to Perdigao Malheiro, freedom could be granted at the 
will of the master or by slave's own efforts. Slaves could also be 
awarded freedom under particular circumstances by the government, 
for example for reporting slave conspiracies or as the result of 
military service. Malheiro also observed that the practice of 
freeing slaves upon payment of the original purchase price was 
customary in Brazil even in the early colonial period and that it 
was common for owners to allow slaves to make some earning aimed at 
financing manumission. But Malheiro explained that the initiative 
did not mean immediate freedom. It represented only the owner 
intention or promise of granting freedom. 151 The simple promise, of 
course, did not bind the master. But if the slave was in possession 
of the amount required for his own purchase price, or if he had 
already fulfilled his obligation, he was able to demand manumission 
or could be declared free at any time. 152 
However, it was never easy for a slave to purchase his own 
freedom. In Brazil the practice of freeing slaves upon a payment 
was, as Malheiro stated, a customary one. Despite many proposals and 
attempts to legalize self-purchase, it remained a matter of custom 
until formally included amongst the provisions of the Law of 1871. 
There was no formal protection for the slaves' savings, and even 
when he acquired the right to work on his account, and self-purchase 
became a matter of law, it would be subjected to the owner's will. 
Official reluctance to legislate on this matter indicates that the 
route to freedom provided by self-purchase was not free from 
constraint. It might be possible that far greater mobility and 
resources facilitated alforria in urban areas compared with isolated 
plantation areas, as it happened in Cuba. In rural areas slaves 
could get some income from subsistence plots traditionally granted 
Janeiro: Graal,1983); in the city of Rio de Janeiro, M.C. Karasch. 
Slave Life in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1850 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1987) chap. 11; manumission is also examined in J. 
Gorender, 0 escravismo colonial 5th ed (Sao Paulo: Atica, 1988); and 
M.C. da Cunha, op.cit., esp. pp.17-61. 
151 A.P. Malheiro, op.cit., II, p.108. 
152 A.P. Malheiro, op.cit., II, p.108 
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to them. But potential income from those plots might have 
contributed little to facilitate self-purchase. ila.ster's 
arbitrariness regarding plot size and even what could be grow and 
sold, clearly controlled the slaven)ossibilities of obtaining income 
from this source. By the early 1870s county laws (Posturas 
Municipals) in the Province of Sao Paulo still provided for fines 
for the purchase of any kind of articles from slaves, without the  
written authorization of the master. Other Posturas banned the sale 
by slaves of certain commercial goods such as coffee, sugar and 
aguardiente. 153 Some planters, such as the Baron Pati de Alferes, 
even believed that a slave's crops should be sold only to the 
master: "The planter should reserve a small plot of land as nearby 
as possible where the blacks can plant their gardens. Let them plant 
their own coffee, maize, beans, bananas, potatoes, yams, sweet 
cassava, etc. However, the planter should not allow them to sell 
their products to anyone else, only to himself, and he should pay a 
reasonable price, to prevent them from going astray and carousing in 
the taverns" . 154 In the rural areas of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo 
the French traveller Louis Couty did not find a single example of a 
slave who had been manumitted through his own efforts. 155 
Although of limited effect, the fact that self-purchase had 
always been the preferred route to freedom, as suggested in most 
emancipation plans, indicates that it made a significant 
contribution to the debate about "transition to freedom". Equally, 
as in Cuba, the principal condition included in manumission 
agreements would change over time, from a cash payment at the 
153 See Colleccao de Leis e Posturas Municipaes promulgadas pela 
Assemblea Leqislativa provincial de S. Paulo  (sao Paulo: Americana, 
1870); various towns, for instance, Sao Jose de Barreiros, Areas and 
Mogi-Mirim. 
154 L.P. de Lacerda Werneck. Memoria sobre a fundacao e costeio 
de uma fazenda na provincia do Rio de Janeiro pelo Barao Baty de 
Alferes e anotada pelo Dr. Luiz Peixoto de Lacerda Werneck 2nd ed. 
(Rio de Janeiro: Eduardo and Henrique Laemmert, 1863) p.40; 
quotation transl. in R.E. Conrad, op.cit., p.78. 
155 S.R. Reis de Queiroz, Escravidao negra em Sao Paulo: um 
estudo das tensoes provocadas pelo escravismo no seculo XIX (Rio de 
Janeiro: Jose Olympio/ INL, 1977) p.94. 
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beginning of the nineteenth century to labour services at the end. 
The evolution of the process of manumission in one of the major 
coffee districts of Sao Paulo, Campinas, illustrates this point. 
Analyzing 2,093 letters of liberty (cartas de alforria) freeing 
2,277 slaves in the county of Campinas, during the period 1798 to 
1888, Peter Eisenberg noticed that during the first half of the 
century the rate of growth in the number of manumissions remained 
almost the same as the rate of growth of the slave population as a 
whole. 156 Yet, with the end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and 
particularly in the 1870s and 1880s there was a great increase in 
manumissions while the slave population declined. 157 Eisenberg also 
observed that while the majority of the slave population was male, 
black, creole, adult and unskilled, the manumissions registered were 
mostly of female, mulatto, creole, and mostly those working in 
domestic services. However, this pattern changed in the last decades 
of slavery. The number of manumissions increased rapidly and the 
majority of newly freedmen were now working-age males, blacks as 
well as creoles. The most common form of manumission was the 
conditional, that is the granting of freedom in exchange for money, 
goods, or service payment (a labour contract) or a combination of 
all. Eisenberg states that for three quarters of the century 
conditional manumission predominated by a rate of 2:1 and remained 
the major mechanism of freeing slaves until the mid-1870s. 158 
Table T.3: Campinas, Conditions of Manumission 
Period Gratuitas % Onerosas % Total 
1798-1850 (N=235) 34.3 65.7 100.0 
1851-1874 (N=411) 35.0 65.0 100.0 
1875-1885 (N=618) 46.2 53.8 100.0 
1886-1888 (N=1,013) 61.9 38.1 100.0 
Total (N=2,227) .1,135 1,142 
Peter L Eisenberg, "Ficando Livre: as alforrias em Campinas no 
seculo XIX".Estudos Econamicos 17:2 (may/aug 1987) pp.175-216,p197. 
-" p.179. P.L.Eisenberg, "Ficando Livre", 	op.cit., 
157 P.L.Eisenberg, "Ficando Livre", 	op.cit., p.179. 
158 P.L. Eisenberg, "Ficando Livre", 	op.cit., p.196. 
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Self-purchase and service obligations were the most common sorts 
of conditional manumission. Self-purchase constituted about one 
third of the total of conditional manumissions but freedom under 
service obligations became even more prevalent from the 1870s. 
Eisenberg's study also shows that within the system of service 
obligations, the predominant form was not that of specified tasks, 
but that of g'specified a period _ the number of years _ for 
which service obligation had to be rendered. During the last decades 
of slavery the letter of liberty under service obligation more 
clearly resembled a work contract. It detailed the number of years 
(up to seven years) as established by the 1871 Free Birth Law which 
also allowed the slave "in furtherance of his liberty, to contract 
with a third party the hire of his future services, for a term up to 
seven years "(Law 2.040, art.4, paragraph 3). Moreover, from this 
time the contracts resulting from manumission under service 
obligations started to include reference to wages that would be paid 
\ .30 during the contract period. According Eisenberg, slaves from both 
sexes and from various sectors, including field workers, were 
granted manumission under a remunerated term of service obligations. 
The author also remarked that despite the limited number of such 
agreements the practice was spreading. 159 
Table T.4: Types (% of total) of Conditional Manumission 
Period 
Payment in 
currency 	goods services Combination 
Total 
1798-1850 	(N=157) 34.4 1.9 49.1 14.7 100.0 
1851-1874 	(N=264) 37.1 0 52.7 10.2 100.0 
1875-1885 	(N=338) 37.6 0 55.0 7.4 100.0 
1886-1888 	(N=385) 30.4 0 62.9 6.8 100.0 
P.L. Eisenberg, "Ficando Livre: as alforrias em Campinas no seculo 
XIX" Estudos Econamicos 17:2 (may/aug 1987) pp.175-216, p.197. 
159 P.L. Eisenberg, "Ficando Livre", op.cit., pp.202-203. 
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Although Eisenberg's data shows an increase in alforria gratuita 
in Campinas by the last decades of slavery there is other evidence% 
was that manumission under service obligations ),ce-11-5" still generally 
practised. According to Queiroz, from 1st May, 1866, until 30th 
March, 1887, 251 slaves were freed in Campinas, of whom 248 were 
under obligations. In other coffee districts, such as Lorena, Rio 
Claro, Taubate, Bananal 55, 75, 68, 417 slaves were freed 
respectively. In these four localities all the freedmen remained 
under service obligations. 160 As Eisenberg argues, on the eve of 
the abolition, gratuitous manumission became a final attempt to deal 
with the political circumstances created by the inevitable end of 
slavery. H1 
Conclusion 
As stated in early emancipation plans, conditional manumission 
(self-purchase and indemnification by services)Og considered the 
best way to lead slaves into freedom. During the conditional period, 
slaves were supposed to acquire virtues essential for life in free 
society. But such expedients also represented a form of retaining 
control over labour, of compensation for loss of property rights, 
and were believed to provide the necessary time to re-arrange labour 
relations. Paradoxically, the regime was not so different from that 
already applied to "free labour". Towards the end of the period, the 
features of labour relations contained in the status of "transition 
to freedom" and those of existing "free" labour relations would tend 
to converge. It seems that the notion of "free" labour crystallized 
in the experiments with long contracts of services and, stressing 
dependence and control, became the model for what was supposedto be 
the condition of those leaving slavery. But it could also be that 
the transformation in labour relations meant the submission of all 
labourers (free immigrant and domestic labourers and slaves) to an 
intermediary status, which owed much to systems of control allowed 
160 S.R. Reis de Queiroz, op.cit., p.121. 
161 P.L. Eisenberg, "Ficando Livre", op.cit., p..213. 
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in slavery. 
As will be shown, routes leading individual slaves to freedom, 
previously envisaged as the safest and most controlled way of ending 
slavery, would be the favoured mechanism employed to effect the 
gradualist policies implemented from the 1870s. As pressures for 
final abolition increased the ideal route to freedom became moreover 
the strategy to end slavery and delay abolition. Efforts to subject 
all labourers to a uniform structure of control were present in Cuba 
and Brazil. Binding slaves to contracts of services prior to freedom 
was the way of extending forced labour. And the content of these 
contracts was similar to the terms offered to "free" workers, who 
were increasingly to be subjected to tighter control. 
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CHAPTER 6 
GRADUALISM AND TRANSITION:  
TRACING PARALLELS BETWEEN BRAZIL AND CUBA 
At the beginning of the 1870s, the approval of the Rio Branco Law in 
Brazil and the Moret Law in Cuba initiated the process of gradual 
abolition of slavery. The coincidence of the events and some of the 
main features of the laws provide grounds for comparison. For almost 
two decades Cuba and Brazil shared the problem of establishing a 
framework for gradual abolition which involved a transition to free 
labour without disrupting the existing economic and political order 
both on and off the plantations. The aim was to guarantee a phased, 
smooth, safe and lasting process. This was not easy and the 
multiplicity of themes that touched on the issue accounts for the 
ambiguity, the hesitancy, and the caution of those in charge of the 
task. 
For the majority of Brazilians and Cubans involved in the debate, 
the most difficult task was that of gradually transforming slaves 
into free labourers. It was usually alleged that there should be a 
transitory period when the slave was to be "informed" about civil 
life and instructed in the rules of the labour market. Given the 
open frontier and the availability of land, a mass desertion of the 
plantation sector had to be confronted. The emphasis on a gradual 
transformation in the status of individual slaves was devised to 
avoid disturbances associated with immediate, mass emancipation. 
Individual manumission would also facilitate the deployment of 
coercive measures to assure the continued labour of former slaves. 
The process of gradually granting freedom to individuals implied 
that at any given time there would be other slaves waiting to be 
freed. Thus there would have to be mechanisms to control both the 
recently liberated and those yet to be freed. These measures 
comprised better treatment, such as limits to corporal punishment, 
incentives to the formation of families, and the right to earn or 
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receive wages. To keep control of those set free there would be 
obligatory long-term contracts and vagrancy legislation. These 
measures would facilitate the reorganization of labour supply and 
the creation of a labour market. These provisions were either 
embodied in the same piece of legislation or were devised in 
conjunction with legislation providing for gradual emancipation. 
Finally, policies to reorganize free domestic and immigrant labour 
were also pursued in parallel with new slave legislation. 
Despite shared concerns and the similar features that fashioned 
patterns of slave emancipation, the evolution of the process assumed 
distinct features in Brazil and Cuba. The circumstances in which 
abolition of slavery would be accomplished were very different. The 
role of Spain and its colonial policy, the advance of the Cuban 
struggle for independence, the Ten Years War(1868-1878) and the 
transformations of the sugar industry in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century would all give a particular character to the 
process in Cuba. In Brazil, an independent Empire, the process would 
be shaped by the far greater number of slaves, the different 
interests of several provinces and the dramatic expansion of coffee 
on southern plantations. External pressures and the growth of the 
antislavery movement would also feature differently in both areas. 
The following pages compare and contrast the emancipation 
policies embodied in gradualist legislation implemented from the 
1870s. Final abolition was decreed in 1886 (abolition of the 
Patronship system) in Cuba and in 1888 in Brazil but during the 
1870s and 1880s there would be many changes of directions and much 
hesitation as this chapter will reveal. 
6.1. Gradual Abolition: Rio Branco Law and Moret Law 
By the mid-1860s the issue of abolition arouse decisively in 
Brazil and Spain. At the same time, supported by the Emperor D. 
Pedro II, projects for the extinction of slavery had been discussed 
in the Council of State in Brazil, while Antillan reformers forced 
the question into the agenda of the Reform Commission in Spain. 
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International opposition to the continuance of slavery and the 
growth of domestic abolitionist sentiment also contributed to stamp 
out slavery in the Americas. That such a controversial issue was at 
last being discussed in the government was not overlooked by 
Brazilians and Cubans, watching one another. 
In Brazil, Nabuco de Aratjo, a member of the Council of State, 
observed in 1867: "In effect slavery had been abolished in the 
Christian world. It remains only in Brazil and Spain. Respecting 
Spain (...) a plan had been prepared to be submitted to the Cortes 
(...) Spain must decree abolition because in addition to the 
irresistible force of civilization there was the interest of 
conserving the island of Cuba. Distinguished writers had observed 
that only by abolishing slavery would Spain be able to keep the 
island of Cuba, which is so close to the United States of America. 
Therefore, slavery remains only in Brazil, where nothing had been 
done towards abolition. But (...) Brazil will be pushed into an 
abyss if she does not act, if she simply waits for a solution ...". 1 
 The uncomfortable feeling of being the last outpost of slavery in 
the Americas was also a disturbing one for Spain. As the Count of 
Vega Mar pointed out to the Reform Commission, as the abolition had 
1r)e. taken place in United States and Brazil had initiated its gradual 
emancipation, "it is a dangerous illusion to expect that the status 
quo can be conserved only in our overseas provinces ...". 2 
However, the fact that the word had been pronounced did not imply 
immediate action to set in motion a process leading to rapid 
emancipation. A few years would pass before a final decision was 
taken. In the meantime, major conflicts such as wars, the continued 
growth in the importance of the main export staples and reluctant 
planters predicting catastrophe served to shape the course of events 
1 J. Nabuco, Um Estadista do Imperio 5th ed.(Rio de Janeiro: 
Nova Aguilar, 1975) pp.616-617. 
2 The Count was a Cuban planter and politician residing in 
Madrid. Informe del Excmo Senor Conde de Vega Mar en contestacion a 
los interrogatorios hechos por el Gobierno de S.M. sobre la 
informacion de las leyes especiales para las Islas de Cuba y Puerto 
Rico. (Madrid: T. Fortanet, 1868) p.11. 
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in Brazil and Cuba. 
6.1.1. The Rio Branco Law 
In the period between early plans of emancipation of the 1820s 
and the implementation of gradual abolition in the 1870s, Brazilian 
economy and society had changed considerably. By the middle of the 
century, the political instabilities that followed Independence had 
subsided. A centralized state, responsive to the class interests of 
planters and merchants, was in control and successfully maintained 
social and political order. Overall population grew from about 3.8 
million in 1822 to about 7.5 million in 1850. In 1872, at the time 
of the first national census, it had increased to over ten million. 
Slaves, who constituted more than a half of the population in 1822, 
and probably accounted for between a quarter and a third of the 
population in 1850 (standing at 2,500,000), have fallen in 1872 to 
1,500,000, only 15.8% of total population. 3 
Demographic change was greater in some areas than in others. The 
rapid growth of coffee exports in the southeast, along with a 
relative decline of sugar, altered the distribution of population 
and hastened urbanization. Slaves became more regionally, and 
rurally, concentrated. In 1822 almost 70% of the slave population 
lived in the sugar plantations of the northeastern provinces. Fifty 
years later 55% of the slave population were to be found in the 
southern coffee provinces of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Sao 
Paulo. Whereas the percentage of slaves among agricultural workers 
in the sugar counties of Pernambuco province reached only 14%, by 
1872 in the coffee counties of Rio de Janeiro province it held at 
46%. 4 The city of Rio de Janeiro, with 180,000 residents in 1850, 
had in 1872, 275,000; its commercial class prospered with the coffee 
3 E.V da Costa, "1870-1889" in Leslie Bethell (ed.) Brazil:  
Empire & Republic, 1822-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989) pp.161-213, p.164; R. Graham, "1850-1870"in L. Bethell (ed.), 
Brazil, op.cit., pp.113-160, esp. p.113. 
4 R. Graham, op.cit., p.125. 
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trade, linking planters to the international economy. 5 
During the 1830s coffee had overtaken sugar as Brazil's leading 
export and by mid-century coffee accounted for nearly half of all 
Brazilian export earnings. Its influence continued to grow reaching 
about 60% during the 1870s. Until 1870, the major source of coffee 
remained the Paraiba valley, embracing the province of Rio de 
Janeiro and the northeast of Sao Paulo. However, by this time, the 
area had already began to show signs of stagnation. The slave 
population was ageing and old coffee bushes were not being replaced. 
From the middle of the century, the centre-west of the province of 
Sao Paulo, where there was plenty of land and planters found the 
reddish soils more fertile, began to eclipse the Paraiba Valley. 
During the 1860s railways began to replace traditional systems of 
transportation further extending the frontier of new coffee 
production and helped to create better conditions for the 
development of an internal market. 
By the end of the 1860s, demographic changes had affected the 
basis for political representation and economic growth had generated 
conflicts of interests amongst provinces producing different export 
crops and with different resources and requirements in terms of land 
and labour. Regional elites competed over subsidies, credit, 
tariffs, political representation, land and labour policies and many 
others. New political parties appeared pressing for a series of 
political-administrative and social reforms. Their programmes 
included issues such as decentralization of the state and reforms of 
the electoral and the judicial systems. But the most pressing reform 
was centred on the institution of slavery, already an issue of 
concern to the masses gathered in the cities. 
Several bills proposing gradual emancipation of slaves were 
presented during the 1850s and 1860s and all were rejected. But from 
the mid-1860s signs of change appeared. Two major events contributed 
to initiate a favourable attitude towards a reform of slavery. The 
5 R. Graham, op.cit., p.113; E.V. da Costa, op.cit., p.164. 
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abolition of slavery in the United States (1865) was an event of 
great importance in Brazil, as for the Spanish colonies, Cuba and 
Puerto Rico. It helped to undermine pro-slavery arguments based on 
the continuance of slavery as an American institution and left 
Brazil, Cuba and Puerto Rico as the last outposts of slavery in 
Americas. There was also continued British pressure over the issue 
of the emancipados. British seizure of several Brazilian vessels in 
the port of Rio de Janeiro in 1863 resulting in the so-called 
"Questao Christie" caused a rupture in relations between Brazil and 
Britain. Although British pressures eased after the decree of 1864 
conceding freedom to the already "liberated slaves" and diplomatic 
relations re-established in 1865, the incident had created the 
feeling that Britain was willing to use force in the matter of 
slavery. 6 
By the middle of the decade, the difficult issue of slave 
emancipation was being discussed in high governmental circles. With 
the support of the Emperor D. Pedro II, Pimenta Bueno, later 
Viscount and Marquise of. sao Vicente, devised in January 1866 five 
projects for the gradual emancipation of slaves. 7 The main 
provisions included i) granting freedom to children born to slave 
mother and the stipulation that slavery was to end with compensation 
to the owners in December 31, 1899; ii) the right,of self-purchase, 
protection for slave savings and non-separation of families; iii) 
creation of an emancipation fund for the annual liberation of slaves 
and committees to oversee the process of emancipation; iv) instant 
freedom for certain categories of slaves, such as those belonging to 
the state and religious congregations; and v) the registration of 
6 In the early 1860s, the British minister to Brazil, William 
Christie, had called on Brazil to undertake a series of measures 
leading to the final end of slavery. In 1863 as a reprisal i$ for 
Brazil's failure to comply with some of his minor demands, and to 
demonstrate British willingness to use force in the matter of 
slavery, he ordered the seizure by British vessels of several 
Brazilian vessels outside the port of Rio de Janeiro. See R. Graham, 
"Causes for the abolition of Negro Slavery in Brazil: an 
interpretative essay", Hispanic American Historical Review 46, 
2(1966) pp.123-137. 
7 J. Nabuco, op.cit., p.569. 
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all slaves. 8 
Initially, the Council of State headed by the conservative 
Marquise of Olinda refused to discuss the matter. Consideration was 
delayed until 1867 when the Emperor, influenced by prevailing 
international opinion, cautiously expressed publicly his favourable 
opinion and a new ministry forced the issue. At the time Brazil was 
involved in a major conflict with Paraguay (the Paraguay War, 1865-
1870). For the majority of councillors the pressing issue was the 
war and how to finance it. The resolution of the "questa° social" 
(that is, the future of slavery) would have to wait until the end of 
the war. But as the war had gained international attention, the 
image of the country could be negatively affected by the existence 
of slavery. The decree issued in November 1866, granting freedom to 
slaves (and their wives) who volunteering for military service, 
strengthened this sentiment. 9 Thousands of slaves had been purchased 
and granted freedom to fight for the Brazilian Army. It was a 
controversial move and had provoked anxieties within the Council. 
There was a feeling that it could erode the image of the Brazilian 
Army. It might be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Nabuco de 
Aradjo countered, supporting the freeing slaves to fight for the 
Army. He argued against those who "say that Brazil shows its 
impotence by purchasing slaves for the war". "...This act which is 
about the war and about emancipation will be praised by the 
civilized world". In his view, "the liberated slaves were freedmen, 
and therefore they were citizens before being soldiers". 10 But what 
mostly contributed to councillors anxieties was the anticipated 
disturbance of the slave system that might result after the war. 
8 J. Nabuco, op.cit., pp.606-610. 
9 Decree of November 6, 1866, granting freedom to slaves (and 
their wives) volunteering for military services, A. Gebara, The 
Transition from Slavery to Free Labour Market in Brazil: 1871-1888.  
Slave Legislation and the Organization of the Labour Market. Thesis 
Ph.D., London School of Economics and Political Science, 1984, 
p.103. 
J. Nabuco, op.cit., p.645. 
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In February 1867, Pimenta Bueno's projects were introduced to the 
Council together with three preliminary enquiries: "Is it convenient 
to abolish slavery immediately? When slavery should be abolished? 
What provisions should be taken to accomplish this task?" 11 Again, 
the Council of State reacted uneasily. Some councillors were 
radically opposed to any change in the institution of slavery, 
foreseeing slave insurgency and economic catastrophe. The majority, 
compelled by government pressure, agreed to discuss the reforms. 
Many wished to delay the debate until the end of the war. 12 Others 
believed it would be dangerous even after the war. This was the 
position of Paranhos, the future Viscount of Rio Branco, sponsor of 
the 1871 reform: "It will not be enough to wait for the end of the 
war. It is necessary to give further time to the government, 
society, commerce and agriculture, given the precarious financial 
circumstances resulting from the war (...) To move immediately from 
the war to a reform that can cause alarm to the population, 
undermine rural property and provoke a sensible reduction of 
national revenue and that required the extensive use of military 
forces [to meet expected threats to public order], does not seem to 
reflect the prudence of the Brazilian government and Houses of 
Parliament". 13 
As a result of these preliminary debates, a committee was created 
with the purpose of combining Bueno's projects into one single 
scheme that would also reflect prevailing opinions in the Council. 
Nabuco de Araujo was appointed the president of this committee. 14 
 Another draft was thus prepared but the Council of State decided to 
postpone its discussion until the end of the war. 15 This proposal 
p.611. 





13 J. Nabuco, op.cit.,  p.622. 
14 The committee was included by Sales Torres Homem and Souza 
Franco (later replaced for the Viscount of Sapucai) and Pimenta 
Bueno was invited to attend the meetings, as the author of the first 
projects, see J. Nabuco, op.cit., p.625. 
15 J. Nabuco, op.cit., p.627. 
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would afterwards be taken up by another parliamentary committee 
which ultimately devised the Free Birth Law of 1871. In the 
meantime, between 1866 and the approval of the 1871 Law, discussions 
about abolition continued at government level in an uneasy and 
irregular fashion. At the end of the war, the then conservative 
administration headed by Viscount Itaborai, was strongly opposed to 
any reform. In response to pressures from emancipationists in the 
Lower House, Itaborai restated that great economic and political 
interests were involved and reiterated the need to proceed 
cautiously in order to respect and guarantee the legitimate rights 
of proprietors." 
Nevertheless, despite existing opposition, several events 
contributed to effect substantial changes in attitudes within the 
Empire towards slavery. First, as already mentioned, there was the 
uneasy feeling provoked by the American Civil War and the final end 
of slavery in the United States of America. This was compounded by 
the subsequent war with Paraguay. Those in the Army who conducted 
the war returned with ambiguous feelings about slavery. 
International criticism and the fact that victory had been achieved 
by an Army composed in the majority by former slaves caused 
discomfort and embarrassment. The bulk of Brazilian soldiers serving 
during the Paraguay War were blacks, many were former slaves acting 
as deputy for their masters. Others were slave volunteers seeking 
their freedom. During the war about twenty thousand slaves and their 
wives obtained their freedom through services in the Army. 17 As 
anticipated in the Council of State, the freedom granted to those 
volunteering for the war had at the time created disturbances and 
heightened expectations among those who remained slaves. Further, 
those who survived the war returned with new aspirations and 
benefitting from a certain general sympathy, began to turn public 
opinion against slavery. In launching his plan for gradual abolition 
in 1871, Rio Branco explained his changed view to the Lower House. 
16 J. Nabuco, op.cit., p.680-681; R. Conrad, The Destruction 
of Brazilian Slavery, 1850-1888 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1972) p.87. 
A. Gebara, op.cit., p.101. 
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He observed that no less than 50,000 Brazilians had been in contact 
with the neighbouring nations, and several of the most illustrious 
of these Brazilians had stated that "the preservation of such a 
hated institution had humiliated and vexe4them in front of 
foreigners". 18 
New circumstances resulting from the war, encouraged slave 
protests while the growing activity of the antislavery movement 
served to maintain the momentum for reforms. At the time, Nabuco de 
Aranjo perceived the importance of this critical conjuncture and 
drew the attention of members of the Senate to the need for action: 
"Senhores, this problem is very serious. It is the most important 
question for Brazilian society and it is imprudent to leave it to 
chance. Do you want to know the consequences? I tell you (...) a 
little may be enough today but tomorrow nothing may be enough. The 
main factor of political questions is opportunity. A few reforms can 
be worth a lot today, while tomorrow even the broadest reform 
programme may not satisfy". Nabuco believed that there was an urgent 
need to intervene with suitable legislation to prevent undesirable 
consequences as well as to guide and control the process of 
emancipation. According to Nabuco, if legislators avoided dealing 
with the problem seeking a smooth, regulated path to 
emancipation _ Brazil would be overtaken by uncertainty(an 
unimagined consequences. "Do you not want to have the economic 
problems experienced by the British and French Antilles? You are 
risking the horrors of Saint Domingue...", he asserted with 
conviction. 19 
The announcement of legislative reforms in Cuba and Puerto Rico 
preceding the sanctioning of the Moret Law in July 1870 strengthened 
pressures from Brazilian abolitionists who argued that Brazil should 
implement similar reforms. Influenced by the Spanish example, a 
special committee appointed by the Lower House of Parliament 
18 Rio Branco had been Foreign Minister, during the year. J. 
Nabuco, op.cit., p.615. 
19 J. Nabuco, op.cit., p.689-690. 
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submitted a proposal for the reform of the "element) servil". 
Inspired by the earlier efforts of the Council of State, the reform 
plan of the special committee headed by Teixeira Junior opened up 
space for the opposition in Parliament. 20 More concerned about the 
position of slaveowners, the proposal gave planters the option of 
being indemnified in cash or labour. 21 The suggestion was later 
incorporated into the 1871 Law and would serve to mute planter 
opposition. Slaveowners could either receive compensation from the 
state or make use of the services of the freeborn until they reached 
21 years of age. The committee opposed freeing the children of slave 
mother without compensation. It contrasted Brazilian circumstance 
with that of the Spanish government which had claimed that it could 
not afford to compensate owners: "... because we [Brazilians] can 
afford the gradual and temporary sacrifice of compensating owners 
for the freeing of the newborn (...) and [in contrast with Spain] we 
deal with this question in peace without the pressures of domestic 
confrontation". 22 One member of the committee, the Paulista Rodrigo 
da Silva, in a separate statement expressed a dissident opinion. In 
his view slavery was essential for agriculture and change could led 
to disruption of production and public order. Misjudging the 
underlined divergences already existing among the various provinces, 
Silva pointed out that the circumstances of Brazil were similar to 
those of his province, Sao Paulo, in which slavery was vita1. 23 
Soon after, the resignation in rapid succession of two Ministries 
headed respectively by Itaborai and Sao Vicente, revealed the 
20 "Parecer 
apresentados pela 
Deputados em 24 de 
session 16 August 
Conrad, op.cit., p  
e projecto de lei sobre o elemento servil 
commissao especial nomeada pela Camara dos 
maio de 1870 para examinar este assumpto", APB, 
1870, pp.165-199. J. Nabuco, op.cit., p.688; R. 
.87. 
21 Parecer...commissao especial...24 de maio de 1870", op.cit., 
p.172. 
22 Parecer...commissao especial...24 de maio de 1870", op.cit., 
p.172. 
23 u Parecer..commissao especial..24 de maio de 1870", op.cit., 
includes Rodrigo da Silva separate vote, "Voto em Separado", pp.181- 
188. 
298 
difficulties of reaching an agreement over the reforms proposed by 
the Council of State. 24 It was only in March 1871, when Rio Branco 
assumed the leadership of a new Cabinet committed to reform the 
slave system, that signs of change became evident. The speed of the 
procedures to approve the law indicates how worrying the situation 
had become. In May a new draft bill was delivered to the Lower House 
and four months later, on September 28, 1871, the Free Birth Law, 
was approved. 25 In the Lower House the Law was passed by 65 votes 
against 45. Strong opposition came from the representanteif the 
coffee provinces who constituted two thirds of the 45 votes against. 
In the Senate the Law was approved by 33 to 7. Of the seven 
opponents, five were representan4e8f the coffee provinces. In the 
Lower House, the strongest opposition in the south came from 
representant]Waf the provinces of Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais. 
Of 42 voters from the provinces of Minas Gerais, Espirito Santo, Rio 
de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and the federal district 30 voted against the 
Law. Of whom 20 were from Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro. 26 
The main lines of the Rio Branco Law were the following. First, 
it stipulated that children born to slave women after the date of 
the Law would be free. The freed newborn, subsequently called 
ingenuos, should remain under the control of the owners of the 
mother, who were obliged to rear and take care of them until the age 
of eight. When the child attained this age, the owner should have 
the option either of receiving from the State the indemnification of 
600 milreis or of making use of the services of the minor until he 
reached 21 years of age. The Law also freed slaves belonging to the 
state, those given in usufruct to the Crown, those of unclaimed 
inheritance and those who had been abandoned by their owners. 
24 J. Nabuco, op.cit., pp.692-696; R. Conrad, op.cit., pp.88-89. 
25 On the debates for the approval of Rio Branco Law see A. 
Gebara, op.cit., chapter II; R. Conrad, op.cit., chapter 6. 
26 See Table 21, "Votes on the Rio Branco Law", R. Conrad, 
op.cit., p.301. Perdigao Malheiro, although admitting the need to 
end slavery, opposed to end measure. He feared slave revolt and 
observed that abolition could only be achieved by the safest and 
most convenient method; see R. Conrad for opposition and supporters 
to the Law, op.cit., pp.95-105. 
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Second, the Law provided several mechanisms that would facilitate 
the gradual manumission of those remaining in slavery. To encourage 
manumission an Emancipation Fund was created along with emancipation 
societies to provide funds for the purchase and liberation of 
slaves. Annual lotteries were also established. Slave earnings and 
savings were protected on the assumption that they would be used to 
finance self-purchase. Slaves freed by these means (the libertos) 
were subjected to a five years supervision by the government, a 
period during which they were obliged to hire or engage themselves 
for work. Third, the Law provided for the registration of all the 
slaves in the Empire. The Law also prohibited the separation of 
married couples and of children under the age of twelve from their 
parents. 27 
As will be showk, the Rio Branco Law opened more routes to 
freedom than the Moret Law. However, and in this sense it resembles 
the Cuban case, the impact of the measures on the slave system was 
mitigated by several conditions some of which were contained within 
the legislation and others which resulted from the manner of its 
execution. In both cases, efforts would be directed to controlling 
the pace and direction of the process, producing as little 
disruption as possible and protecting the slaveowner interest. By 
freeing the newborn, for example, the Rio Branco Law cut off the 
main source of slaves. However, this did not represent any major 
change in a short-term. Once children born to slave mothers attained 
the age of 8, planters were allowed the option either of receiving 
from the State an indemnification, or of making use of the labour of 
the children. Planters were guaranteed the labour of freeborn 
ingenuos until they reached the age of 21 years. Ingenuos were only 
to be freed from that obligation if they were ill-treated or 
punished severely. As already stated, the owner option over the form 
of compensation had been suggested by the 1870 special committee. At 
that time the measure was considered essential for agriculture, as 
27 Colleccao das Leis do Imperio do Brazil (Rio de Janeiro: 
Typ. Naciona1,1861-1880) year of 1871; "The Rio Branco Law, 
September 28, 1871" is reproduced in R. Conrad, op.cit., Appendix 
II, pp.304-309 and A. Gebara, op.cit., Appendix I. 
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it provided for an advantageous source of labour supply: 
 "acclimatized workers, who know well the area Ne-pe rc they were raised 
and are cheaper than any other available alternatives (...) And it 
is possible that reaching the age of 21 many of them [ingenuos] 
would remain spontaneously in the same area and work to which they 
had been accustomed since childhood. The planter would have a 
continued supply of free hands" .28 
To control the process of emancipation, the Rio Branco Law 
included other measures that were equally important. The main 
provisions were those leading towards partial and progressive 
emancipation. Manumission was encouraged by the creation of the 
Emancipation Fund and emancipation societies. The Emancipation Fund 
would free as many slaves as its annual disposable income permitted. 
The Emancipation Fund was to be financed by a poll tax on slaves, a 
sales tax on slaves and the proceeds of yearly lotteries. These 
measures had been included in former proposals of the Council of 
State as well as those of the 1870 committee. This mechanism was 
preferred because "... to freegYthe womb is not enough ... Alforrias 
are also necessary to keep slave hope, to make slavery more 
tolerable". 29 
However, the way in which the Emancipation Fund operated turned 
out to be yet another way of controlling routes to freedom presented 
by the law. The registration and the classification system created 
by subsequent regulations, essential to the functioning of the Fund, 
was revealed to be an strategy for the stabilization of slaves and 
freedmen in a given geographical area and became also a mechanism 
for social control. The government had alluded to these purposes 
28 N Parecer...commissao especial...24 de maio de 1870", op.cit., 
p.176; Nabuco de Araujo expressed the same view earlier in the 
Council of State: "... the planter who looks to the future, will 
feel that the measure is a great source of new, useful hands, 
because these minors, besides being acclimatized and accustomed to 
plantation labour, will have devotion and affection to the place 
where they were born, to the family to whom they were attached...", 
in J. Nabuco, op.cit., p.623. 
29 J. Nabuco, op.cit, p. 624. 
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during debates in the Lower House. Besides the fact that the 
liberation of slaves was not to be forced, it was observed that the 
process should be accomplished with the "agreement of the owner", 
and that "the person who nowadays lives in slavery will have to be 
a good slave, and to please their owners", before they will be 
considered for purchase by the Fund. 30 Thus, the Law would enhance 
discipline and give planters more control over their remaining 
slaves. 
The registration procedure was essential for the enforcement of 
the Rio Branco Law. According to the Law, the Government was to 
carry out the registration of all slaves and ingenuos. Slaves who 
were not registered by their owners would automatically be 
considered free. Procedures for the registration and fines and 
penalties against fraud were specified by a set of Regulations 
issued on December 1, 1871. 31 According to these Regulations, the 
registration of all slaves and ingenuos was to be accomplished 
between April and the end of September of 1872, when the 
registration books would be closed. This period could be extended 
for one year for late registration. 
Further regulations issued in November 13, 1872, established a 
system of classification for the liberation of slaves through the 
Emancipation Fund. 32 Classification was to be carried out by a Board 
set up in each county especially for this purpose. In allocating 
Emancipation Fund revenue, Boards would give priority to freeing 
families, according to the following criteria: i) married couples 
where the partners had different owners; ii) married slaves with 
freeborn children under the age of twenty one; iii) mothers with 
young slave children; iv) married slaves with young children; v) 
30 APB, session 11 June 1871, p.131; A. Gebara, op.cit., p.113. 
31  Regulation to which Decree n. 4835 of 1st of December 1871, 
for execution Art. 8th. of the Law n. 2040 of 1871", is translated 
in A. Gebara, op.cit., Appendix II, pp.306-319. 
32 "Regulation to which the Decree n. 5135 of 13th November 1872 
refers" is translated in A. Gebara, op. cit., Appendix III, pp.320- 
352. 
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mothers or fathers with free children and v) persons between twelve 
and fifty years old, beginning with young female and older males. 
According to Ademir Gebara, the provisions were afterwards changed 
giving priority to those who had already paid (or on whose behalf 
money had been paid) part of the purchase price for their freedom, 
as well as the best workers who would be nominated by masters. 33 
 Although all slaves should be classified, the Fund would not 
purchase the freedom of slaves prosecuted for crimes, those already 
committed for trial, runaways and habitual drunkards. Equally, 
slaves whose freedom was pending according toVZontracted period of 
service were not entitled to be classified for the Fund. 34 
Enhancing a master's control over slave routes to freedom, the 
regulations provided the slaveowners with further mechanisms to 
ensure discipline during the period of transition. The regulations 
were also designed to encourage slaves to work. Eliminating the 
dangers of a hybrid family, with slave and freed members, the 
classification would rather stimulate families to work, to 
acquiescence and to comply with the rules. The scheme might also 
stimulate sentiments of gratitude in slaves, therefore perpetuating 
an ideal paternalistic relation between former masters and slaves. 35 
Besides creating the Emancipation Fund and liberating slaves 
selected by lotteries, the Rio Branco Law allowed slave to form a 
saving fund, and those who had the means to pay had the right to buy 
their freedom. It further permitted the slave, "in furtherance of 
his liberty, to contract with a third party the hire of his future 
services" for a term of up to seven years. 36 Self-purchase was an 
evident novelty in the Brazilian law. Although customary practice, 
• A. Gebara, op.cit., p.126. 
N "Regulations, 1872", in A. Gebara, op.cit., p.328. 
• A. Gebara, op.cit., pp.127-128. 
36 " The Rio Branco Law", op.cit., according to art.IV, parag.3. 
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it has been the subject of only scattered and specific 
dispositions. 37 The measure was viewed as "a civilizing agent, 
infusing habits of labour and economy". 38 Nevertheless, although 
stating that the slave "who, through his savings, may obtain means 
to pay his value has a right to freedom", the Rio Branco Law in fact 
limited the right of self-purchase by subjecting it to the consent 
of the owner. Quite distinct from what had been proposed in the 
Council of State in 1868, the slave could now only hire himself out, 
and save by his "labour and economy", with the permission of the 
owner. 39 Once more the Rio Branco Law provided several routes to 
freedom, but limited and subject to the owner's will. As Gebara 
observed, "The conservative abolitionists in the 1871 Chamber were 
in fact proposing a mechanism of transition which allowed the owner 
to keep control over their slaves, control that now was extended to 
the possibilities of freedom (...) it reinforced the informal ties 
that already existed between the slave and his owner, as well as 
strengthening the owner's influence in determining the future of his 
slaves". 40 While freeing slaves, the Law opened room for planter 
manoeuvre during the period of "transition". 
Several obstacles impeding the enforcement of the 1871 Law also 
favoured slaveowners. The process of registration and classification 
was carried out at a very slow pace. If from one side delays 
occurred due to the sheer size of the country and bureaucratic 
inefficiency, from another side this was due in part to planter 
opposition. In may, 1876, the government announced the freedom of 
the first 1,503 slaves liberated through the Emancipation Fund, 
37 Parecer...commissao especial...24 de maio de 1870", op.cit., 
p. 171. 
38 See for instance opinion in the 1870 committee, 
"Parecer...commissao especial...24 de maio de 1870", op.cit., p.170. 
39 For a contrast, about this and other issues, between the Rio 
Branco Law and former proposals in the Council of State, see 
"Confronto dos Trabalhos do Conselho de Estado com a Lei de 28 de 
Setembro de 1871 e a proposta primitiva do governo" in J. Nabuco, 
op.cit., Appendix VII, pp.1071-1092. 
40 A. Gebara, op.cit., p.114. 
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promising that a total of 2,500 would shortly be freed. At the end 
of 1878, another 1,800 were freed. 41 In the 1880s, with the support 
of the abolitionist movement, the pace of liberation would be 
accelerated. But even then the impact of the Emancipation Fund as a 
mechanism of freeing slaves was limited. Thirteen years after the 
passage of the Rio Branco Law, Rui Barbosa remarked in 1884 that 
only 18,900 slaves had been liberated. Even if increased by a factor 
of five, and allowing for some fall in the manumission prices, by 
1900 the Fund would be expected to free no more than 125,000. If 
this figure was doubled to 250,000, and assuming that deaths during 
the period helped to free a further 250,000 and that private 
manumissions reached 200,000, there would still be 400,000 slaves in 
Brazil at the beginning of the century. In Barbosa's view, this 
figure was probably an underestimate. 42 Even the 18,900 slaves freed 
between 1871 and 1884 had been part purchased as the result of their 
own savings and not exclusively with the resources of the 
Emancipation Fund. 43 
The Law was cautious so as not to disturb "private" relation 
between master and slave. It made no mention of corporal punishment, 
working hours or maintenance. The point was well explained in the 
early discussion of the Council of State and in the 1870 special 
Committee. In the Council of State there had been opposition to 
changes in the statutes regulating relations between master and 
slave. "In order that slavery might be maintained for some time 
more, it is necessary to keep it as it is". Otherwise, "slave 
complaints and owner reactions resulting in the intervention of the 
authorities, would in the final event lead to the demoralization of 
the masters and to the impossibility of slavery (...) The English 
regulations of 1831 and the 1845 French Law, altering the regime of 
slavery, the working hours, punishment and so forth, were the main 
41 R. Conrad,  op.cit., pp.110-111. 
42 "Parecer n.48 A, formulado em nome das Commiss6es Reunidas 
de Orgamento e Justiga Civil acerca do projecto de Emancipagao dos 
escravos, pelo Sr. Rui Barbosa", APB, session 4 August 1884, p. 44. 
43 For results of the Emancipation Fund, 1873-1883, see "Parecer 
n.48 A... pelo Sr. Rui Barbosa", APB, session 4 August 1884, p.63. 
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causes that led to the final and immediate abolition of slavery in 
their colonies". 44 The Teixeira Junior Committee also stressed the 
point in 1870: "The majority of the committee (...) have limited 
themselves to public problems, avoiding issues that could disturb 
the private, domestic relationship between master and slave". 45 
 Despite all this caution, changes were taking place. State action in 
attempting to direct the process brought slaves into the public 
domain _ as showed by Gebara _ either by means of protests or 
through acquiescence, and so their incorporation within the process 
and rules established by the Law. 46 
Although trying to interfere as little as possible in the 
"private" relations of masters and slaves, the Law intended to 
transform those relations. It was an explicit attempt to effect a 
transition to "free labour", albeit as slowly, smoothly and 
gradually as circumstances permitted. With the Law, agreement over 
the time, pace and mode of leading slaves to freedom was effectively 
achieved. Planters did not want to lose control over the future 
labour of their slaves nor over their time to reorganize labour 
relations. They were given both plus the assurance that in the 
short-term there would be no radical changes. The major question was 
not the effectiveness of the Law as a means of abolishing slavery, 
"But the maintenance of a stable social environment in which a 
phased transition to free labour could be sustained". 47 And in this 
sense, as will be seen, the Law achieved its purpose. It is only by 
the end of decade, that the policy of gradual abolition and 
transition devised with the Rio Branco Law would again be 
questioned. 
In the meantime, parallel to the adjustments of the 1871 Law, 
there were attempts to devise a new legislation on loca0o de 
44 J. Nabuco, op.cit., p. 624. 
45 "Parecer...commissao 	especial...24 de maio de 1870", 
op.cit., p.172. 
46 A. Gebara, op.cit., pp.134-138. 
47 A. Gebara, op.cit., p.129. 
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servigos. As indicated above, this initiative was considered an 
essential complement to the Rio Branco Law. It would continue the 
"cautious", "prudent", "smooth" and gradualist process of leading 
slaves into freedom, inserting the freedmen within a new 
organization of labour relations. It would also provide for 
alternative source of labourers. The new Law of locag&o de servigos 
approved in 1879 shaped the features of this new organization of 
labour relations, based on the obligation to engage in long-term 
contracts and targeting both domestic free labourers and 
immigrants. 48 The complementarity of the 1871 and 1879 measures was 
evident. If this new organization of labour relations would be only 
temporary, a period of "transition" as claimed by some, or a 
permanent feature as maintained by others, only the time would tell. 
In any case, as will be demonstrated, the approval in 1879 of the 
new Law of locagao de servigos in response to the consequences of 
the 1871 Law fashioned one mode _ at the institutional level _ of 
keeping on course the process of gradual emancipation and of 
effecting a gradual "transition to free labour". The close 
connection between gradual emancipation and transition to free 
labour, implemented by the complementary measures of the 1871 Law 
and 1879 locagan de servigos, makes the Brazilian a distinctive 
case. It does not have a parallel in Cuba. 
6.1.2. The Moret Law 
The circumstances in which the Law Moret was approved were very 
different from those in Brazil. In Spain, the issue of the future of 
slavery moved into the open when the Spanish government called 
together a meeting with delegates from its Antillan colonies and 
when Puerto Rican delegates forced the question onto the agenda. As 
was mentioned, despite initial strong opposition, Cuban delegates 
recognized the need for reform and reluctantly submitted a plan for 
the gradual emancipation of slaves on the island. This initiative 
did not led anywhere. The very idea of emancipation encountered 
resistance from Cuban planters and the Spanish government, unwilling 
48 See chapter 4, section 3. 
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to risk losing their support, failed to act because it was unable to 
settle a compensation scheme and feared the loss of the colony. 
The controversial question of slavery was not the major issue 
that concerned the Cuban delegates. Rather they were most exercised 
by the nature of the connection with Spain. Cuban delegates came to 
Madrid to ask for economic, political and administrative reforms 
that would modify the colonial status of the island. After the 
meeting, not only did Spain refuse to address matters raised by 
Cuban delegates but actually took measures that worsened the 
situation. 49 When in October, 1868, Carlos Manuel de Cespedes and 
a group of conspirators declared themselves in revolt against 
Spanish rule, they called for gradual and indemnified emancipation. 
Thus, the continued maintenance of slavery, which was not the major 
grievance of those opposing Spain, soon became entangled with the 
first major struggle for Cuban independence. The insurrection became 
known as the Ten Years' War (1868-1878). 
The extreme circumstances of the anti-colonialist war within 
which the debate and implementation of the gradual policy devised in 
the Moret Law took place, made the Cuban case very different from 
that of Brazil. Although the war was mainly fought in the eastern 
part of the island and hardly affected the sugar provinces of the 
west, where slavery prevailed, the institutional and legal decisions 
over the future of slaves were devised in conjunction with the 
evolution of the rebellion. Emancipation became a political and 
strategic device manipulated by both sides. The ambiguities of rebel 
49 Cubans had asked for abolition of customs duties but instead 
new taxes were imposed on the colonies in 1867. A.F. Corwin. Spain 
and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba, 1817-1886. (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1967) p.213. Cubans had also asked for political and 
administrative reforms, "Special Laws" that had been promised since 
1837. These included an insular council and insular assembly, 
popularly elected, to be consulted by the governor on all matters 
over finance and administrative policy; political representation in 
the Cortes; and extension of rights of the individual citizen, such 
as freedom of press and association. In sum, the Spanish 
Constitutions applied to the Antilles.Informacion sobre reformas en 
Cuba y Puerto Rico (Nueva York: Imprenta de Ballet Y Breen, 1867) 
II, pp.100-137. 
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and Spanish policies revealed their reluctance and weak commitment 
towards decisive action on the problem of slavery. 50 
In the Assembly of Guainamo, in April 1869, the rebels drew up a 
declaration proclaiming that all inhabitants of the Republic were 
entirely free. However, the impact of this declaration was soon 
mitigated by the Reglamento de Libertos, approved by the 
revolutionaries two months later. The Reglamento established the 
tutelage of patronos over their former slaves. If the libertos wish 
to leave their masters, they had to report to the Oficina Provincial 
which would then allocate them to a new patrono whose estate they 
could not leave without permission. The Reglamento, which was to 
come into immediate effect, obliged the libertos to work. They were 
to receive a nominal wage of ten pesos a month. The Reglamento 
created an Oficina Principal de Libertos that would carry out a 
census and keep a register of all libertos not engaged in the Army 
and would record their movement. Patronos were to provide libertos 
with clothing, maintenance, medical assistance in case of serious 
illness, and the use of provision grounds. Working hours were fixed 
at nine a day. The Oficina was to mediate in conflicts between 
patronos and libertos and to enforce punishment. Maximum fines of 4 
pesos and three days detention were stipulated for libertos who 
infringed the regulations. 51 The purpose of the regulations, as 
Cespedes would admit later, was to enrol some libertos as soldiers 
and some as field workers. 52 The idea was not to transform slaves 
into wage workers or free citizens but to attend the urgent 
circumstances of the war. Although it is uncertain if it was 
50 The evolvement of the insurrection and the problem of slavery 
in Cuba is examined in R. Cepero Bonilla. Azdcar y AboliciOn, 1st ed 
1948, (Barcelona: Critica, 1976), see chapter 11-13; R.J. Scott, 
Slave Emancipation in Cuba. The Transition to Free Labor, 1860-1899  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) chapter II. A classic 
source on the war is R. Guerra y Sanchez, Guerra de los Diez Aflos 
1st ed. 1950-52 (Havana: Editorial Pueblo y EducaciOn, 1986) 2 
tomos. 
51 "Reglamento de Libertos, July 5, 1869", reprod. in H. 
Pichardo Viflals (ed.) Documentos para la Historia de Cuba (Havana: 
Editora del Consejo Nacional de Universidades, 1965) pp.389-393. 
52 R. Scott, op.cit., p.48. 
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systematically enforced, the Regulation remained in effect in 
insurgent territory until the end of December 1870, when it was 
revoked in favour of full freedom. 53 
In the meantime, the initiatives of the insurgents and the 
reality of the war changed Spanish policy regarding slavery and 
abolition. Strategic and international consideration required the 
government to take steps towards a repudiation of slavery, however 
partial. Although the struggle for independence from Spain was not 
primarily concerned with the maintenance of slavery, the action of 
the insurgents in declaring immediate emancipation as a way of 
recruiting slaves into their army and of seeking international 
support, influenced Spanish policy. In spite of the insurgents' 
initially weak commitment to general emancipation, their appeal to 
blacks and to those who favoured the elimination of slavery needed 
to be addressed. The Spanish government was also anxious to avoid 
the disturbance of sugar production which might reduce colonial 
revenues. A growing antislavery sentiment within Spain as well as 
the need for international support for the continuance of Cuban 
colonial ties also contributed to change Spanish policy. Spain had 
been carefully handling international pressures to end slavery. But 
the outcomes of the American Civil War heightened Spanish anxiety. 
The United States of America was already the greatest market for 
Cuban sugar. This represented a real danger to Spain as the U.S.A 
might intervene in the island or declare a boycott of slave-produced 
staples.c154 As emancipation was now being discussed in Brazil, it 
appeaifpossible that Spain might be the last supporter of slavery in 
the New World. The war aggravated the situation, and Spain was 
compelled to show the world that its action in the island was in 
53 R.Cepero Bonilla, op.cit., p.138; Cepero Bonilla suggests 
that the regulation was executed in insurrectionist territory, in 
contrast with Ramiro Guerra, who observed that its execution 
resulted impossible due to the conditions of war, R. Cepero Bonilla, 
op.cit., p.137; R. Guerra y Sanchez, op.cit., I, p.109. 
54 Insurrectionist initiatives for annexation is examined in R. 
Cepero Bonilla, op.cit., chapter 13; for American pretensions see H. 
Thomas, Cuba, or The Pursuit of Freedom. New York: Harper and Row, 
1971, chapter 18. 
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defence of territory and not to sustain slavery. The response was 
the Moret Law. 
The Moret Law was approved by the Spanish Cortes on July 4, 1870, 
in the midst of the Ten Year's War. It freed all slaves over the age 
of sixty and children born to slave mother since 1868. The free born 
were to be under the tutelage of the motherg0 master who should 
provide for maintenance and medical assistance. The patron was 
allowed to use their labour without remuneration up to the age of 
18. Between 18 and 22 years the liberto would have to be paid half 
the daily wage of a free labourer, according to his class and 
training. On reaching the age of 22 the liberto was free of any 
obligation to his mother's master. Physical abuse by the patron 
could be punished with the loss of a right to the freedman's labour. 
The Law also freed the slaves belonging to the state and finally the 
"liberated" emancipados. Registration of all slaves in the island 
should be completed by December 31, 1870, and those slaves omitted 
would be considered free. The bill also outlawed the use of the whip 
and prohibited the separation of couples and of children under 14 
years of age from their mothers. 55 
On the surface, the general lines were similar to those of the 
subsequent Brazilian law of 1871: namely that the freeborn remained 
under the patronage of the master, labour obligations were imposed 
on freedmen; slave registration; the non-separation of families and 
so forth. Some differences were easy to identify. First, elderly 
slaves in Brazil were not freed by Rio Branco Law but by the 
Saraiva-Cotegipe Law of 1885. Second, Brazilian owners had the right 
to freeborn labour until they reach 21 years of age, without any 
wage payment. Emancipados had been legally "freed" in Brazil in 
1864. Self-purchase was an already established practice recognized 
by Spanish law in Cuba. While the Moret Law prohibited whipping, the 
Rio Branco act made no references to punishment: public whipping of 
55 " La Ley (Moret) de 4 de jul io de 1870" and "El Reglamento de 
5 de agosto de 1872, in Appendix. Ley y Reqlamento de la Abolicion 
de la Esclavitud de 13 de Febrero y 8 de mayo de 1880'  (Havana: La 
Nueva Principal, 1880). The Moret Law is reproduced in H. Pichardo 
Viflals, op.cit., pp.394-397. 
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slaves would be abolished in Brazil only in 1886. In the Brazilian 
law, mothers could not be separated from their children ingenuos 
under eight years old. Also in the Brazilian legislation, there were 
additional routes to freedom provided by the Emancipation Fund. 
These two provisions were reputed to have made the Brazilian 
superior to the Spanish legislation. That was, for instance, the 
opinion of Torres Aguilar in his speech to the Spanish Abolitionist 
Society in February, 1872 : "...emancipation in Brazil does not 
embrace only the new-born, but provides means which can benefit all 
slaves (...) in contrast with this important provision we can show 
only the promise within the Law of July of 1870 of presenting 
another law to abolish slavery with compensation as soon as Cuban 
representatives are seated in the Cortes". 56 
What Aguillar and other contemporary supporters of emancipation 
criticized in the Moret law was the limited impact it would have on 
initiatives to transform slaves into free labourers and as a 
mechanism for the transformation of the system of labour. Closely 
related to this issue, and frankly in contrast with Rio Branco Law, 
were two main articles of Moret Law, planned in conjunction with the 
development of the war. Thus _ similarly to the attitudes of the 
Brazilian government during the Paraguay War _ article 3 stated 
that slaves who had served the Spanish flag or by any other means 
had helped the Spanish military during the insurrection, were to be 
declared free. The Spanish government promised to compensate their 
owners, of course, only if owners had been loyal to the Spanish 
cause. These freedmen were to be "under the protection of the 
State", and were assured the means of earning a living without 
coercion. Those who wished would be returned to Africa (art.13). The 
other article that is relevant to contrast with Rio Branco Law is 
article 21, which stipulated that a proposal for gradual, 
indemnified emancipation of remaining slaves was to be submitted to 
the Cortes, including representatives from Cuba, only after the end 
56 S. Torres Aguillar, La abolicion de la esclavitud en el  
Brasil y en Espana. Discurso pronunciado en la conferencia (anti-
esclavista) del 26 de Febrero de 1872 (Madrid: Secretaria de la 
Sociedad Abolicionista Espanola, 1872) p.10. 
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of the war. 57 
The Emancipation Fund and the obligation of those freed by its 
provisions to work and other measures included in the Brazilian law 
as well as article 21 of the Spanish law were closely related to the 
issue of "transition". The liberation of slaves to fight in the 
Spanish forces was a strategic response to the war and rebel 
initiatives. When introducing his project-of-law in the Cortes, 
Minister Segismundo Moret observed that the law was a "single effort 
to preserve territorial integrity and redeem the slaves". He also 
observed that the intention of the law was not to deal with the 
major issue of a "transition to free labour"; it was designed to 
handle problems created by the insurgents. Considerations about 
transition and the organization of the labour market could only be 
discussed when peace had been restored to the island. "With respect 
to the second part which involved the transition,  la cuestion de 
hecho, the government far from avoiding its resolution or delaying 
it, merely asks the Chamber to postpone it..." (my stress). 58 
The government's purpose became more evident during the debates. 
Supporting the project, a member of the Cortes committee which 
amended the original draft submitted by the Minister observed that 
it addressed the main concerns about slavery. He noted that besides 
guaranteeing compensation, the Law stipulated the registration of 
slaves. This would prevent further illegal entry of slaves into the 
colonies. 59 The law also regulated the status of the emancipados and 
established the patronato del amo, requiring that the master 
"provides for the freedman and guide him during his first steps". 
Therefore, when reaching 22 years of age the freedman would have 
57 "Ley de Vientres Libres de 4 de julio de 1870" in H. Pichardo 
op.cit., pp.394-397. 
58 Diario de las sesiones de las Cortes Constituyentes , session 
10 June 10, 1870, tomo XIII, Apendice primero al n.292, p.l. 
59 Data provided by J. Perez de la Riva, Para la historia de las  
qentes sin historia (Barcelona: Ariel, 1976) p.130, shows that 
slaves continued to enter the island after the 1866 Law at an 
average of 6,000 to 7,000 a year. In 1870, 4,000 entered. Between 
1866 and 1873 a total of 28,000 slaves were imported. 
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"all rights, plus savings, and would possibly enter society in 
better conditions than those whites beginning a working life". 60 
 Further, the main purpose of the law was fundamentally political: 
"to show Spain is willing fully to abolish slavery". 61 In presenting 
the bill, the Minister admitted that the strategy was to reduce the 
appeal of the insurgents, who spoke of "the flag of liberty against 
tyranny, the principle of emancipation against slavery, as well as 
of colonial autonomy against imperial oppression" . 62 He went on to 
observe that it was not enough just to announce the abolition of 
slavery in the near future. The project was necessary to reduce 
international difficulties created by the war. "... Slavery is the 
crucial problem, the great obstacle, the basis of the politics and 
the source of all accusations (...) We have pursued in America a 
free, just policy (...) We are acting on the administration and 
economy of Cuba. However as this was not enough we will give them 
the definitive evidence and here is the project after which it can 
be clearly written _ slavery is dead and has ended for ever on 
Spanish territory...". 63 The law would also enhance Spain's capacity 
to counter the problems created by the insurgents. "Within the law 
of emancipation declared by the so-called Cuban government and 
signed by Cespedes, there is no such idea of emancipation, it is a 
law of war, it is not a law of liberty. It intends to cause damage 
but it does not attempt to abolish slavery (...) Owners who would 
present their slaves to the Government of Cespedes are promised a 
compensation. But these slaves go to the Army, to serve as soldiers. 
These slaves are not granted freedom but are converted into 
mercenaries, supporters of a cause they do not love, and to whom 
freedom is granted solely on the condition to expose themselves to 
60 Diario...Cortes Constituyentes, op.cit., session 10 June, 
1870, p.8766. 
61 	• 	• Diario...Cortes Constituyentes, op.cit., session 10 June, 
1870, p.8763. 
62 	• Diario...Cortes Constituyentes, op.cit., session 10 June, 
1870, p.8768. 
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„ . 64 the fire of the enemies... 
The strategic nature of the legislation and the uncertain 
commitment of Spain towards even a gradual emancipation was also 
evident during the debates. Although nobody dared to defend the 
institution of slavery at this stage, some debaters alarmed at the 
consequences of emancipation objected even to such a partial 
measure. Member Ortiz de Zarate, for instance, argued that the 
amendment introduced by the committee (article 21) to the original 
draft presented by the Minister, namely the addition of the term 
"emancipaciOn gradual”, represented a threat "that could lead to a 
state of alarm in Cuba and Puerto Rico". 65 The most intransigent 
opposition to the project, however, came from the conservative 
Romero y Robledo, who was also concerned about the consequences of 
this article. He criticized the use of the word "gradual". That did 
not calm anyone It could mean "one year as well as 30, or 40 
years" .66  Robledo was also concerned about the danger of the 
"Africanisation of Cuba", that is an eventual supremacy of the black 
population. Like others he included in his discourse a condemnation 
of slavery while at the same time stressing its necessity. Declaring 
himself an "abolitionist", he explained that there were various 
sorts of abolitionists. In his view, the process of abolition should 
take place in such a way as to avoid "disturbances" and the 
disruption of production. It should also protect colonial ties and 
guarantee compensation, "...in order to assure all the interests 
involved, to avoid lesser disturbance and in order that [Cuba] 
continued to be wealthy, flourishing and Spanish". 67 The response 
of the proponents of the project to these objections focused on the 
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something "still to be solved". In the committee's view the project 
ensured that emancipation would be gradual: "Does not it establish 
the principle that emancipation would be gradual? Does not Mr. 
Romero y Robledo believe this would be a means of removing all 
suspicion from slaveowners that they would be suddenly deprived of 
their hands? Do not these means provide guarantees not only to 
slaveowners but to the whole society ... that it would not receive 
on a fixed date a irrational mass of men who has just left slavery, 
a mass of men who has no social habits?". 68 That was why the 
commission favoured the addition of the word "gradual", believing it 
inappropriate to fix any date or time limit to qualify "gradual 
emancipation". 69 In the end, the Minister himself disclosed that he 
did not want the word "gradual" either. Finally, at the suggestion 
of Canovas de Castillo it was replaced by the phrase "emancipation 
indenizada". 70 
The exceptional circumstances of war in Cuba and Spanish colonial 
policy made for another distinctions between the Cuban and Brazilian 
cases. One interesting point is the position of planters towards 
making and implementing gradualism. Contrasting both pieces of 
legislations and criticizing the Spanish law, Torres Aguilar noted 
the failure to implement a more liberal emancipation law. In the 
Spanish colonies "we have not had, that is, we should not have had 
the immediate pressure from slaveowners, who in Brazil were closely 
related to the legislators or were themselves seated in the 
Congress". 71 The Brazilian abolitionist, Joaquim Nabuco, in his 
speech to the Sociedad Abolicionista Espanola in 1881 also observed 
that among other differences "... when your speakers proposed 
abolition of slavery to the Cortes, they faced men who had nothing 
68 Diario...Cortes Constituyentes, op.cit., session 9 June, 
1870, p.8733. 
69 Diario...Cortes Constituyentes, op.cit., session 9 June, 
1870, p.8733. 
M Diario...Cortes Constituyentes, op.cit., tomo XIV, session 
17 June, 1870, p.8922. 
71 S. Torres Aguilar, op.cit., p.5. 
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in common with slavery. When we [Brazilian abolitionists] address 
Parliament we ask the members who are themselves slave owners for 
abolition". 72 In Brazil, the policy makers involved in the 
formulation of the policy were directly or indirectly connected with 
slaveowners interest. In most cases they were slaveowners 
themselves. Those discussing the reform of the institution of 
slavery were discussing directly their own vested interests, the 
future of their own property and wealth. Despite the strong 
opposition from southern coffee provinces, the debates somehow 
resulted in a new kind of consensus about the gradual policy 
envisaged in the 1871 Law and its regulations. Also despite the 
reluctance and opposition of some members of the Brazilian elite, 
the majority soon realized that the measures were essential to 
guarantee a gradual, peaceful, and extended process of ending 
slavery. Hence, believing that no further step would be taken, they 
finally accepted and struggled to sustain the pace of emancipation 
set in motion by the Rio Branco Law. 
When Cuban planters became involved in the discussion of gradual 
abolition, the Moret Law had already been approved and it was 
already a fact. Although Minister Moret noted in the debate that he 
had consulted Cuban planters residing in Madrid and even that he had 
taken one article directly from a proposal submitted by Cuban 
planters, Cuban planters criticized the law and attempted to block 
its enforcement. From the first, news that the liberal government of 
Spain was preparing a project-of-law on abolition provoked anxiety 
and alarm. Leading Cuban planters of the Junta de Hacendados, 
petitioned the Capitan General Caballero to be allowed to convene 
and discuss the "social question". After consulting Madrid, the 
Capitan General decided to explain the provisions of the Moret Law 
to an assembly of leading planters and merchants. The first meeting 
was held on June 17, 1870. 73 According to Corwin, confronted with 
the "delicate matter of submitting the projected Moret Law to 
72 Sociedad Abolicionista Espanola. SesiOn del 23 de Enero de 
1881. Discurso del Sr. Nabuco. Discurso del Sr. Labra. (Madrid: 
Presidencia de la Sociedad Abolicionista, 1881) p.4. 
A. Corwin, op.cit., p.256. 
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proprietors", Caballero gave several reasons why they were expected 
to assent: "i) that slavery was exclusively found in Cuba, and that 
this placed the nation in an unfavourable light in its relations 
with other nations; ii) that slavery was one of the causes 
prolonging the war because the insurrectionists had obtained 
sympathy and help from abolitionist opinion in the United States of 
America, propagating the idea that Spain wanted to preserve slavery 
perpetually; iii) that government had in the treaties with Great 
Britain given a promise to resolve the problem". 74 
Although many planters were not in full accord with the 
government, some accepted freedom for newborn and elderly slaves, if 
there was to be proper compensation. 75 Others, however, objected 
even to free birth, suggesting that moral instruction, the expansion 
of provision grounds and the encouragement of coartacion would be 
the best way to end slavery. Yet others viewed abolition with 
suspicion and hostility. Julian Zulueta, one of Cuba's leading 
planters, believed the reform was dangerous while the enemies of 
Spain still held arms. 76 In his view abolition should be linked with 
immigration and the organization of a labour market based on 
contract labour. 77 Jose Suarez Argudin, a strong opponent of any 
change in the institution of slavery and owner of sugarmills in 
Cienfuegos and Bahia Honda, considered the issue to be one of "life 
and death" for Cuba. It was a weapon used by the enemies of Spain: 
Cuban sugar production would collapse after abolition. 78 He argued 
in favour of leaving abolition not to the abolitionists nor to the 
government but to the owners themselves. Several planters supported 
Argudin's proposal that a committee be sent to Madrid to fight 
against the adoption of the Law. 79 Other meetings were held on July 
74 Ibid. 
A.F. Corwin, op.cit., p.256-257. 
76 A.F. Corwin, op.cit., p.257. 
77 R. Scott, op.cit., p.67. 
78 Ibid. 
79 A. Corwin, op.cit., p.257. 
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1, and July 11, 1870. Both were an effort to justify the government 
claim that the measures were essential given the extraordinary 
circumstances. The government also sought to reassure planters that 
no further step leading to abolition were contemplated beyond the 
freeing to the newborn and the aged." 
As with the Rio Branco Law in Brazil, there were attempts to 
delay or block the enforcement of the Moret Law. Any delay was of 
course advantageous to planters. First, Cuban planters, with the 
cooperation of colonial officials, obstructed its publication. The 
Moret Law was only officially published in the Official Gazette of 
Havana in September 28, 1870, some three months after promulgation 
in Madrid. Following publication, planters attempted to delay its 
application by making enforcement dependent on the regulations. The 
regulations for applying the Moret Law would only be published in 
November 23, 1872, almost two and half years after approval by the 
Cortes. Changes in the Spanish political scenario (the assassination 
of General Prim at the end of the 1870 and the ascension of a new 
monarch) contributed to the delay, despite pressure from Britain and 
the danger of American intervention as the Ten Years War continued. 
Difficulty forming an accurate slave census was another common 
feature. As in Brazil, the complete registration of the slaves was 
essential to the application of the Moret Law. Planters had many 
reasons to delay, confuse and falsify accounts. But registration in 
the midst of the war added to these problems. The Cuban case was 
further complicated by the much later end of the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade. Registration, besides being a mechanism of controlling 
slaves, was a way of controlling the illegal entry of slaves. The 
law for repression and punishment of the slave trade (September 29, 
1866) already demanded a census of all slaves, declaring that those 
not legally registered would be free. The task was hardly completed 
in 1867. The new census ordered by the Moret Law was only completed 
in January 1871. Planters protested against the "injustice of 
freeing legally acquired slaves simply because of errors in the 
80 A. Corwin, op.cit., p.257-258. 
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lists", and continued to block the application of the Law. 
Individual slaveowners appealed for the inclusion of unregistered 
slaves in the lists throughout the 1870s. 81  
In addition, regulations governing the enforcement of the law, 
became another device by which planters would manage to minimize the 
effects of the Moret Law. Besides delaying publication of these 
regulations, planters succeed in making the rules to suit 
themselves. Thus, the regulations of August 5, 1872, created the 
Boards for the Protection of the Freedmen (Juntas Protectoras de los 
Libertos) which were to be established in each civil district in 
Cuba with a Central Board in Havana. 82 The Boards were to administer 
the execution of the Moret Law and enforce measures protecting the 
libertos. Working regulations, wages, protection of slave savings, 
maintenance, and any question resulting from the application of the 
regulations were subjected to Junta control. In addition, Boards 
were required to ensure that libertos strictly complied with the 
Law. They were also to maintain accurate registrations and records: 
slaves not included in the late 1871 census were to be considered 
free. However, the role to be performed by the Boards was clearly 
compromised. Although Boards should look after freedmen "seeking to 
assure that contracts and stipulations agreed were in conformity 
with their interests", it should also take into account the 
interests of "agriculture prosperity and public order". 83 And 
besides, half of the members of the Junta should be slaveowners. 
Several other measures included in the 1872 Regulations also 
guaranteed the interests of planters. Thus, the new born and the 
aged freed by the Moret Law were expected to obey and respect their 
patrons "as if the later were their own fathers". The faculty of 
transferring the patronship by all legal means stipulated by Moret 
Law was re-emphasised. The liberto could not leave nor change 
81 R. Scott, op.cit., p.70. 
82 " El Reglamento de 5 de agosto de 1872", Appendix, Ley y 
Reglamento de la AboliciOn de la Esclavitud..., op.cit., pp.47-63. 
83 "El Reglamento de 5 de agosto de 1872", op.cit., Art.6, 
parag.4., p.50. 
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patrons without the consent of his original patron. Patrons had the 
right to correct the faults of the liberto : "a regulation by the 
colonial government, consulting the Junta Central, would specify the 
punishments to be applied by the patronos". 84 Chapter IV of the 
regulations provided for the return to Africa of those wishing to 
emigrate. 
Inaccuracies in the census and slave records posed further 
serious problems to the enforcement of Moret Law, again favouring 
planters. In many cases, children born after 1868 but before the 
enactment of the Law and the elderly had no proof of age other than 
records kept by masters. Freedom was therefore compromised by errors 
or frauds. Slaves could appeal to the Junta Protectora, requiring an 
estimate of age by a doctor, but as Scott observed, that was a 
laborious and potentially corrupt procedure. 85 Unregistered slaves 
and emancipados also encountered many other obstacles. The number of 
unregistered slaves entitled to legal freedom was estimated at 
70,000. 86 By 1871 only 5,059 had received their liberty in this 
way. 87 
The Moret Law also granted freedom to emancipados. This category 
of "liberated slaves" had for decades suffered the consequences of 
frauds and errors in the records. The Cuban government had been 
legally responsible for this group of slaves since the first ships 
had been sized off the coast of Cuba in 1824. Theoretically, 
Emancipados were free men. But, in Cuba as well as in Brazil they 
had been sold or placed with planters and their life differed very 
little in fact from that of the slave. The number of slaves captured 
off the coast of Cuba from 1824 to 1866, when the last cargo was 
84  "El Reglamento de 5 de agosto de 1872", op.cit., Art. 49, 
p.62. 
85 R. Scott, op.cit., p.69. 
86 A. Corwin, op.cit., p.276. 
87 C. de Sedano y Cruzat, Cuba desde 1850 a 1873. Colecion de 
Informes, Memorias, Proyectos y Antecedentes sobre el Gobierno de la 
Isla de Cuba, relativos al citado periodo (Madrid: Imprenta 
Nacional, 1873) p.156. 
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seized, was calculated at 26,026. It is estimated that about 10,000 
of them eventually found freedom. 88 According to Corwin, emancipados 
had been freed in groups, depending on the year of their capture. 
For example, 3,029 emancipados belonging to the last nine 
expeditions captured in Cuba between the years 1862-1866, were 
granted freedom by the decree of December 6, 1870. An earlier decree 
of September 21, 1869, set at liberty 1,025 emancipados belonging to 
seven expeditions captured between the years 1824-1842. 89  But there 
are reasons to believe that obtaining precise information (such as 
if they were still alive or remaining in the place to which they 
were assigned) about this class of slaves must have been as 
difficult as for other slaves. And like other categories freed under 
the Moret Law, emancipados were still required to enter into 
engagements with the government or former masters. 
Despite inaccuracies, the 1871 census registered 287,626 slaves 
in Cuba. 90 Before the publication of the August 5, 1872 regulation, 
the number of slaves who were granted freedom through the Moret Law 
was reported as follow ( 91 ): 
Libertos by virtue of articles lo. and 2o. 	20,055 
Idem by article 3o. 	 188 
Idem by article 4o. 1,368 
Idem by article 5o. 5,059 
Total 	 26,667 
According to Scott, between 1870 and 1877, 61,766 children of 
slaves became or were born legally free by virtue of the Moret Law. 
Over 32,000 slaves were technically free under other provisions of 
the Law. The government's calculations recorded a decline in the 
88 A. Corwin, op.cit., pp.277-278. 
89 Ibid. 
90 C. Sedano y Cruzat, op.cit., p.156. 
91 	"Resumen General 
libertad por virtud de la 
publicacion del reglamento 
interesados", Habana 30 de 
op.cit., p.156. 
de los esclavos que 
ley de 4 de Julio de 
de 5 de Agosto 1872, 
Enero de 1873, in C. 
han obtenido su 
1870, antes de la a peticion de los 
Sedano y Cruzat, 
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slave population of about 52,000 between 1871 and 1877. 
Recalculating these figures to reduce the effect of double counting, 
Scott finds that the major sources of recorded decline resulted from 
the freeing of the elderly (45%), the freeing of unregistered slaves 
(21%), deaths (19%) and "causes outside the law" (12%)". 92 Scott 
also pointed out that although the Moret Law by itself did not free 
significant numbers of slaves of working age, the operation of the 
law tended to accelerate the process of overall emancipation. As a 
formal measure, Scott pointed out, Moret Law was very limited, but 
its indirect consequences were considerable and often unforeseen. It 
created an additional lever that enabled some slaves to exert 
influence on their condition and that of their relatives. 93 
Table T.5: Sources of Decline in the Slave Population, 1870-1877,  
Government Estimates  
1. Slaves listed in the census of Jan. 15,1871 	287,653 	2. 
Freed for serving the Spanish flag 	658 3. 
Freed because over the age of sixty 21,032 	4. 
Freed because owned by the state 1,046 
5. Freed because unregistered (a) 9,611 
6. Freed for reasons outside the law (b) 	5,423 
7. Slave deaths 	 8,917 
8. Liberto deaths (c) 5,256 
9. Slaves calculated as remaining in 1877 (d) 	235,710 
10. Slaves actually on tax registers, 1878 (e) 	184,030 
Source:  R.J. Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba, The Transition to  
Free Labour, 1860-1899. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1985) p.72. (a) This appears to refer to slaves not in the index to 
the 1871 census. It may therefore be misleading to subcontract 
category 5 from category 1 as the junta officials preparing this 
report did. (b) This presumably included some recorded self-purchase 
and manumission. (c) This inclusion of liberto deaths also suggests 
double-counting. (d) Since some of those in 3, 5 and 8 should not 
have been in the 1871 census, this total is unreliable.(e) Includes 
only slaves over the age of eleven. 
The process of gradual abolition triggered by Rio Branco Law in 
Brazil and the Moret Law in Cuba would continued for almost two 
decades. By the late 1870s, the end of the war in Cuba and the 
92 R. Scott, op.cit., p.71. 
93 R. Scott, op.cit., p.73. 
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urgent pressures for abolition led to more decisive acts. Besides 
the gradual liberation of slaves, attention now turned to sources of 
alternative workers and mechanisms to accomplish the "transition" _ 
facets in the organizing a free labour market. At this stage, the 
objectives and interests of Cuban planters and policy-makers again 
approximated to those of their Brazilian counterparts. 
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6.2. Gradualism and Transition 
In most of the debates, in Brazil as well as in Cuba, the idea of 
gradual emancipation embodied ideas about the "reorganization of 
labour" and the "regulation of labour" besides individual 
manumission. The reorganization of labour usually meant appointed 
the way to sustain slavery while individual slaves were being freed, 
and the formulation of a labour regime that would operate after the  
final abolition of slavery. The configuration of the new modes of 
organizing labour was given by the regulation of labour, the 
creation of rules to oversee relations with new categories of 
workers. As was showed above, a series of possible modes of 
reorganizing labour had been discussed and attempted. The search for 
alternatives or supplements for slave labour described in chapters 
3 and 4 were early examples. Other examples were provided by 
conditions devised in original plans of emancipation, such as 
contracts of service for those working towards self-purchase, 
contracts of services for those freed and for vagrants and the 
promotion of immigration. The term "transition" covered the process 
of transforming the slave into freedmen, the new position of these 
freedmen in the labour market, and the employment of either domestic 
or immigrant labourers. It also embraced the modes of reorganizing 
labour that were devised either to support slavery while delaying 
final abolition, or to constitute forms of labour after abolition. 
In Brazil the legal and institutional processes of gradual 
emancipation and transition was interrelated. The government sought 
to make them a single formal process. From the early plans for 
emancipation to discussions in the Council of State leading to the 
approval of Free Birth Law, there were attempts to transform slaves 
into free labourers, as well as simultaneously reorganizing labour 
either through domestic regulations or the promotion of immigration. 
The approval of the 1879 locag&o de servigos Law completed this 
attempt by linking the two processes. Both pieces of legislation _ 
the 1871 and 1879 acts _ together provided for the future of 
freedmen, their insertion in the labour market as well as for the 
replacement of slaves who had been freed by domestic and immigrant 
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labourers. The legislation was intended to apply during a transitory 
period while gradual abolition was taking place as well as a further 
indeterminate transitory period after final abolition. 
In Cuba gradual emancipation and transition appeared to be 
envisaged as distinct processes. The Moret Law and its regulations 
while providing for free birth and encouraging individual 
manumissions did not include provisions for the organization of the 
labour of freedmen. During the 1870s Cuban planters attempted to 
link both processes, submitting several projects on abolition and 
the reorganization of labour with both freedmen and immigrants. Most 
of these projects envisaged long term contracts and low wages. 
Although the Patronship system was principally concerned with 
securing the labour of former slaves, it was as much concerned about 
the reorganization of labour after patronship had been extinguished. 
6.2.1. Gradualism and Transition in Cuba 
In the final analysis, it can be argued that the Moret Law 
represented the interests of a more progressive sector of Cuban 
planters who wished to facilitate abolition and at the same time 
extended the life of slavery. Although many would have preferred 
that the process followed existing means of achieving freedom, such 
as coartaciem, they had little choice but to accept Spanish 
legislation and wait until the end of the Ten Year's War when 
further reforms on this issue as well as in colonial policy were 
promised. 
At the time when the abolition of slavery was being considered in 
Puerto Rico, Cuban planters decided to meet again to organize a 
defence their interests. On January 26, 1873, thirteen planters 
gathered to form a planter's association (Junta de Hacendados de 
Cuba) under the leadership of Julian Zulueta. Their main concern was 
about the impending Puerto Rico abolition of slavery and the likely 
consequences if a similar measure was applied in Cuba. The majority 
believed that a project of abolition should be "junto, razonado y 
prudente", and should also be accompanied by another on immigration 
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to facilitate the reorganization of labour. 94 As a result, a project 
of abolition was presented to the Minister of Colonial Affairs to be 
discussed later in the Cortes. In it they suggested that slavery 
should be abolished and slaves transformed in colonos, who would be 
under the patronato of the owner for a ten years period. Former 
slaves were to receive wages of 2 pesos (minors) and 4 pesos 
(adults) and would be fed and clothed by the patron. The 
transformation of the planter property rights over slaves into the 
patronato would resolve the problem of compensation. It would also 
prepare slaves for entry into free society. The patronato was 
transferable and could be ended by mutual agreement. Abuses or 
renunciation by the master would also result in the termination of 
the patronos's obligations. 95 It was observed .'_that 1:41151014-Eff that 
the plan of abolition prepared by planters was only in name 
different from slavery. It only changed the term "slave" into 
"colono". 96 
Throughout the 1870s Cuban planters attempted to continue with 
the importation of immigrant contract workers. After the end of the 
trade in Chinese in 1874, suggestions turned again to Mexican and 
American Indians. Several proposals to authorize this sort of 
immigration were sent to Madrid. Labour conditions set out in these 
new proposals did not differ greatly from those included in earlier 
schemes. Immigrants were supposed to work for wages lower than those 
currently prevailing in the island, to be bound to long-term 
contracts which would be subject to existing repressive regulations. 
At the end of the decade, under rising pressure to solve the 
"cuestion social", hopes that immigrants would replaceie slaves 
94 M. del Carmen Barcia, Burquesia esclavista y aboliciOn 
(Havana: Editora de Ciencias Sociales, 1987) p.145. 
95 Project submitted by the Junta de Hacendados de Cuba al 
Ministro de Ultramar, Havana, May 10, 1874. AHN, Ultramar, Gobierno, 
leg.4.882. 
96 F. Acosta y Albear. Memoria sobre el estado actual de Cuba.  
Apreciaciones sobre las reformas y la abolicion. Providencias y 
resoluciones que se consideran convenientes. (Havana: Libreria de 
Andres Pego, 1874) p.18. 
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increased. The variety of plans then suggested and discussed reveals 
a wide range of opinions both within Cuba and the Colonial Office in 
Madrid. One of the most controversial of these projects was proposed 
in 1878 by the Count of Casa More and other members of the Planter 
Association (Circulo de Hacendados). The plan, signed by 1,500 
planters, merchants and manufacturers, provided for the importation 
(with government subsidies) of 40,000 Asian and Canary Islanders to 
work as field labourers. The conditions were very similar to those 
of previous years, emphasising contractual obligations and requiring 
workers to repay expenses advanced by employers. The debt would be 
means of keeping labour bound to the plantation. The purpose was to 
keep wages low and to provide substitutes for slaves. Critics of the 
project once again drew attention to the similarities of the scheme 
with "slavery", and all the evils associated with the "odiosos 
contracts". 97 
These initiatives provoked similar responses to those taking 
place in Brazil. The range of opinions on the subject of immigration 
revealed several points. Foremost was uncertainty about whether or 
not slaves would be expected to work on plantations after abolition. 
What degree of direct coercion and discipline were necessary to 
ensure regular labour? Should there be measures to ensure low wages 
after abolition? What kind of immigration (white, non-white, single 
or family, contract or free) was required and who should be 
responsible for the costs of immigration _ planters, government or 
immigrants themselves? 
As during earlier experiments, the preference for a particular 
scheme had social, political, economic and racial overtones. 
97 Consulta sobre lo promovido por el Escmo. Sr. Conde de Casa 
More, hacendados, industriales, comerciantes de la Isla, relativo 
la cuestiOn de la colonizacion, ANC, CA, leg. 69, n.692; planter 
plans for immigration are criticized in several articles in Revista 
Econ6mica (Havana: La Propaganda Literaria, 1878-1879) which voiced 
the opinion of the various Spanish immigrant associations on the 
plans. See for instance the articles "Gato por lebre. El proyecto de 
Calvo, Ibaflez, More y Pulido" of June 7, 1878, pp.32-33, and a serie 
of articles on "Inmigracion Canaria" published on n.22, n.23, n.24, 
n.25, n.27, n.30. 
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Families of Europeans were still the most desirable form of 
immigration but it was believed they would not come to "tropical 
plantations" to work for low wages. Earlier experiments had shown 
that. Africans and Asians who would work only under coercion would 
endanger the "whiteness" of the island. While some still favoured 
Chinese believing that they were likely to constitute a third race 
in the black/white division and so contribute to stability and the 
retention of control by Spain, others were not convinced. During the 
Ten Years War many Chinese had sided with the insurgents. Other 
planters believed in the ultimate primacy of the free market. Only 
"free labour" could solve the labour problem. That meant a system of 
labour free from state regulations. Agreements should be made freely 
between planters and workers. This was a view that gained strength 
in Brazil and Cuba especially from the end of the 1870s and divided 
opinion in the 1880s. 
By the end of the decade (1879) the authorities in Madrid, 
responding to a proposal of the Comision Central de Colonizacion to 
introduce Yucatecans to Cuba observed that "Cubans wanted to impose 
on free labour the same conditions that applied to slaves _ whether 
by contracts or by regulation. That is impossible because the 
essence of free labour is to have no more limitations than the 
common law". 98 Contracts, it was stated further, were not the way 
to provide the labour demand in Cuba. To resolve the problem, 
"economic law, good wages and rational conditions" would suffice. 
Planters would then have workers in sufficient numbers to lower 
wages. "Today labour is free in the provinces of Ultramar." 99 At 
the same time a divergence of opinions within the Spanish Colonial 
Office on the issue was observed in a statement prepared by the 
Council of State. The controversy was over contracts agreed with 
Yucatecans. Should they be governed by the 1860s Regulation or 
should they be treated as freely agreed? The Council of State, 
following the opinion of the Comision de Colonizacion in Cuba, 
stated formally that contracts should be subjected to 1860s 
98 AHN, Ultramar, leg.102, n.39, exp.l. 
99 AHN, Ultramar, leg.102, n.39, exp.l. 
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regulations but a minority report stressed that contracts should be 
free, based only on common law. 100  
The debates about gradual emancipation and methods of effecting 
the "transition" would sharpen views on the means of reorganizing 
labour. They also revealed the strength of those proposing the 
continuance of coercion to ensure a smooth and extended process of 
abolition thereby guaranteeing a "transition" without disruption of 
production and with regular and cheap labour. In February 1878, the 
Pact of ZanjOn ended the Ten Years War. According to the Pact, the 
general question of slavery was left to be settled once Cuban 
delegates were seated in the Cortes. In its third article it 
pardoned Chinese contract workers and slaves who had fought 
alongside the rebels. The freeing of the rebel slaves was a partial 
measure of emancipation made necessary by the fact that it would 
probably have been impossible to persuade rebel slaves to lay down 
arms otherwise. 101 The government, as provided by the Moret Law, 
also granted freedom to slaves who had served the Spanish military. 
It was estimated that 16,000 slaves were freed by the Pact. 102 
By this time the total number of slaves had been considerably 
reduced. Young and elderly slaves had already been freed by decree; 
others particularly in the cities and in the east gained freedom 
through litigation or self-purchase and many slaves became free as 
a result of the war. The total number of slaves dropped from 360,000 
in 1867 to about 200,000 in 1877. But sugar production remained 
heavily dependent on slavery. According to the 1877 agricultural 
census, about 72% of the workers on plantations were still slaves 
owned by the planters for whom they worked: free workers, rented 
slaves and Chinese made up the remainder. 103  
100 AHN, Ultramar, leg.102, n.39, exp.18. 
101 R. Scott, op.cit., p.115. 
102 Ibid. 
103 R. Scott "Gradual Abolition and the Dynamics of Slave 
Emancipation in Cuba, 1868-86". Hispanic American Historical Review 
63:3 (1983) pp.449-477, esp. p.456. 
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After the end of the war, Cuban planters grouped in the Circulo 
de Hacendados discussed a plan for emancipation to be submitted to 
the Cortes. Several proposals were made but no agreement was reached 
and no initiatives were taken. It was only a year later that the 
Minister of Colonial Affairs by a decree of August 15, 1879, set up 
a committee "to study and report on the problems of the island", 
within which a subcommittee would analyze the "social question". 1" 
Most continued to advocate gradual abolition in order to avoid 
disruption of production and disturbance of public order. Gradualism 
might also secure emancipation without massive state compensation 
for slaveowners. Above all it was the preferred way to convert the 
slave into a "free labourer". The project of the subcommittee 
suggested the creation of a fund of emancipation and annual 
liberation of slaves according to good behaviour and laboriousness. 
It was also suggested that in the meantime, those waiting to be 
liberated, should earn one to three pesos monthly, and that the 
government should provide for the immigration of free labourers. 105 
 Other proposals included gradual and individual emancipation of 
slaves through coartacion and compulsory work contracts. 106 
From these debates a new law of abolition emerged on February 13, 
1880, establishing the Patronship system (patronato). Based on a 
belief in gradualism, the patronato represented an intermediate 
stage between slavery and freedom. Former slaves (patrocinados) 
still owed labour to their masters (patronos) but were now to 
receive a token wage. The law provided for a phased liberation of 
all remaining slaves, in descending order of age. The patronato was 
transferable by all existing legal means but the separation of 
families and children under 12 years of age was prohibited. The 
patrono was obliged to support and cloth patrocinados. Medical 
assistance should also be available and wages would be paid, one to 
104 M. C. del Barcia, op.cit., p.148. 
105 Project-of-law presented by the Committee of Reform of Cuba, 
Madrid, October 14, 1879. AHN, Ultramar, Gobierno, leg. 4.780. 
106 See other projects presented by the committee in AHN, 
Ultramar, Gobierno, leg. 4.780. 
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two pesos for those under 18 years old and three pesos for those 
over eighteen. The patronato could end by gradual phased liberation 
of the workers, by mutual agreement between patrono and patrocinado, 
by renunciation by the patrono, by compensation for services or any 
other existing means of manumission. Those leaving the patronato 
would be under the protection of the state and were obliged to 
contract themselves for a period of four years. Failing to do so, 
they would be considered vagrants and compelled to labour on public 
works projects. The decree forbade corporal punishment and created 
Boards to oversee its enforcement. 107 
A few months later regulations for the enforcement of the 
Patronato Law were issued. These regulated working hours, food and 
clothing rations and wages. Wages were now re-stipulated as one peso 
to those under eighteen, two pesos for those between 19 and 20 years 
old and three for others. Those freed from patronship were still 
obliged to sign four years contracts. The regulations even 
emphasized that those slaves who had been freed because they had not 
been registered by the owners also be required to sign a four year 
contract. Although corporal punishment was prohibited by the law, 
planters managed to keep the stocks. Passive resistance, work not 
done properly, absence from the estate without permission, lack of 
respect to patrono, his deputies and family, could be punished with 
4 days in stocks. Flights, indiscipline and disruption of labour 
could be punished from one to eight days in stocks. Repeated 
offenses and injuries to the patrono, his deputies and family, 
flights for more than four days, collective resistance to work and 
disruption of labour could result on more severe punishments. 108 At 
the time, the Spanish Abolitionist Society criticizing these harsh 
terms, observed that the regulations had "restored slavery in 
107 Ley y Reqlamento de la Abolicion de la Esclavitud de 13 de 
Febrero y 8 de Mayo de 1880, op.cit., pp.3-12; the main text of the 
law is reproduced in H. Pichardo Vinals, op.cit., pp.423-428. 
108 The regulations are included in the Ley y Reqlamento de la 
Abolicion, op.ci ., pp.12-46. 
332 
Cuba". 109 The 11 hour working day in the dead season were even 
longer than that specified in the 1842 slave code (9 hours, and 16 
during harvesting) and all for a wage of 3 pesos monthly, one sixth 
of the wage of a free black. 11° 
The Patronato, which was due to end in 1888, was abolished 
earlier in 1886. In the first year of the new regime 6,000 
patrocinados obtained legal freedom. During the second year 10,000 
were freed, 17,000 in the third and over 26,000 in the fourth. By 
1885 the number of patrocinados was about 25,000. Slave initiative 
was an important element in the dismantling of the system. By 
providing local committees of appeal through which slaves could act 
to gain their freedom, the Patronato Law opened various routes for 
patrocinados to achieve freedom, including the age of the slave, 
mutual agreements between slave and master, renunciation by master, 
self-purchase and so forth. 111 Previous fears about the role of 
ahe state intervention with legislation inVrivate relationship between 
masters and slaves had_its-ground. In an attempt to retain control 
over the process of emancipation, the state would encourage legal 
action by slaves to secure their freedom. There were grounds for 
fears about legislation that interferes with relation between master 
and slave. In an attempt to retain control over the process of 
emancipation the state encouraged legal action by slaves who sought 
to secure their freedom. 
By this time the colonato was already emerging as the dynamic 
form of cane farm organization and cane production. The colonato 
system and a steady stream of immigrants would help to solve the 
problem of alternative supply while reducing the cost of labour. 
109 Sociedad Abolicionista Espanola. El cepo y el qrillete. La 
esclavitud en Cuba (Madrid: A.J. Alaria impressor, 1881) p.5. 
110 Sociedad Abolicionista Espanola. El cepo y el qrillete, 
op.cit., p.20. 
in Manuel Villanueva. Estadistica de la abolicion de la 
esclavitud en la Isla de Cuba (Havana: Imprenta de Soler, Alvarez y 
Compania, 1885; see R. Scott, Slave Emancipation, op.cit., part two, 
for a detailed examination of the patronato and its dismantlement. 
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After 1882 tens of thousands of Spaniards, most of them males, 
entered the island each year sponsored by private or semi-official 
enterprises to work as day labourers during the harvest. Between 
1882 and 1894 a total of 224,000 arrived from Spain, a third of whom 
remained in the island. 112 Some planters initially experimented 
with freedmen engaging them under the colonato agreement. However, 
by the end of the period the system was applied almost exclusively 
to white owners and tenants. 113 
6.2.2. Gradualism and Transition in Brazil  
After the approval of the Rio Branco Law _ presumed to be the 
final solution to the issue of slavery _ the search for ways of 
replacing slaves and solving problems of labour supply intensified. 
Schemes aimed at poor Brazilians, recently-liberated slaves, 
ingenuos and European and Asian immigrants were all proposed. The 
Rio Branco Law itself had already devised mechanisms for re-
arranging relations with former slaves and the children of slave 
mothers. That was just the beginning. In so far as the process of 
gradually emancipating slaves progressed, further initiatives from 
the government continued to link both processes of "abolition" and 
"transition". 
The distinct interests of various provinces affected the search 
for alternatives to slave labour. The most marked difference was 
between northern sugar and cotton and southern coffee provinces. 
While sugar plantations could incorporate the relatively abundant 
supply of free caboclo labour available in the northeast, coffee 
plantations had to recruit slaves through the interprovincial slave 
trade. The southern coffee provinces would also come to rely on 
immigrant labour. The factors that would lead to these distinct 
112 An average of 6,900 a year remained, Carlos Manuel Trelles 
y Govin. Biblioteca Historica Cubana 3 vols(Matanzas: Imprenta de 
Juan F. Oliver, 1922) II, p.361. Between 1887 and 1894 entered 
268,628 immigrants from Spain and other countries, in Trelles, 
op.cit.  
113 R. Scott, Slave Emancipation, op.cit., p.241. 
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regional solutions were already evident by the time Rio Branco Law 
was approved. In effect, the Law was sanctioned with the support of 
the north while facing strong opposition from southern coffee 
provinces who claimed repeatedly they were not yet "prepared" for 
the changes. Different views on the Rio Branco Law reflected wide 
regional divergences on other issues, for example about credit, 
export taxes, capital investment (modernization of production, 
railways, ports etc), land and labour policy. The prosperity of the 
south as a result of a continued coffee expansion compounded the 
agony of the northern provinces, competing with a more developed 
Cuban sugar production and European beet sugar in world markets. 
Moreover, the balance of political power had altered given the 
increasing importance of coffee exports to the national economy. 
Coffee planters struggled to defend their interests within the 
centralized system of government based in Rio de Janeiro, the main 
coffee comercial and financial centre, where sugar interests were 
still influential. 
As a complementary measure to the 1871 Law, the government sought 
to reinforce the promotion of large-scale European immigration. 
Instead of acting directly, the government opted to contract private 
companies to bring into the country specified numbers of immigrants. 
The costs would be covered by the government, or shared between the 
government and contractors. 114 By the middle of decade, however, 
114 The annual reports of the Ministry of Agriculture include 
copies of several contracts. See, for instance, the 1871 contracts 
with Joaquim Bonifacio do Amaral to import 200 colonos to work in 
his fazenda Sete Quedas. Expenses were to be shared with the 
government. Similar conditions appeared in the contract with 
Bernardo Avelino Gavido Peixoto, with the London company J.M.Mackay 
Filho e Cia. and Guilherme Hadfield. For 1872 there are further 
contracts. See for instance, contracts between the Imperial 
Government and General M.M. Franzini and the renewal of contracts 
with John Beaton (Brazilian Coffee Estates). Relatorio do Ministerio  
da Aqricultura, Commercio e Obras PUblicas, ministro Teodoro Machado 
Freire Pereira da Silva (Rio de Janeiro: Typ.Universal, 1871), 
appenso E; Relatorio do Ministerio da Aqricultura, Commercio e Obras  
Publicas, ministro Barao de Itauna (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Universal, 
1872). See also company Mackay Filho contract in Relatorio 
apresentado a Assemblea Leqislativa Provincial de S. Paulo pelo 
presidente da Provincia Exmo. Sr. Dr. Antonio da Costa Pinto Silva,  
no dia 5 de fevereiro de 1871 (sao Paulo: Typ. Americana, 1871) 
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policy-makers were already concerned about the great expenditure and 
the poor results obtained from these initiatives. There were 
complaints from the immigrants. Abuses and fraud by the contractors 
injured immigrants and damaged the reputation of the government. And 
worse, there had been a great deal of expenditure and immigrants 
were not staying in the country; they were going back to Europe or 
re-emigrating to Argentina and Uruguay. 115 At that time prospects 
of promoting immigration seemed bleak. According to the 1875 
Committee, appointed by the Lower House of Parliament to study the 
means of developing agriculture, European immigrants could only be 
attracted if "reforms in the law and new habits changed Brazilian 
society". In the committee's view, large properties had to be 
subdivided and leased to colonos and sharecropping contracts should 
be abandoned. There should be changes in the methods of cultivation 
and in the disciplinary regime on plantations. 116 
Reporting on the results of the planter Congress held in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1878, the Agriculture Minister observed that the European 
colono did not fill the lacunae caused by slave deaths and gradual 
emancipation. "There is no point persisting" wrote the Minister. In 
his view the system of sharecropping could never be the basis for 
large-scale agriculture. European immigrants only accepted 
sharecropping in extreme circumstances and always expecting the 
opportunity to settle as an independent farmer, "which is his great 
aspiration coming to a country with extensive unoccupied land" .117 
pp•38-39. 
115 " Relatorio da Agencia Official de Colonisacao, por Ignacio 
da Cunha Galvao" appendix in Relatorio do Ministerio da Agricultura,  
Commercio e Obras Publicas, 1871, op.cit.,p.2; E.C. de Melo, 0 Norte  
Acirdrio e o Imperio. (Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira; Brasilia: INL, 
1984) p.69. 
116 nMelhoramento da Lavoura. Parecer da comissao da fazenda e 
da comissao especial nomeadas pela Camara dos Srs. Deputados para 
estudar os meios de auxiliar a lavoura nacional e apresentado 
mesma Camara dos Deputados". APB, session 20 July 20, 1875, p.130. 
117 	"Congresso Agricola do Rio de Janeiro", appendix 
"Agricultura" in Relatorio do Ministerio da Agricultura, Commercio  
e Obras Publicas, ministro Joao Lins Vieira Cansansao de Sinimbu  
(Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Industrial, 1879) pp.20-30, p.23. 
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In 1878, northern planters gathered in the agricultural congress 
held in Recife, were unanimous in their lack of confidence in 
initiatives promoting European immigration. Those who favoured 
European immigration did so only if it was spontaneous and did not 
require government subsidies. Northern planters rejected plans 
encouraging European immigration and were very critical of 
government immigration policy. It was considered excessively onerous 
and of little advantage to agriculture. 118 Machado Portella and 
Coelho Rodrigues estimated the costs of each colono at between 
800$000 and 1:000$0000. That was at least 100$000 more expensive 
that a price of a capable slave in Pernambuco in 1878. 119 Their 
pessimism was also based on the belief that immigration had become 
a "business" handled by unscrupulous entrepreneurs in the Capital. 
One of the strongest critics of immigration policy, Coelho 
Rodrigues, stated, "Who is not aware that colonization is a 
lucrative _ and perhaps the most corrupt _ business that exists 
in the Court where ... private fortunes had been built to colossal 
proportions eroding the finances of the Exchequer?" .120  Northern 
planter scepticism about the government immigration policy was 
reinforced by the idea that they were subsidizing immigration for 
the south. 
Southern planters also criticized the government's immigration 
policy but in contrast to their northern counterparts they still 
held hopes that European immigrants could be an alternative to slave 
labour. The majority of the representant l" the coffee provinces at 
the 1878 Rio de Janeiro Agricultural Congress believed that changes 
118 " Congresso Agricola do Recife, 7a sesao em 12 de outubro de 
1878", appendix "Agricultura" in Relatorio do Ministerio da 
Aqricultura, Commercio e Obras Pablicas, 1979, op.cit., pp.1-13. 
119 " A questao da mao-de-obra nos congressos agricolas de 1878" 
in P.L. Eisenberg, Homens Esquecidos. Escravos e Trabalhadores 
Livres no Brasil, seculos XVIII e XIX (Campinas: Editora da UNICAMP, 
1989) pp.167-187, p.177.-187. The estimative of 1:000$000 seems to 
be exaggerated,as observed,by Cabral de Melo, others estimated 380$ 
and 400$, E.C. de Melo, op.cit., p.69. 
120 E.C. de Melo, op.cit., p.69; also in P. Eisenberg, "A mao-
de-obra" in Homens Esquecidos, op.cit., p.177. 
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in policy would yield better results. They suggested that colonies 
should be established close to railways and urban centres; religious 
freedom, civil marriage, easy naturalization and guaranteed civil 
and political rights for immigrants, improved means of 
communication, better publicity in Europe along with reform of 
locagao de servigos legislation would stimulate immigration. The 
committee representing Sao Paulo planters recognized that official 
colonization schemes had negative results. They were expensive to 
administer and had damaged the reputation of the government overseas 
while yielding few practical benefits. 121 The committee believed 
that the initiatives undertaken by private planters had been the 
most efficacious and should be encouraged by the government. The Sao 
Paulo committee argued in favour European immigrants as labourers 
and as a prospective element of the Brazilian nation. In its view, 
the race, origin, character and habits of the immigrants who would 
become part of "Brazilian nationhood" were an important 
consideration. "Above all we need to temper our energy. Morality and 
liberty will stimulate labour". 122 Although preferring subsidized 
immigration and critical of plans to promote large-scale Chinese 
immigration, Paulista planters were not totally opposed to the 
recruitment of coolies who continued to be regarded as a "means of 
transition". 
Northern enthusiasm for immigration was at best sporadic. It 
appeared as an immediate reaction to an eventual end of slavery and 
was dependent of official subsidies. Most of the attempts to 
encourage immigration to the sugar provinces yielded poor results. 
According to Cabral de Melo, in 1876 while a total 30,000 immigrants 
had entered the country only 60 were directed to the north-east. 123 
 Peter Eisenberg noted that between 1872 and 1900, the foreign 
population of the main northern sugar export province, Pernambuco, 
121 Commissao dos Lavradores de Sao Paulo" in Congress° 
Agricola. Colleccao de Documentos (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 
1878) p.76. 
122 Congresso Agricola, op.cit., p.76. 
123 E.C. de Melo, op.cit., p.70. 
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never accounted for more than 2% of the total population. In Rio de 
Janeiro immigrants accounted for 10% to 15% of the population and in 
Sao Paulo at the beginning of the twentieth century more than a 
quarter of the population was foreign. 124 Eisenberg also indicated 
that although climate and patterns of landholding had adversely 
affected schemes to promote immigration to Pernambuco, mo st 
significant factor was the stagnation of the sugar economy. The 
contrast with the prosperity of coffee production in Sao Paulo was 
obvious. 125 Coffee prosperity allowed Sao Paulo planters to 
subsidize travel expenses and to pay better salaries. At the same 
time, a local market for products grown on colono food plots was 
developing and offered additional opportunities to immigrants. 
According to Eisenberg, the distinct conditions of sugar also 
explained the indifference of sugar planters to immigration plans. 
While Sao Paulo coffee planters performed an important role in 
societies promoting immigration, influencing governmental aid and 
initiatives, Pernambuco sugar planters hardly ever fostered similar 
enterprises. 126 The rapid expansion of Sao Paulo coffee plantations 
required a great amount of workers. Sugar production did not expand 
as much and could employ the large local free population. In 
addition, from the 1880s technical developments in sugar processing 
would also reduce labour demand. In sum, sugar planters did not need 
immigrants. 
Differences between north and south were not confined to the 
issue of immigration. They had different perceptions, and needs, 
with regard the whole problem of ending slavery and finding 
alternative labour arrangements. For several northern provinces, the 
Rio Branco Law represented the final measure to end slavery. The 
evident reduction in the slave population, a phenomenon that had 
been observed since the end of the African trade, would continue 
gradually. Table 21, Appendix demonstrates the great decline of the 
124 P.L. Eisenberg, "Falta de imigrantes: um aspecto do atraso 
nordestino", in his Homens Esquecidos, op.cit., pp.61-85, esp. p.68. 
125 P.L. Eisenberg,"Falta de imigrantes", op.cit., p.72. 
126 P.L. Eisenberg, "Falta de Imigrantes", op.cit., pp.72-73. 
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slave population in the northeast (Piaui, Ceara, Rio Grande do 
Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, Bahia). In 1864 the 
region had 774,000 slaves; in 1874, 435,687; and in 1884, 301,470. 
Even in Pernambuco, the main sugar export province, the significance 
of slavery had been limited and had fallen since the abolition of 
the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Eisemberg shows that at mid-century 
slaves constituted about one fifth of the total population of 
Pernambuco. By 1873 they accounted for little over 10%. 127 The 
slave population of Pernambuco was 106,236 individuals in 1872; and 
84,700 in 1882. The decline was due to the high death rate among 
slaves, to the interprovincial slave trade, to the effects of Rio 
Branco Law and to private manumissions. 128 The provinces of the 
northeast had always had a large and growing free population, a 
feature remarked upon by contemporary observers. While the slave 
population declined, it appeared that the number of free workers 
employed in sugar production increased. At mid-century the ratio of 
slave to free labour on sugar plantations was 3:1. 129 In 1871, 
Perdigao Malheiro estimated that about 50% of the workforce of 
northern plantations were free labourers. In 1884, 75% of the 
workforce in the province of Pernambuco was free and in the sugar 
districts was about it 500 30 In 1872 free workers in Pernambuco 
surpassed the number of slaves in all occupational categories. The 
free/slave ratio was as follows in the various categories of 
workers: unskilled, 4:1; estate workers, 5:1; domestic servants, 
5:1. 131 Free workers were employed under several arrangements. The 
most common were agregados but there were also sharecroppers, day 
127 P.L. Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry in Pernambuco.  
Modernization Without Change, 1840-1910 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, !974) table 22, p.147. 
128 P. L. Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry, op.cit, pp.164-165. 
129 P.L. Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry, op.cit., p.180. 
130 E.C. de Melo, op.cit., p.22-23. 
131 P.L. Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry, op.cit., p.180. 
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labourers, salaried workers and an intense use of seasonal 
labour. 132 Thus, in contrast with their southern counterparts, 
northern planters were not concerned about substitutes for slaves. 
That became evident by the end of the 1870s. During the debates in 
the Recife planter Congress, and on several other occasions, 
northern planters stressed that there was no shortage of labour. By 
that time famine and draught had resulted in the migration of great 
numbers of people (retirantes). In search of better opportunities 
they had moved to coastal and more prosperous areas in the sugar 
region. The problem for northern planters was how to re-arrange 
labour relations and draw the local population into the labour 
market. Locagao de servicos and vagrancy legislations would be the 
means of obtaining a reliable and disciplined labour force in the 
northeast . 133 
As with the issue of immigration, the problem of the 
interprovincial slave trade was another point of contrast between 
the regions respecting the end of slavery and alternative labour 
supply. It has been estimated that between 1850 and 1881 some 
200,000 slaves were transported through the interprovincial slave 
trade to coffee producing areas; during a period of thirty-five 
years transfers of slaves through the interprovincial and 
intraprovincial slave trade could have been more than 400,000. 134 
 It was the greater profitability of coffee that allowed coffee 
planters to bid slaves away from other activities and areas 
following the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. At the 
beginning some individual northern provinces, such as Pernambuco and 
132 P.L. Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry, op.cit., pp.183-194; 
also for descriptions of the various labour arrangements on sugar 
plantations see J. Reis, "From bangte to usina: social aspects of 
growth and modernization in the sugar industry of Pernambuco, 
Brazil, 1850-1920" in K. Duncan and I. Rutledge (ed.) Land and 
Labour in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977) pp.369-396. 
133 "Congresso Agricola de Recife, 1878", Relatorio do 
Ministerio da Agricultura, Commercio e Obras Publicas, 1879, op.cit, 
pp.5-6. 
134 R.E. Conrad, World of Sorrow. The African Slave Trade to 
Brazil (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986) p.179. 
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Bahia, acted to stop the exportation of slaves, imposing taxes on 
the transfer of slaves to other provinces. However, the trade did 
not stop, and reached a peak during the 1870s. By this time southern 
planters, fearing the great concentration of slaves in the area and 
the narrowing of the political support for slavery, started to 
campaign against the internal trade. But the prohibition of the 
trade was no longer of interest to northern planters. The trade had 
became a significant source of capital which could be used to 
liquidate debts or modernize sugar production and the issue of 
labour supply was not as acute as in the coffee provinces. The 
northern historian Cabral de Melo pointed out that to prohibit the 
trade would reduce the value of slaves in the northeast while 
leading to a corresponding increase in the south. Melo quotes a 
Paraiba member of Parliament, Meira de Vasconcelos, who opposed 
prohibition in 1879. Vasconcelos argued that to prohibit the trade 
would damage the planter who usually sold a slave to cover 
debts . 135 
By the end of the 1870s, continued trade and resultant 
accentuated concentration of slaves in the southern provinces while 
supporting coffee expansion became a politically explosive issue. It 
could spell an early end of slavery. The reduced importance of slave 
labour in the sugar provinces could lead northern planters to 
support measures more radical than the Rio Branco Law, thereby 
jeopardizing the recent investments coffee planters had made buying 
high priced slaves. There was a risk that the south would become the 
only area supporting slavery. Hence in 1880 and 1881 Rio de Janeiro, 
Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo imposed prohibitively high taxes on 
slaves imported from other provinces. 136 
The increasingly divergent views between the two areas on the 
problem of slavery and alternative labour schemes would become 
clearer during the 1880s. Until the end of the 1870s planter 
135 E.C. de Melo, op.cit., p.31. 
136 R.E. Conrad, The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, op.cit., 
pp.170-174. 
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interests in the sugar and coffee districts appeared to concur on 
the route of ending slavery established by the Rio Branco Law. As 
mentioned before, the 1871 law was designed to keep initiatives 
leading to freedom under control and, furthermore, to keep under 
control those liberated. But it was also accepted at the outset 
that, "to attend the consequences of the Law", several measures 
regarding labour and the movement of freedmen should be taken. New 
legislation on locagao de servigos and anti-vagrancy were the main 
suggestions. 
Soon after the approval of the Rio Branco Law, policy-makers 
started to work on new legislation for locagao de servigos. 137 
Demands for changes to the locagao de servigos legislation had been 
repeaPted&L- frequently. Initially it had been agreed that there was a need Itilb up-to-date legislation to meet the new requirements of free 
immigrant and domestic labour after the experiments of the 1850s and 
1860s. From the 1870s, however, the main reasons would be to attend 
to the consequences of the Rio Branco Law and related plans for the 
importation of European and, especially, Chinese contract labour. 
After several debates, the new law on locagao de servigos, prepared 
by Nabuco de Araujo, was finally approved in 1879. 
The approval of the 1879 locagao de servigos Law indicates a 
certain confluence of interests that would be sustained until the 
end of the decade. The law attempted to embrace all the concerns 
inherent in the process of gradual emancipation and "transition to 
free labour". The new locagao de servigos law was aimed exclusively 
at labour relations in the agricultural sector. 138 A complex, 
detailed piece of legislation it could be describe as a rural labour 
code. It stipulated conditions of contracts of services to be agreed 
with various potential labourers _ Brazilians, immigrants, and 
137 For the legislative debates see M.L. Lamounier, Da 
Escravidao ao Trabalho Livre: a Lei de Locacao de Servicos de 1879  
(Campinas: Papirus, 1988), pp.77-99. 
138 Decreto 2827, March 15, 1879. Colleccao das Leis do Imperio 
do Brazil, 1879 (Rio de Janeiro: Typ. Nacional, 1861-1880) v. of 
1879, pp.11-20. 
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slaves liberated by the 1871 Law. Long term-engagements were 
devised: 7 years for freedmen; 6 years for Brazilians; 5 years for 
immigrants. It also stipulated imprisonment for no-compliance with 
contract conditions. The 1879 Law was devised as a reaffirmation of, 
and a complement to, the Rio Branco Law. Contracts of those freed 
under the Rio Branco Law would in the future be regulated by the 
locagao de servigos law. By providing legal guarantees for the 
fulfilment of contracts agreed with Brazilians, it sought to 
guarantee the reliability of, and thus encourage the employment of, 
nationals. It might be that with this measure the 1879 Law attempted 
to meet the requirements of northern planters. But as has already 
been showed, measures to promote the employment of domestic labour 
were also demanded by Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais planters. The 1870s 
long drought in the northern backlands had driven hundreds of 
retirantes to other areas of the country, including Sao Paulo. 
Several lists of retirantes who had arrived in Sao Paulo by the end 
of decade can be found in the state archive in Sao Paulo. 139 Once 
they arrived, they were quickly distributed amongst the coffee 
plantations. 
The 1879 Law also attempted to stabilize the employment of 
immigrants. Several of its clauses detailed conditions of engagement 
of immigrants, clarifying many points that had been the cause of 
disrupt between planters and immigrant labourers in the past. 
Indeed, one of the main arguments for the approval of the Law was 
that it would facilitate immigration. It was assumed that by 
detailing the rights and duties of planters and contracted workers, 
the image in Europe of free labour on Brazilian coffee plantations 
would be improved in Europe.'" The Rio Branco Law and the 1879 Law 
139 Solicitacoes de passagens ao Sr. Joaquim Jose do Rego  
Rangel, agente de Colonisacao, 1878 APESP, Manuscritos, ordem 7215, 
lata 3. 
140 During the debates in the Senate, in several occasions 
supporters of the law emphasised the provisions protecting immigrant 
workers. Criticism, however, was directed to many other provisions 
that could obstruct immigration, especially the stipulation of 
imprisonment for non-completion of contracts. See debates Brazil.  
Anais do Senado, sessions 27 July 1877, pp.94-97 and 31 July 1877, 
for instance. As it will be showed, the law would be later revoked 
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devised a route of gradual emancipation and "transition to free 
labour". They attempted to transform existing labour relations with 
slaves about to be liberated and with existing free workers, 
subjecting all labourers to long contracts of services. And by 
providing guarantees, and incentives, for the employment of the 
domestic labour force and immigrant labour the new legislation 
appear to be attending to the interests of the north and south. 
However, by the end of the 1870s circumstances were changing 
rapidly. The reiteration of the 1871 policy by the 1879 locagao de 
servicos Law, although providing a possible solution to the problem 
of ending slavery and of establishing the labour market, was soon 
questioned. Current debates about the best methods of advancing the 
process of transition and the resolution of the labour problem 
revealed at least two distinct positions. On one side, there were 
those who continued to support the compromise established by the 
1871 Law, namely a very gradual, smooth and safe process abolition. 
Representing interests from various provinces, those who espoused 
this position demanded more rigorous legislation to encourage the 
participation of domestic labour in the market and to assure 
discipline and stability. They aimed to draw upon the labour of poor 
Brazilians as well as that of slaves freed by provisions of the 1871 
Law. These interests usually opposed large-scale European 
immigration either because they recalled earlier failures or because 
of the high costs it would involve. However, they accepted Asian 
immigrants under long contracts as a transitionaJr expedient. On the 
other side, were those representing mostly the interests of the 
prosperous western Paulista coffee areas who considered that it was 
too risky to depend on Brazilian labour and the supply of former 
slaves. Instead they proposed European immigration subsidized by the 
government. At the same time they accepted that mass immigration 
would "whiten" the population. They were also ready to accept 
Chinese immigration, regarded as an "element of transition". 
because it was an obstacle to immigration! 
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A critical point had been reached by the early 1880s. The 
gradual, safe, long-drawn out process of abolition was still viewed 
as the most desirable. Several proposals to import Asian contract 
labour, to apply the 1879 locagao de servigos Law to domestic free 
labour and the application of anti-vagrancy legislation to freedmen 
and ingenuos indicated the desire to extend for as long as possible 
coercive forms of labour. In 1883 a Representation drawn up by 
northeastern slaveowners was sent to the Lower House of Parliament 
supporting the course of gradual emancipation established within the 
1871 Law. "The Law of 28 of September of 1871 must be supported and 
conserved by the government, in order to avoid the triumph of 
assaults and aggressions that fanatical supporters of sudden, 
anarchical emancipation have addressed and whose dangers are 
incalculable." 141 
But this position was no longer sustainable. The abolitionist 
movement became more incisive. It fostered a change in public 
opinion while at the same time promoting direct initiatives such as 
helping slaves with legal action and encouraging radical acts such 
as flights. Slaves protests, expressed in various ways, such as 
crimes against masters and overseers and in flights, heightened 
fears that final abolition could arrive sooner than planned. 142 
141 Representacao, APB, session 9 August, 1883, p.56. Several 
Representations were sent to the Lower House by that time; see, for 
instance, Representacao da Bahia, APB, session 14 July, 1884, p.158; 
and representations from Conceicao da Boa Vista and Mar de Hespanha, 
Minas Gerais, APB, session 19 May, 1884, pp.236-237, both demanding 
the guarantees and strict execution of the 1871 Law and of locagao 
de servigos Law. 
142 On the Brazilian abolitionist movement see J. Nabuco, 0 
abolicionismo. (sao Paulo: Ipe, 1949); E.V. da Costa, Da senzala  
colania 2nd ed. (sao Paulo: Ed. de Ciencias Humanas, 1982) pp.420- 
438; E.R. Conrad, The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, op.cit., 
chap. 10; for different analysis of the impact of the Brazilian 
antislavery movement on the final abolition of slavery is examined 
in R.E. Conrad, The destruction of Brazilian Slavery, op.cit., 
chap.16; R.B. Toplin, The Abolition of Slavery in Brazil(New York: 
Atheneum, 1972); L.L. da Gama Lima, Rebeldia negra e abolicionismo. 
(Rio de Janeiro: Achiame, 1981); J. Gorender, A escravidao  
reabilitada (Sao Paulo: Atica, 1990) esp. pp.158-168 ; slave 
protests, crimes and revolts see C. Moura, Os quilombos e a rebeliao 
neqra (Sao Paulo: Brasiliense, 1981), R. B. Toplin, The Abolition of  
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Acute regional differences became even more evident. In many 
northern province slavery had been dramatically reduced. Fears of an 
early end of slavery increased with the abolition of slavery in the 
northern province of Ceara in 1884. 143 
The gradual emancipation of slaves continued with the approval in 
September 28, 1885, of the Saraiva-Cotegipe Law, freeing the aged. 
Those over 60 years of age were to be free but had to work three 
more years for their masters. The law continued the process of 
gradual abolition established in 1871 and at the same time extended 
a "transitory" period of coercive labour. Another slave registration 
was ordered. The value of the slaves was fixed according to their 
age, and those not-registered would be considered free. Freedom for 
individual slaves was again encouraged with government help, the 
Emancipation Fund and private manumissions. Those freed under the 
provisions of the Law could not move from their place of residence 
and should continue to provide services for five years. Absence 
without permission would be considered vagrancy, and delinquents 
could be seized by the police and compelled to perform public works. 
Freedmen should produce evidence of a regular occupation. They were 
obliged to engage their services within a term defined by the 
police, under pain of fifteen days imprisonment or exile to 
agricultural colonies. 144 
During the whole decade, before the final abolition of slavery in 
1888, to attend the consequences of the gradual process of abolition 
there were several proposals for the reorganization of labour 
Slavery,  op.cit.; M.H.P.T. Machado Crime e Escravidao. Trabalho,  
luta e resistencia nas lavouras paulistas, 1830-1888 (Sao Paulo: 
Brasiliense, 1987). 
143 On the early abolition in the province of Ceara see R. 
Conrad, The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, op.cit., chapter 11. 
At the time the slave population of Sao Paulo was relatively stable, 
see Table 23, Appendix. 
144 Lei n.3270 de 28 de setembro de 1885, Colleccao das Leis do 
Imperio do Brazil (Rio de Janeiro: Typ Naciona1,1886); transl. in 
R.E. Conrad, The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, op.cit., Appendix 
III, pp.310-316. 
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through more repressive legislation . 145 The great number of slaves 
and the large number of ingenuos (those born to a slave mother and 
freed by the 1871 Law) made freedmen and inganuos the main target of 
new projected repressive legislation. They were a great source of 
continued forced labour. In 1885 the government reported a total of 
439,831 inganuos. 146 The 1879 locagao de servigos Law continued to 
point to the direction of official policy and was claimed to be the 
only possible means of avoiding a labour crisis and the disruption 
of production that was still feared from abolition. But by this time 
there was already opposition to the enforcement of coercive 
measures. Countering arguments that the period of "transition", of 
the transformation of the slaves into free labourers and "the 
reorganization of labour", should be guided and controlled through 
labour contracts and draconian legal framework were opposing claims 
that "free labour" required "no ties", no iron circles restraining 
it. 147 These conflicting views would be observed in Cuba in a later 
period. The idea of free labour seemed to have changed. When slavery 
145 There were proposals for further changes in the locagao de 
servigos legislation, more efficacious sanctions for non-completion 
of contracts. See, for instance, project n.241 of 1882, APB, session 
19 September, 1882, proposed by planters from Minas Gerais and sao 
Paulo, which covered Brazilian workers and stipulated no limit of 
time for imprisonment in case of non-completion of contract 
obligations. See also Representations from planters of Barbacena and 
Juiz de Fora, both in Minas Gerais, APB, sessions 10 June, 1887, and 
11 June, 1888 (after abolition) respectively. Other proposals were 
concerned about freedmen and inganuos, and the consequences of the 
emancipation such as vagrancy and disturbances. See for instance, 
proposals of the member of Parliament Mr. Jaguaribe Filho, APB, 
session 20 September, 1886, p.253 and immediately after abolition, 
project-of-law on "Repressao a Ociosidade" (anti-vagrancy) discussed 
APB, sessions 4 June, 10 July, 14 August, 8 October, 9 November, 
1888. 
146 R.B. Toplin, The Abolition of Slavery in Brazil, op.cit., 
p.35. 
147 These views became clear during debates about changes on 
locagao de servigos legislation which reopened in 1884 in the Lower 
House of Parliament. Some, as the leader of the Immigration Society 
Alfredo E. Taunay, were frankly opposed to the "draconian" 
"vexatious" contratos de servigos, believing they obstructed 
European immigration. Others did not reject totally the "locagao de 
servigos" scheme, but advocated that more general legislation, more 
freedom for the forms of arrangements attuned to provincial or 
commodity requirements. See M.L.Lamounier, op.cit., pp.151-153. 
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was untouchable, the term "free labour" was employed to describe a 
"transitory" stage, where coercion and dependence prevailed over 
market rule. Before he could be transformed into a free labourer, 
the slave needed a period in which he was neither slave nor free, 
when his "savage" instincts would be repressed and positive rules of 
the labour market inculcated. Anti-vagrancy measures and the 
requirement to engage in labour contracts was the meansthrough which 
that aim could be achieved. On being freed, repressive measures 
would still be needed to ensure that the slave would continue to 
work on the plantation. On the other hand, when the end of slavery 
seemed imminent, the discourse changed and repressive legislation 
was condemned. There should be no rules nor regulations to control 
and guide the "free labour market". Planters and workers should be 
free to agree between themselves the conditions of labour. 
However, looking at the course of events in Cuba and Brazil it is 
difficult to discern what exactly had changed. Was it the general 
idea of "free labour" or the views about the nature of the labourer. 
Changed attitudes towards "free labour" rcoincident with the 
arrival of European immigrants. As has been shown, attitudes towards 
Europeans in both areas had never been the same as those with regard 
to Asians, domestic workers or former slaves. Those proposing 
repressive legislation/ usually doubted the viability of European 
immigration and they also believed that Europeans would not work for 
low wages under repressive conditions supposedly reflecting the 
heritage of slavery. Those who now modified their ideas about "free 
labour" did so facing an auspicious wave of European immigrants in 
the 1880s. Whether this had been promoted by the abolition process 
or came to help the abolition process is not relevant to this point. 
The project which envisaged a system of "contract labour" 
embracing Europeans, domestic labour, freedmen and poor Brazilians, 
and Chinese contract workers was formally end in 1890 with 
revocation of the 1879 locagao de servigos legislation in Brazil. 
The locagao de servigos project was abandoned with the arrival of 
thousands of immigrants who, entering the country in family groups, 
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were seen as cheaper and more productive than forced labour. Between 
1884 and 1914 some 900,000 subsidized immigrants, mainly from Italy, 
arrived in sao Paulo, mostly to work on coffee plantations. Mass 
immigration promoted and subsidized by the provincial government and 
the colonato system not only helped coffee planters to abolish 
slavery (1888) but at the same time created the conditions for 
sustaining coffee production in the province. 
Repressive measures imposed by the 1879 Law, reportedly approved 
to attract immigrants, would for the same reason be revoked in 1890, 
a few years after final abolition. According to the decree revoking 
the law, the intention was to attract immigrants: "...in order to 
attract to the Brazilian territory a flow of abundant, spontaneous 
immigration it is necessary that alongside of the extraordinary 
advantages of the climate and soil, the country also needs to offer 
the benefits of free legislation..." (my stress). It was observed 
that the locagao de servigos laws were not currently enforced, for 
planters had recognized the convenience of replacing vexatious 
(vexatorios) contratos de locagao with acts of "pure convention, 
based in mutual consent, raising the colono to the category of a 
contracting party, what was denied to him by that legislation" (my 
stress). It was also clearly stated that confronted by dramatic 
differences among the states, the decree transferred to the states 
competence to regulate labour relations agreed)" The decree was 
in harmony with the views of the new Republic, decentralization and 
states' rights. 
The influence of the by then powerful Paulista coffee interests 
on these measures was clear. Immigration policy and the system of 
colonato mitigated the disruptions created on the eve of final 
abolition by mass slave desertions of plantations and for the next 
decades would help to meet the labour demand of the great coffee 
expansion of the 1880s. Other provinces continued the search for 
alternative solutions. Many would yet claim that "uma boa lei de 
148 Decreto n.213 de 22 de fevereiro de 1890, DecisOes do 
Governo Provisorio; here quoted cf. 0 Direito (Revista de 
Legislacao, Doutrina e Jurisprudencia) XVIII, 1890, v.51. 
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locagao de servigos" and other coercive measures were necessary to 
assure a stable and disciplined labour force. But times had changed 
and the influence of S'do Paulo was paramount preventing the 
enactment of coercive legislation. 
The process of gradual abolition implemented with the sanction of 
Moret Law and Rio Branco Law initiated a process of "transition to 
free labour". The impact of these new institutional and legal 
mechanisms on the process of freeing slaves was limited. This had 
been the objective. Both laws sought to facilitate a very gradual 
slave emancipation. However, the legislation created a new order of 
pressures that accelerated transition. Along with slave initiatives 
and a growing antislavery movement there was a more urgent need to 
devise a new structure of labour relations. Initially in both areas, 
laws, regulations and contracts were the envisaged mechanisms to 
fashion a new configuration of labour relations. In Brazil, there 
was an attempt to tie formally both processes of "gradual abolition 
and transition", embracing former slaves and free workers. In Cuba, 
gradual abolition was more narrowly conceived, it meant the gradual, 
controlled, emancipation of individual slaves. In contrast with 
Brazil, Cubans could rely on existing legal mechanisms and their 
experience with contract labour. But in the end, both countries 
pursued policies for the "gradual abolition and transition to free 
labour", irrespective of whether they were formally connected, in 
which the maintenance of labour constraints were essential. Coercive 
measures were considered essential to the period of "transition" and 
to extend the phase of gradual abolition. 
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CONCLUSION 
At mid-century Cuban and Brazilian planters were confronted with 
the problem of finding an alternative source of labour. Slaves had 
comprised the mass of the workforce needed by the plantations. But 
as soon as the massive expansion of Brazilian coffee and Cuban sugar 
got under way, external pressures to end the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade began. Elsewhere, slavery came under increasing attacks and 
started to be replaced by other labour arrangements. Faced with the 
spectre of an imminent labour crisis, planters and policy makers in 
the areas started searching for alternative supplies of workers as 
for a general solution to the "labour question". However, special 
circumstances of Cuba and Brazil unfolded to reveal different 
solutions to the common problem, as the analysis of the first 
experiments with non-slave labour demonstrated. 
In Cuba, the acute labour demand provoked by the great expansion 
of sugar plantations in the mid-century led planters to an incessant 
search for labourers. The Cuban quest was profoundly shaped by 
Spanish colonial policy and the rapid development of sugar 
production as well as by Cuba' strategic position in the Caribbean 
and proximity to the United States of America. As a result of 
several experiments, Chinese coolies proved an important source of 
labour supply. Thousands were imported to complement slave labour 
which continued to be supplied by means of the international slave 
trade until late in the 1860s. 
Paulista planters began experiments with European sharecroppers 
at about the same time as Chinese coolies started to be imported 
into Cuba. But Paulistas were less exercised by the labour problem 
than Cubans. As a result of the different timing of the development 
of plantation production, Paulista coffee planters were well stocked 
with slaves illegally imported during the years immediately before 
the final end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade just as the boom in 
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coffee took off. In addition they could draw upon internal supplies 
of slaves. It is no coincidence that the internalVin slaves grew 
. -thc substantially during and after85X10s. These factors eased initial 
adjustment to the end of the Atlantic trade and gave Paulistas more 
flexibility to experiment with non-slave labour. 
VA \Cc -"On he 
W.-Cubans, Paulistas started experimenting with Europeans, 
regarded in both regions as the best alternative to replace slaves. 
The regime of plantations and the working conditions devised for 
these immigrants failed to accommodate the expectations of either 
party. European workers deserted plantations and planters started to 
search for other sources and systems of labour more attuned to their 
needs and expectations. In both areas, that meant a search for 
labour as cheap as and as disciplined as that provided by slaves. In 
their quest, Cubans met their needs with Chinese coolie labour and 
Brazilians would turn their sights to the domestic slave and free 
labour force. 
The international and domestic trade in Chinese resembled very 
closely slavery. Chinese coolies worked alongside the slaves. The 
severe conditions of their contracts were further reinforced by 
regulations designed to assure discipline and low wages. Chinese 
coolies were imported into Cuba mainly to supplement, rather than to 
replace, slave labour. Notwithstanding, Chinese were also perceived 
as a potential and desirable temporary replacement device, in case 
of a final fall in slave supply or a "catastrophic" end of slavery. 
That did not imply, however, that as potential substitutes for 
slaves, the Chinese were viewed as free workers. They were 
considered only an "element of transition" occupying an intermediate 
position between free and slave. This position was defined by the 
juridical terms of long-term fixed contracts, which removed the 
rights of a free worker, and by his colour, viewed as an 
intermediate between black and white. And it was this position in 
the labour and colour hierarchy that appealed to Spanish authorities 
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and Cuban planters, unwilling to disrupt the system of sugar 
production. 
The introduction of European sharecroppers in Sao Paulo coffee 
plantations answered the completely different needs of the Brazilian 
province. It was also shaped by distinct expectations. Like their 
Cuban counterparts, Paulista planters were concerned about origin, 
costs, discipline and profitability of alternative labour schemes. 
But those who introduced European sharecroppers were also anxious 
about an early end of slavery and being in the frontier coffee zone 
they were particularly preoccupied by the threat to supply posed by 
the effective end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Initially they 
believed that immigration would promote long-term population growth 
and in the short-term speedily displace slave labour. And most 
importantly the scheme would not alter existing patterns of land 
ownership. 
Brazilian sharecropper contract conditions were evidently 
different from those spelt out in Chinese coolie contracts in Cuba. 
Further, European sharecroppers were not subject to the severe 
regulations like coolies were in Cuban sugar plantations. Even 
Brazilian planter attempts to create a more rigid and coercive 
legislation covering all new labour schemes did not reach the same 
severity as colono regulations in Cuba. However, that does not 
necessarily reflect" greater liberality on the part of Brazilian 
planters in their views of "free labour". They actually experimented 
with a wide range of schemes and with the failure of European 
sharecroppers, many once again came to relyYlave labour. 
Disenchanted with Europeans, Brazilian planters would be keen to 
suggest coolies and more severe labour regulations. This became even 
clearer in the 1870s when they were pressured by the great expansion 
of coffee production and the implementation of gradual abolition. 
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y41oy‘ In Brazil and Cuba, the evolvemeftt of free labour relations was 
inextricably linked to the future of slavery. It was believed that 
"free labour" _ a vague idea at that time but which in most cases 
meant European labour _ could not develop while slavery existed. 
Additional labour to slaves could be provided only by transitional 
schemes or "transitional" labourers. This is what was really meant 
the idea of gradual abolition and transition to free labour. Gradual 
abolition involved a transitional period and an intermediate status 
for workers, in which individual slaves would be gradually shifted 
to the condition of "freedom" and a new organization of labour 
relations. Gradual and transition meant time. Slaves needed time to 
adjust themselves to new conditions learning how to live in a "free 
society", as citizens and labourers. Agriculture needed time to 
rearrange labour relations and find new sources of labour. And the 
state needed time to legislate and guide the process in a smooth and 
safe way. 
For almost two decades, Cuba and Brazil shared the difficult 
problem of defining a framework for the transition from slavery to 
"freedom", simultaneously seeking to preserve the status quo in 
social relations while at the same time beginning a process that 
would ultimately dissolve those relations. The resulting processes 
although quite different were shaped by the particular 
circumstances of domestic slavery and the national and international 
context. The Moret Law was approved in a context completely 
different from that of Rio Branco Law and consequently differed in 
content and purpose. The Ten Years' war and the struggle for 
independence shaped Cuban slavery and gradual abolition and so did 
the changed conditions of sugar production. But the views on gradual 
abolition and transition to free labour of planters and policy 
makers in both areas were mostly coincident. Particularly about the 
organization of labour relations during the transitional period. 
During this exceptional time, while slavery still existed and 
individual slaves orderly and systematically would be set free, 
labour Mould be carefully controlled to avoid the disruption of 
production, the disturbance of society, and most important a sudden, 
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ark unexpected, violent, general emancipation. Labour regulation was 
assumed to have an important function guiding, impelling and 
restraining the process. And to a certain extent the gradualist 
legislative initiative worked. It did partially incorporate slaves 
into the legalistic process of achieving freedom, and contributed to 
the avoidance of disruption of production. Compounded with a more 
general labour legislation, it attempted to set the parameters for 
the reorganization of labour relations during the transitional 
period compatible with yet existing system of slavery, targeting 
former slaves as well as free workers. By doing so, it delayed final 




TABLE 1 Agricultural Wealth Distributed by Departments,Y1846 
Sugar 	Coffee 
estates 




Western 735 1,012 1,548 193 3,990 12,286 
Central 404 78 4,305 576 967 6,678 
Eastern 303 580 2,838 470 4,145 6,328 
Total 1,442 1,760 8,691 1,239 9,102 25,292 
Source:: A. Humboldt, Island of Cuba. Transl. by J.S. Trasher. 
(New York: Derby and Jackson, 1856) p.280. 
TABLE 2 Cuban Sugar Production, 1840-1894 
Year Metric T. Year Metric Tons Year Metric Tons 
1840 161,248 1861 533,800 1882 620,565 
1841 169,886 1862 454,758 1883 601,423 
1842 192,769 1863 445,693 1884 626,477 
1843 182,081 1864 525,372 1885 628,990 
1844 208,506 1865 547,364 1886 657,290 
1845 98,437 1866 535,641 1887 707,442 
1846 205,608 1867 585,814 1888 662,758 
1847 267,474 1868 720,250 1889 569,367 
1848 260,463 1869 718,745 1890 636,239 
1849 239,128 1870 702,974 1891 807,742 
1850 294,952 1871 609,660 1892 1,000,797 
1851 365,843 1872 772,068 1893 945,035 
1852 329,905 1873 742,843 1894 1,110,991 
1853 391,247 1874 768,672 
1854 397,713 1875 750,062 
1855 462,968 1876 626,082 
1856 416,141 1877 516,268 
1857 436,030 1878 553,364 
1858 426,274 1879 775,368 
1859 469,263 1880 618,654 
1860 428,769 1881 580,894 
Source: M. Moreno Fraginals, El Ingenio. Complejo econamico 
social cubano del azucar (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 
1978) III, pp.36-37. 
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TABLE 3 sugar mills in Cuba, 1860 
Number of 	Area under cultivation 
Depart. 	Sugar mills 	Source of Power 	(caballerias)(b) 
Steam Ox Water 	Sugar 	Others 
Western 	1,065 	829 	231 	5 	19,2501/2 26,8252/3 
Eastern 330 120 	178 	2 1,507 	11,8633/4 
Total 	1,365 	949 	409 	7 	20,7571/2 38,6895/12 
gou 	C. Rebello, Estados relativos a la produciOn azucarera de la isla de Cuba (Havana, n.p., 1860) p.108. 
-Op) one caballeria equals 33,3 acres 
TABLE 4 Cuban Sugar Production, 1860 Harvest 
Average product 
mill per caball. Province 	Total 	Caball. 
	




Matanzas 265,644 9,661 442 601 27,5 
S.Clara 145,163 5,068 395 368 28,6 
Havana 38,999 2,537 126 310 15,4 
P.del Rio 38,644 1,986 102 379 19,5 
S.de Cuba 31,953 1,093 198 161 29,2 
P.Principe 15,434 414 102 151 37,3 
Total Cuba 
(cont.) 
535,857 20,759 1,365 393 25,8 
No of Percent of Average No of Mills 
Steam pow. Steam pow. No of Caball. with Vacuum 
mills per mill 	Apparatus 
409 93% 21,9 44 
235 59% 12,8 10 
97 77% 20,1 4 
88 86% 19,5 7 
84 42% 5,5 0 
36 35% 4,1 
949 70% 15,2 66 
Source: R.J. Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba. The Transition 
to Free Labor, 1860-1899. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1985) p.22. 
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Source: D.R. Murray, Odious Commerce. Britain, Spain and the  
abolition of the Cuban slave trade (Cambridge University 
Press,1980) p.244. 
(a) These totals are the estimates published by the British 
Foreign Office and are based on reports of the British 
commissioners in Havana; except for 1841 when no figure was 
published, and the figure included is taken from the 
commissioner's reports. 
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TABLE 6 prera•e Slave Nominal Prices 1845-1879 	•esos 
year 	 Male Female 
1846 440 420 
1847 510 460 
1848 480 470 
1849 490 410 
1850 500 430 
1851 530 450 
1852 530 530 
1853 660 570 
1854 670 660 
1855 630 660 
1856 770 710 
1857 880 810 
1858 1,290 1,210 
1859 1,390 1,200 
1860 1,270 1,290 
1861 1,200 1,180 
1862 940 900 
1863 870 800 
1864 850 800 
1865 850 800 
1866 800 750 
1867 740 700 
1868 730 710 
1869 610 550 
1870 620 630 
1871 690 550 
1872 830 820 
1873 720 780 
1874 1,400 1,250 
1875 1,520 1,410 
1876 1,660 1,330 
1877 1,400 1,300 
1878 1,140 1,050 
1879 900 760 
Source: M. del Carmen Barcia, Burguesia esclavista y abolicion 
(Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1987) p.176. 
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TABLE Cuban Population, 1817-1862  
1817 1827 1846 1862 
Whites 291,021 311,051 425,767 729,957 
Free Coloured(a) 115,691 106,490 149,226 221,417 
Emancipados(b) 4,521 
Slave 224,268 286,946 323,759 368,550 
Asian 34,050 
Yucatecan 743 
Total 630,980 704,487 898,752 1,359,238 
Sources: figures for 1817, from A. Corwin, Spain and the  
Abolition of Slavery in Cuba, 1817-1886 (University of Texas 
Press: 1967) p.45; "census of 1827" in K.F. Kiple, Blacks in  
Colonial Cuba: 1774-1889 (The University Press of Florida: 1976); 
1846 and 1862 data from R.J. Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba.  
The Transition to Free Labor, 1860-1899. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985) p.7. 
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ToLE 8 Distribution of Slave Population by Place of Residence,  1862 
Residence 	Males 	Females 	Total (census category) 
Ingenios (Sugar 










plantations) 14,344 11,598 25,942 
Sitios de labor 
(small 	farms) 14,253 10,597 24,850 Vegas(tobacco farms) 11,622 6,053 17,675 
Estancias(small farms) 4,220 2,698 6,918 
Haciendas(ranches) 4,311 1,909 6,220 
Other establishments 2,675 1,500 4,175 
Other farms 1,655 769 2,424 








per 100 female 
slaves 
47% 79% 174 
21% 15% 95 
9% 35% 184 
7% 11% 135 
5% 15% 192 
2% 8% 156 
2% 18% 226 
1% 19% 178 
1% 20% 215 
Total 149 
Source: R.J. Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba. 	The Transition 
to Free Labor, 1860-1899. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1985) p.12. 
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TAHI. 	 9 Cuban Population, 	1861 
Free 
Coloured Slave Total jurisdiction 	White 
Bahia Honda 4,352 839 5,890 11,081 
Bejucal 15,416 2,191 7,052 24,659 
Cardenas 28,355 2,214 27,418 57,987 
Cienfuegos 29,714 7,812 16,985 54,511 
Colon 26,476 2,706 33,699 62,881 
Guanabacoa 16,278 5,998 4,775 27,051 
Guanajay 18,998 3,653 17,708 40,359 
Guines 32,630 4,473 24,817 61,920 
Havana 138,895 37,768 29,013 205,676 
Isla de Pinos 1,366 221 480 2,067 
Jaruco 23,085 3,303 11,309 37,697 
Matanzas 47,677 7,952 32,181 87,810 
Nuevitas 4,165 505 1,608 6,278 
Pinar del Rio 41,466 10,251 14,590 66,307 
Puerto Principe 42,243 11,398 12,875 66,516 
Remedios 27,855 5,652 7,182 40,689 
Sagua la Grande 30,420 2,416 19,150 51,986 
San Antonio 19,648 2,491 11,189 33,328 
San CristObal 17,888 3,290 7,760 28,938 
S. Espiritus 29,698 7,318 8,828 45,844 
Villa Clara 35,455 10,847 6,921 53,223 
S.M.del Rosario 5,368 884 2,307 8,559 
Santiago 11,226 2,555 4,897 18,678 
Trinidad 18,471 9,353 10,141 37,965 
Total West D. 667,145 146,090 318,775 1,132,010 
Baracoa 4,905 4,804 1,576 11,285 
Bayamo 17,046 13,900 2,727 33,673 
Cuba 27,743 36,030 32,255 96,028 
Guantanamo 5,331 5,727 8,561 19,619 
Holguin 41,392 7,243 4,391 53,026 
Jiguani 12,473 4,734 620 17,827 
Manzanillo 12,900 11,271 1,184 25,535 
Tunas 4,549 2,694 464 7,707 
Total East D. 126,339 86,403 51,778 264,520 
Total 793,484 232,493 370,553 1,396,530 
Source: 	K.F. Kiple. 	Blacks 	in 	Colonial 	Cuba, 1774-1889 
(Gainesville: 	The 	University 	Press 	of 	Florida, 1976). 	Data 
complied from Spain. Censo de la poblacion de Espana sequn el  
recuento verificado en 25 de diciembre de 1860 (Madrid: Junta 
General de Estadistica, 1863) 
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TABLE 10 


























Source: J. Perez de la Riva El Barraccin. Esclavitud y capitalismo 
en Cuba 1st ed 1975 (Barcelona: Editorial Critica, 	1978) 	p.58. 
TABLE 11 
Chinese Population, 1861-1877 
1872 1877 Province 1861 
Pinar del Rio 2,221 3,396 3,137 
Havana 9,456 11,365 10,108 
Matanzas 15,782 27,002 20,054 
Santa Clara 6,274 15,878 13,301 
Puerto Principe 341 297 94 
Santiago de Cuba 754 462 422 
Total 34,828 58,400 47,116 
Source: 	R.J. 	Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba. 	The Transition 
to Free Labor, 1860-1899. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1985) p.90. 
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TABLE 12 Cuban Slave Population, 1862-1877  
province 	1862 	1867 	1871 	1877 
pinar del Rio 	46,027 	44,879 	36,031 	29,129 
Havana 	86,241 84,769 63,312 41,716 
Matanzas 98,496 	102,661 	87,858 	70,849 
Santa Clara 	72,116 68,680 56,535 42,049 
Puerto Principe 	14,807 	14,889 	7,167 	2,290 Santiago de Cuba 	50,863 47,410 36,717 13,061 
Dotal 	368,550 	363,288 	287,620 	199,094 
5ource: R.J. Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba. The Transition 
to Free Labor, 1860-1899. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1985) p.87. 
366 
TABLE 13 Coffee Export through the port of Rio de Janeiro 	1851-1872 
-(Arrobas) 
year 	Total RJ SP MG 
1851 -52  9,694,127 7,535,844 1,247,938 784,034 
1852 -53  8,330,085 6,535,113 1,030,642 648,698 1853-54 10,145,122 7,998,551 1,249,339 792,971 
1854 -55 12,052,310 9,369,107 1,562,477 930,010 
1855-56 10,968,828 8,602,658 1,300,927 853,880 
1856-57 10,445,593 8,097,879 1,356,246 803,823 
1857 - 5 8 9,431,509 7,593,200 924,773 753,733 
1858-59 10,319,801 8,082,953 1,232,454 802,342 
1859-60 10,618,085 8,746,361 1,015,770 634,935 
1860-61 10,559,473 7,554,735 1,344,135 1,427,014 
1861-62 7,460,753 5,136,564 1,150,692 893,947 
1862-63 9,937,710 4,869,182 793,534 1,145,486 
1863-64 7,460,753 5,479,544 721,158 1,144,536 
1864-65 9,114,153 6,284,651 1,202,309 1,297,724 
1865-66 9,802,992 7,072,961 1,054,603 1,422,977 
1866-67 13,202,691 9,308,654 1,120,159 2,390,220 
1867-68 11,399,901 7,755,790 1,113,863 2,149,354 
1868-69 12,844,794 8,920,247 1,387,249 2,155,182 
1869-70 11,037,023 6,723,550 1,251,252 2,515,116 
1870-71 11,961,440 7,722,608 1,303,803 2,392,922 
1871-72 10,089,741 6,988,412 889,543 1,783,461 
Source: A.E.Taunay, HistOria do Café no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: 
Departamento Nacional do Café, 1939) III, pp.62-63. 
Table 14  
Sao Paulo Population, 1819-1886 
Year 	1819 	1854 	1872 	1886 
Free 	160,656 	294,612 	680,742 	1,114,065 
Slave 	77,667 117,238 	156,612 107,329 
Total 	238,323 	411,850 	837,354 	1,221,394 
Source: Estatisticas Historicas do Brasil. Series Economicas,  
Demogr&ficas e Sociais de 1550 a 1985 (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 
1987) p.30; for 1854, R. Bastide and F. Fernandes. Brancos e  
negros em Sao Paulo 3rd ed. (sao Paulo: Cia. Editora Nacional, 
1971) p.49. 
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TABLE 15 Coffee and Sugar Exports, 1850s (Arrobas)a 
Product 1854-55 1855-56 1856-57 
Coffee 846,184 796,867 746,673 
Sugar 136,917 52,740 39,706 
Soue  A.E.Taunay, Historia do Café no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: 
Departamento Nacional do Cafe, 1939) III, p.156. 
a Arroba equals 14,40 kilogram or 31,7 pounds. 
TABLE 16 
Sao Paulo Exports, 1862-1867 (Arrobas) 
Year Coffee Cotton Tobacco Bacon Sugar 
1862-63 2,413,385 87 4,963 26,551 11,144 
1863-64 1,611,729 61 3,539 20,228 8,831 
1864-65 2,993,151 7,107 102,706 26,719 6,005 
1865-66 2,242,254 194,958 2,334 20,623 1,735 
1866-67 2,343,994 295,119 4,261 36,558 111 
Source: A.E.Taunay, Historia do Café no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: 
Departamento Nacional do Café, 1939) III, p.212. 
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TABLE 17 
price of Coffee in Rio de Janeiro, 	1840-1872 

































Source: A.E.Taunay, Historia do Cafe no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: 
Departamento Nacional do Café, 1939) III, p.30 and pp.62-63. 
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TABLE 18 
















Source: A.E.Taunay, HistOria do Café no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: 
Departamento Nacional do Café, 1939) VI, p.355. 
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TABLE 19 








in £ 	(a) 
Coffee 
% total 	Annual 	Average 
value of 	Tons 	value, 




1821-25 41,174 983,600 23,2 12,480 739,600 17,6 
1826 - 30 54,796 1,369,600 37,8 25,680 698,200 19,7 
1831-35 66,716 1,091,500 23,5 46,980 2,001,500 40,7 
1836-40 79,010 1,320,800 24,3 69,900 2,428,000 46,0 
1841-45 87,979 1,264,600 21,6 85,320 2,058,200 42,0 
1846-50 112,830 1,650,600 27,5 120,120 2,472,800 40,9 
1851-55 127,874 1,882,200 21,5 150,840 4,113,000 48,6 
1856-60 98,864 2,445,400 21,2 164,160 5,635,000 48,7 
1861-65 113,551 1,943,600 14,0 153,300 6,863,400 49,3 
1866-70 109,001 1,717,800 10,7 192,840 6,737,400 42,5 
1871-75 169,337 2,353,400 11,8 216,120 10,487,800 52,0 
1876-80 167,761 2,354,600 11,8 219,900 12,103,000 60,7 
1881-85 238,074 2,646,000 13,7 311,760 11,359,000 58,8 
1886-90 147,274 1,537,200 7,0 307,800 14,380,800 64,5 
1891-95 153,333 2,182,800 7,2 361,092 20,914,000 69,2 
Source: P.L. Eisenberg. The Sugar Industry in Pernambuco.  
Modernization Without Change, 1840-1910  (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1974) pp.9-10. 
a nominal values 
TABLE 20  





1821-1825 181,200 120,100 23,700 37,400 
1826-1830 250,200 176,100 47,900 26,200 
1831-1835 93,700 57,800 16,700 19,200 
1836-1840 240,600 202,800 15,800 22,000 
1841-1845 120,900 90,800 21,100 9,000 
1846-1850 257,500 208,900 45,000 3,600 
1851-1855 (a) 6,100 3,300 1,900 900 
Source: Estatisticas HistOricas do Brasil. Series Economicas,  
Pgmograficas e Sociais de 1550 a 1985 (sao Paulo: IBGE, 1987) 
p.58. 911c ilk (a) No disembargrwas registered in 1853 and 1855. Only one ship 
transporting 300 slaves arrived in Rio in 1856. 
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745,000 	856,659 779,175 	482,571 
Total 	1,715,000 	1,540,829 	1,240,806 	723,419 
Source: R. Conrad. The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, 1850-
1888 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972) p.285. 
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Source:  R. Conrad. The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, 1850-
1888 (Los Angeles: University of California Press,1972) p.290. 
TABLE 23  
EstimateciSlave Population of Province of Sao Paulo, 1836-1887 
Year 	East and 	Coast 
Paraiba Valley 
Centre North and West 	Total 
(Mogiana Paulista) 
1836 	24,460 12,317 38,417 3,584 78,858 







1886 	43,361 4,148 53,545 67,036 168,090a 
1887 107,829 
(Conrad= 	107,329) 
Sources: R. Conrad. The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, 
op.cit., p.296; Stanley J. Stein. Vassouras. A Brazilian Coffee  
County, 1850-1900. paper back ed., Princeton University Press, 
1985. p.295. 
a includes ingenuos 
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TABLE 24 





















Source: T. Holloway, Immigrants on the Land: Coffee and Society 
in Sao Paulo, 1886-1934 (Chapel Hill: 1980) p.179. 
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TABLE 25 




Santos 	Other ports Total 
Other 	World 
Countries Total 
1880 4,521 1,126 136 5,783 4,192 9,975 
1881 3,841 1,723 126 5,691 4,113 9,804 
1882 4,737 1,968 147 6,852 4,944 11,796 
1883 3,186 1,872 108 5,166 3,979 9,145 
1884 4,276 2,095 121 6,492 4,149 10,641 
1885 3,870 1,665 235 5,770 3,900 9,670 
1886 3,510 2,620 190 6,320 4,145 10,465 
1887 1,805 1,115 155 3,165 3,760 6,925 
1888 4,125 2,610 190 6,925 4,090 11,015 
1889 2,350 1,870 185 4,405 4,015 8,420 
1890 2,395 2,915 215 5,525 3,760 9,285 
1891 3,720 3,655 320 7,695 4,245 11,940 
Source: Thomas Holloway. Immigrants on the Land. Coffee and 
Society in Sao Paulo, 1886-1934 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1980) 
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